This book tells the stories of fifteen independent efforts to govern higher education – a set of individual journeys forward, each from a common originating point in the early 1990s. The cases profile the ways in which countries of the former Soviet Union are approaching governing their universities and what governance structures they put it place to undertake this essential task. Underlying these stories are the common and different governance structures of public universities. What do they have in common? How are they different? Some of the countries in this book have moved toward their existing models in response to independence and autonomy; others kept traditional centralized approaches; still others are trying approaches that are novel. This chapter suggests four different models that exist across the fifteen countries, described below in detail – academic-focused, state-extended, internal/external, and external civic.
This chapter signals the transition from describing each approach to looking at the set as a whole and identifying meaningful subsets and clusters of approaches. As the previous fifteen chapters demonstrate how each country structured the governance of its University systems, this chapter presents a broader view of the common and varied structures. This chapter is organized to describe patterns within the set. Subsequent chapters move toward analysis and discussion.
18.1 A Reminder about Governance Structures
Structure, while not the only organizational element, matters to all organizations, including universities and policy agencies. The ways in which an organization, and in this case the University governance body, is structured shapes what information is collected and how it is sorted, transmitted, and made available; the ways decisions are made, including which decision-makers come together under what opportunities and constraints, and the ways in which decisions are addressed and actions taken (Hammond, 1993, Reference Hammond2004; Mintzberg, Reference Mintzberg1993; Orton & Weick, Reference Orton and Weick1990; Simon, Reference Simon1957). “The structural design of public organizations is important for fulfilling collective public goals, and reorganizations will reflect changing goals” (Christensen, Reference Christensen2011, p. 505).
The structure of University governance is a complex undertaking regardless of context, involving multiple stakeholders (Jongbloed et al., Reference Jongbloed, Enders and Salerno2008). “Even though the legal responsibility for an institution may lie in a single entity such as a governing board, multiple actors such as the legislature, the governor, higher education commissioner, and coordinating board all could compete for some controlling interest in the decision-making process of public colleges and universities” (Lane, Reference Lane and Bastedo2012, p. 285). The governance structure dictates which stakeholders come together and how, including who has access to what information and how decision-makers work together collaboratively, sequentially, or independently. If, as former Harvard University Dean Henry Rosovsky astutely notes, “Governance is about power: who is in charge; who makes decisions; who has a voice; and how loud is that voice?” (1991, p. 261) then the governance structure is the vehicle for power.
The governance structure, however, also is an artifact of that power in that its contours reflect the wishes of the powerful who created it. The organizational configuration reflects values, meanings, and beliefs (Kallio et al., Reference Kallio, Kallio and Blomberg2020). Patterns of power shape structures through both de facto (informal) and de jure (formal) ways. An inclusive authority will likely create avenues for multiple stakeholders to exert their variety of influence leading to a more open structure. A consolidated authority, such as solely in the hands of a ministry, will likely result in a different structure that is narrow. Research supports this notion in the context of gender equity, as an example, where women’s access to formal and informal sources of authority yield more inclusive opportunities (Milazzo & Goldstein, Reference Milazzo and Goldstein2017). In the higher education context, ministries, universities, and even heads of state give form to University governance; they shape it and dictate its functions. The stronger the authority held by one, the seemingly more that power holder dictates the shape.
Organizational structure is both an independent and a dependent variable in organizational activity (Hammond, Reference Hammond2004; Simon, Reference Simon1957). Structure and its information flows are never impartial (Hammond & Thomas, Reference Hammond and Thomas1989). The structure of a particular organization will bias decisions or policymaking toward some outcomes and away from others, even before one adds to the equation decision-makers’ abilities, priorities, and dispositions. “If two institutions are identical in every respect (e.g., they have the same tasks, the same personnel, and even have access to the same raw data) but the two institutions’ hierarchies [structures] differ, the institutions may classify the data differently, and thus the top level decisionmakers in each may learn different things from the information” (Hammond, Reference Hammond2004, p. 123). The results are different outcomes shaped solely by variation in structure. Structures in this view can be thought of as the independent variable that shape outcomes and processes (Hammond, Reference Hammond2004).
Yet structures also are dependent variables. They are “the outcome of forces both outside and inside of the University” (Hammond, Reference Hammond2004, p. 102). The structures that exist are shaped by a variety of factors, including historic and contemporary economic and political conditions, as well as collective beliefs and authority’s preferences (Pfeffer & Salancik, Reference Pfeffer and Salancik2003; Powell & DiMaggio, Reference Powell and DiMaggio1991), all of which evolve over time (Bucheli & Kim, 2013). Structure is not the only factor that matters, but it is a key one, discernable and describable, and the focus of this book.
18.2 Comparing Approaches
This chapter compares the various structures of University governance across the fifteen former Soviet countries. Governance, as noted in Chapter 1, is the process and activities used to steer universities and operates through defined structures at the governmental as well as institutional levels. Thus, governance bodies are the discernable structures that determine mission, approve strategy, set policy, monitor institutional well-being, and oversee quality and compliance. We focus on those bodies at the institutional not governmental level. The first comparison, Table 18.1, describes the most authoritative (or supreme) governing body for public universities at the institutional level across the set of focal countries. These bodies are identified by a range of names that describe similar but also different bodies; however, they are the senior-most collective or institutional decision-making body. The table also notes where external advisory bodies exist, as described by law or statue.
Table 18.1 Primary governing structure
The most common structure across the fifteen countries is the Academic Council; found in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Academic Councils are university-wide decision-making bodies that are composed of members of the academic community and make or validate University decisions. These bodies within and across countries may or may not be identical, but they do share some similar characteristics in terms of academic membership, the focus of their work predominately on academic issues, and their place within the organizational and decision-making structures of the University.
The second most common University governance model across this set of countries are governance bodies that are a mix of University staff (internal members who are employed by the University) and external members who are not University employees and hold posts external to the University) – found in Armenia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia – or consist of two complementary bodies that include University stakeholders and external individuals such as Moldova and Ukraine.
The third model is limited to Kazakhstan, whose universities have governing bodies consisting solely of external or non-university members, with the exception of the rector’s membership. Until recently, this country had a variety of University governance structures, Boards of Directors, Boards of Trustees, Boards of Oversees, each assigned to a different type of University and operating differently and with varying scopes of responsibilities and authority. The law of 2019 created a uniform governance approach, external boards, for all universities regardless of mission or type.
Worth noting is the fact that Moldova and Ukraine both have a dual system of governance that combines the Academic Council with a second governance body comprising University staff and externally appointed members (mixed internal and external) – the Strategic and Institutional Development Council in Moldova and or all external members as the Supreme Council in Ukraine. This is a bicameral governance approach. In a different context, Canada also uses a bicameral, as compared to unicameral, governance structure with a Senate and a Board of Governors with parallel and complementary authorities (see, for example, Shanahan, Reference Shanahan2019).
Furthermore, four countries – Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan – supplement their Academic Councils with external advisory bodies. These seem to be non-decision-making bodies, offering only insight and perspective. These are structures outside of formal decision-making schema that create opportunities for linkages beyond the campus and government with other universities, the private sector, and other entities invested in higher education and its outputs.
Similar structures have similar as well as different labels, which are reflected in Table 18.1. We use the terminology (often translated) common to each country.
There is tremendous variation within the structure of the different governing bodies. In some instances, the law dictates the size and composition of the body across all universities, such as the Strategic and Institutional Development Councils (SDIC) in Moldova, at nine, and the University Councils in Estonia, at eleven members, respectively. The external boards and the dual external/internal boards are small, such as the two above. The Academic Councils are the largest bodies, with upwards to 100 in Moldova and Belarus (see Table 18.2).
Table 18.2 Size and composition of governing bodies
The membership composition is consistent across the Academic Councils with a mix of University administrators, such as rectors, pro-rectors, deans, and heads of research institutes, and academic staff. Academic staff in such Academic Councils make up at least 50 percent of the Council composition (e.g., in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Student representation is also present, although it varies in the proportion of student participants from 10 percent (Ukraine) to 25 percent (Belarus) of the body’s membership. The internal/external boards as well as the external governing bodies tend to be much smaller in size ranging from five (in some of Latvia’s arts and culture and applied sciences universities) to thirty-two (Armenia), with these bodies in Estonia (eleven), Lithuania (nine to eleven) and Moldova (nine) being small, particularly compared to the Academic Councils. In Kazakhstan the sizes range from eight to twelve members with some of the new boards still forming.
The membership of the internal/external boards varies in the proportion of internal and external members. Armenia’s Board of Trustees include 50 percent from campus and 50 percent external members. Estonia and Moldova have equal membership as well. Latvia’s boards are approximately 40 percent external appointments and 60 percent internal University members.
The external members tend to be heavily governmental with some evidence of individuals from the private or corporate sector. Kazakhstan includes members of the Ministry of Education and Sciences as well as other ministries on University Boards of Trustees. The two boards of Nazarbayev University are both chaired by high-ranking government officials. These boards also include individuals from the private sector. Moldova’s SIDC includes individuals appointed by various ministries and may or may not include members of government. Estonia’s University Council includes individuals from the Ministry of Education and Research as well as from the Academy of Sciences. The European Union criticized the highly political nature of Armenia’s governing board composition (Smith & Hamilton, 2005). Latvia, in contrast, explicitly prohibits current members of government agencies and elected members of parliament from serving on public University boards.
Most of the Academic Councils are chaired by the rector, which is part of that individuals’ official responsibilities. In some instances, such as Georgia and Ukraine, the rector is elected by the body. In other countries, the rector is appointed by the appropriate ministry (Russia and Moldova) or by the president of the country (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and some Russian universities). For those countries with external boards or internal/external boards – Armenia, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, and Lithuania – the bodies elect board leaders from within their ranks. Latvia specifies that the board chair must be elected from the external board members. In Kazakhstan, board leadership is appointed by the ministries or, in the case of Nazarbayev University, by the president of the country, as is the case for Russian autonomous universities (see Table 18.3).
Table 18.3 Governing body leadership
| Country | Elected chair | Appointed chair | As part of job duties |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armenia | elected by the board (often held by a government official) | ||
| Azerbaijan | appointed Rector | ||
| Belarus | government-appointed rector or the president of the Republic | ||
| Estonia | elected by the board | ||
| Georgia | Elected Rector | ||
| Kazakhstan | |||
| State universities | elected by the board | ||
| Nazarbayev University | Board of Trustees – appointed by president | Supreme Board – first president of the Republic | |
| Kyrgyzstan | appointed rector | ||
| Latvia | elected by the board (from members not appointed by staff or students) | ||
| Lithuania | elected by the Council (from members not appointed by staff or students) | ||
| Moldova | SIDC – elected by members (must be an external member) | Senate–elected Rector | |
| Russia | appointed rector | ||
| Tajikistan | appointed rector | ||
| Turkmenistan | appointed rector | ||
| Ukraine | Academic Council – elected by members | Supervisory Board – appointed by the ministry | |
| Uzbekistan | appointed rector |
The scope of work varies based on the type of governance approach. Academic Councils focus on institutional-level governance issues such as approving or discussing the budget and the University’s strategic program (for example, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Turkmenistan). They also address traditional academic topics such as curricula, and degree program offerings. In Ukraine, the Academic Council also concerns itself with quality assurance. In Georgia and Turkmenistan, the Academic Council concerns itself with European integration or internationalization; and in Azerbaijan, that body contributes to the development of state educational standards. Academic Councils in Uzbekistan are advisory to the rector. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Academic Council does not have financial responsibility; and outside of academic issues, its governance activity is to approve the strategic program presented by the rector.
