Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T22:38:49.880Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

When elites polarize over polarization: Framing the polarization debate in Turkey – RETRACTED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2018

Senem Aydın-Düzgit  and
Evren Balta
Senem Aydın-Düzgit
Affiliation:
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Orta Mahalle, Tuzla, İstanbul, Turkey34956; saduzgit@sabanciuniv.edu.
Evren Balta
Affiliation:
Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations, Nisantepe District, Orman street, 34794 Çekmeköy, Istanbul; evren.balta@ozyegin.edu.tr.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article aims to explore the views of the Turkish elite on the state of polarization in Turkey. By identifying four political frames—namely, harmony, continuity/decline, conspiracy, and conflict—that selected Turkish political and civil society elites use in discussing the phenomenon of polarization in the country through their contributions to a workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews, the article finds that there is a considerable degree of polarization among the Turkish elite regarding their views on the presence of polarization in Turkey. Moreover, this overlaps with the divide between the government and the opposition in the country. An analysis of the justificatory arguments employed in constituting the aforementioned frames shows that, while those elites who deny the existence of polarization seek its absence in essentialist characteristics of society, in reductionist comparisons with history, or in internal/external enemies, those who acknowledge polarization’s presence look for its roots in political and institutional factors and processes. The article highlights how, given the denial of polarization by the pro-government elite and the substantial gap between the two camps’ justificatory narratives, the currently reported high rates of polarization in Turkey can, at best, be expected to remain as is in the near future, barring a radical change in political constellations.

Keywords

polarizationTurkeypopulismdemocracyelite conflict
Type
Special Dossier: Researching human smuggling in the Mediterranean
Information
New Perspectives on Turkey , Volume 59 , November 2018 , pp. 109 - 133
Copyright
© New Perspectives on Turkey and Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Authors’ Note: This study was made possible by the Post-Coup Opportunities on Conflict Resolution and Democracy Project conducted by the Resolution and Mediation Stream of Istanbul Policy Center. The authors would like to thank Pınar Akpınar for project coordination and the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the earlier versions of this article.

