Introduction
Research on fundamentalism has a long and multidisciplinary history, including theology, history, (inter)religious studies, psychology, and sociology (Huff, Reference Huff2008; Taylor, Reference Taylor2017; Williamson, Reference Williamson2020). While a demise in fundamentalism studies has been observed in some disciplines (Taylor, Reference Taylor2017), recent developments such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the election of Donald Trump and renewed visibility of the religious Right in the United States, have prompted a revival in multidisciplinary scholarly interest in fundamentalism (Käsehage, Reference Käsehage2021; Phillips and Kitchens, Reference Phillips and Kitchens2021; Ibrahimi, Reference Ibrahimi2023; Atherstone and Jones, Reference Atherstone and Jones2024). Despite the vast amount of research on fundamentalism, there is no agreement on the concept's boundaries, nor on its defining characteristics. Lastly, it is debated whether the concept fosters prejudice and therefore should be used at all for research. In other words, there are debates concerning the concept's domain of application, the concept's intension, and the legitimacy of its usage. This paper seeks to contribute to these debates by presenting the results of a scoping review on the uses and definition of the concept fundamentalism.
With regard to the domain of application, the concept's potential boundaries have been expanded since it originated in the UnitedStates in the 1920s, denoting a specific and conservative American Protestant movement (Watt, Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014). From the 1970s onwards, the term was increasingly applied to make sense of Islamic and Jewish movements (see Taylor, Reference Taylor2017, for an overview of the widening scope of the term; Watt, Reference Watt2008). Many authors also apply the term to factions in non-Abrahamic religions, such as to Hinduism (Clarke, Reference Clarke2017) or Buddhism (e.g., Bartholomeusz and De Silva, Reference Bartholomeusz and De Silva1998; Lehr, Reference Lehr2019). Marty and Appleby's seminal Fundamentalism Project (1991–1995) developed and theorized fundamentalism as a global comparative category. Nowadays, the term is also applied to nonreligious fundamentalisms, such as market fundamentalism (Stiglitz, Reference Stiglitz2009) and gender fundamentalism (Lasio et al., Reference Lasio, Congiargiu, De Simone and Serri2019). The question is whether it makes sense for the concept fundamentalism to include such a broad range of phenomena. Some have criticized the broad usage of the concept as developed in the Fundamentalism Project and beyond (Watt, Reference Watt2017). They have, for instance, argued that it is most valuable when applied with specificity and precision to American Protestant fundamentalism (Watt, Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014), that there is too much difference between fundamentalist movements for them to be subsumed under a single concept (Juergensmeyer, Reference Juergensmeyer1993; Wood, Reference Wood, Wood and Watt2014; Watt, Reference Watt2017), or that we should limit the notion to religious fundamentalisms in order to be analytically useful (Ruthven, Reference Ruthven2007). Others have argued that the broad domain of application of the term is not problematic but can be useful for comparative research (Almond et al., Reference Almond, Sivan and Appleby2003). This shows that there is no consensus on what the concept's domain of application is. We present an overview of different domains of applications of the concept fundamentalism, and their distribution in recent research on fundamentalism. This helps to draw conclusions about what the domain of application of the concept should be.
This debate is closely connected to disputes concerning the intension of the concept. What are its defining features? In virtue of what does a movement or group qualify as fundamentalist? For example, some (e.g., Hood et al., Reference Hood, Hill and Williamson2005) wonder whether dogmatism is indeed a defining characteristic of fundamentalism, as frequently suggested (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, Reference Altemeyer, Hunsberger, Paloutzian and Park2005). Others debate whether militance is a characteristic feature of fundamentalism as suggested by Lustick (Reference Lustick1988) but rejected by Antoun (Reference Antoun and Turner2010). And Williamson (Reference Williamson2020) observes that it has frequently remained unspecified exactly what is meant by characteristics such as anti-modern or militant, which makes it hard to determine whether they are indeed defining features. Stances vary on the question whether the lack of clarity regarding the intension of fundamentalism is problematic. Authors such as Williamson (Reference Williamson2020) or Watt (Reference Watt2017) find the lack of clarity worrisome. To determine whether and why phenomena qualify as fundamentalist, we need clear criteria. Others allow for flexibility in our understanding of fundamentalism. They argue that it is a family resemblance concept. That is, different fundamentalisms share overlapping characteristics, none of which are necessary and shared by all fundamentalisms (Almond et al., Reference Almond, Sivan and Appleby2003). They also allow for variety in how certain characteristics, such as anti-modernism and militancy, manifest themselves across different fundamentalisms. The family resemblance conception of fundamentalism that was popularized in the Fundamentalism Project has been criticized for being prone to various biases (see below for more detail). What we see as defining characteristics of fundamentalism, and how we specify these, will determine not only how we (mis)understand the phenomenon, but also which phenomena we classify as fundamentalist. This review aims to contribute to the debate about the intension of the concept of fundamentalism by giving an overview of allegedly defining characteristics of different types of fundamentalisms. Such an overview provides the groundwork for further normative debates about which of these characteristics should be included in a definition of fundamentalism, and how they should be specified.
