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Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Gerardo L. Munck
Gerardo L. Munck
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Abstract

In an effort to take stock of the claims put forth by advocates of game theory, this article offers an assessment that considers game theory both as a set of theoretical principles that extends rational choice theory to interdependent decision making and as a type of formal methodology. Some important strengths of game theory are identified, such as its emphasis on actors and strategic choices and its ability to generate predictions in a logically rigorous and internally consistent manner. But many shortcomings are also discussed. One shortcoming is that the effort to develop a theory of action falls short, both in the sense of failing to provide a full explanation of actions and in the sense of not applying to domains of great significance. A second shortcoming is the failure of the procedures used in formal modeling to offer guidance pertaining to a critical step in the process of modeling: the conceptualization of the model. Thus, the challenge facing scholars in comparative politics is to consider the new perspectives offered by game theory and draw upon its strengths, but to do so without losing sight of a series of old concerns in the social sciences that game theory is not suited to tackle.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 53 , Issue 2 , January 2001 , pp. 173 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2001

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In addition to distinguishing two basic elements of game theory, this distinction between theory and method also helps to distinguish game theory from closely related approaches. On the one hand, the use of a formal methodology underlies the distinction between formal and “soft” versions of game theory. On the other hand, the use of rational choice theory underlies the distinction between “traditional” game theory, which subscribes to RCT, and other, newer variants of game theory, such as “evolutionary” game theory, which rely upon other behavioral assumptions. In these terms, the aim of this article is to assess traditional game theory that uses a formal methodology.

10 It is very hard to convey the strengths and weaknesses of game theory without offering an actual modeling exercise. Though this is precluded here for reasons of space, a companion book-length manuscript presents an extensive exercise in game-theoretic modeling.

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20 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994), 27–28.

21 Though many scholars have dedicated some thought to the problem of domain specification, currently there does not appear to be a consensus about the domains where the behavioral assumptions of the expected utility model hold. Compare, for example, Elster, , Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Lim itation of Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 26–27Google Scholar; Tsebelis (fn. 13), 36, 38; Morris P. Fiorina, “Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise,” in Friedman (fn. 9), 88; John A. Ferejohn and Debra Satz, “Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory,” in Friedman (fn. 9), 78; Robert E. Lane, “What Rational Choice Explains,” in Friedman (fn. 9), 108–9; Michael Taylor, “When Rationality Fails,” in Friedman (fn. 9), 225–28; Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994), 27–28; and idem (fn. 14, 1996), 267, 254–55.

22 Elster (fn. 21), 7–8; Morton (fn. 15), 165.

23 Elster (fn. 11, 1979), 118–23; idem (fn. 12, 1989), chaps. 4, 11; idem (fn. 21), 7–17.

24 Kreps, David M., Game Theory and Economic Modelling (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Elster (fn. 11,1979), 123; idem (fn. 12,1989), 110; idem (fn. 21), 26–27; Morrow (fn. 13), 306–7.

25 Morton (fn. 15), 163, 208.

26 Though the task of domain specification concerning the applicability of the expected utility model must be addressed outside of game theory, the domains where game theory yields unique predictions can be determined with the tools of game theory. Thus, this task is less demanding and less of a challenge to game theory.

27 In light of the problem of indeterminate predictions, Elster suggests that the use of game theory should be restricted to the local, partial, and short-term effects of choice, as opposed to the global, net, and long-term effects of choice. Elster (fn. 21), 181–94. See also James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes,” in Tetlock, Philip E. and Belkin, Aaron, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University 1996)Google Scholar; and Riker (fn. 6), 169–72.

28 Stein (fn. 15), 218. See also Walt, Stephen M., “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23 (Spring 1999), 18–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schick-ler, “Majority Rule,” in Mueller (fn. 2), 175.

29 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994), 26–27.

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36 Kreps (fn. 24), 128—32; Kitschelt, Herbert, “Comparative Historical Research and Rational Choice Theory: The Case of Transitions to Democracy,” Theory and Society 22 (June 1993), 415CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Elster (fn. 11, 1979), 107–11; Stein (fn. 15), 220–22.

