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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2025
Amid a new era of disruption spawned by looming climate threats and significant geopolitical tensions, an increasing number of countries have favored a more robust green industrial policy (GIP) to reduce carbon emissions and achieve other economic, political, and geostrategic objectives. The use of multi-purpose GIPs not only raises questions regarding the policies' compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules but also, more broadly, profoundly implicates the interface between energy, trade, and the environment. This article selects China, the United States, and the European Union as case studies and provides a thorough analysis of the specific text and context of their GIPs to identify the new trends that deviate from past practices in order to capture the policy transformation. It highlights the disruptively adverse implications of the multi-purpose GIPs on the multilateral trading system. However, the WTO has an opportunity to mitigate such disruptions and avoid a seemingly unavoidable clash by facilitating international cooperation and coordination in the design and implementation of multi-purpose GIPs, particularly among major clean energy producer countries. In doing so, the WTO can strengthen its credibility and stability while also minimizing the misalignment of the diverse objectives and ensuring the decarbonization efforts will not undermined.
1 International Energy Agency, ‘Energy Investment in 2022’ (IEA, June 2022), www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2022/overview-and-key-findings.
2 Terzi, A., Sherwood, M., and Singh, A. (2023) ‘European Industrial Policy for the Green and Digital Revolution’, Science and Public Policy 842, 843CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Low carbon technology products and critical minerals have attracted an increasing use of industrial policies since the beginning of 2023. See, S. Evenett et al., ‘The Return of Industrial Policy in Data’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper (January 2024), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/12/23/The-Return-of-Industrial-Policy-in-Data-542828.
4 Ibid.
5 Renewable energy subsidies as a form of GIPs are particularly susceptible to WTO disputes, see, Asmelash, H. (2015) ‘Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies are Challenged?’, Journal of International Economic Law 18(2), 261CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 For example, Rodrik, D. (2014) ‘Green Industrial Policy’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30(3), 469CrossRefGoogle Scholar; T. Altenburg and C. Assmann (eds.) (2017) Green Industrial Policy: Concept, Policies, Country Experiences (UN Environment; German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitk); Espa, I. (2019) ‘New Features of Green Industrial Policy and the Limits of WTO Rules: What Options for the Twenty-first Century?’, Journal of World Trade 53(6), 979CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kemp, R. and Never, B. (2017) ‘Green Transition, Industrial Policy, and Economic Development’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(1), 66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Matsuo, T. and Schmidt, T.S. (2019) ‘Managing Tradeoffs in Green Industrial Policies: The Role of Renewable Energy Policy Design’, World Development 122, 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lewis, J.I. (2021) ‘Green Industrial Policy after Paris: Renewable Energy Policy Measures and Climate Goals’, Global Environmental Politics 21(4), 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Cosbey, ‘Green Industrial Policy and the World Trading System’ (ENTWINED Issue Brief, October 2013); Fang, M.M. (2021) ‘Old Wine in a New Bottle? Green Industrial Policy and the Use of Safeguards in the Solar Sector’, Journal of World Trade 55(4), 573Google Scholar; Wu, M. and Salzman, J. (2014) ‘The Next Generate of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy’, Northwestern University Law Review 108(2), 401Google Scholar; Meckling, J. (2021) ‘Making Industrial Policy Work for Decarbonization’, Global Environmental Politics 21(4), 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Allan, B., Lewis, J.I., and Oatley, T. (2021) ‘Green Industrial Policy and the Global Transformation of Climate Politics’, Global Environmental Politics 21(4), 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harrison, A., Martin, L.A. and Nataraj, S. (2017) ‘Green Industrial Policy in Emerging Markets’, Annual Review of Resource Economics 9, 253CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 China, the US and the EU stand out in terms of clean energy investment and market size for clean energy technologies. From 2019 to 2023, China invested more than USD 180 billion in clean energy technologies annually, followed by the EU (more than USD 150 billion) and the US (more than USD 95 billion). See, International Energy Agency (2023) ‘Increase in Annual Clean Energy Investment in Selected Countries and Regions, 2019–2023’ (IEA, 22 May 2023), www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/increase-in-annual-clean-energy-investment-in-selected-countries-and-regions-2019-2023.