Those countries with external boards or the mixed board of insider and external members do not address academic issues, delegating that responsibility to their own Academic Councils, which are either subservient to the supreme decision-making body or work parallel to it. Lithuania’s Councils, in addition to approving the budget and the strategic program, also are responsible for overseeing the rector selection process. Estonia’s University Councils do not have this responsibility. In Latvia, the board approves the University’s constitution, sets the strategic development plan and monitors its implementation and approves the budget and University policies. The board also nominates candidates for rector and can initiate the rector’s replacement.
In contrast, the external boards of Kazakhstan’s universities, in addition to budget and strategic programs and to hiring the rector (confirmed by the ministry), also determine tuition fees, address issues of risk management, and set admissions targets and criteria. The latter set of responsibilities are newly devolved; prior to 2019, they were the responsibilities of the Ministry of Education or relevant ministries. In Ukraine, the Academic Council addresses academic issues and makes most of the key financial and strategic decisions. This body works in concert with the Supervisory Board, which is an external body. This second body makes proposals to the University, oversees University management, and considers financing.
The unique division of labor in Moldova between the Academic Senate and the SIDC are worthy of deeper explanation of its design as intended (see the Appendix of Chapter 12 for a side-by-side comparison). The Academic Senate is responsible for academic issues and new degree programs, the University charter, and the rector’s annual report and the strategic development plan. It confirms members on the SIDC and develops and approves the admissions framework and research strategy. The Strategic and Institutional Development Council (SIDC) coordinates the strategic development plan and puts it forth for Senate approval. It organizes the rector election, again for selection by the Senate, and it develops the budget and monitors finances, which is approved by the Senate. The two bodies are structured to work in concert with each other. A similar two-body approach exists in the Ukraine with an internal Academic Council and an external Supervisory Board, but those bodies seem to work on issues independently (academic versus finance) rather than requiring sign off by the other as in Moldova.
Of the fifteen countries in this study, eleven have structures – advisory or decision making – that have at least some external (non-university) members. Four countries – Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine – have external advisory bodies but with limited influence and no bureaucratic or formal authority. Kazakhstan has externally comprised governing boards. Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova have bodies that are a mix of internal and external individuals with limited structural authority. The membership of these external bodies is often governmental (except for Latvia), and many have individuals of public renown or leaders from the private sector. The advisory bodies seem to serve as resources for the rector and for those with strong governmental presence, also likely play an accountability function for the state although informal.
18.3 Emerging Models of Governance
The above descriptions point to four university-level governing models across the former Soviet countries. The models reflect a composite of structural elements including the general membership of the body, its leadership and how those individuals obtain that role, the focus or scope of the decisions made, and the extent to which there is a direct role by the government or its branches.
The first is the academic-focused model. This approach is common to Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and in Ukraine and Moldova, for one of their governance dual structures. The elected rector is a first-among-equals coming from the University’s academic ranks, serves at the preference of the academic staff, and serves as the body’s chair as part of the rector position. The body focuses strongly on academic issues. The membership is dominated by academic staff as well as representatives that include students and members of campus units and trade unions. Key governance decisions beyond academic issues, such as budget and planning, often fall outside of this body and are either made by the rector and his or her staff or are the responsibilities of the ministry.
The second model is state-extended. This approach in many ways is structured similarly to the academic-focused mode. The essential difference is that the leadership of these bodies is appointed by the government and the scope of responsibilities is limited based on what is delegated to them as compared to what is ministerial responsibility. These models exist in Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This model seems to extend the one-man management model of the Soviet era (Kuraev, Reference Kuraev2016) in which the government appoints the rector and holds that person to account. The rector is powerful, with authority derived directly from the State. Thus, the government has a strong role in setting institutional direction and driving decisions through its appointed institutional head as well as through its control and policy making. This structure limits the scope of institutional-level governance. Ministries remain strong and have direct control of the universities. Azerbaijan, Russia, and Uzbekistan supplement their government-centric approaches to University governance with external advisory boards. The key difference between this model and the academic-focused approach centers on the rector. Is that person an academic, elected by and accountable to academic staff or is that person appointed by the government and its agents and primarily accountable to them?
The third approach is the internal/external model, which consists of membership from within as well as outside the University. Armenia’s Board of Trustees, Latvia’s boards, Lithuania’s and Estonia’s University Councils and Moldova’s Strategic and Institutional Development Councils are examples. The Ukraine and Moldova adopt a slightly different approach in that rather than a single body with dual representation, it has two bodies with coordinated responsibilities. One example from the Ukraine is the Academic Council and the Supervisory Board at National Technical University of Ukraine Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. The Supervisory Board consists of individuals external to the University, whereas the Academic Council consists of administrators and representative staff and students. Moldova’s Strategic and Institutional Development Councils are themselves the permeable body with a combination of University staff and external appointments.
The final model we label external civic, describing the governance structure of Kazakhstan. Here the power center in terms of governance structure, composition, and agendas is located outside of the institution in a public or civic domain. “External members in governing bodies in higher education institutions could be seen as representatives for civil society.” (Larsen, Massen & Senker, Reference Larsen, Masseen and Stensaker2009, p. 8) Thus, the label here is external civic to differentiate it from state-extended in which the locus of authority is also external but grounded in government. We understand that the term civic can be a nuanced term, but we use it to indicate that it is grounded in the community and citizens, even if those citizens are elites but outside of government and the academy – grass tops, not grassroots, so to speak. In the Kazakhstani context, the balance tilts toward governmental members, but participation from the private sector and from other universities does exist. This is a nuanced distinction and an important one in which membership matters. If the external civic board members are all more mostly governmental, this module becomes the state-extended one and loses the important voice of civic stakeholders. Having members of government holding the most seats and being most influential is a risk in Kazakhstani universities if the country is to operationalize the design of its governing boards structure.
These boards have broad scopes of responsibilities including hiring, supervising, and firing the rector; determining budgets; setting admissions criteria and targets; and creating partnerships and other entities. Given that the members are appointed by the ministries, they are notable and well-respected individuals by the government, and, in the Kazakhstani context, many notable and influential individuals have strong links to the government. Ukraine’s Supervisory Councils also comprise non-university staff. In countries such as Kazakhstan, often highly influential powerbrokers are in governmental positions as compared to the West; whereas, in US boards, the most influential are members from corporate backgrounds and professionally accomplished, if not wealthy, individuals (Chait, Reference Chait2009; Eckel & Trower, Reference Eckel and Trower2018).
18.4 Putting the Models in Context
If governance is about power and voice (Rosovsky, Reference Rosovsky1991), these models offer insights into University power dynamics and to ideas about the variation of authority and control between governments and their public universities. The external civic and state-extended models reflect a locus of power outside of the University. The state-extended model places authority in the government, which varies between University presidential and ministerial influence and involvement depending on county and University. Given the composition of the Kazakhstani external civic governing bodies, while the structure allows for broad stakeholder influence, currently that influence remains governmental. However, it is different from the state-extended model because influence is indirect via appointments rather than through direct ministerial line-management oversight and it has the potential to be balanced with corporate and academic (from other universities) voices. Furthermore, this approach alters governmental influence by sharing power with private citizens and people of eminence from other walks of life in the country. If Kazakhstani boards had fewer governmental members and surrogates, they would be more representative in their composition and thus more civic.
The academic-focused model also reflects division of power between government via the ministries and University academics. In the academic-focused model, the government devolves or delegates academic decisions to the University governing body. The level of this delegation is tied to levels of state-granted autonomy.
The final model reflects the most complex of the power dynamics. This model is termed internal/external because of its involvement of University and governmental or other external stakeholders and reflects a balance between these stakeholders’ influence and aims. In the Moldova structure, for example, there is a differentiated role between the Academic Council and the Strategic and Institutional Development Council, with different stakeholders serving on each and only the rector and pro-rector serving on both bodies. The rector chairs the Academic Council and an external member of SIDC chairs that body and is selected by members of SIDC. Estonia’s University Councils include five individuals appointed by the Senate and who are not members of the Senate or serving as senior University administrators, five individuals appointed by the Ministry of Education and Research, and one person from the Academy of Sciences. Latvia’s boards balance the interests of internal and external stakeholders and explicitly bans current members of government from serving on boards. The Armenian Boards of Trustees also are designed to be representative across stakeholder groups with balanced representation of governmental members, external individuals, students, and University staff. However, as the European Union analysis suggests (Smith & Hamilton, Reference Smith and Hamilton2015), examples of governmental influence in the selection of the nongovernmental appointments consolidate its influence.
These four models from post-Soviet contexts connect to but also differ in substantive ways from governance models described in the literature. The three primary ways of understanding governance approaches – both at the state and campus levels – are market-oriented, state-centered, and academic self-rule models (Clark, Reference Clark1983; Dobbins et al., Reference Dobbins, Knill and Vogtle2011; Dobbins & Khachatryan Reference Dobbins and Khachatryan2015) or various deviations of them, such Humboldtian, Napoleonic, and incorporated models (Shattock, Reference Shattock2014). Trakman (Reference Trakman2008) adopt a slightly different focus and describes five models addressing institutional-level governance: academic or collegial governance with its dominance of academic staff; corporate governance that focuses predominately on the business model of universities and efficiencies; trustee governance that relies on surrogates working in good faith to advance institutional interests; stakeholder governance with its representative approach that may include internal and external stakeholders; and an amalgam model, which is a composite of select elements of the other four.
Our academic-focused and state-extended models reflect Trakman’s academic self-rule and the state-centered models respectively. The internal/external model adds detail to Trakman’s stakeholder approach by clarifying the composition of and balance among the key stakeholders, which in most instances are individuals representing government interests or with ties to the government, with the exception being Latvia. Trakman comments, “the problem with stakeholder governance is in determining which stakeholders ought to be represented on the governing bodies” (2008, p. 73). Countries in this project address that question in different ways. The internal/external model addresses that question from a contextually relevant perspective. The external civic model is also different from the market-oriented model above and from Trakman’s corporate and trustee models. The participants are not significantly corporate representatives, nor do they serve as trustees solely for a public trust (Trakman, Reference Trakman2008).
The final element of this discussion links these models to various theoretical underpinnings of the different governance approaches. There are three conceptual frameworks typically used to understand nonprofit and University governance: agency theory, stakeholder theory, and stewardship theory (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Van Puyvelde et al., Reference Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois and Jegers2012), although others exist (Cornforth, Reference Cornforth2003; Donina et al., Reference Diuk2015). These approaches are instructive because “they focus on the relationships between a delegator and a delegate [labeled principals and agents], which is the central object of analysis in the design of governance regimes” (Schillemans & Bjurstrom, 2019, p. 651). The delegate (agent) is intended to act in the interests of the delegator (principal). What differs across these frameworks is the nature of that relationship and who is engaged in the relationship. These frameworks are reflected both in the structure of governance but also in the culture of how boards operate (Eckel & Trower, Reference Eckel and Trower2018).
Agency theory suggests that key actors are narrowly defined principals and agents who engage in a compliance-based relationship (Eisenhardt, Reference Eisenhardt1989). The principals typically are the owners, such as shareholders in a corporate setting or the government in a state University context. The agents, on the other hand, are those individuals hired by the principals to manage the organization and its well-being. The expectation by principals is that the agents should act in the best interests of the organization. However, the theory argues that agents see their hiring as an opportunity to maximize their own best interests or those of the organization, which may conflict with the wishes of the principals. The result of this drift are goal conflicts (Eisenhardt, Reference Eisenhardt1989; Kivisto, Reference Kivisto2008). The misalignment may be because of self-interest or because universities leaders and faculty are pulled toward goals simply different from those of the principals (state or founders) (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Bleikle, Reference Bleiklie1998; Kivisto, Reference Kivisto2008). For instance, universities may pursue a research and graduate agenda in the pursuit of academic prestige when the state prioritizes undergraduate education and workforce alignment. Agency theory may be a tool for countering mission drift (Morphew & Huisman, Reference Morphew and Huisman2002) and institutional striving (O’Meara, Reference O’Meara and Smart2007) to align University objectives with those of its principles.