38 Threats to the internal coherence of game theory—a key weakness of the position of partial uni-versalism—are possibly less of a concern in this context. This is so because the articulation of different approaches does not involve a complex process of interaction, as occurs in the context of games that yield indeterminate results, but involves rather an additive process, in which non-game-theoretic approaches are used to explain the basic inputs of a game.

39 Ferejohn and Satz (fn. 21), 78; Friedman and Hechter (fn. 8), 214.

40 The need to go beyond game theory is not always equally pressing. On the one hand, the reliance on supplementary approaches is necessary when game theorists confront the problem of indeterminacy. On the other hand, when it comes to the rules of the game, a game-theoretic analysis, though incomplete, can stand on its own.

41 To give but one prominent example, this is a point made about Bates et al. (fn. 4) by Elster, , “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition,” American Political Science Review 94 (September 2000)Google Scholar.

42 Youssef Cohen, for example, argues explicitly against the value of structural and institutional approaches; Cohen, , Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of De mocracy in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chaps. 2, 4Google Scholar.

43 Tsebelis (fn. 13), 38, 33–39.

44 Geddes (fn. 6,1991), 67–69; Riker (fn. 6), 169–72; Elster (fn. 21), 181–94.

45 Bates (fn. 3, 1997), 704. See also Tsebelis (fn. 13), 32; and Levi (fn. 7), 25.

46 Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast, , “The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition,” Politics and Society 26 (December 1998), 603Google Scholar. See also Laitin, , “Game Theory and Culture,” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 8 (Summer 1997), 9–11Google Scholar; and Bates (fn. 3, 1997).

47 Levi, “Producing an Analytical Narrative,” in Bowen and Petersen (fn. 3), 168; idem (fn. 7), 30; Weingast (fn. 4, 1997b), 257; Laitin, , “Post Soviet Area Studies,” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 10 (Summer 1999), 30Google Scholar; Cox, Gary W., Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 186CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast (fn. 46), 628–36.

49 Tsebelis (fn. 13), 38; Elster (fn. 21), 27.

50 Geddes (fn. 6, 1991), 67–69; Levi (fn. 7), 32; Elster (fn. 21), 26–27.

51 For example, compare Bates's call to focus on “highly structured settings” with the analysis provided by Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast: Bates (fn. 3, 1997), 704; Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast (fn. 46), 635.

52 An example of such a disconnect is Geddes' analysis of transitions from nondemocratic regimes. Geddes, , “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, 1999), 125–30Google Scholar. It is unclear in what way this is the kind of small question she suggests as appropriate for game theory in Geddes (fn. 6, 1991), 67—69.

53 An example of this tendency is Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast (fn. 46). Though these authors are interested in changes in “the very structure of politics,” all they do to capture this feature is acknowledge that actors possess incomplete information (pp. 613—14). Thus, the key fact—that the political transitions they study violate game theory's assumption that the rules of the game are constant—goes unaddressed. A similar point is made by Elster (fn. 41) concerning Bates et al. (fn. 4).

54 Levi (fn. 47), 168.

55 Skocpol, Theda, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 325CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kitschelt (fn. 36).

56 Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 10–11.

57 As Gates and Humes note, Przeworski fails to provide the payoffs for one of the actors in his game-theoretic model, thus preventing a formal analysis of equilibria; see Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 113—24; Przeworski (fn. 3), 61—66. This advice also applies to “soft” rational choice theorists, who do not construct formal models and who are even more prone to problems of underspecification.

58 For a complete list of these games, see Rapoport, Anatol, Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966)Google Scholar; and Brams, Steven J., Theory of Moves (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 215–19Google Scholar.

59 Schelling, “Social Mechanisms and Social Dynamics,” in Hedstrom and Swedberg (fn. 12), 40, 37–43; idem, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 42, 89–91Google Scholar.

60 Kreps (fn. 24), 41, 37–40.

61 Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 7,12. See also Snidal (fn. 9), 26–27, 29–30.

62 Walt (fn. 28), 26–31. Examples of this type of game theory in comparative politics include Colomer, Josep M., “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way,” American Political Science Review 85 (December 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1995)Google Scholar; Cohen (fn. 42); and Geddes (fn. 52), 121–30.