8 This is the same case in industrial policies in general. See, Terzi, Sherwood, and Singh, supra n. 2, 843.
9 T. Altenburg and D. Rodrik (2017) ‘Green Industrial Policy: Accelerating Structural Change towards Wealthy Green Economies’, in T. Altenburg and C. Assmann (eds.), Gremen Industrial Policy: Concept, Policies, Country Experiences (UN Environment; German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitk), at 12.
10 S. Hallegatte, M. Fay, and A. Vogt-Schilb (2013) ‘Green Industrial Policy: When and How’ (World Bank, October 2013), at 3. Defined more narrowly, GIPs refer to government attempts to facilitate the development of low-carbon alternatives to fossil fuels. See, L. Karp and M. Stevenson (2012) ‘Green Industrial Policy: Trade and Theory’ (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6238), at 1.
11 Altenburg and Rodrik, supra n. 7, at 2.
12 See, P. Krugman (2023) ‘How to Think about Green Industrial Policy?’, New York Times, 9 May 2023, www.nytimes.com/2023/05/09/opinion/climate-inflation-reduction-act-biden.html.
13 Rodrik, supra n. 4.
14 See, A. Malhotra and T. S. Schmidt (2022) ‘Accelerating Low-Carbon Innovation’, Joule (2), 2259.
15 Rodrik contends that the existence of R&D externalities, and carbon under-pricing serve as two mutually reinforcing reasons justifying government support for green technologies. See, Rodrik, supra n. 4, 470–471.
16 A. Terzi (2023) ‘Green Industrial Policy: The Necessary Evil to Avoid a Climate Catastrophe’, in S. Tagliapietra and R. Veugelers (eds.), Sparking Europe's New Industrial Revolution. Bruegel, at 109.
17 S. Tagliapietra and R. Veugelers (2021) ‘Fostering the Industrial Component of the European Green Deal: Key Principles and Policy Options’, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 56(6), 305, 311.
18 Rodrik, supra n. 4, 471.
19 See, J. Meckling et al. (2015) ‘Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy’, Science 349(6253), 1170, 1171.
20 Ibid. Some scholars also argue that GIPs can lay the political groundwork for enacting carbon pricing mechanisms in the future. See, E. Biber, N. Kelsey, and J. Meckling (2017) ‘The Political Economy of Decarbonisation: A Research Agenda’, Brooklyn Law Review 82(2), 604, 618.
21 For instance, facing mounting domestic pressure, the UK had to add blatantly discriminatory policy measures – local content requirements to its offshore auctions schemes to garner support for its renewable energy development plan. See, M.M. Fang (2023) ‘When Decarbonization Meets Industralization: The First WTO Dispute Settlement between the EU and the UK’, Virginia Journal of International Law 63(2), 165, 177–178.
22 Rodrik, supra n. 4, 472.
23 Ibid.
24 J. Meckling, T. Sterner, and G. Wagner (2017) ‘Policy Sequencing toward Decarbonization’, Nature Energy 2, 918, 919.
25 Ibid.
26 R. Agarwal, ‘Industrial Policy and the Growth Strategy Trilemma’ (IMF, 31 August 2023), www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0060/003/article-A013-en.xml?rskey=1GsMa6&result=42.
27 R. Cherif and F. Hasanov, ‘The Return of the Policy that Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy’ (IMF Working Paper WP/19/74, March 2019), at 64.
28 D. Rodrik (2008) ‘Industrial Policy: Don't Ask Why, Ask How’, Middle East Development Journal 1.
29 D. Rodrik, R. Juhasz, and N. Lane, ‘Economists Reconsider Industrial Policy’ (Project Syndicate, 4 August 2023), www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/new-economic-research-more-favorable-to-industrial-policy-by-dani-rodrik-et-al-2023-08. There is an emerging trend to link GIPs with social policy to address the issue of injustice and inequality by delivering more benefits to the working and middle classes. See, L. Murphy, ‘An Industrial Strategy at the Heart of a Green New Deal’ (Common Wealth, 9 September 2019), www.common-wealth.org/publications/an-industrial-strategy-at-the-heart-of-a-green-new-deal.
30 Tagliapietra and Veugelers, supra n. 15.
31 See, Meckling, supra n. 4.
32 Allan, Lewis, and Oatley, supra n. 4, 9.
33 T. Riofrancos (2023) ‘The Security-Sustainability Nexus: Lithium Onshoring in the Global North’, Global Environmental Politics 23(1), 20.
34 See, M. Hirson, ‘State Capitalism and the Evolution of “China, Inc.”, Key Policy Issues for the United States’, Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission on China's Internal and External Challenges (7 February 2019).
