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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
The First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the First Review Conference) was convened by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in The Hague, the Netherlands. This article examines the mandate of the Review Conference, as stipulated by the Chemical Weapons Convention (Convention or CWC), the preparations undertaken by the OPCW and its Member States, the issues that could have been raised, and those that were addressed in the Political Declaration and the Report adopted by the First Review Conference.
4. Para. 2 of the Opening Statement by the Director-General to the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW Doc. RC–1/DG.3, 28 April 2003, <http://www.opcw.org>.
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, UNTS (1974) No. 33757, p. 45. Corrected and changed [amended] text available at <http://www.opcw.org>; Tabassi, L., ed., OPCW: The Legal Texts (The Hague, OPCW/TMC Asser Press 1999) pp. 3–115Google Scholar; or from the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Johan de Wittlaan 32, 2517 JR The Hague, the Netherlands.
The corrected text of the Convention consists of the Appendix to Conference on Disarmament Doc. CD/1170, dated 26 August 1992, corrected by Depositary Notifications C.N.246.1994.TREATIES–5 of 31 August 1994 (procès-verbal of rectification of the original of the Convention: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts); C.N.359.1994.TREATIES–8 of 27 January 1995 (procès-verbal of rectification of the original of the Convention: Spanish text); C.N.454.1995.TREATIES–12 of 2 February 1996 (procès-verbal of rectification of the original of the Convention: Arabic and Russian texts); C.N.916.1999.TREATIES–7 of 8 October 1999 (acceptance of amendment for a change to Section B of Part VI of the Annex on Implementation and Verification (‘Verification Annex’), effective 31 October 1999); and C.N.157.2000.TREATIES–1 of 13 March 2000 (acceptance of corrections to the amendments, effective 9 March 2000).
6. Art. VIII(1) of the Convention.
7. See Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention, <http://www.opcw.org> under documents, S series. As of 20 October 2003, the number of States Parties had increased to 157 to include Afghanistan, Andorra, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and Tonga.
8. The Verification Annex Part IX provisions on ‘other chemical production facilities’ are deliberately evolutionary. The negotiators of the Convention failed to agree on a regime for ‘capable’ facilities. Capable facilities are those in which the technological processes or nature of activities are such that they can quickly be converted to produce chemical weapons, if so desired. All modern chemical industries have certain facilities that are ‘capable’ but agreement could never be reached on the development of another schedule listing, for example, technological processes or equipment. Instead it was decided to create a category for unscheduled discrete organic production facilities in which thousands of plants would be declared (with some differentiation based on chemistry — the so-called PSF facilities producing discrete organic chemicals containing one or more of the elements of phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine), while at the same time OPCW capacity for inspecting them would be finite. Random selection of sites for inspection, use of information available to the Secretariat, and involvement of Member States in the selection process was envisaged by the Convention to target inspections. The First Review Conference was to review this entire verification concept for other chemical production facilities producing discrete organic chemicals, in the light of experience gained, and as part of an overall review of industry verification.
9. Krutzsch, W. and Trapp, R., A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1994)pp. 143–145Google Scholar.
10. Report of the Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, subparas. 21.2 of OPCW Doc. C–VI/6, dated 19 May 2001, <http://www.opcw.org>.
11. Decision on the Establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group on Preparations for the Review Conference, OPCW Doc. EC-XXV/DEC.4, dated 28 September 2001, <http://www.opcw.org>.
12. Decision: Tenure Policy of the OPCW, OPCW Doc. C–SS–2/DEC. 1, 30 April 2003, <http://www.opcw.org>.
13. Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the States Parties, OPCW Doc. C–I/3, 12 May 1997. <http://www.opcw.org>.
14. Committee of the Whole: Report to the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW Doc. RC–1/CoW. l, 9 May 2003. <http://www.opcw.org>.
15. Ruppe, D., ‘Red Cross Says it was Muzzled over Stand on Incapacitating Weapons’, Global Security Newswire (30 04 2003)Google Scholar; Daoust, I., Coupland, R. and Ishoey, R., ‘New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare’, 84 IRRC (2002) pp. 345–363Google Scholar. <http://www.icrc.org>.
16. See for example, M. Dando, ‘The Danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention from Incapacitating Chemicals’, First CWC Review Conference Paper No. 4, University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies, March 2003, <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/scwc/cwcrcp/cwcrcps.htm>; and Wheelis, M., ‘“Non-Lethal” Chemical Weapons — A Faustian Bargain’, Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2003) pp. 74–78Google Scholar; and a later report, ‘“Non-Lethal” Weapons, the CWC and the BWC’, 61 The CBW Conventions Bulletin (09 2003) p. 102Google Scholar, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp>/pdfbulletin.html>.
17. de Luce, D. and Burkeman, O., ‘US Accuses Iran of Stockpiling Chemical Arms’, The Guardian (16 05 2003)Google Scholar.
18. See for example, Kelle, A., ‘The First CWC Review Conference: Taking Stock and Paving the Way Ahead’, in UNIDIR, 4 Disarmament Forum (2002) pp. 3 at 6Google Scholar.
19. See for example, paras. 17 and 21 of the Political Declaration of the First Review Conference OPCW Doc. RC-1/3, 9 May 2003: ‘17. The States Parties reaffirm that national implementation measures must reflect all relevant provisions of the Convention and the comprehensive nature of its prohibitions, to ensure that they apply to all toxic chemicals and precursors except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as their types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.’ and ‘21. The States Parties … reaffirm their undertaking not to maintain among themselves any restrictions that are incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes.’
20. Political Declaration of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review Conference), OPCW Doc. RC–1/3, 9 May 2003, <http://www.opcw.org>.
21. Report of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review Conference), OPCW Doc. RC–1/5, 9 May 2003, <http://www.opcw.org>.
22. The Review Conference left it to the Executive Council to study the recommendations and observations made by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board in its Report on Developments in Science and Technology (OPCW Doc. RC–1/DG.3, dated 28 April 2003, with a view to preparing recommendations to the Conference on them, <http://www.opcw.org>.
23. ISO–17799 is an internationally recognised generic information security standard with a comprehensive set of rules for best practices in information security. It comprises a code of practice and a specification for an information security management system and is intended to serve as a single reference point for identifying a range of controls needed for most situations where information systems are used in industry and commerce. For more information see <http://www.iso17799software.com>.
24. The authors note that this decision was taken despite the impact that it will undoubtedly have in terms of loss of institutional memory, reduction of operational capacity of the OPCW to implement its mandate, and cost.
25. The version of Staff Regulation 3.3 adopted in July 1999 stipulates that, on reimbursement of national income taxes paid by Secretariat staff on OPCW net salaries and emoluments, the OPCW shall refund to staff the amounts of those taxes paid, but only to the extent that the OPCW is reimbursed the amounts by the State Party concerned (a qualifier that is not consistent with the regulations and practice of other international organisations).