63 Laitin (fn. 47), 33.

64 Jonathan Turner, “The Failure of Sociology to Institutionalize Cumulative Theorizing,” in Hage, Jerald, ed., Formal Theory in Sociology: Opportunity or Pitfall? (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 43Google Scholar. See also Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 6), 51.

65 Powell, , In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 28Google Scholar.

66 Morrow (fn. 13), 57.

67 The claims to generality are made by Kreps (fn. 24), 6–7; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 7; and Levi (fn. 7), 20. The claim that modeling generates statements of clear scope is emphasized in Levi (fn. 7), 20; and Geddes, “Comparisons in the Context of a Game Theoretic Argument,” in Bowen and Petersen (fn. 3), 201. The link between modeling and theoretical cumulation is stressed by Riker (fn. 6), 177; Tsebelis (fn. 13), 42–43; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 7–8, 14–16; and Levi (fn. 7), 20.

68 Przeworski (fn. 3), 62. Though Przeworski's use of game theory in the context of the analysis of transitions was clearly pathbreaking, it builds on ideas first introduced by Guillermo O'Donnell in 1979 and later published in translation as “Notes for the Study of Processes of Political Democratization in the Wake of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” in O'Donnell, , Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999)Google Scholar; and O'Donnell, and Schmitter, Philippe, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

69 Zielinski, Jakub, “The Polish Transition to Democracy: A Game-Theoretic Approach,” Archives Europiennes de Sociologie 36 (1995)Google Scholar; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), chap. 5; Crescenzi, Mark J. C., “Violence and Uncertainty in Transitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (April 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70 Suffer, Daniel, “Settling Old Scores: Potholes along the Transition from Authoritarian Rule,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (March 1995)Google Scholar; Swaminathan, Siddharth, “Time, Power, and Democratic Transitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (April 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 This is the case with work by Colomer (fn. 62,1991); idem (fn. 62,1995); Colomer and Pascual, Margot, “The Polish Games of Transition,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 21 (October 1994)Google Scholar; Marks, Gary, “Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Transition,” American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Casper, Gretchen and Taylor, Michelle M., Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996)Google Scholar; and Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast (fn. 46).

72 Zielinski (fn. 69); Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast (fn. 46), 615, 624.

73 Of course, one might talk about theoretical integration in the sense that game-theoretic research produces a series of models that are unified by virtue of being applications of a single theory. Snidal (fn. 9), 25, 32—36. But this is an entirely different issue from the challenge of cumulation understood in terms of the integration of models.

74 For example, modelers might debate whether a phenomenon should be modeled as a one-shot or repeated game, as a game of complete or incomplete information, and so on.

75 For relevant research on the formation and evolving use of concepts, see Sartori, Giovanni, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 64, no. 4 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, ed., Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1984)Google Scholar; Collier, David and Mahon, James E., “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87 (December 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Collier, , “Trajectory of a Concept: ‘Corporatism’ in the Study of Latin American Politics,” in Smith, Peter H., ed., Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Methods and Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and Collier and Levitsky, Steven, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49 (April 1997)Google Scholar.

76 See, for example, Edgar Kiser and Hechter, “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology,” American Journal of Sociology 97 (July 1991)Google Scholar; Levi (fn. 47), 155—57, 171; and Martin, Lisa, “The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999), 76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 Efforts to portray game theory as a form of general theory are severely misleading. Rather, as Skocpol argues in response to Kiser and Hechter's advocacy of “theory in general,” all good work, whether game theoretic or not, combines deduction and induction and thus occupies, to use the phrase of Bates et al., “a complex middle ground between ideographic and nomothetic reasoning.” Skocpol (fn. 55), 321–23; Kiser and Hechter (fn. 76), 2; Bates et al. (fn. 4), 12.

78 Tsebelis (fn. 13), 40; Morrow (fn. 13), 6–7, 302–3; Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 6), 66–70; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 5–6; and Morton (fn. 15), 68, 280.

79 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994), 10; Walt (fn. 28), 14–15, 45–46.

