Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-dh8gc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-11T10:50:42.787Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2020

Andreas Albertsen Open the ORCID record for Andreas Albertsen [Opens in a new window]  and
Lasse Nielsen Open the ORCID record for Lasse Nielsen [Opens in a new window]
Andreas Albertsen*
Affiliation:
Aarhus University
Lasse Nielsen
Affiliation:
University of Southern Denmark, Odense
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail ABA@ps.au.dk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to luck egalitarianism, it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The most common criticism of luck egalitarianism is the ‘harshness objection’, which states that luck egalitarianism allows for too harsh consequences, as it fails to provide justification for why those responsible for their bad fate can be entitled to society's assistance. It has largely gone unnoticed that the harshness objection is open to a number of very different interpretations. We present four different interpretations of the harshness objection in which the problem pertains to counterintuitive implications, badness of outcome, disproportionality, or inconsistency, respectively. We analyse and discuss appropriate luck egalitarian replies. Disentangling these different versions clarifies what is at the heart of this dispute and reveals the point of the harshness objection. We conclude that only the inconsistency version involves a durable problem for luck egalitarianism.

Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 427 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Albertsen, A. (2019) Personal Responsibility in Health and Health Care: Luck Egalitarianism as a Plausible and Flexible Approach to Health. Political Research Quarterly: 106591291984507. DOI: 10.1177/1065912919845077.Google Scholar
Albertsen, A. and Knight, C. (2015) A Framework for Luck Egalitarianism in Health and Healthcare. Journal of Medical Ethics 41(2): 165–69. DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2013-101666.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Anderson, E. S. (1999) What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109(2): 287–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arneson, R. J. (1989) Equality and equal Opportunity for Welfare. Philosophical Studies 56(1): 77–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arneson, R. J. (2000) Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. Ethics 110: 339–49. DOI: 10.1086/233272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arneson, R. J. (2004) Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended. Philosophical Topics 32(1/2): 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barry, N. (2006) Defending Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23: 89–107. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00322.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, G. A. (1989) On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics 99(4): 906–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, G. A. (2008) Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daniels, N. (2008) Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dekker, T. J. (2009) Choices, Consequences and Desert. Inquiry 52(2): 109–126. DOI: 10.1080/00201740902790201.Google Scholar
Duus-Otterström, G. (2012) Weak and Strong Luck Egalitarianism. Contemporary Political Theory 11(2): 153–71. DOI: 10.1057/cpt.2011.32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, R. (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. (2005) Taking Rights Seriously: New Impression with a Reply to Critics. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Eyal, N. (2017) Luck Egalitarianism, Harshness, and the Rule of Rescue. In Liao, S. M. and O'Neil, C. (eds) Current Controversies in Bioethics. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 160–176.Google Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. (1995) Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome? Economics and Philosophy 11(1): 25–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. (2008) Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodin, R. E. (1985) Negating Positive Desert Claims. Political Theory 13(4): 575–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, C. (2009) Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Google Scholar
Knight, C. (2011) Responsibility, Desert and Justice. In Knight, C. and Stemplowska, Z. (eds) Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 152–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, C. (2013) Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(5): 1061–73. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9415-6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, C. (2015) Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Public Insurance. Res Publica 21(2): 119–35. DOI: 10.1007/s11158-015-9273-2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2001) Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility. Ethics 111(3): 548–79. DOI: 10.1086/233526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2005) Hurley on Egalitarianism and the luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 4: 249–65. DOI: 10.1177/1470594X05052543.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2016) Luck Egalitarianism. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2018) Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nielsen, L. (2013) Taking Health Needs Seriously: Against a Luck Egalitarian Approach to Justice in Health. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16(3): 407–16. DOI: 10.1007/s11019-012-9399-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olsaretti, S. (2009) IX-Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109(1.2): 165–88. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00263.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pedersen, V. M. L. and Midtgaard, S. F.. (2018) Is Anti-Paternalism Enough? Political Studies 66(3): 771–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, S. (2003) What is Egalitrianism? Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(1): 5–39. DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00005.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Segall, S. (2010) Health, Luck, and Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton.Google Scholar
Segall, S. (2011) Luck Prioritarian Justice in Health. In Knight, C. and Stemplowska, Z. (eds) Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 246–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stemplowska, Z. (2009) Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility. Political Studies 57(2): 237–59. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00731.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stemplowska, Z. (2013) Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of Social Philosophy 44(4): 402–19. DOI: 10.1111/josp.12039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stemplowska, Z. (2017) Rarely Harsh and Always Fair: Luck Egalitarianism and Unhealthy Choices. In Liao, S. M. and O'Neil, C. (eds) Current Controversies in Bioethics. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 149–159.Google Scholar
Temkin, L. (2011) Justice, Equality, Fairness, Desert, Rights, Free Will, Responsibility and Luck. In Knight, C. and Stemplowska, Z. (eds) Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 51–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Temkin, L. (2017) Equality as Comparative Fairness: Equality as Comparative Fairness. Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(1): 43–60. DOI: 10.1111/japp.12140.Google Scholar
Vallentyne, P. (2002) Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities. Ethics 112(3): 529–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Voigt, K. (2007) The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10(4): 389–407. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9060-4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, A. (2006) Liberty, Equality and Property. In Dryzek, J., Honig, B. and Phillips, A. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 488–506.Google Scholar