35 See, S. Zhang et al. (2013) ‘Interactions between Renewable Energy Policy and Renewable Energy Industrial Policy: A Critical Analysis of China's Policy Approach to Renewable Energies’, Energy Policy 62, 342; K.S. Gallagher (2014) The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology: Lessons from China. MIT Press; J. Helveston and J. Nahm (2019) ‘China's Key Role in Scaling Low-Carbon Energy Technologies’, Science 366(6467), 794.
36 The central government offered fiscal support to the development of biogas in rural China in 1979. See, J. Yao, ‘The Problems Faced by the Transformation and Upgrading of Biogas Projects Are Yet to Solve’ (People.cn, 16 January 2016), http://paper.people.com.cn/zgnyb/html/2016-01/18/content_1648870.htm.
37 ‘The 10th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China’, passed by the 4th Meeting of the 9th National People's Congress on 15 March 2001, www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60699.htm.
38 ‘The 10th Five-Year Plan of New and Renewable Energy Industry Development’ issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission on 10 October 2001, www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61602.htm.
39 Examples such as the Renewable Energy Law, the Medium to Long-term Development Plans for Renewable Energy provided generous tax incentives and other forms of subsidies to develop renewable energy industries. See, J. Ball et al., ‘The New Solar System: China's Evolving Solar Industry and Its Implications for Competitive Solar Power in the United States and the World’ (Stanford Steyer–Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, March 2017), at 123–134.
40 Nevertheless, local governments have also contributed to the policy misalignment with central plans, leading to manufacturing overcapacity, power curtailment, and economically irrational expansion of renewable energy power industries. See, S. Corwin and T.L. Johnson (2019) ‘The Role of Local Governments in the Development of China's Solar Photovoltaic Industry’, Energy Policy 130, 283.
41 See, Fang, supra n. 4, 578–580.
42 The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) is one example, which effectively serves as a trade ban on Chinese PV products that source polysilicon from Xinjang. For an analytical discussion of the Act, see, M.M. Fang (2024) ‘A Never-ending US–China Solar Trade War? The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and International Trade Law’, Minnesota Journal of International Law (forthcoming), 33(1).
43 The ‘Dual Circulation’ Strategy was raised for the first time by President Xi Jinping in the meeting of the Politburo on 14 May 2020 and included in China's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). The Strategy places a greater focus on China's domestic market with less reliance on export-oriented development model. As envisioned by President Xi, China would ‘gradually form a new development model in which domestic circulation plays a dominant role’.
44 F. Tang, ‘What is China's Dual Circulation Economic Strategy and Why Is It Important?’, South China Morning Post, 19 November 2020), www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3110184/what-chinas-dual-circulation-economic-strategy-and-why-it.
45 See, ‘Outline of the Strategic Plan of Increasing Domestic Demand (2022–2035)’, issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council on 14 December 2022, www.gov.cn/zhengce/2022-12/14/content_5732067.htm; ‘The 14th Five-Year Plan of Renewable Energy Development’, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, National Energy Administration and other seven central governmental departments on 1 June 2021, www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202206/t20220601_1326720.html.
46 See, ‘Several Measures Incentivising the Vehicle Consumption’,issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other eleven central departments on 20 July 2023, www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202307/content_6893476.htm; ‘The Plan of New Energy Vehicle Industry Development (2021–2035)’, issued by the State Council on 20 October 2020, www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-11/02/content_5556716.htm.
47 The new generation of green energy technologies include tidal and wave power, enhanced geothermal, thin film, perovskite and organic PV, green hydrogen, and others. For instance, the Mid-to-Long Term Hydrogen Industry Development Plan sets specific targets for green hydrogen development, one of which is to reach the production capacity of green hydrogen – 100,000 to 200,000 tons/per year by 2025. See, ‘The Mid-to-Long Term Hydrogen Industry Development Plan’, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration on 23 March 2023, www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202203/t20220323_1320038.html.
48 ‘The Implementation Plan on the Green and Low-Carbon Advanced Technologies Demonstration Projects’, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology and other eight central departments on 4 August 2023, www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202308/content_6899582.htm.
49 A. De Podesta Gomes, R. Pauls, and T. ten Brink (2024) ‘Industrial Policy and the Creation of the Electric Vehicles Market in China: Demand Structure, Sectoral Complementarities and Policy Coordination’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 47(1), 45, 48.