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. and Saunders, Kyle L.. “Is Polarization a Myth?” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): 542–555.Google Scholar
Adams, James, Green, Jane, and Milazzo, Caitlin. “Has the British Public Depolarized Along with Political Elites? An American Perspective on British Public Opinion.” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 4 (2012): 507–530.Google Scholar
Atikcan, E. Özlem and Öge, Kerem. “Referendum Campaigns in Polarized Societies: The Case of Turkey.” Turkish Studies 13, no. 3 (2012): 449–470.Google Scholar
Aydın-Düzgit, Senem. “No Crisis, No Change: The Third AKP Victory in the June 2011 Elections in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 17, no. 2 (2012): 329–346.Google Scholar
Baldassari, Delia and Bearman, Peter. “Dynamics of Political Polarization.” American Sociological Review 72, no. 5 (2007): 784–811.Google Scholar
Bock, Kathryn and Loebell, Helga. “Framing Sentences.” Cognition 35, no. 1 (1990): 1–39.Google Scholar
Çelik, Ayşe Betül, Rezarta, Bilali, and Ikbal, Yeshim. “Patterns of ‘Othering’ in Turkey: A Study of Ethnic, Ideological and Sectarian Polarisation.” South European Society and Politics 22, no. 2 (2017): 217–238.Google Scholar
Chong, Dennis and Druckman, James N.. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 103–126.Google Scholar
De la Torre, Carlos and Lemos, Andres Ortiz. “Populist Polarization and the Slow Death of Democracy in Ecuador.” Democratization 23, no. 2 (2016): 221–241.Google Scholar
Dinçşahin, Şakir. “A Symptomatic Analysis of the Justice and Development Party’s Populism in Turkey: The 2007 Electoral Crisis and After.” Government and Opposition 47, no. 4 (2012): 618–640.Google Scholar
Druckman, James N. “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence.” Political Behavior 23, no. 3 (2001): 225–256.Google Scholar
Druckman, James N., Peterson, Erik, and Slothuus, Rune. “How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation.” American Political Science Review 107, no.1 (2013): 57–79.Google Scholar
Duchesne, Sarah, Frazer, Elizabeth, Haegel, Florence, and Van Ingelgom., Virginie Citizens’ Reactions to European Integration Compared: Overlooking Europe. London: Palgrave, 2013.Google Scholar
Enyedi, Zsolt. “Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The Role of Party Politics in De-Democratization.” Problems of Post-Communism 63, no. 4 (2016): 210–220.Google Scholar
Erdoğan, Emre. “Türkiye’de Kutuplaşmanın Boyutları Araştırması.” February 1, 2016. https://www.fichier-pdf.fr/2016/02/19/kutuplasma-arast-rmas-sonuclar/preview/page/1/.Google Scholar
Erdoğan, Emre. “Turkey: Divided We Stand.” GMF: The German Marshall Fund of the United States. April 12, 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-divided-we-stand.Google Scholar
Erdoğan, Emre. “Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey.” GMF: The German Marshall Fund of the United States. February 20, 2018. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/dimensions-polarization-turkey.Google Scholar
Erdoğan, Emre and Uyan-Semerci, Pınar. Türkiye’de Kutuplaşmanın Boyutları Araştırması. İstanbul Bilgi University and BST: The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2018/02/05/bilgi-goc-merkezi-kutuplasmanin-boyutlari-2017-sunum.pdf Google Scholar
Esen, Berk and Gümüşçü, Şebnem. “A Small Yes for Presidentialism: The Turkish Constitutional Referendum of April 2017.” South European Society and Politics 22, no. 3 (2017): 303–326.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P., Abrams, Samuel J., and Pope, Jeremy C. . Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006.Google Scholar
, Freedom House. “Turkey Profile.” Freedom in the World 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/turkey.Google Scholar
, Freedom House. “Turkey Profile.” Freedom of the Press 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/turkey.Google Scholar
Guida, Michelangelo. “The Sèvres Syndrome and ‘Komplo’ Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press.” Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008): 37–52.Google Scholar
Halkier, Bente. “Focus Groups as Social Enactments: Integrating Interaction and Content in the Analysis of Focus Group Data.” Qualitative Research 10, no. 1 (2010): 71–89.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Marc J. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 619–631.Google Scholar
Iyengar, Shanto, Sood, Gaurav, and Lelkes, Yphtach. “Affect Not Ideology: A Social Identity Based Perspective on Polarisation.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2012): 405–431.Google Scholar
Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. “Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010.” South European Society and Politics 17, no. 1 (2012): 1–22.Google Scholar
Kemahlıoğlu, Özge. “Winds of Change? The June 2015 Parliamentary Election in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 20, no. 4 (2015): 445–464.Google Scholar
Keyman, Fuat. “The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization.” Insight Turkey 16, no. 2 (2014): 19–31.Google Scholar
KONDA. April ’17 Barometer. http://konda.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/KONDA_16April2017_AnalysesoftheReferendumandtheElectorate.pdf.Google Scholar
LeBas, Adrienne. “Polarization as Craft: Explaining Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe.” Comparative Politics 38, no. 4 (2006): 419–438.Google Scholar
McLeod, Douglas M. and Shah, Dhavan V.. News Frames and National Security: Covering Big Brother. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.Google Scholar
McCoy, Jennifer, Rahman, Tahmina, and Somer, Murat. “Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Politics.” American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (2018): 16–42.Google Scholar
Nefes, Salim Türkay. “The Impact of the Turkish Government’s Conspiratorial Framing of the Gezi Park Protests.” Social Movement Studies 16, no. 5 (2017): 610–622.Google Scholar
Oosterwaal, Annemarije and Torenvleid, Rene. “Politics Divided from Society? Three Explanations for Trends in Social and Political Polarisation in the Netherlands.” West European Politics 33, no. 2 (2010): 258–279.Google Scholar
Özbudun, Ergun. “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift.” South European Society and Politics 19, no. 2 (2014): 155–167.Google Scholar
Özdemir, Özge. “Muhafazakar Kesim Kutuplaşmaya Nasıl Bakıyor?” BBC News: Türkçe. January 27, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-38667730.Google Scholar
Palonen, Emilia. “Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary.” Parliamentary Affairs 62, no. 2 (2009): 318–334.Google Scholar
Parent, Genevieve. “Genocide Denial: Perpetuating Victimisation and the Cycle of Violence in Bosnia Herzegovina.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 10, no. 2 (2016): 38–58.Google Scholar
Patterson, Thomas E. The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty. New York: Vintage Books, 2009.Google Scholar
Piven, Francis F. and Cloward, Richard A.. Why Americans Still Don’t Vote — And Why Politicians Want It That Way. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.Google Scholar
Przeworski, Adam and Sprague, John. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.Google Scholar
Reisigl, Martin. “Analysing Political Rhetoric.” In Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences . Edited by Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008. 96–119.Google Scholar
Sayarı, Sabri. “Back to a Predominant Party System: November 2015 Snap Election in Turkey.” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 2 (2016): 263–280.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. Party Government. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. The Semisovereign People. Hindsdale, IL: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.Google Scholar
Somer, Murat and McCoy, Jennifer. “Déjà Vu? Polarisation and Endangered Democracies in the 21st Century.” American Behavioral Scientist 62, no. 1 (2018): 3–15.Google Scholar
Soroka, Stuart. “Agenda-Setting and Issue Definition.” In Critical Policy Studies. Edited by M. Orsini and M. Smith. Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2011. 185–210.Google Scholar
Stanley, Liam. “Using Focus Groups in Political Science and International Relations.” Politics 36, no. 3 (2016): 236–249.Google Scholar
Statham, Paul and Trenz, Hans-Jörg. The Politicization of Europe: Contesting the Constitution in the Mass Media. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013.Google Scholar
Thompson, Joseph L.P. “Denial, Polarisation and Massacre: A Comparative Analysis of Northern Ireland and Zanzibar.” The Economic and Social Review 17, no. 4 (1986): 293–314.Google Scholar
Torcal, Mariano and Mainwaring, Scott. “The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95.” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (2003): 55–84.Google Scholar
White, Jenny. Müslüman Milliyetçiliği ve Yeni Türkler. Translated by Fuat Güllüpınar and Coşkun Taştan. İstanbul: İletişim, 2013.Google Scholar
White, Jonathan and Ypi, Lea. “On Partisan Political Justification.” American Political Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011): 381–396.Google Scholar
World Bank. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.Google Scholar
Yinanç, Barçın. “Turkish Media’s Partisan Coverage Alarming for Democracy.” Hürriyet Daily News. April 20, 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-medias-partisan-coverage-alarming-for-democracy-81271.Google Scholar