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Evidential Variety and Mixed-Methods Research in Social Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2023

Jaakko Kuorikoski Open the ORCID record for Jaakko Kuorikoski [Opens in a new window]  and
Caterina Marchionni Open the ORCID record for Caterina Marchionni [Opens in a new window]
Jaakko Kuorikoski*
Affiliation:
Practical Philosophy, Faculty of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Caterina Marchionni
Affiliation:
Practical Philosophy, Faculty of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
*
Corresponding author: Jaakko Kuorikoski; Email: jaakko.kuorikoski@helsinki.fi
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Abstract

Mixed-methods research (MMR)—the combination of qualitative and quantitative data within the same design to strengthen causal inference—is gaining prominence in the social sciences but its benefits are contested. There remains confusion over which methods to mix and what is the point of mixing them. We argue that variety of evidence is what matters, not of data or methods, and that distinct epistemic principles underlie its added value for causal inference. The centrality of evidential variety also implies that strong causal pluralism is untenable as a foundation for MMR.

Type
Contributed Paper
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 90 , Issue 5 , December 2023 , pp. 1449 - 1458
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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