These first two issues are tightly connected to the third point of contest: whether the concept fosters prejudice in research. The concept in its global scope as developed in the Fundamentalism Project, that is with a domain of application that includes religious movements from various traditions on a global scale, has been criticized for being derogatory and othering, as well as Western- and Christiancentric (Harding, Reference Harding1991; Wood, Reference Wood, Wood and Watt2014; Watt, Reference Watt2017). Critics have worried that most researchers studying fundamentalism come from the Global North, and that their research questions and interests mirror concerns of a “Western” public, and policy makers (Watt, Reference Watt2017). Scholars (e.g., Harding, Reference Harding1991; Campo, Reference Campo1995; Harris, Reference Harris1998; Blankenship, Reference Blankenship, Wood and Watt2014; Taylor, Reference Taylor2017; Watt, Reference Watt2017) have also expressed their concern with the vague meaning of the concept and its building blocks which allow for the introduction of biases and unwarranted assumptions in the study of fundamentalism. To give some examples: Wood and Watt (Reference Wood, Watt, Wood and Watt2014) argue that the concept encodes Christian assumptions which leads to approaching and understanding other, non-Christian movements, through a Christian lens—thereby ignoring relevant differences and failing to perceive phenomena in their own right. Watt (Reference Watt2017) and Taylor (Reference Taylor2017) worry that the term's negative meaning in ordinary discourse (e.g., Harding, Reference Harding1991) and scholars' own opposition to and worries about fundamentalist movements color their approach to and study of these movements. This, as Williamson (Reference Williamson2020) worries, leads to a disproportionate focus on violent fundamentalisms. Scholars of fundamentalism, moreover, seem to predominantly come from a Western and liberal background which, Watt (Reference Watt2017) worries, makes the concept fundamentalism complicit in the domination of the Global South by the Global North. By comparing characterizations of different types of fundamentalisms, and by recording descriptive characteristics of studies, it scrutinizes whether there is evidence warranting the worry about bias in fundamentalism studies.
While several authors discussed and reviewed the ambiguity of the term fundamentalism, no systematic attempt has been made to map the existing meanings of the term in academic discourse.Footnote 1 This study fills this gap by systematically reviewing fundamentalism studies published between 1996 and 2020. This timespan has been selected because Marty and Appleby's seminal Fundamentalism Project (1991–1995) solidified fundamentalism as a global comparative category that is frequently used for research. The scoping review provides an overview of the suggested domains of application of the term, as well as of the proposed conceptual building blocks of fundamentalism. It also traces by whom the concept was used, and which types of fundamentalism receive most attention. Thereby, this review provides evidence that the worry of Westerncentric and liberal biases in the study of fundamentalism is warranted. While this paper does not answer the normative question whether, and if so how, the concept fundamentalism should be used in research, its results provide a firm basis to tackle such questions—as we argue in the discussion.