Agency theory suggests that governing structures are created by the principals to set and articulate goals for the agents and then to oversee, monitor, and when necessary, correct their actions when they pursue their own self-interests. “Hence, governance structures are used to minimize the misalignment between the principals’ and agents’ goals, minimize agency costs, keep agents’ self-serving behaviors in check” (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016, p. 35). Governing bodies then act accordingly through the use of extrinsic rewards and punishments to steer the behavior of agents (Davis et al., Reference Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson1997). This is control-oriented governance (Franco-Santos et al., Reference Franco‐Santos, Nalick, Rivera‐Torres and Gomez‐Mejia2017).
The second theoretical tradition is that of stewardship theory. This theory stems from alternative assumptions to agency theory. Stewardship theory argues that the agents adopt a collectivist perspective, rather than individualistic, and seek to act in the best interests of the organization (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Schillemans & Bjurstrom, 2019) either because goals are aligned or because there is greater utility and returns for the agents to pursue principals’ goals (Davis et al., 2007; Van Puyvelde et al., Reference Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois and Jegers2012). In this framework, agents are committed to the organization and personally identify with it and its goals (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Davis, et al., 2007). These notions of affiliation, collective intent, and intrinsic rewards counter those of agency theory with the self-interested agents extrinsically motivated to be compliant. Executives and other agents see themselves as personally connected to the institutions and advancing a shared purpose. There is a moral dimension to this work, grounded in a sense of obligation (Hernandez, Reference Hernandez2012) and a level of trustworthiness between agents and principles (Davis et. al., 2007). Stewardship suggests significant autonomy for the agents regarding strategic and operational issues (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016).
The work of governance from this theoretical tradition is for the governing body “to support the president’s decision-making and to provide advice and counsel to the University’s leadership rather than engaging in excessive monitoring behaviors” (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016, p. 39). The governing assumptions are not oversight and compliance but consist of collaboration between principals and agents, self-management and agent discretion, and procedural and substantive independence (Schillemans & Bjurstrom, 2019).
Stakeholder theory, the third tradition, offers yet another perspective on governance by recognizing a broader set of principles. It argues that organizations have an array of stakeholders who have different expectations for, obligations to, dependencies on, and interactions with an organization (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Jongbloed et al., Reference Jongbloed, Enders and Salerno2008), even if they can be challenging to accurately and consistently define (Mitchell et al., Reference Mitchell, Agle and Wood1997; Van Puyvelde et al., Reference Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois and Jegers2012).
The primary role of governance via stakeholder theory is to represent the needs and interests of the diversity of stakeholders. These are individuals or collectives of individuals who to some notable extent have a relationship that is influential, legitimate, timely, and salient to the operation of the organization (Mitchell et al., Reference Mitchell, Agle and Wood1997). In a corporate context, this may mean shareholders as well as communities, suppliers, and customers. In a public higher education context, not only government interests matter, but those of employers, students and their families, alumni, donors, academics staff, and trade unions can be defined as stakeholders (Jongbloed et al., Reference Jongbloed, Enders and Salerno2008).
Governance from this tradition, therefore, is the mechanism to provide voice and lend influence to various stakeholders (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016) and to sort among those voices. A key element of governance is to leverage these stakeholder relationships to secure external resources and ensure the long-term well-being of the organization (Mampaey & Huisman, Reference Mampaey and Huisman2016). A fundamental aspect of governance is increased institutional responsiveness to outside expectations, demands, and opportunities, and to gain and sustain legitimacy of the University (Beerkens & Udam, Reference Beerkens and Udam2017; Christensen, Reference Christensen2011; Jongbloed et al., Reference Jongbloed, Enders and Salerno2008).
These three frameworks help ground the four emergent models of post-Soviet States in an explanatory context. While each exist as independent theories, their utility is increased through multidimensional application (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Schillemans & Bjurstrom, Reference Schillemans and Bjurstrøm2020; Van Puyvelde et al., Reference Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois and Jegers2012). The models here, including their compositions of the governing bodies, their scope of work, and their relationship to the ministries – the principals in these structures provide insights into the theoretical underpinnings that illuminate the different approaches (see Table 18.4). One can both identify the framework assumptions from which each structure is designed and the ways in which it seems to operate.
Table 18.4 Theoretical underpinning by governance structure
| Country | Agency theory | Stewardship theory | Stakeholder theory |
|---|---|---|---|
| academic focused: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan | designed and operated | operated | |
| state-extended: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan | designed and operated | ||
| internal/ixternal: Armenia, Estonia Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine | operated | designated | |
| external civic: Kazakhstan | operated | designated and operated |
The state-extended model reflects the assumptions of agency theory. In these cases, the ministry (the principal) oversees and directs the agents (rector), with a high degree of compliance and extrinsic motivations (rewards and punishments); the role of other stakeholders is minimal or nonexistent. The external civic model predominately reflects the ideas of stakeholder theory with broad representation and involvement by a variety of individuals. Depending on the degree of influence of the individuals who serve and how they see their role, they may well work on behalf of the institution to secure needed resources and help bolster its reputation. In the Kazakhstani context, because of the strong presence of government members and their surrogates, the external civic model may also serve the goals of the agency theory.
Regarding its connection to the state, the academic-focused model reflects the notions of stewardship theory, with its internal representation and focus on academic issues, and a leader elected by the academic staff and the seeming alignment of principals’ and agents’ goals. However, from an internal or organizational governance perspective, this model may well reflect the stakeholder model, given its broad representation of internal stakeholders (not external principals) and the focus of its work on lending voice to institutional, particularly academic, decisions. The internal/external model seems to reflect the stakeholder theory as it gives voice to a range of individuals and recognizes that internal staff too have perspective and important voice in University governance. This structure seems to view academic staff as both principals and as agents.
Finally, what may matter most to understanding the patterns of governance through these theoretical models is not the structures themselves, but how the structures operate. For example, Moldova and Armenia’s governing bodies include external individuals (internal/external model) as does Kazakhstan (external civic model), yet the composition of those external participants is strongly tied to, appointed by, or consist of governmental officials. Because the key stakeholder is the government, these structures may actually operate as an agency model, based on compliance and oversight rather than cooperation between principals and agents and a level of procedural and substantive autonomy.
18.5 Conclusion: Questions Remaining
This chapter sought to describe and begin to categorize the different approaches to University governance found across the fifteen post-Soviet countries. What it doesn’t accomplish is to describe how these models work or their appropriateness or effectiveness. As the criticism of Armenian University governance demonstrates (Smith & Hamilton, Reference Smith and Hamilton2015), how these structures are used varies and their operation matters.
The transition to external civic boards in Kazakhstan is also a new and relatively novel approach for this part of the world. It is one that differs in key ways from the US, Canadian, and UK models of independent boards because of the composition of these boards with governmental presence. For instance, Canadian law prevents members of government from serving on its public University boards (Shanahan, Reference Shanahan2019). While in the United States, state governors often do hold appointments as ex officio members of boards, they are rarely active participants (Association of Governing Boards, 2016a). This is not the case in Kazakhstan. These universities seek influential individuals to serve on boards, and for many that means individuals from the government or with strong ties to it.
The next chapters offer further investigation into the efficacy of the models that emerged since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. How well do these models reflect the University governance needs of their respective national contexts? What do we know about what the various structures are able to accomplish given University needs and the contexts in which they operate?
This chapter begins to ask about the appropriateness of the governance structures given context. Chapter 18 described the structures of governance. This chapter seeks to understand what those structures might mean.
Governance does not happen in isolation from the policy area and institutional activity. Rather, it is the bridge between them. “The purpose of governance is to assure that higher education’s stakeholders are able to achieve the goals they have for the enterprise” (OECD, Reference Maassen, Amaral, Bleiklie and Musselin2017b, p. 260). How well a particular approach to governance is designed to serve as this bridge is important to this discussion, and the focus of this chapter and the next. The previous comparison chapter highlights four different patterns of University governance structure across the fifteen countries of focus – academic-focused, state-extended, internal/external, and the external civic.
Governance is about execution, the ability of agents to carry out the wishes of principals (Austin & Jones, Reference Austin and Jones2016; Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama2013). Therefore, the question explored here is how appropriately structured is the approach to governance suited for the principals’ aims given the realities of the context in which the universities operate? The fact that the performance of governing bodies is extremely difficult to discern (Chait, Holland & Taylor, 1993; Daily, Dalton & Cannella, Reference Daily, Dalton and Cannella2003; Forbes & Milliken, Reference Forbes and Milliken1999) makes understanding the degree of fit between the governance context and the structure a plausible logic to explore.
Structure is not the only factor in governance capacity. Execution matters – how well the governance actors operate within the presented structures. Common wisdom as well as academic research acknowledge that the use of organizational and decision-making structures may have little relationship to their intended objectives and expectations of their designers (Brunsson & Olsen, Reference Brunsson and Olsen1997; Jibladze, Reference Jibladze2017). “Reform and response will thus not be the outcome of a near perfect rational choice but will be limited in its capacity to deal with complex realities” (Enders, de Boer & Weyer, 2012, p. 9). Structures do the best they can but are unlikely perfect. However, they do matter, as they provide the framework for action, and they must operate in the given context.
This chapter focuses on the nexus of two elements, bureaucratic or public sector capacity and autonomy, drawing on the framework of Fukuyama (Reference Fukuyama2013). Chapter 20 retains the dual-element focus and changes the second dimension to the amount of competition in the system, using the logic of Aghion, Dewatripont, Hoxby Mas-Colell, Sapir, and Jacobs (Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010). Both chapters use dimensions of autonomy as a common anchor.
19.1 Autonomy as Common Anchor
Autonomy is the organization’s ability and capacity to act in relationship to its environment, independent from external control (Enders, de Boer & Weyner, Reference Enders, De Boer and Weyer2013). It is an important condition that allows universities to fulfill their missions (EUA, 2017) and ensures that organizations have the authority and capacity to direct their own efforts rather than have them dictated for them. It is a key indicator of organizational development (Brunnson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2010). Finally, autonomy isn’t an absolute but rather is “contextually and political defined” (Neave, 1988, p. 31) and it evolves in response to changing conditions and policy connections. Thus, it varies across country and within policy contexts.
To determine the levels and forms of autonomy across the fifteen countries in this project, the analysis draws on the University Autonomy in Europe framework advanced by the European Universities Association (EUA). This comprehensive framework investigates autonomy across four different dimensions, collectively drawing on over thirty indicators (EUA, 2017):
organizational – a University’s capacity to determine its internal organization and decision-making processes;
financial – a University’s ability to manage its funds and allocate its budget independently;
staffing – a University’s ability to recruit and manage its human resources as it sees fit; and
academic – a University’s capacity to manage its internal academic affairs independently.
