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Paradoxes of Police Reform: Federalism, Parties, and Civil Society in Argentina's Public Security Crisis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2022
Abstract
This article focuses on three central impediments to police reform in Argentina, each of which has generated an important, yet distinct, paradox. First, although advocates of federalism argue that police reform facilitates innovation, in practice, reform efforts at one level of government in Argentina have been sabotaged by officials at other levels of government. Second, although electoral pressures have pushed police reform onto the policy agenda, these same pressures have also obstructed reform efforts because politicians depend on illicit party-police networks for campaign financing. Third, despite copious evidence of police involvement in criminal acts, Argentina's crime wave has energized conservative civil society groups whose demand for a heavy-handed response to crime has derailed the most promising attempts to restructure the police force.
Resumo
Este ensayo se centra en tres impedimentos centrales a la reforma de la policía en Argentina. Cada uno de ellos ha generado paradojas importantes pero diferentes entre sí. Primero, aunque los defensores del federalismo afirman que éste favorece la innovación, en la práctica los esfuerzos realizados en un nivel del gobierno para reformar a la policía han sido saboteados en los otros. Segundo, las presiones electorales, si bien han llevado la reforma de la policía al centro de la agenda política, también han retrasado los esfuerzos para reformarla, pues los políticos dependen de redes ilícitas de policía, vinculadas a los partidos, para financiar sus campañas. Tercero, pese a existir evidencia que involucra a la policía en actos criminales, la ola de crimen en Argentina ha fortalecido las demandas de grupos de derecha de la sociedad civil para una respuesta de mano dura frente al crimen, lo que ha retrasado los intentos más prometedores de reestructuración.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © 2008 by the University of Texas Press
Footnotes
For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, I would like to thank Desmond Arias, Daniel Brinks, Miguel de Figueiredo, Jodi Finkel, Candelaria Garay, Maiah Jaskoski, Eric Jensen, Deborah Norden, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Murray Tanner, Harold Trinkunas, Allen Weiner, Deborah Yashar, and three anonymous reviewers at the Latin American Research Review. I am also grateful to the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University for the opportunity to present this research.