50 See, ‘The Plan of Implementing the Strategy of Expanding Domestic Demand in the Guangdong Province’, issued by the Guangdong Provincial Government on 14 August 2023, www.gd.gov.cn/zwgk/wjk/qbwj/yfb/content/post_4250544.html; ‘The Plan of Implementing the Strategy of Expanding Domestic Demand in the Jiangsu Province’, issued by the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee on 29 May 2023, www.zgjssw.gov.cn/fabuting/shengweiwenjian/202305/t20230529_7955774.shtml.
51 As the world's largest graphite producer and exporter, China accounts for over 90% of the globe's graphite processing capacity. Graphite features on the latest critical minerals lists for the US, Canada, Europe, the UK, and Australia, owing to its wide application in clean energy technologies, particularly EV batteries. See, C. Sandell-Hay, ‘Graphite: A Big Winner in the Global Clean Energy Race’ (Assay, 10 June 2021), www.theassay.com/articles/feature-story/graphite-a-big-winner-in-the-global-clean-energy-race/. A few months ago, China has imposed an export licensing requirement on another two critical minerals – germanium and gallium, which can be applied in manufacturing high-efficiency solar cells and other electronic devices. See, ‘Germanium and Gallium in Today's Technology Landscape’ (Brunel, 26 July 2023), www.brunel.net/en-au/blog/mining/germanium-and-gallium-in-technology.
52 E. White, W. Langley, and H. Dempsey, ‘China Imposes Export Curbs on Graphite’, Financial Times (20 October 2023), www.ft.com/content/8af8c05c-8e54-40e9-9051-5a0b2b036c32.
53 See, M. Wu (2017) ‘China's Export Restrictions and the Limits of WTO Law’, World Trade Review 16(4), 673.
54 S.C. Greitens, ‘Xi's Security Obsession: Why China Is Digging in at Home and Asserting Itself Abroad’, Foreign Affairs (28 July 2023), www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/xis-security-obsession.
55 J. Nahm, ‘Reimagine: Clean Energy Technology and US Industrial Policy’ (Center for a New American Security, 7 September 2022), www.cnas.org/publications/reports/reimagine-clean-energy-technology-and-u-s-industrial-policy.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Trade defense mechanisms also constitute a form of GIPs as they restrict the market access of imports and provide an advantage for domestic products.
59 J. Nahm, ‘A Green Economic Recovery: Global Trends and Lessons for the United States’ (House Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 September 2020), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20200923/111050/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-NahmJ-20200923.pdf.
60 L. Nguyen and H.W. Kinnucan (2019) ‘The US Solar Panel Anti-Dumping Duties Versus Uniform Tariff’, Energy Policy 127, 523, 524.
61 Nahm, supra n. 55.
62 Ibid.
63 See, G. Pisano and W. Shih (2012) Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs A Manufacturing Renaissance. Harvard Business Review Press. The book argues that in certain sorts of industries with rapidly evolving production processes, it is crucial that research and manufacturing should be kept in close proximity. This is important to obtain the production know-how and supplier networks that are key to future innovation.
64 C. Welch and S. Gibbens, ‘Trump vs. Biden on the Environment – Here's Where They Stand’, National Geography (19 October 2020), www.nationalgeographic.com/science/graphics/trump-vs-biden-environment-heres-where-they-stand.
65 See, the Inflation Reduction Act, Public Law No. 117–169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022).
66 Instead of a single $7,500 tax credit, the IRA creates two $3,750 tax credits: one contingent on battery component origin and the other on critical mineral origin. The content requirements will be gradually increased from the first year of enactment. See, Section 30D of IRA. For a detailed analysis of the IRA incentives for EVs, see, Chad Bown, ‘Industrial Policy for Electric Vehicle Supply Chains and the US–EU Fight Over the Inflation Reduction Act’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 23-1, May 2023), www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/industrial-policy-electric-vehicle-supply-chains-and-us-eu-fight-over.
67 See, ‘Section 30D Excluded Entities, A Proposed Rule by the Internal Revenue Services’. The finalization of the Rule is expected around 2024.
68 See, Section 45X of IRA. Only production that takes place in the US can qualify for the tax credits.
69 For project components considered ‘manufactured products’, 40% of the equipment installed at solar and land-based wind projects must be made in the US and 20% of the equipment installed at offshore wind projects must be made in the US, although the minimum domestic content requirement for manufactured components increases to 55% for both types of projects after 2026 and 2027, respectively.