Where data is available about the post-Soviet countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), this effort draws directly upon the EUA’s scorecard. Outside of the European scorecard effort, EUA independently conducted autonomy audits of Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine as part of the ATHENA project 2012–2015 (EUA, 2015). The effort produced percentage scores and narrative insight to classify the autonomy level of each country. The remaining nine countries are assigned autonomy levels based on our own rough analysis, as described below. Kazakhstan also had its level of autonomy assessed (EUA, 2018). Since the time of that report, the different levels of autonomy by institutional mission have been consolidated into a common approach. Kazakhstan continues its transition toward governmental goals of increased autonomy, and it remains in transition (Hartley, et al, 2015). Thus, we rely only peripherally on the EUA report. Because a comprehensive analysis of autonomy in former Soviet countries does not exist, this analysis draws on data collected at different points in time, beginning in 2015 (for the ATHENA project countries) through 2021.
Particularly relevant to University governance structures are three dimensions of the EUA framework – organizational, financial, and academic autonomy. The staffing dimension is a management issue and thus not included in this governance analysis. For non-EUA countries, we developed rough (and comparably incomplete) indicators of autonomy based on information in the country profiles, drawing on select indicators from the EUA framework. Specifically for organizational autonomy, we considered the ability of the governing body to hire and fire the president or rector; for financial autonomy, the ability to determine budgets and to generate and keep revenue; and for academic autonomy, the ability to determine academic program offerings and the curricula of those programs. These are focused but also limited conceptualizations of autonomy compared to the comprehensive EUA scorecard framework. Given the lack of numerical scores parallel to EUA’s efforts, each was assigned a mid-range number for comparison. This is not ideal; however, the focus of this effort is not to determine, benchmark, or evaluate autonomy but rather to understand the appropriateness of the governance structure to context. Autonomy is a central element of that context and modest indicators satisfice for this purpose.
Following the lead of EUA (2017), we classify each remaining country’s higher education system level of autonomy across a four-part scale: high, medium-high, medium-low, and low. Table 19.1 provides a snapshot of country-level autonomy.
Table 19.1 Levels of higher education autonomy by country
| Levels of autonomy | Country |
|---|---|
| high levels | Estonia, Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev University) |
| medium-high levels | Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan (State Universities) |
| medium-low levels | Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine |
| low levels | Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan |
19.2 Governance Structure via Capacity and Autonomy
One way to understand the appropriateness of University governing structures is through the nexus of capacity, the ability of the governance system to produce and execute, and autonomy, its level of discretion it has to carry out its functions. Fukuyama (Reference Fukuyama2013) argues that public sector or bureaucratic capacity and autonomy are two contextual dimensions that while independent must be appropriately aligned within a governance context. “More or less autonomy can be a good or bad thing depending how much underlying capacity a bureaucracy has” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama2013, p. 360). Autonomy is important because it leads to creative problem solving and, where it aligns with capacity, has fewer transactional costs than compliance. Autonomy increases when there are fewer rules and broader mandates, with a decentralized or local locus of control rather than a centralized state one.
More or less bureaucracy also can be a good or bad thing depending on the amount and type of autonomy. A low-quality bureaucracy can have too much autonomy allowing decision-makers to pursue poor priorities and in extreme situations can lead to high corruption. Fukuyama (Reference Fukuyama2013) posits Klitgaard’s (1988) formula Corruption = Discretion – Accountability as extreme evidence. See Osipian (Reference Osipian2017) for a discussion of the relationship between autonomy and corruption in Ukrainian higher education as an example from the region.
A high-quality bureaucracy also can have too little autonomy constraining its professionals. “The higher the capacity of a bureaucracy, then, the more autonomy one would want to grant them” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama2013, p. 361). Given the capacity of the governance structure, the problem also can be one of excessive rules or excessive discretion. In a low-quality situation, one would need extensive rules to guide actor behavior. “If an agency were full of incompetent, self-dealing, political appointees, one would want to limit their discretion and subject them to clear rules” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama2013, p. 360). A paper on reform in Ukrainian higher education addresses this point by asking, “What level of self-governance can be delegated to the organizations, which have little public trust, yet receive considerable public funding? How one can provide more autonomy to highly centralised institutions without turning them into feudal domains of the individual rectors?” (Sovsun, Reference Sovsun and Nikolaiev2017, p. 9). Capacity linked to autonomy is needed to address these potential shortcomings. On the other hand, in a high-quality structure, one would not want to limit the professional judgment through overly cumbersome rules to encourage innovative problem solving. “In a high-capacity state, one would like to have more rather than less discretion” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama2013, p. 361).
This framework suggests that a relative ideal exists in balancing appropriate and corresponding levels of autonomy and capacity. It further suggests that changing a level of autonomy is best done in proportion to appropriate system capacity. More autonomy matches higher levels of capacity; less capacity is likely better aligned with low levels of autonomy. In the University governance context, then, systems with high capacity should have high levels of autonomy, and the inverse would also be desirable.
However, there exists a possible paradox in this rationale worthy of attention. One might argue that if the government cannot function well, delegation may be the answer, removing decision-making out of central control to devolved control. The challenge here is that the State likely doesn’t have the capacity to monitor performance across a set of autonomous entities. The policy guardrails and accountability frameworks likely needed to ensure that the delegated powers are functioning with the country’s best interests at a variety of local levels won’t exist.
Autonomy, Capacity, and Governance Structures
This analysis focuses on the perceived levels of capacity or quality of the bureaucracy and the level of autonomy provided to its institutions. It then overlays the current University governance structure over these dimensions to determine the extent to which the approach seems to map appropriately onto country-level government quality and autonomy. Does the structure provide too much autonomy given capacity? Does capacity seem to outstrip the level of autonomy?
To determine country context regarding quality and government capacity, this analysis draws on a set of indicators from the World Bank (WB) (2019) and World Economic Forum (WEF) (Schwab, Reference Schwab2019) to develop an estimate of bureaucratic capacity. These indicators were not developed for this purpose, so the analysis is indirect and likely inexact. Each indicator independently measures other aspects associated with governance capacity, not those directly associated with higher education. They also focus on the government’s capacity, not universities’ capacities. And although there is a distinction between these two levels, they should be somewhat related. As a set, the indicators provide a general sense of the quality contexts in which each country’s public universities are operating. This is as much as we can accomplish here.
For government capacity, a composite indicator was created from a simple average of percentile scores of WB Governance Indicators: (1) control of corruption, (2) rule of law, (3) regulatory quality, (4) government effectiveness, and (5) voice and accountability. We created a composite score of WB indicators.
The World Bank Governance Indicators were selected because as a set they represent elements likely important to University governance.
Control of corruption and rule of law address issues important to fidelity to laws and policy and the collective good, ensuring that institutional priorities are placed ahead of individual ones and that public resources are likely spent for public gains and not private ones.
Regulatory quality and government effectiveness address issues related to the quality of public sector services and regulations, the ability of governmental actors to set appropriate rules and follow them and the belief that those rules are constructive as intended, and the level of governmental credibility.
Voice and accountability are relevant because they address issues such as freedom of expression and commentary, important elements of independent higher education and because universities are public goods and should reflect collective social values and priorities.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) offers a complementary set of indicators that also may matter to public University governance. Two of WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index rankings of public sector performance and the future orientation of the government seem useful (Schwab, Reference Schwab2019).
Public sector performance addresses the ability of governments to meet their mandate without overly cumbersome regulation, similar to the World Bank’s government effectiveness variable. The future orientation of the government is important to this project because universities are a key component of creating a favorable future for the country in terms of educating the future workforce and providing inputs for the future economy of a country. How well a government looks to the future may impact its efforts related to higher education. WEF includes a corporate governance indicator, which at one point we thought might be a parallel for public governance in terms of auditing and accounting standards, conflict of interest regulation and shareholder governance, and addresses the governance ethos that exists in the country, albeit in the private sector. However, in the end, because the levers of corporate and higher education governance are different, it is not included in this analysis. For public sector effectiveness and the future orientation of government, we created percentile rankings compared to the countries in the total WEF data set. Data for Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan did not appear in the WEF data.
For each of the two sets of indicators we developed a percentile score for each country. This percentile score is across the whole data set, for instance across approximately 140 countries in the WEF project. We then rank ordered the 15 post-Soviet countries against each other and classified the country into quartiles – low, medium-low, medium-high, high – to parallel the autonomy assessments for rough comparison.
Because the World Bank and World Economic Forum rely on different indices, the comparative rankings of the country set differed, particularly in the middle portion of the fifteen countries. Estonia and Lithuania consistently were at the top and Kyrgyzstan was at the bottom. Belarus and Turkmenistan also scored low on WB indicators and were not included in the WEF set. Latvia ranked third in the WB indicators but dropped to sixth in the WEF set. Georgia also ranked comparatively high in the WB set at fourth but was ninth in the WEF data. Moldova was seventh comparably in the WB data but twelfth in WEF data. Russia, on the other hand, was low in WB indicators (tenth) but fifth in the WEF indicators. To iron out these differences, a simple average of averages was calculated of the two composite scores for a grand composite. Again, the analysis is not aiming for specificity as much as a general understanding of context.
These scores are unweighted and the relationships between them unexplored. Both are worthy of deeper examination, but that is beyond the scope of this chapter.
We classify level of governance capacity in quartiles as determined by their comparative percentile rankings: 100–76 as high (H); 75–51 as medium-high (MH); 50–26 as medium-low (ML); and 25 and under as low (L). See Table 19.2 for the WB, WEF, and composite assessments.
Table 19.2 Governance capacity percentile averages and comparative ranking and assessment
| Country | World Bank indicators (rank) | WEF indicators (rank) | Grand composite (rank) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armenia | 52 (5) MH | 53 (8) MH | 53 (5) MH |
| Azerbaijan | 30 (11) ML | 67 (3) MH | 48 (7) ML |
| Belarus | 33 (9) ML | NA | NA |
| Estonia | 89 (1) H | 83 (1) H | 86 (1) H |
| Georgia | 70 (4) MH | 51 (9) MH | 60 (4) - MH |
| Kazakhstan | 43 (6) ML | 61 (4) MH | 52 (6) - MH |
| Kyrgyzstan | 27 (12) ML | 23 (13) L | 25 (13) L |
| Latvia | 78 (3) H | 54 (6) MH | 66 (3) MH |
| Lithuania | 80 (2) H | 70 (2) MH | 75 (2) MH |
| Moldova | 42 (7) ML | 37 (12) ML | 39 (9) ML |
| Russia | 32 (10) ML | 57 (5) ML | 44 (8) ML |
| Tajikistan | 10 (14) L | 47 (10) ML | 28 (12) ML |
| Turkmenistan | 5 (15) L | NA | NA |
| Ukraine | 37 (8) ML | 41(11) ML | 39 (10) ML |
| Uzbekistan | 17 (13) L | NA | NA |
These tables allow for descriptively plotting Fukuyama’s two dimensions – bureaucratic capacity and autonomy (see Figure 19.1). The figure indicates the low to high levels of autonomy and capacity given the two scales. One slope (solid line) indicates an idealized one-to-one assumed relationship that we developed for lack of clear alternatives. (See Chapter 21 for questions for further research to better explore this relationship). The second dotted line shows the relative slope across the set of the fifteen countries for a comparative understanding.
Figure 19.1 Bureaucratic capacity and autonomy by country
Figure 19.1 graphically describes the autonomy levels of the HE system and the general bureaucratic capacity in which universities operate. We wanted to create a visual summary to frame the discussion. It is not intended to demonstrate inferential analysis. Using the assumed one-to-one relationship, the capacity and autonomy of the context seem to correspond to each other well for Estonia, Lithuania, Armenia, and Turkmenistan, even though they are at different points on the slope with differing but with corresponding levels of autonomy and bureaucratic capacity. Based on the countries’ relationship to the idealized capacity-autonomy slope, Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Belarus seem to have bureaucratic capacity that outstrips their levels of autonomy. Inversely, Moldova, Ukraine, Latvia, and Kazakhstan seem to have greater autonomy given their levels of inferred bureaucratic capacity. Thus, to create appropriately aligned governance contexts, those countries above the solid line would need to shift to the right to increase autonomy, freeing their universities from excessive constraint. Those below the line would need to move left for lesser autonomy to align with system capacity.