Methodology
Scoping review
(Semi-)systematic literature reviews, including scoping reviews, were primarily developed for life and health sciences. Their transparent and rigorous methods to select, assess, and synthesize empirical literature in an unbiased and complete manner are increasingly used for research in the social sciences and the humanities (Petticrew and Roberts, Reference Petticrew and Roberts2006; Polonioli, Reference Polonioli2019). For our study, we conducted a scoping review. This type of review is suitable for definitional work, for mapping and clarifying concepts (Peters et al., Reference Peters, Godfrey, Khalil, McInerney, Parker and Soares2015). It allows for the inclusion of studies regardless of their study design. This enables us to broadly take stock of and explore uses and conceptualizations of the concept of fundamentalism. An additional benefit of scoping studies is that they have an iterative character: researchers can adjust the search terms and criteria for the selection of relevant studies as their familiarity with the literature increases (Arksey and O'Malley, Reference Arksey and O'Malley2005).Footnote 2
Literature search
We conducted this scoping review in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) statement, specifically its extension for scoping reviews (https://www.prisma-statement.org/scoping; Tricco et al., Reference AC, Lillie, Zarin, KK, Colquhoun, Levac, Moher, MDJ, Horsley, Weeks, Hempel, EA, Chang, McGowan, Stewart, Hartling, Aldcroft, MG, Garritty, Lewin, CM, MT, EV, Soares-Weiser, Moriarty, Clifford, Ö and SE2018). As fundamentalism research spans across various academic disciplines, we comprehensively searched the following bibliographic databases in collaboration with a librarian (A4): ATLA Religion Database (via Ebsco), PsycInfo (via Ebsco), Historical Abstracts (via Ebsco), Philosopher's Index (via Ovid), Scopus (via Elsevier), Web of Science Core Collection (via Clarivate), and the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (via ProQuest). We included publications from January 1, 1996, to November 10, 2020. Search terms included controlled terms as well as free text terms. The following terms were used: “fundamentalism,” “radicalism,” “extremism,” “terrorism.”Footnote 3 We applied a filter to restrict the results to peer-reviewed publications and performed the search without language restrictions. Duplicate articles were excluded. For the full search strategies for all databases see appendix 1.
Selection process
We conducted the screening in the review program Rayyan QCRI (Ouzzani et al., Reference Ouzzani, Hammady, Fedorowicz and Elmagarmid2016) in line with the following selection criteria.Footnote 4 Publications were included if they focused on fundamentalism, extremism, terrorism, or radicalism, and (a) aimed to explain or understand these phenomena; (b) and/or discuss or develop these concepts; and/or (c) operationalize these concepts or develop measurements tools using these concepts. Publications were excluded if they (a) discussed literary fiction, movies, television shows, etc., or (b) concerned theoretical positions in controversies or debates. Other exclusion criteria were: (c) published before 1996; (d) studies not published in English, Dutch, German, French, or Spanish; (e) dissertations, book-reviews, editorials, conference proceedings, commentaries, or letters; (f) not peer reviewed.
First, A1 screened the titles and abstracts. She excluded publications if the title and abstract gave reason to think that they did not meet the inclusion criteria. She then conducted a full-text screening of publications included thus far, again assessing whether the publications met the inclusion criteria. At the outset of both rounds of screening A1, A2, and A3 tested the selection criteria by independently screening a limited number of publications (in total n = 334). They discussed differences regarding in- and exclusion decisions, which helped to clarify and consistently apply the in- and exclusion criteria. Ambiguous cases were always discussed by A1, A2, and A3. For the flowchart, see Figure 1 (Page et al., Reference Page, McKenzie, Bossuyt, Boutron, Hoffmann, Mulrow, Shamseer, Tetzlaff, Akl, Brennan, Chou, Glanville, Grimshaw, Hróbjartsson, Lalu, Li, Loder, Mayo-Wilson, McDonald, McGuinness, Stewart, Thomas, Tricco, Welch, Whiting and Moher2021).
Figure 1. Flow diagram of scoping review process.
Data extraction and analysis
General information about the included studies in the review is recorded in a data charting form (Arksey and O'Malley, Reference Arksey and O'Malley2005). Among other things, the field and the type of study are recorded. In addition, to get a grasp on the scope of the concept fundamentalism, the types of fundamentalism that form the focus of a publication are charted. And, to get information on the Western centrism and bias worry, we collected information on the geographic focus of empirical studies as well as the location of researchers. See appendix 2 for the full data charting form.