80 Snidal (fn. 9), 33–34.

81 Walt (fn. 28), 32, 17. See also Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing, 1964), 278–80Google Scholar, 289–90.

82 Morton (fn. 15), 182–83, 206–8, 281.

83 Snidal (fn. 9), 33; Stein (fn. 15), 223.

84 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14,1994), 32; Walt (fn. 28), 31; Snidal (fn. 9), 55; Powell, , “The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999), 104CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994), 203; Walt (fn. 28), 8, 32–33; idem, “A Model Disagreement,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999), 125–26Google Scholar; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 12.

86 Niou and Ordeshook (fn. 6), 84; Powell (fn. 65), 29. See, however, Mesquita, Bueno de and Morrow, “Sorting through the Wealth of Notions,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999), 71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Zagare, Frank C., “All Mortis, No Rigor,” International Security 24 (Fall 1999), 114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

87 Powell (fn. 65), 24–29.

88 Bates et al. (fn. 4), 11. See also Laitin (fn. 3,1999).

89 Snidal (fn. 9), 34; Tsebelis (fn. 13), 40; Gates and Humes (fn. 2), 12; Levi (fn. 7), 27; Geddes (fn. 67), 199; Martin (fn. 76), 77.

90 Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 6), 50, 58; Levi (fn. 7), 20.

91 It is important to note that game theory's theoretical emphasis on strategic choice, as distinct from its use of a formal methodology, has some important implications for the way hypotheses are tested. Thus, Bueno de Mesquita makes a good case for how game theory, and specifically the notion of behavior off the equilibrium path, helps alert researchers to the problem of nonevents and offers an interesting way of thinking about counterfactuals. Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 6), 61–63. See also the provocative discussions of the problem of selection bias in Signorino, Curtis, “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 93 (June 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Smith, Alastair, “Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation,” American Journal of Political Science 43 (October 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 Morton (fn. 15), 197–98, 206–8.

93 Snidal (fn. 9), 27, 56; Morton (fn. 15), 119.

94 Morton (fn. 15), chaps. 6, 7.

95 Laitin (fn. 3, 1999); Levi (fn. 47), 158; Blossfeld, Hans-Peter and Prein, Gerald, eds., Rational Choice Theory and Large-Scale Data Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

96 Geddes (fn. 6,1995), 101.

97 Whether formal modefers have a monopoly on rigor, understood in the sense used here, is a claim about which game theorists differ. Some advocates of game theory appear to argue that research using formal models is always superior to research that does not use formal models. Martin (fn. 76), 77—80; Morton (fn. 15), 36,41–47. Others take a halfway position, arguing that theorizing on the basis of formal models is not inherently superior to nonformal or verbal theorizing but does have a definite advantage. Morrow (fn. 13), 6; Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (fn. 86), 56–57, 72; Powell (fn. 84), 101–2; idem (fn. 65), 29–33, 38. Finally, yet other advocates are less inclined to such a priori judgments and readily admit there is no basis for claiming that game theory and other forms of modeling have a monopoly on rigor. Tsebelis (fn. 13), 42—43; see also Snidal (fn. 9), 30.

98 Almond, , “Political Science: The History of the Discipline,” in Goodin, Robert and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, eds., The New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 86Google Scholar.

99 Green and Shapiro (fn. 14, 1994); idem (fn. 14, 1996); Friedman (fn. 9); Johnson, James, “How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory: Pathologies of'Common Sense,'” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (March 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cox, Gary, “The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (April 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100 Walt (fn. 28); idem (fn. 85); Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow (fn. 86); Martin (fn. 76); Niou and Ordeshook (fn. 6); Powell (fn. 84); Zagare (fn. 86). This entire debate is reprinted in Brown, Michael E. et al. , eds., Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

101 Lichbach, “Social Theory and Comparative Politics,” in Lichbach and Zuckerman (fn. 7), 240–42, 272–74; James Bernard Murphy, “Rational Choice Theory as Social Physics,” in Friedman (fn. 9), 168–73.

102 Kohli et al. (fn. 4); Collier, , “Building a Disciplined, Rigorous Center in Comparative Politics,” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 10 (Summer 1999)Google Scholar.