Comparatively, similar but not exact patterns exist using a within-group slope: Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Latvia, and Moldova have autonomy levels that outpace their levels of capacity in contrast to the other countries in this set (see the dotted line in Figure 19.1). Turkmenistan, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Tajikistan all have relative excess capacity compared to their levels of autonomy.
To what extent do the current governance structures of post-Soviet universities align with the governing contexts? Chapter 18 identified four models of University governance – academic-focused, state-extended, internal/external, and external civic. Given that policymakers are more likely to alter level of autonomy – limit it or increase it through regulatory change– as compared to have the ability to readily alter bureaucratic capacity in all of its complexity, the analysis defaults to autonomy as the potentially modified variable in this discussion.
The analysis allows one to speculate about the appropriateness of various models in different contexts. It provides a framework to speculate and raise questions, make inferences (Table 19.3).
Table 19.3 Country governance structure and capacity/autonomy levels and ratio
| Governance structure/country | Capacity/autonomy | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| state-extended | ||
| Azerbaijan | MH/L | insufficient autonomy |
| Belarus | L/ML | insufficient autonomy |
| Russia | MH/ML | insufficient autonomy |
| Tajikistan | ML/L | insufficient autonomy |
| Turkmenistan | L/L | appropriate |
| Uzbekistan | L/L | appropriate |
| academic-focused | ||
| Georgia | MH/ML | insufficient autonomy |
| Kyrgyzstan | L/L | appropriate |
| internal/external | ||
| Armenia | MH/MH | appropriate |
| Estonia | H/H | appropriate |
| Latvia | MH/MH | appropriate |
| Lithuania | MH/MH | appropriate |
| Moldova | ML/ML | excess autonomy |
| Ukraine | ML/ML | excess autonomy |
| external civic | ||
| Kazakhstan | MH/MH | appropriate |
The state-extended models not surprisingly exist in countries with low autonomy – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. However, the bureaucratic capacity levels of Azerbaijan and Russia are medium-high and that of Tajikistan and Belarus are medium-low, suggesting that each of these countries have autonomy levels that seem too low by comparison to capacity levels. The capacity of Azerbaijan seems high given the country’s government and its authoritarianism (Freedom House, Reference Donina, Meoli and Peleari2022). That may be due to the WEF indicators selected for this analysis that focus on future orientation and public sector capacity, both of which may be strong in that country’s form of political governance (Figure 19.2).
Figure 19.2 State-extended governance structures by autonomy and capacity
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have strongly governmentally driven University governance structures via the state-extended model that seem appropriate for the context in which those universities are operating – low capacity and low autonomy. A state-extended structure in which the government makes the most of the relevant decisions and appointments may suit those contexts well. However, for other countries, that have bureaucratic capacity that surpasses autonomy, a different University governance structure that can take advantage of capacity and autonomy may be beneficial. The state-extended model likely does not allow this, meaning that capacity goes untapped, and the system may be overly constrained by its governance approach of an extended state.
The second model, academic-focused, appears in Georgia and Kyrygstan.Footnote 1 Georgia has medium-low levels of autonomy and capacity; Kyrgyzstan is low on both dimensions. The academic-focused model suggests a level of institutional insularity – for instance, the rector is elected from within the University and the primary actors in governance are internal to the University. Two points can be inferred from the Georgia example: First, the system seems to have insufficient autonomy for its bureaucratic capacity. More autonomy may benefit its universities to act and remove some governance burden from the administration. Second, the governance structure with its insularity and focus on academic issues may align well with the comparatively low levels of autonomy but doesn’t take advantage of bureaucratic capacity. As the analysis by Dobbins and Khachatryan (Reference Dobbins and Khachatryan2015) indicate, the context has elements both of autonomy and authoritarian control. Expanding the scope and levels of autonomy and adopting a different governance model may best take advantage of capacity levels and move its institutions out of this paradoxical context. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, has low levels of both autonomy and capacity. It’s context more closely resembles that of the state-extended models above. Its academic focus may work against a University system that likely benefits most from close ties to the government. This model limits organization effectiveness in a low capacity, low autonomy environment; the state-extended model may yield tighter beneficial relations with the State.
The internal/external governance structures are most prevalent in countries with high and medium-high capacity and autonomy, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in Armenia with similar medium-high capacity but with a level of medium-low autonomy (see Figure 19.3). Two other countries also followed the internal/external model, Moldova and Ukraine, and they are examples of this type of governance model within medium-low autonomy and capacity. They are also the only two with dual governance structures, the second being academic-focused Academic Councils. Moldova and Ukraine are two countries in this set with seemingly excess autonomy given bureaucratic capacity. The other countries with internal/external governance models had a balanced ratio between capacity and autonomy. This model reflects the greatest variation across contexts from medium-low to high in both dimensions.
Figure 19.3 Internal/external structures by autonomy and capacity
Given that Moldova and Ukraine are countries with medium-low autonomy and capacity, the internal/external governing model may be underperforming or at least not function in ways for which the University governance structure was designed. Its bicameral governance structure means that the internal/external body, which is comprises mostly external members, is balanced with staff-dominated Academic Councils (academic-focused model). Given medium-low capacity, this may mean that the independent elements of these models may underperform; the capacity isn’t there. Concurrently, if the capacity exists, the medium-low autonomy may mean that these bodies are unable to take advantage of that autonomy to advance institutional priorities. Insights from the country profiles suggest that those with lower levels of capacity and autonomy have operational challenges of this system with undue governmental influence and in the case of Armenia a recent history of corruption (Smith & Hamilton, Reference Smith and Hamilton2015).
The three countries with the highest levels of autonomy and that also have comparatively high levels of bureaucratic capacity adopted these models of external and internal stakeholders. They may be well suited for these contexts. The governing context is different for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania than Ukraine and Moldova, although the University governance structures are similar. Thus, questions exist as to which context allows for effective and efficient use of a common structure and how well those structures can operate in their relative contexts? A second way to think about this difference is to consider who the stakeholders are participating in this structure. Evidence from Moldova, as well as Armenia, suggests that government actors and affiliates fill seats that can be reserved for external board members such as corporate or community leaders and educators. Thus, in medium-low autonomy contexts, the government retains a strong degree of influence through a structure that operates differently in high and medium-high autonomy contexts.
The external civic model, which in many ways is structured similarly to governing boards in the United States and United Kingdom, appears only in Kazakhstan and this is a relatively new approach for that country, with the exception of Nazarbayev University starting its second decade of operation. That country’s levels of autonomy and capacity are both medium-high but with what seems like excess levels of autonomy given bureaucratic capacity. Two potential scenarios exist. One is that the governance structure is ahead of the country’s capacities and level of granted autonomy. Thus, an external civic structure is created for a future context and having this in place may permit progress toward increased autonomy. Decision-makers are planning for a future not yet arrived and thus they will need to do the due diligence to ensure its arrival. The second possibility is that the structures, although intended to have strong external presence across a range of industries and sectors, still operates predominately or strongly with governmental influence; they are versions of state-extended models but portend to be something different. In the post-Soviet context, this may be a retrograde approach to University governance.
19.3 Making Sense of Capacity and Autonomy
This analysis across the set of fifteen former Soviet countries demonstrates a variety of governance structures situated in differing contexts. Those University systems with state-extended structures tend to be in low autonomy contexts. This is not surprising and offers confirmation that universities in low autonomy and capacity contexts may need different things from governance as compared to universities operating in other contexts. That said, based on the indicators used here, many of these countries seem to have bureaucratic capacity that outpace their levels of autonomy. This mismatch raises the question: to what extent might these universities be more efficiently, and possibly effectively, governed with a governance structure and policy schema that allowed them the autonomy to take advantage of capacity? Some countries seem to have excess bureaucratic capacity but do not leverage it and instead align University governing bodies with low levels of autonomy.
A second observation is that the internal/external model exists across a variety of capacity/autonomy levels. The similar governance structure model appears in contexts ranging from high autonomy/high capacity contexts (Lithuania) to medium-low autonomy/medium-low capacity contexts (Moldova). Unlike the state-extended structures that clustered at one end of the continuum, this model appeared across diverse contexts. This raises the question of how well these models work given their design across the capacity variations? Is there operational variation within this model depending on context? Asked another way, is there a difference between how this model works in Lithuania as compared to Moldova? We do know that Moldova adopted a different version of this model with its two parallel bodies as compared to Lithuania’s single governing body.
Relatedly, how much external voice truly exists in the internal/external structure when autonomy and capacity are low? What happens when governmental officials serve in what may be nongovernmental positions on governing boards? The critical review of Armenian University governance provides one lens into these questions (Smith & Hamilton, Reference Smith and Hamilton2015).
Third, Kazakhstan is the outlier governing structure with its external civic approach. Yet Kazakhstan’s universities seem to be operating in a medium-high autonomy and capacity context. We also know that Kazakhstan’s autonomy is a relatively new phenomenon, and the country continues to have growing pains related to it (Hartley et al., 2015). What it says on paper and in its laws may be slow to evolve in reality. This structure creates a distance from direct governance involvement and from internal stakeholders (such as academic staff). This model may better suit high-autonomy/high-capacity contexts because it allows more flexibility at the local level to pursue strategies that the University deemed valuable and have the capacity to pursue priorities that matter to the University and have less risk of inefficiency or in worse cases corruption. Because of its distance from government, the model places more responsibility and higher expectations on an independent body to act effectively and in ways that can take advantage of its context. The external civic structure also seems the model best suited for high-capacity contexts as it requires much from an independent board. The question to ask, particularly following the civil unrest in that country in winter 2022, is to what extent does the system have the needed capacity via its independent governance, or is the structure too far ahead of the policy context? And if it is ahead of the policy context is this newly adopted structure able to move the needle on autonomy and gain the needed capacity to govern well?
Implications for Policymakers and Campus Leaders
This preliminary exploration raises three implications for policymakers and campus leaders. First, a group of countries have governance structures that may be out of alignment with their autonomy and bureaucratic capacity levels. University administrators and policymakers might be well-served by exploring alternative structures to governance that allow them to take advantage of autonomy and capacity levels. If universities are not leveraging their given autonomy and capacity, they may be working inefficiently. In practical terms, universities with capacity that outpaces autonomy may be well suited for governing in a more autonomous context and thus they can make the case for increased autonomy. Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia might benefit from increased autonomy given the indices of bureaucratic capacity used here. However, except for Georgia with its internal/external model, the other countries noted have state-extended governance structures. Thus, in addition to making the case for increased autonomy, they might also need simultaneous reform of their governance structures, moving to less direct control and adopting the internal/external model per other more autonomous post-Soviet countries.
Second, it seems like some University systems have excess autonomy that may not be supported by their levels of bureaucratic capacity – particularly Moldova and Ukraine. The mismatch may mean that these systems do not have sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure adherence to higher education goals and priorities, might allow for universities to pursue their own priorities rather than those linked to stated educational objectives, and in worse case situations allow for corruption. Some writers have been critical of Ukrainian higher education on this point (Osipian, Reference Osipian2017, for example). Thus, these countries might be better served by constraining some levels of autonomy or putting in place safeguards to prevent poor governance. The safeguards might be differently structured governance systems and new accountability schema with clear country-level goals. The more complex undertaking is to increase the bureaucratic capacity for oversight and strategy and this too may mean new governance structures, which, for example, involving members of government or their surrogates more intentionally.
