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Re-emergence of Great Power Conflict and US Economic Statecraft

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2021

Linda Weiss
Linda Weiss*
Affiliation:
Department of Government & International Relations University of Sydney, Australia
*
Email: linda.weiss@sydney.edu.au
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Abstract

After almost two decades of dealing with asymmetric threats, America's strategic focus on technological superiority carefully honed during the Cold War, began to fracture, eroding its military and economic advantage. But China's recent emergence as a credible geopolitical rival has reinvigorated US efforts to sustain high-tech leadership as the basis of its military primacy. At the center of these efforts are the defense and defense-related agencies of the national security state (NSS) whose mission is to dominate the new technological frontiers of military power and achieve future competitive advantage. Alongside the quest for breakthroughs in foundational technologies, NSS agencies are seeking to correct long neglected deficiencies in advanced manufacturing, by rebuilding the industrial ecosystem's supply chains depleted after decades of offshoring. With this suite of initiatives, the US is following a course of action more consistent with the exercise of (economic) statecraft than industrial policy. However, unlike its authoritarian rival, the US faces the challenge of having to balance security imperatives with commercial interests and, not least, having to contend with a dysfunctional and maladapted presidency.

Type
Original Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 20 , Special Issue 2: Economic Statecraft and Global Trade in the 21st Century , May 2021 , pp. 152 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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