70 M.M. Fang (2020) ‘Local Content Measures and the WTO Regime: Addressing Contentions and Trade Offs’, in D.S. Olawuyi (ed.), Local Content, Sustainable Development and Treaty Implementation in Global Energy Markets. Cambridge University Press, at 43.
71 C. Cavanagh, ‘The United States Rights a Wrong with Critical Minerals Agreements’, Georgetown Security Studies Review (26 April 2023), https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/04/26/the-united-states-rights-a-wrong-with-critical-minerals-agreements.
72 M.G. Attinasi, L. Boeckelmann, and B. Meunier, ‘Unfriendly Friends: Trade and Relocation Effect of the US Inflation Reduction Act’ (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 3 July 2023), https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/unfriendly-friends-trade-and-relocation-effects-us-inflation-reduction-act.
73 S. Lincicome, ‘Electric Vehicles and the Unintended Consequences of Industrial Policies’ (Cato Institute, 11 January 2023), www.cato.org/commentary/electric-vehicles-unintended-consequences-industrial-policy.
74 Mining projects can take between seven and 20 years to be completed. See, H. Dempsey, ‘Higher Investment in Critical Minerals Boosts Chances of Meeting Climate Targets’, Financial Times (11 July 2023), www.ft.com/content/c51d4601-e2ec-40d2-93d7-fcd7d7ab1310.
75 V.K. Aggarwal and A. Reddie, ‘Putting the Biden Administration's “New Economic Statecraft” in Context’, Lawfare (21 August 2023), www.lawfaremedia.org/article/putting-the-biden-administration-s-new-economic-statecraft-in-context.
76 M. McCormick, ‘White House Warns against Republican Efforts to Gut “Tremendous” IRA’, Financial Times, 20 December 2023, www.ft.com/content/cc0be27d-fdeb-4841-8502-1df2637409e9.
77 See, D. Di Carlo and L. Schimitz (2023) ‘Europe First? The Rise of EU Industrial Policy Promoting and Protecting the Single Market’, Journal of European Public Policy 30(10), 2063.
78 S. Dullien and J. Hackenbroich, ‘European Industrial Policy: A Crucial Element of Strategic Autonomy’ (Foundation for European Progressive Studies, May 2022), at 5–6.
79 A. Prontera and R. Quitzow (2022) ‘The EU as Catalytic State? Rethinking European Climate and Energy Governance’, New Political Economy 27(3), 517, 524.
80 The binding renewable target for the EU has been steadily raised throughout the years. The primary target as of 2023 is to source a minimum of 42.5% of total energy consumption from renewable energy by 2030, up from the previous 32% target. See, ‘European Green Deal: EU Agrees Stronger Legislation to Accelerate the Rollout of Renewable Energy’ (European Commission, 30 March 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2061.
81 J. Meckling (2019) ‘Governing Renewables: Policy Feedback in a Global Energy Transition’, Politics and Space 37(2), 317.
82 For instance, the New Industrial Strategy for Europe and the Green Deal Industrial Plan also underscore the objective of boosting the EU's manufacturing competitiveness.
83 Tagliapietra and Veugelers, supra n. 15, 308.
84 For instance, Next Generation EU, RePowerEU, pandemic Recovery Fund, and a host of member state-level support measures have allocated sizeable funding to support renewable energy, energy efficient applications.
85 See, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for Ensuring a Secure and Sustainable Supply of Critical Raw Materials and Amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013 (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724, and (EU) 2019/102’ (European Commission, 16 March 2023).
86 A. Hool et al. (2023) ‘Challenges and opportunities of the European Critical Raw Materials Act’, Mineral Economics (20 September).
87 See, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Establishing a Framework of Measures for Strengthening Europe's Net-Zero Technology Products Manufacturing Ecosystem’ (European Commission, 16 March 2023).
88 This is based on some remarks made by the Minister Jo Brouns. See, ‘Net-Zero Industry Act: Council and Parliament Strike a Deal to Boost EU's Green Industry’ (Council of the EU, 16 February 2024), www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/net-zero-industry-act-council-and-parliament-strike-a-deal-to-boost-eu-s-green-industry/.