To analyze the meanings of the concept of fundamentalism, we conducted a directed qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, Reference Hsieh and Shannon2005), using the analysis program ATLAS.ti, version 22.2.0 (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development GmbH). One author (A1) inductively developed the coding scheme. Initially, text passages that characterize or define fundamentalism were read to derive codes. A1 assigned codes to denote the kind of fundamentalism (e.g., “religious fundamentalism,” “Islamic fundamentalism,” “feminist fundamentalism”). In addition, codes for each characteristic or defining feature of fundamentalism (e.g., “scandalized or outraged attitude,” “justification of violence”) were assigned to each text passage. After analyzing 120 texts, we reached data saturation. A1 developed a coding scheme by comparing the initial codes, thereby deriving broader codes that encompassed various initial codes. The resulting coding scheme was discussed with A2 and A3. All documents were coded by A1 based on the coding scheme. New findings were discussed by A1, A2, and A3, and resulted in adjustments of the original coding scheme. The codes were grouped in meaningful clusters (e.g., codes denoting beliefs about religious matters were distinguished from beliefs about political matters) and sorted into five categories, which are discussed below. See appendix 3 for an overview of the code categories and clusters. To find patterns across various kinds of fundamentalism, we compared the relative importance of characteristic features across various kinds of fundamentalism by ranking the codes denoting characteristic or defining features for each kind of fundamentalism (see appendix 4 which illustrated how the ranking of co-occurrences between code-clusters and kinds of fundamentalisms supported our search for comparative patterns). Given the fact that we were primarily interested in the content of definitions, and qualitative differences between definitions of different kinds of fundamentalism, we then compared the content of the codes denoting characteristic features across various kinds of fundamentalism.Footnote 5
Descriptive results
General description
A total of 713 publications are included in this review of which 295 studies are empirical. Of these studies, most studies apply a quantitative methodology (n = 247). In total, 43 studies apply a qualitative methodology, five studies apply mixed methods, and 418 publications are theoretical. Of these, 18 self-qualify as literature reviews and explicate their methodology. Most of the theoretical publications, however, do not explicate their method (n = 400).Footnote 6 The topics and purposes of the publications vary widely, from literature reviews on the relation of religious fundamentalism to violence (e.g., Ahmed and Bashirov, Reference Ahmed, Bashirov and Aravena2020), to studies developing scales to measure religious fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger, Reference Altemeyer and Hunsberger2004; Williamson et al., Reference Williamson, Hood, Ahmad, Sadiq and Hill2010), to studies comparing different fundamentalisms (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), to cite only a few examples. When it comes to the geographic focus of the empirical studies, most collect and analyze data from the United States (n = 159), followed by Indonesia (n = 19), Germany (n = 13), Canada (n = 12), and Egypt (n = 11).
The bulk of the included publications are written in English (n = 686),Footnote 7 and published by authors affiliated with U.S. universities (n = 309). Most of the publications that we analyzed come from the field of psychology (n = 260), followed by political science (n = 65), sociology (n = 62), and religious studies (n = 54). From 2001 onwards, the studies are relatively equally distributed over the timespan that was analyzed. See appendix 2 for a full overview of the descriptive data.
Domain of application of fundamentalism
Regarding the domain of application, we distinguish four categories of publications: (1) publications that use the term fundamentalism to denote and characterize Christian fundamentalism (n = 126), most often Christian Protestant fundamentalism; (2) publications that explicitly limit the domain of application to Abrahamic religious traditions (n = 17); (3) publications that use the concept of fundamentalism in its global sense, denoting and characterizing various types of religious fundamentalisms (n = 478), such as Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, or Sikh fundamentalism, in addition to Christian fundamentalisms; (4) publications that extend the scope of the concept beyond religious phenomena (n = 87), including, for instance, market fundamentalism and various types of political fundamentalism. In total, we identified 54 types of fundamentalism, of which 40 are nonreligious (see appendix 5).
Distribution of kinds of fundamentalism
Not all fundamentalisms receive equal attention. When it comes to religious types of fundamentalism, Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms are discussed the most (n = 188, n = 175), followed by Jewish and Hindu fundamentalism (n = 60, n = 51). When it comes to nonreligious types of fundamentalism, market fundamentalism is mentioned most (n = 32). Often, nonreligious fundamentalisms are discussed by a single or a very small number of publications. For a full overview, see appendix 5.
Defining characteristics of fundamentalism
In this section, we discuss the defining characteristics of the 54 types of fundamentalisms we identify. We map how each kind of fundamentalism is defined or characterized in the publications that we include in this review. As the amount of defining characteristics presented in these publications is very large (n = 321), we organize them into five categories (subdivided in 30 clusters).
(A) The belief category contains creedal statements and the doxastic (from the Greek “doxa,” belief) attitudes of belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief that are typical for fundamentalism. We distinguish foundational beliefs, beliefs regarding in- and out-groups and their relationship, beliefs regarding political matters, beliefs regarding metaphysical matters,Footnote 8 beliefs regarding ethical and normative matters, and beliefs regarding historical, social, and economic developments.