Finally, those universities in countries with high capacity and high autonomy might be better served by considering an external civic model of governance. The likely policy and governance questions focus on issues of relevance, responsiveness, and performance. Given high levels of capacity and autonomy, the compliance-focused governance approaches with less capacity is likely under delivering. One might argue that boards that are external to the University minimize stakeholder or representative conflicts of interest. As Harvard sociologist David Reisman is reported to have said, “the role of governance is to protect the future from the demands of the present” (Bowen & Tobin, Reference Bowen and Tobin2015). Thus, a broader representative stakeholder board that is external to the University may be better suited to serve as a bridge to different social and economic sectors, serve as collaborators on strategy, and balance internal decision structures. They would avoid or at least minimize representatives advocating their own positions rather than considering the good of the University as a whole (Shanahan, Reference Shanahan2019). The author’s personal experience with a representative University board in Canada suggests that University insiders dominate conversations more than external members in board meetings because they are more knowledgeable about University activities, and because they have a stronger self-interest. They also view their roles as advocating on behalf of their constituents rather than taking a broader University perspective. That said, external civic boards require the most board education because their members are not of the academy or all from the government. And effective governance via this structure does not happen naturally or easily but demands a high degree of intentionality from member selection through meeting organizations and board leadership (Chait et al., Reference Chait, Ryan and Taylor2005; Eckel & Trower, Reference Eckel and Trower2018).
How appropriate are the University governance structures in former Soviet countries for their expected tasks and in their respective contexts? Chapter 19 considered the appropriateness of University governance structures given the nexus of autonomy and capacity for each of the fifteen countries and the four identified models of University governance. It was a perspective focused on assumed capacity to govern given levels of autonomy. Keeping the focus on autonomy consistent, this second exploration considers the level of competition among universities as a salient contextual element important to governance (Marginson & Considine, Reference Marginson and Considine2000; Musselin, Reference Musselin2018; Pucciarelli & Kaplan, Reference Pucciarelli and Kaplan2016). Competition in higher education consists of a set of organizational responses to environmental pressures (Schofield et al., Reference Schofield, Cotton, Gresty, Kneale and Winter2013). It focuses on what universities must do to attract financial resources; recruit students and staff, both foreign and domestic; be part of the global research enterprise; and, for many, pursue world class status (Salmi, Reference Salmi2009) and global rankings (Hazelkorn, Reference Hazelkorn2015).
On a more pragmatic level, competition also becomes a way to direct organizational priorities and focus attention. Viewed in this way, competition also becomes its own type of “external discipline” (Aghion et al., Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010, p. 45). The more competition in a system, the more universities must focus attention on requisite inputs – such as students, tuition, and funding. This in turn creates an alternative type of accountability system, one that is market driven rather than government mandated.
The competitive lens is important to higher education and a counter to direct government oversight because effective governmental accountability and steering can be difficult to do given the nature of higher education. First, as Aghion et al. (Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010) argue, the production function of universities is difficult to observe and understand, therefore centralized government control may be less effective than making organizations compete for resources and inputs. Competition thus serves as a guardrail against institutions pursuing their own objectives. Second, according to Aghion and colleagues, high levels of competition and autonomy are linked to high levels of productivity, at least in terms of research indicators. Third, using the United States as an example, the authors argue that its low levels of guaranteed funding and at best mediocre student inputs (based on the relatively poor performance of US schools on primary and secondary assessments as compared to other countries), further coupled with the existence of high caliber universities, seems to suggest high levels of performance from high levels of competition and autonomy. This high level of performance of US higher education system at the country level was further verified by a comparative study of national level higher education systems by Williams et al. (Reference Williams, De Rassenfosse, Jensen and Marginson2013).
Competition is an increasingly important topic of policy discussion around the globe. However, when coupled with autonomy, its role becomes clearer as these two dimensions work as a set. An imbalance in one against the other creates inefficiencies in the system. Write Aghion and colleagues:
There is some danger in giving universities great autonomy if they are not in an environment disciplined by competition for research funding, faculty and students. The autonomy might be used to pursue goals other than expanding University outputs that are valued by society. There is little point in promoting competition among universities if they do not have sufficient autonomy to respond with more productive, inventive, or efficient programs.
20.1 Tides of Competition in Post-Soviet Higher Education
Before this examination of competitiveness and autonomy and its link to University governance structures, we need to note that higher education competition is a relatively new aspect for some of the University systems in this study. Centralization and coordination, and not competition, clearly was the modus operandi during Soviet times (Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020). All higher education institutions were under direct ministerial control (Froumin & Kouzminov, Reference Froumin, Kuzminov, Huisman, Smolentseva and Froumin2018), with little or no opportunity for choice of what programs to pursue, which students to admit, or what resources to secure and how to spend them. All governance decisions were centrally taken. Not until the time of Perestroika did competition emerge and HEIs begin to have opportunities to participate in (or were arguably thrust into) a global competition for research, students, and academic staff. “However, even in the extreme Soviet state-control model, HE providers and rival regions engaged in heavy competition over resources from the ‘‘party-state’” (Dobbins & Khachatryan, Reference Dobbins and Khachatryan2015, p. 193). Competition existed in higher education, just in a different form.
The competitive environment for higher education in the post-Soviet world, beginning in the 1990s, included introducing the privatization of higher education (Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020). During this period, a fundamental transformation took place when unregulated markets emerged, populated with low quality, unregulated providers. Cost sharing between the state and students for higher education also emerged because of cuts in public HE funding (Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020). Hence, HEIs began reinstating the new forms of funding beyond direct state support, including introducing tuition fees. Most countries adopted, over time, a dual-track tuition structure (except for Turkmenistan) with one group of students supported by state grants and others who self-funded their education (Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020). With the funding changes, came the relaxation of control in admissions, which according to some research (Gerber, 2007) was at the root of inequalities in access to higher education, given that the students from economically disadvantaged families were no longer able to afford higher education for which they now had to pay themselves. At the other end of the spectrum, some universities adjusted academic standards by enrolling less prepared students (Smoltenseva, Reference Smolentseva, Hoffman and Välimaa2016).
The gold standard of world class universities driven by their research rankings also emerged. “Research has long been organized as a competitive activity” (Musselin, 2018, p. 659). Global rankings dominated by research indicators further pushed universities to compete on a global level and created a global marketplace for research (Hazelkorn, Reference Hazelkorn2015; Tsvetkova & Lomer, Reference Tsvetkova and Lomer2019), even when it conflicted with nationalistic policies and sovereign goals (Makinen, Reference Makinen2021).
The privatizing reforms in higher education occurred in parallel to those elsewhere in the post-Soviet economy, including the privatization of state-owned enterprises and housing and efforts to transform different sectors via credits and loans from Western banks. The abrupt changes in both the government and the economy affected higher education and created an opening for the emergence of competition and an ecosystem to support it.
A caveat on competition. We admittedly use a Western, neoliberal-driven framework of competition and its assumptions. It is market-based; it is about accessing resources and capital (Aghion, et al, Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010; Musselin, Reference Musselin2018; Pucciarelli & Kaplan, Reference Pucciarelli and Kaplan2016). It also is about prestige and exists in a transnational context (Hazelkorn, Reference Hazelkorn2015; Makinen, Reference Makinen2021). Hasse and Krucken (Reference Hartley, Gopaul, Sagintayeva and Apergenova2013) argue that competition as a notion is shaped by context-specific logics (they compare businesses and universities, for instance). We recognize that the West and post-Soviet contexts had, have, and will likely advance different logics. “One of the first obstacles that hinders the inclusion of Russian universities in international rankings is that there are differences in interpretation and measurement in HEI’s effectiveness in Russia and western countries” (Mushketova et al., 2017, p. 50). Notions of Western, neoliberal competition may not strictly align with the post-Socialist notions of competition. This is particularly so, given the ongoing Soviet legacies in this region’s higher education (Froumin & Kouzminov, Reference Froumin, Kuzminov, Huisman, Smolentseva and Froumin2018). However, researchers note that these Western ideas of competition exist in the post-Soviet space, with two examples focusing specifically on Russia (Makinen, Reference Makinen2021; Tsvetkova & Lomer, Reference Tsvetkova and Lomer2019), even if there is tension between local and Western logics. Furthermore, the context-specific logics of competition in higher education also may not equally be supported across the fifteen very different countries that have different forms of universities, fund higher education in different ways and at different levels, use different accountability approaches, and that have policy schemas that prioritize and support priorities differently. Yet, factors that we take to infer competition do exist within and across the fifteen countries in this exploration. Smolentseva (Reference Smolentseva2020) provides an excellent study of the privatization of post-Soviet higher education through a lens of student markets, tuition fees, and private University growth. Her work is important and we use it here.
The aim is to understand in broad strokes how diversified, extensive, and intensive competition is along a set of compatible domains – ones for which secondary data is available to develop a composite picture that can be compared. This chapter focuses on the cumulative competitive environment that consists of international research productivity, domestic and international students, and funding via tuition fees. The indicators selected here are a mix of input (tuition fees) and output (research productivity) variables. We worked to find possible indicators that exist across most of the fifteen countries. The point is to try to capture the extent and magnitude of the overall competitive environment. We do not think a clear and comprehensive way exists to describe the competition levels within higher education. This is an imperfect attempt.
The chapter then explores the four different University governance models of this book – academic-focused, state-extended, internal/external, and external civic – within the comparative competitive and autonomous contexts.
Research Competition
To understand the extent to which research competition exists within each country, we looked at research output at the country level as a surrogate for research competition. Research productivity can be considered an indicator of a country’s ability to compete on a global research stage. The act of producing internationally recognized research and gaining acceptance in international journals requires scholars to conduct research that competes with other submissions, making successfully published research an illustration of competitive success. We used country level h-index scores obtained from Scimago.Footnote 1 H-index scores are commonly used indicators of research productivity, such as by QS World University RankingsFootnote 2 – and can be used to estimate country-level research output (Jacso, Reference Jacso2009). This index has its flaws, including being field dependent and rewarding established researchers (Bornmann & Daniel, Reference Bornmann and Daniel2008) who may exist in greater numbers in some countries rather than others, but the h-score index is a common framework to describe and compare research output. The latter shortcoming might make it more challenging for researchers in countries with less-established research agendas, but it also means that newcomers have overcome ingrained hurdles to become more competitive, possibly suggesting a disproportionate ability to compete. We converted the h-index country rank to percentiles (comparing against a reported 240 countries and localities). We assigned an assessment – high, medium-high, medium-low, and low quartiles – based on the derived percentile (Table 20.1).
Table 20.1 Country research productivity percentile ordinal rankings
| Country | h-index percentile |
|---|---|
| high | |
| Russia | 9 |
| Ukraine | 21 |
| Estonia | 22 |
| medium-high | |
| Lithuania | 25 |
| Armenia | 28 |
| Georgia | 29 |
| Belarus | 30 |
| Latvia | 35 |
| Azerbaijan | 40 |
| Moldova | 43 |
| Kazakhstan | 44 |
| medium-low | |
| Uzbekistan | 53 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 58 |
| low | |
| Tajikistan | 74 |
| Turkmenistan | 85 |
Student Competition
The second dimension of competition is the extent to which institutions compete for students. Here two dimensions may matter, internal country competition and competition for international students. (More on competing for student tuition fees below in the resources section.) One dimension is when state universities compete for in-country students against private higher education. The larger share of students enrolled in the private sector the greater the competition for public universities, which suggests that they do not compete well against private universities. Capacity of the public system may be a factor weakening this argument, particularly when universities are constrained in increasing their enrollment numbers. But considering the sector as a whole, the more institutions that exist means that each institution has to compete against a larger competitor set for students if enrollments are assumed to remain constant. At an extreme, for example, three universities are likely existing in a less competitive place than thirty-five institutions, particularly regarding competition for quality students.