89 N. Poitiers et al., ‘The EU Net Zero Industry Act and the Risk of Reviving Past Failures’, Brugel (9 March 2023), www.bruegel.org/first-glance/eu-net-zero-industry-act-and-risk-reviving-past-failures.
90 G. Wolff, M. Fratzscher, and A. Wambach, ‘For A Green European Industrial Policy’ (German Council on Foreign Relations, 27 February 2023), https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/green-european-industrial-policy.
91 R. Hausmann and K. Ahuja (2023) ‘A More Globally Minded European Green Industrial Policy’, in S. Tagliapietra and R. Veugelers (eds.) ‘Sparking Europe's New Industrial Revolution’, Bruegel, at 159.
92 J. Jansen, P. Jager, and N. Redeker, ‘For Climate, Profiles, or Resilience? Why Where and How the EU Should Respond to the Inflation Reduction Act’ (Hertie School Jacques Delors Center Policy Brief, 5 May 2023), www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20230505_JDC_IRA.pdf, at 8.
93 J. Henley and J. Rankin, ‘Can EU Anger at Biden's “Protectionist” Green Deal Translate into Effective Action?’, Guardian (18 January 2023), www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/18/eu-anger-biden-green-370bn-deal-action-industrial-policy; N. Crawford (2023) ‘The Energy Transition, Protectionism and Transatlantic Relations’, Global Politics and Strategy 65(2), 75, 91–92.
94 See, A. Bradford (2020) The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. Oxford University Press.
95 The Batteries Regulation sets extensive sustainability-oriented requirements that cover the entire life cycle of batteries with key measures such as a compulsory carbon footprint declaration and labeling requirement, maximum levels of carbon footprints, minimum levels of recycled content from manufacturing and consumer waste for use in new batteries, minimum levels of materials recovered from waste batteries, and traceability requirement. See, ‘Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 Concerning Batteries and Waste Batteries, Amending Directive 2008/98/EC and Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Repealing Directive 2006/66/EC’, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj. The proposal for Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation sets requirements to make products more durable, reliable, reusable, upgradable, reparable, easier to maintain, refurbish and recycle, and energy and resource efficient. The proposal has a much more extensive coverage of products, compared to the Ecodesign Directive 2009. Clean energy products placed on the EU market such as wind turbines, and solar panels will be subject to the Regulation. See, ‘The Proposal for a New Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (European Commission, 30 March 2022), https://commission.europa.eu/energy-climate-change-environment/standards-tools-and-labels/products-labelling-rules-and-requirements/sustainable-products/ecodesign-sustainable-products-regulation_en.
96 For instance, the Council of the EU posited that the new rules of the Batteries Regulation have an aim to ensure fairer competition. See, ‘Council Adopts New Regulation on Batteries and Waste Batteries’ (Council of the EU, 10 July 2023), www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/10/council-adopts-new-regulation-on-batteries-and-waste-batteries/.
97 Tagliapietra and Veugelers, supra n. 15, 308.
98 See, Carlo and Schimitz, supra n. 76; M. Pianta and M. Lucchese (2020) ‘Rethinking the European Green Deal: An Industrial Policy for a Just Transition in Europe’, Review of Radical Political Economies 52(4), 633.
99 Dullien and Hackenbroich, supra n. 77, 3.
100 S. Tagliapietra and J. Zettelmeyer, ‘Europe's Critical Struggle with Its Economic Paradigm’ (Politico, 25 May 2023), www.politico.eu/article/europes-critical-struggle-with-its-economic-paradigm/.
101 See, S. Lester, B. Mercurio, and A. Davies (2018) World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (3rd edn, Hart).
102 See, Request for Consultations by the European Union, United Kingdom – Measures Relating to the Allocation of Contracts for Difference in Low Carbon Energy Generation, WTO Doc. WT/DS612 (28 March 2022); Request for Consultations by Malaysia, European Union – Certain Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels, WTO Doc. WT/DS600/1 (15 January 2021); Request for Consultations by Indonesia, European Union – Certain Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm Crop-Based Biofuels, WTO Doc. WT/DS593/1 (9 December 2019); Request for Consultations by China, United States – Certain Measure Related to Renewable Energy, WTO Doc. WT/DS563/1 (14 August 2018); Request for Consultations by China, United States – Safeguard Measure on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS562/1 (14 August 2018); Request for Consultations by India, United States – Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/1 (9 September 2016); Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS459/1 (15 May 2013); Request for Consultations by the United States, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/1 (6 February 2013); Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member State – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (5 November 2012); Request for Consultations by China, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/1 (25 May 2012); Request for Consultations by the European Union, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/1 (11 August 2011); Request for Consultations by United States, China – Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Dec. 22, 2010); Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/1 (13 September 2010).