Across the fifteen countries in this study, we found a mean private University enrollment at 14 percent. We grouped countries ordinally and clustered them based on their relationship to the mean and assigned them a ranking of high, medium-high (both above the mean, with high at least two times the mean) or medium-low and low (both below the mean, with low 50 percent or less of the mean) (Table 20.2).
Table 20.2 Grouped ordinal ranking of private higher education enrollments by percentage
| Country | Percent of private sector enrollment |
|---|---|
| high | |
| Kazakhstan | 52 |
| Georgia | 35 |
| medium-high | |
| Moldova | 23 |
| Latvia | 22 |
| medium-low | |
| Kyrgyzstan | 14 |
| Armenia | 12 |
| Russia | 10 |
| Azerbaijan | 9 |
| Estonia | 9 |
| Ukraine | 8 |
| low | |
| Belarus | 7 |
| Lithuania | 5 |
| Uzbekistan | 5 |
| Tajikistan | 0 |
| Turkmenistan | 0 |
Second, universities compete for international students as well as domestic ones. International student mobility creates its own set of competitive dynamics and does so in two different dimensions. The first is the ability to compete for international student enrollments. This is inward flow. The more competitive the sector the larger the share of international students it can attract. However, competition flows two ways, as universities within a country must compete against foreign universities seeking to capture their domestic students. Therefore, a country with a competitive international student market would be able to recruit students from abroad and prevent their students from leaving to study elsewhere – outbound flow.
The percentages of in- and outbound students from UNESCO’s study of student flow were the sources of evidence.Footnote 3 We recognize an important limitation, as in both instances government policy very likely may be a factor. Governments may actively recruit international students, or, conversely, they may create policy hurdles that limit inward mobility. (See, for instance, Mushketova et al., 2017, discussion on Russia). They may also establish barriers to outbound mobility or conversely fund programs that support outbound mobility, as in Kazakhstan’s Bolashak program, for instance (Perna et al., Reference Perna, Orosz and Jumakulov2015). Nevertheless, this exercise seeks to create a rough sense of competition within the higher education space in each country; and policy is part of that defining context.
Three patterns emerge across the inbound and outbound student data. One set of countries had a comparatively high percentage of inbound students with low shares of outbound students. Thus, the competitive context seems to be strong in those countries because they attract students from abroad and have few of their own students leave – Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The second set of countries are those with higher relative percentages of outbound students and comparably low levels of inbound students. They are likely characterized as weak competitive context countries because they lose domestic students and can’t attract international ones – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The final set are those institutions with similar levels of inbound and outbound students – Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Because they equally gain and lose students, we categorize those countries as competitively neutral even though they vary in the share of students sent and received. Included in this list is Turkmenistan, which does not report data on outbound students to UNESCO but it reports only 0.3 percent inbound students (Table 20.3).
Table 20.3 Percentages and ratios of inbound and outbound students in post-Soviet countries
| Country | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound/ outbound ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong competition | |||
| Latvia | 9.3 | 6.3 | 1:0.7 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 9 | 5.1 | 1:0.6 |
| Russia | 4.5 | 1 | 1:0.2 |
| Neutral competition | |||
| Armenia | 5.5 | 5.1 | 1:1 |
| Belarus | 4.3 | 5.8 | 1:1.3 |
| Estonia | 9.6 | 8 | 1:0.8 |
| Georgia | 8.1 | 7.5 | 1:0.9 |
| Lithuania | 5.3 | 8.8 | 1:1.7 |
| Turkmenistan | 0.3 | NA | NA |
| Ukraine | 3.5 | 4.5 | 1:1.3 |
| Weak competition | |||
| Azerbaijan | 2.2 | 21.8 | 1:1 |
| Kazakhstan | 3.3 | 13.2 | 1:4 |
| Moldova | 5.6 | 22.2 | 1:4 |
| Tajikistan | 0.8 | 7.5 | 1:9 |
| Uzbekistan | 0.2 | 12.3 | 1:61 |
Funding Competition
The third dimension of competition is funding. The focus here is on student-paid fees. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent countries faced times of austerity because of increased difficulties with taxation and/or because of competition with other public needs (Johnstone, Reference Johnstone2014). Higher costs in the higher education system, public sector austerity, and the introduction of tuition fee schemas during the times of independence in post-Soviet Union countries led to a marked difference in cost-sharing between universities and the state (Smolentseva et al., Reference Smolentseva, Huisman, Froumin, Huisman, Smolentseva and Froumin2018, Reference Smolentseva2020). The result was “a shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne exclusively or predominately by government to being shared with parents and students” (Johnstone, Reference Hammond and Ehrenberg2003, p. 351).
University funding in former Soviet countries predominantly comes from the state and follows three broad categories: (1) basic funding aimed at supporting the performance of basic tasks, (2) performance-based funding that incentivizes a variety of activities deemed important; and (3) an innovation-oriented component that enables University investments in strategic objectives (Ziegele, Reference Ziegele2013). However, universities in most former Soviet countries, particularly to fund the third objective, leverage dual-track tuition in which some students are supported by the state through scholarships and other students pay tuition fees (Ait Si Mhamed, Reference Ait Si Mhamed2017; Johnstone, Reference Johnstone2014; Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020).
The dual-track tuition approach both increases and diversifies University revenue as state funds do not always keep up with rising expenses. In fact, using Kazakhstan as an example, Ait Si Mhamed et al. (Reference Ait Si Mhamed, Vossensteyn and Kaša2021) found that public universities seem to prefer non-stipend students because state-supported students bring in less money per student than those who pay tuition. Without robust ways to compete for students and their tuition fees, a University’s access to an important source of funding is limited. Due to data challenges in this area, it is not easy to find supporting information about how important tuition fees are to overall Kazakhstani University budgets. However, in the 2020–2021 academic year, the total number of students enrolled was 576,557. Of this number, 196,100 students (which represents about 34 percent) have a state grant; and 380,500 students (which represents 66 percent) pay tuition fees. Ait Si Mhamed’s estimations suggest that the high rate of students paying for their studies indicates that universities make choices to compete for these students in ways that they do not for state grant students. State grants are highly regulated, and universities cannot reject any state grant students who decide to enroll at a designated University.
Smolentseva (Reference Smolentseva2020) reports that the percentage of fee-paying students varies across post-Soviet countries from a low of 7 percent in Turkmenistan to a high of 85 percent in Armenia and Georgia. Only in Estonia and Turkmenistan do less than 20 percent of students pay fees. Estonia abolished tuition fees for first-cycle, full-time students in 2021 (Smolentseva, Reference Smolentseva2020), thus only students outside of this group pay fees. Approximately half of students pay tuition fees in Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Moldova. Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan all have over 80 percent of students paying fees (see Table 20.4). The mean percentage of students paying tuition fees is 55 percent. This percentage becomes the threshold to determine the relative level of competition for fee paying students.
Table 20.4 Ordinal ranking of fee-paying students by percentage
| Countries | Percentage of fee-paying students |
|---|---|
| high | |
| Armenia | 85 |
| Georgia | 85 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 81 |
| medium-high | |
| Uzbekistan | 73 |
| Tajikistan | 68 |
| Azerbaijan | 61 |
| Moldova | 57 |
| medium-low | |
| Belarus | 54 |
| Russia | 50 |
| Ukraine | 49 |
| Latvia | 47 |
| Lithuania | 46 |
| Kazakhstan | 45 |
| low | |
| Estonia | 18 |
| Turkmenistan | 7 |
Toward a Competition Composite
From the above elements, a sense of the competitive context can be constructed. The aim is to offer a general understanding of competition within each national higher education system context by looking at the intensity within each and the breadth across the four elements. We treated each of the four indicators equally – research output, share of students enrolled in private universities, international student mobility (which itself consists of inbound and outbound mobility) and competition for fee paying students. They may have different weights in practice, the discerning of which is beyond the scope of this project but a valuable discussion to consider.
We assigned each item a score of 1 (low competition) to 4 (highly diversified competition) and created a country-level compositive score that had the possible range of 4 (all assigned low scores) to 16 (all assigned high scores), representing the most intensive and diversified competitive context. The competition array is presented in Figure 20.1. The countries with the highest diversified competition indexes were Georgia, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Armenia, and Latvia. Those in the least overall competitive contexts were Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Lithuania, and Azerbaijan.
Figure 20.1 Composite competition across PSS
The composite suggests that the contexts with the highest levels of competition are Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Latvia, and Russia. However, the types of competition vary across the set as the elements that make up the composites differ. For example, Georgia is highly competitive with tuition fees, regarding international students, and for research. Whereas Kyrgyzstan competitiveness is tied to tuition and international students but comparatively low on research and private University competition. Russia is low on tuition and private University competition but high in research and international students. Armenia is high on tuition and research but low on private University competition and international students. Competition levels may be similar but the dimensions on which they compete are different even in this rough analysis.
Like the capacity/autonomy comparison in Chapter 19, the following figure visually describes by country the array of competition and autonomy contexts. The competition axis has been adjusted to reflect the possible 4 as the lowest possible assigned competition score as 1 for each of the four areas and 16 as the highest level of competition across the four domains (4 x 4). Figure 20.2 presents the country scattergram plot of competition and autonomy. The solid line shows an assumed idealized one-to-one slope, the dotted line indicates the mean slope across the data set.
Figure 20.2 Competition and autonomy
Figure 20.2 describes the autonomy levels of the HE system and determined composite levels of competition by country context. While not making conclusive assessments, competition and autonomy seem to correspond well for those countries that fall along the idealized slope: Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Latvia. They appear at different points on the slope with differing but appropriate corresponding levels of autonomy and competition. For instance, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have low levels of autonomy but also face little competition. On the other hand, Latvia operates in a competitive context but has comparatively and compatibly high autonomy. Moldova is in the middle of both.
Based on the countries’ relationship to the competition–autonomy slope, countries such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Belarus, and Armenia seem to operate in competitive environments that outstrip their levels of granted autonomy. Inversely, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, and Estonia seem to have excess autonomy given their levels of competition in their University sectors. Thus, to create appropriately structured governance contexts, those countries above the line would need to shift to the right to increase autonomy to compete more effectively. Those below the line would need to move left for lesser autonomy to align with the levels of competition they face.
Policy can also adjust levels of competition. Another alternative for those countries above the line – Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, Belarus, and Armenia – is to constrain competition if universities are not granted more autonomy. Those countries below the line – Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Estonia – might find benefit from policy changes that increased competition for domestic and international students, for tuition paying students, and/or for research to better take advantage of their levels of autonomy.
Looking comparatively within this set (the dotted slope line), Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Russia could possibly benefit by gaining autonomy compared to other universities in this region who have high levels of competition. Conversely, Estonia and Kazakhstan as well as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan might need more competition to align with their levels of autonomy, benchmarking against other former Soviet countries. They could also be granted less autonomy. To simplify the discussion, this chapter draws upon the idealized one-to-one slope for its remaining discussions and comparisons.
20.2 Governing Appropriately in Context
This book works to develop a comparative understanding of University governance and its structures. We are not seeking inferential analysis but rather a descriptive understanding within and across contexts. The next step is to consider governance structure appropriateness for the context in terms of higher education competition and autonomy, paralleling the analysis in Chapter 19. To what extent do the current governance structures of universities in former Soviet states align with the autonomy and competition governing contexts? The comparative chapter identified four models of University governance – academic-focused, state-extended, internal/external, and external civic that organize this discussion.
Aghion et al. (Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010) argue autonomy and competition should work as a set and that there are optimal levels of balance between the two dimensions. Too much autonomy without the constraints of competition can be problematic. It might allow actors to pursue their own objectives without constraints, leading to inefficiencies. Competition sets safeguards on behavior. The same is also true in that too little autonomy in a highly competitive context can constrain actors so that they are unable to compete effectively. “Competition compels adaptation and those who do not compete successful are threatened by selective forces.” (Hasse & Krucken, Reference Hartley, Gopaul, Sagintayeva and Apergenova2013, p. 185). The competition–autonomy framework describes the “rules” for its universities to operate (Aghion, et al., Reference Aghion, Dewatripoint, Hoxby, Mas-Colell, Spair and Jacobs2010, p. 19), whereas the previous capacity–autonomy framework describes the structure’s capacity to adhere to and benefit from the rules. Because autonomy and competition also scale up and down together, like Fukuyama’s autonomy and capacity framework in Chapter 19, an assumed sloped line exists of appropriate sweet spots for governance structures that reflect this sliding intersection of competition and autonomy (see Table 20.5).
Table 20.5 Country governance structure and competition/autonomy levels and ratio
| Governance structure/country | Relationship | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| state-extended | |||
| Azerbaijan | appropriate | ||
| Belarus | increase autonomy / decrease competition | ||
| Russia | increase autonomy / decrease competition | ||
| Tajikistan | appropriate | ||
| Turkmenistan | appropriate | ||
| Uzbekistan | appropriate | ||
| academic-focused | |||
| Georgia | increase autonomy / decrease competition | ||
| Kyrgyzstan | increase autonomy/ decrease competition | ||
| internal/external | |||
| Armenia | increase autonomy / decrease competition | ||
| Estonia | decrease autonomy / increase competition | ||
| Latvia | decrease autonomy / increase competition | ||
| Lithuania | appropriate | ||
| Moldova | appropriate | ||
| Ukraine | appropriate | ||
| external civic | |||
| Kazakhstan | decrease autonomy / increase competition | ||
We can further extend this analysis to examine how the competitive landscape aligns with governance structures in each of the fifteen countries.
The state-extended model would seem most appropriate when low competition and low autonomy exist in tandem. The state directs higher education, provides the needed resources, and may put in place policies that limit competition. There are few incentives or opportunities to compete and therefore institutional autonomy is unwarranted. Governance structures, from this perspective, can and should be tied to the state. They likely have limited scopes of work beyond compliance and assuring progress on state-directed objectives. Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan seem to have appropriate governance structures for their competitive contexts.
Belarus and Russia, on the other hand, each seem to be operating in competitive environments for which they do not have sufficient autonomy. Thus, state-extended governance structures may be ill suited in that they are dominated by the state and thus respond to government policy rather than competitive forces. They may benefit from broader composition that include individuals with knowledge of competition and strategy (Figure 20.3).
Figure 20.3 State-extended governance structures by autonomy and competition
An Internal/external model of governance is common among those University systems with higher levels of autonomy and where competition comparatively is moderate to high. Moldova, Latvia, and Ukraine fall along the assumed slope of competition and autonomy. Of this set, Moldova and Ukraine have less autonomy than Latvia but correspondingly lower levels of competition to which they need to respond. Two other situations exist in countries with this governance model. First, Estonia and Lithuania have autonomy that seems to outpace competition. They both have high levels of autonomy and correspondingly moderate levels of competition as defined in this chapter. The system may be better optimized by increasing competition in both contexts. What does need to be taken into account and is not detailed in this analysis is the size of the competitive environment. Both are comparatively small countries and vastly smaller than Russia, for example. Thus, the scope of competition may be different and arguably underrepresented here. Second, this analysis suggests Armenia has insufficient autonomy for the country’s level of competition, the inverse of Estonia and Lithuania.
One factor to consider is who the external members of governing bodies are in these different contexts. In the lower autonomy and lower competition contexts, members of government may suffice to give the few degrees of freedom and complexity in which they are working. However, in Latvia, where competition is greater as is autonomy, governmental members may work against the University’s ability to respond to external pressures and opportunities. They have a limited scope of engagement. This model of internal/external membership may be the most flexible across contexts depending on the number and backgrounds of governing body members (Figure 20.4).
Figure 20.4 Internal/external governance structures by autonomy and competition
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are the two academic-focused examples in this project. Georgia seems to operate in a highly competitive environment, the most competitive across this set of fifteen countries per this analysis. Georgia’s governance structure seems to be insular with membership and leader selection from inside the University. Given its need to compete effectively, but with insufficient autonomy, this governance structure and the granted autonomy may hinder strategic action that allows the universities to take advantage of its competitive environment and not be overwhelmed by it. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan seems to be operating in a comparatively high competitive environment and one with comparatively low levels of autonomy. Its governance structure also does not suggest it is outwardly facing, likely hindering universities’ abilities to compete, on the one hand, and, at the same time, limiting its access to government to benefit from ministerial engagement.
The final model, external civic, only appears in Kazakhstan in this project. This is a country where autonomy seems to outpace competition. This governance structure, with its external members, may be more suited for high competition/high autonomy contexts where external stakeholders can provide significant strategic insight if not competitive advantage to governance (Chait et al., Reference Chait, Ryan and Taylor2005).
Research on team decision-making suggests that those with diversified backgrounds and multiple perspectives are less likely to be overconfident in their decision-making abilities, explore more possibilities in their deliberations, and be more willing to question judgments and opinions leading to better decision making (Almadoz & Tilcik, Reference Alcala and Markosyan2016). They bring outside perspectives to better understand opportunities and threats in the competitive environment and have the autonomy to act as needed (Pucciarelli & Kaplan, Reference Pucciarelli and Kaplan2016), as those that cannot compete well cannot make necessary changes and therefore risk negative organizational results if not downright closure (Hasse & Krucken, Reference Hartley, Gopaul, Sagintayeva and Apergenova2013). To what extent might the external civic model be one applicable to countries such as Latvia, with its high autonomy and high competition; to Estonia, if it had more competition in the system; or to Georgia, if its universities had greater autonomy given its high level of competition? We believe this is an important question that merits further exploration. See Figure 20.5 for the last two models.
Figure 20.5 Academic-focused and external civic governance structures by autonomy and competition
20.3 Making Sense of Competition and Autonomy
Across the fifteen former Soviet countries, there seems to be very few well-aligned governance structures for the competitive contexts in which they operate. Those with state-extended models operating in low autonomy, low competition, and low-capacity contexts, such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus may be most appropriately suited to govern universities in this context. Kazakhstan is the only example of an external civic governance structure. It operates with comparatively (on paper) high levels of autonomy. Yet Latvia has the comparatively highest levels of autonomy and competition. To what extent might this model also suit the autonomy and competition contexts of Latvia? An external civic structure may help Latvian universities create strong ties beyond campus boarders with the private sector, future employers, and other external stakeholders (AGB, 2016). It can create a disciplined focus for governance by minimizing disruptive internally driven self-interest that has been documented in other internal/external governance structures (Shanahan, Reference Shanahan2019) and address shortcomings of expertise bias when field experts are over involved (Almandoz & Tilcsik, Reference Alcala and Markosyan2016).
Countries such as Georgia, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan may exist in overly competitive environments per their levels of autonomy. Georgia operates in the most competitive higher education space per this analysis and furthermore outpaces its level of autonomy. Yet its capacity and level of autonomy (see Chapter 19) are much more aligned. It follows an academic-focused model of governance with a strong, internally appointed rector and staff membership. This model suggests an inward focus that may not serve it well in either context, particularly the competitive one. Kyrgyzstan follows the same academic-focused governance model. Yet it too finds itself in a competitive environment but has limited autonomy to compete effectively and a governance structure that is focused inward rather than with a structure that provides opportunities for an external focus.
The other two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia, have a University governance model that includes both internal and external stakeholders. Each has comparatively high levels of autonomy, with Estonia the highest across the fifteen countries. Estonia has corresponding levels of high capacity but is not operating in a very competitive environment. Of the Baltics, only Latvia operates in an environment of corresponding competition and autonomy and of capacity and autonomy. The dual-stakeholder approach may serve its universities well, as it gives voice to multiple groups of individuals helping it navigate the realities of its contexts. The low levels of competition for Lithuania and Latvia coupled with high levels of capacity may mean that universities run the risk of having too few constraints on their behaviors. They are missing the guardrails that competition can provide. This fact coupled with multiple voices of stakeholders who likely have similar but also different priorities (Shanahan, Reference Shanahan2019) may lead to institutions being adrift or pursuing multiple strategic priorities concurrently at counter purposes.
Finally, to what extent has the academic-focused model outlived its utility as viewed through a competitive lens? Only Georgia and Kyrgyzstan use this model. While likely overstating its insularity, it is structured to be internally focused on academic needs and priorities. Given the increased competitive contexts in which these two higher education systems operate – with an internal focus, in which rectors are elected from within the campus and the governing body comprises members who are University employees – this structure may have been sufficient at one point in time. But increased external demands shaped by the dual trends of New Public Management and globalization that reach deeper into University priorities and governing structures that do not look outward at least to some extent, such as through the internal/external stakeholder model, may well be unable to sufficiently respond to external demands and changing contexts.
An interesting question to consider is the extent to which the type of competition matters in terms of governance structure? There is so much variation within the set of countries that a line of future inquiry might focus on the type of competition – for students, resources, or research – and if some types of governance approaches are more suited for each.
Comparison across Frameworks
While the analysis and its components is in many ways rough and incomplete, the pictures this analysis paints are worth considering and building upon with future research. Autonomy and competition yielded different contexts across the governance models as compared to the capacity and autonomy analysis in Chapter 19. For example, Georgia has drastically more competition than suitable for its levels of autonomy, but its capacity only moderately surpasses autonomy in that framework. Estonia has appropriately high levels of capacity and autonomy, but its competition was medium-low and less than aligned with autonomy. Lithuania was similar in that competition and capacity were aligned, but competition was low compared to autonomy. Thus, the implication for those countries that profiled differently is that solutions to one misalignment might not apply to the other or make the other alignment worse. For example, increasing autonomy in Azerbaijan to better align autonomy with public sector capacity would take both out of alignment with competition. Policymakers may need to think about which is a more ideal alignment and which governance structure might be best suited for the context. Both of these two countries have state-extended models. Moving to a more externally attuned model such as internal/external may address capacity but be problematic in terms of competition as few market-based guardrails exist.
Some instances may benefit from a single adjustment. Estonia, for example, has aligned levels of autonomy and capacity as well as the internal/external governance model. Its competition is medium-low, so using policy levers to increase competition may be beneficial and place less of a regulatory burden on policy mechanisms.
Some countries had similar patterns across the two comparisons. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan both had low levels of autonomy, capacity, and competition. Russia had medium-high capacity and competition, and low autonomy. Belarus, Armenia, and Kazakhstan each profiled similarly across the two frameworks. For countries that showed similar patterns across contexts and for which the current governance model is questionable, a common solution may work well across both domains. For instance, Russia seems to have capacity that further outpaces autonomy as well as competition that exceeds autonomy. Its governance structure is state-extended, which may not be the most beneficial given its levels of competition and capacity. More autonomy and a governance structure that is more permeable – external civic or internal/external – may better serve its universities.
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