103 For a critique of the WTO renewable energy disputes, see, H. Asmelash (2022) ‘The First Ten Years of WTO Jurisprudence on Renewable Energy Support Measures: Has the Dust Settled Yet?’, World Trade Review 21(4), 455.
104 For instance, several WTO members have raised special concerns regarding the EU Batteries Regulation to the TBT committee. For a legal analysis, see, M.M. Fang (2023) ‘Regulating EV Batteries’ Carbon Footprint: EU Climate Ambition or Green Protectionism?’, The Environmental Law Reporter 53(7), 10590.
105 I. Espa (2022) ‘Reconciling the Climate/Industrial Interlay of CBAMs: What Role for the WTO?’ American Journal of International Law Unbound 116, 208, 212.
106 It is noted that the EU challenged the UK's contract for difference measures in the renewable energy sector under the WTO dispute settlement, nevertheless, the challenged measures do not qualify as multi-purpose GIPs but as traditional GIPs.
107 Cameron Cavanagh, ‘The United States Rights a Wrong with Critical Minerals Agreements’ (Georgetown Security Studies Review, 26 April 2023), https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/04/26/the-united-states-rights-a-wrong-with-critical-minerals-agreements/.
108 The EU and UK have started talks with the US on critical minerals used for EVs. See J. Mason, S. Holland, and A. Shalal, ‘United States, EU Agree to Start Talks on Critical Minerals Amid Trade Tensions’ (Reuters, 11 March 2023), www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/amid-trade-dispute-us-eu-seek-minerals-agreement-talks-subsidies-2023-03-10/.
109 ‘United States and Japan Sigh Critical Minerals Agreement’ (USTR, 28 March 2023), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/march/united-states-and-japan-sign-critical-minerals-agreement.
110 C. Flavelle et al. (2023) ‘Climate Change Poses a Widening Threat to National Security’, New York Times, 23 June 2023, www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/climate/climate-change-national-security.html.
111 See, B. Heath (2020) ‘The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order’, Yale Law Journal 129(4), 1020.
112 See, W. Maruyama and A.W. Wolff, ‘Saving the WTO from the National Security Exception’ (PIIE Working Paper, May 2023), www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/saving-wto-national-security-exception.
113 ‘Members Share Views in Informal Talks on Trade and Industrial Policy’ (WTO, 26 September 2023), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/gc_26sep23_e.htm#:~:text=The%20retreat%20was%20held%20to,meetings%20on%20the%20WTO%20calendar.
114 ‘New Initiatives Launched to Intensify WTO Work on Trade and the Environment’ (WTO, 17 November 2020), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/envir_17nov20_e.htm.
115 See, ‘Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis’ (US Department of State, 14 November 2023), www.state.gov/sunnylands-statement-on-enhancing-cooperation-to-address-the-climate-crisis/.
116 See, ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994’, 1867 UNTS 154.
117 Nevertheless, the use of plurilateral agreements was quite widespread during the GATT era. See, Hokeman, B. and Marvroidis, P. (2015) ‘WTO ‘à la carte’ or ‘menu du jour’? Assessing the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements’, European Journal of International Law 26(2), 319, 320Google Scholar.
118 Basedow, R. (2018), ‘The WTO and the Rise of Plurilateralism – What Lessons Can We Learn from the European Union's Experience with Differentiated Integration’, Journal of International Economic Law 21(2), 411, 414CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
119 D.A. Farber, ‘Turning Point: Green Industrial Policy and the Future of U.S. Climate Action’ (SSRN Working Paper, 16 June 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4482489, at 18.
120 Helveston, J.P., He, G., and Davidson, M.R. (2022) ‘Quantifying the Cost Savings of Global Solar Photovoltaic Supply Chains’, Nature 612, 83, 84CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.
121 For instance, the US IRA and the administration have not clarified the exact level of Chinese involvement in the clean energy value chains that would trigger the prohibition. See, H. Sanderson, ‘What Counts as De-risking? The Geopolitics of Energy and China’ (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, August 2023), www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/taking-stock-of-china-and-the-geopolitics-of-energy-issue-137/, at 15.