(B) The behavior category contains types and tokens of individual and group actions and omissions that are typical for fundamentalism. For this category, we distinguish behavior regarding knowing, thinking, and interpreting, behavior pertaining to group dynamics, behavior connected to political and metaphysical convictions or goals, ethical and normative behavior, and behavior in reaction to historical, social, institutional, and economic developments.
(C) The emotional category contains affects, passions, and emotions that are typical for fundamentalism. Again, we distinguish emotions that bear on processes of knowing, thinking, and interpreting, that pertain to group dynamics, political, metaphysical, and ethical/normative matters, and emotions that are elicited by historical, social, and economic developments.
(D) The goal category contains goals and desires that are typical for and motivate fundamentalists. Also with regards to the goals and desires, different themes could be distinguished: cognitive, social and group-related, political, metaphysical, and ethical/normative goals and desires, as well as goals that pertain to broader historical, social, institutional, and economic developments and changes.
(E) The structural category refers to the group structures that bear on typically fundamentalist cognition and group organization. It also contains characteristic ways of institutionalizing metaphysical and ethical/normative principles, as well as characteristics that highlight fundamentalists' relation to the wider political structures in which they are embedded. In addition, this category contains characterizations of fundamentalism that highlight its connection to broad structural historical, social, institutional, and economic developments.
In what follows, for each category we discuss trends and recurrent elements in the characterizations and definitions of fundamentalism. We start with discussing Christian Protestant fundamentalism given that the term originated in the Christian Protestant tradition (see Huff, Reference Huff2008) and is therefore often seen as a starting point for analyzing other religious revivalist movement that resist modernity (Watt, Reference Watt2017). We then point to continuities and discontinuities with other kinds of religious fundamentalisms, and with nonreligious fundamentalisms.
Elements of Christian Protestant fundamentalism
(A) Beliefs
Most authors discussing Christian Protestant fundamentalisms cite foundational beliefs as defining characteristics, that is beliefs that are seen as more fundamental and secure than, and as serving as a basis for, other beliefs. Most prominently foundational beliefs concern the existence of an absolute and universal truth to be found in the Bible, which was revealed, which is infallible and prescriptive (e.g., Percy, Reference Percy1996; Bosman, Reference Bosman2008), and must be interpreted literally (e.g., Priest, Reference Priest2004; Bendroth, Reference Bendroth, Wood and Watt2014, Reference Bendroth2016). Interestingly, there is no agreement on what “literalism” means. Schiller (Reference Schiller1997, 42), for examples, states that among fundamentalists, there is “strong tendency to interpret everything in the Bible literally.” Others, however, limit literalism to a selection of basic doctrines such as “such as virgin birth, bodily resurrection, and the return of Jesus” (Streib, Reference Streib2001, 238). These beliefs align with the rejection of some sciences, especially evolution theory (Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006; Bendroth, Reference Bendroth and Stein2012). Scholars also draw attention to the fact that fundamentalist beliefs are held strongly and understood as absolute, not allowing for doubt or criticism (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth and Stein2012).
Other allegedly definitional beliefs concern historical developments which are believed to have a religious meaning. Most frequently authors describe fundamentalist movements as believing in a perfect and lost past which must be re-instantiated (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016). Often scholars highlight the belief that there is an ongoing cosmic struggle between good and evil (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016), and that fundamentalists have a millennialist and apocalyptic understanding of history (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016). Many scholars point to Protestant fundamentalists' particular understanding of the nature and structure of reality and religious matters, for example, their belief in a strict distinction between good and evil (e.g., Clarke, Reference Clarke, Wood and Watt2014; Gregg, Reference Gregg2016), and in resurrection, virgin birth, or creation science (e.g., Geffré, Reference Geffré2002; Barkun, Reference Barkun, Pedahzur and Weinberg2004).
Beliefs regarding ethical and normative, and political matters are seen as characteristic as well, most prominently anti-modern beliefs and conservative values. Anti-modernism can have a political dimension and converge with opposition to secularism or pluralism. However, it mostly has an ideological and normative component. Watt (Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014, 28), for example, writes that for fundamentalists, “modern age was a time of lawlessness, sexual licentiousness, and cultural decline.” Other characteristic beliefs concern gender differences and roles (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth and Stein2012; Ault, Reference Ault, Obelkevich, Roper and Samuel2013). Lastly, various authors see certain group-related beliefs—such as that the own group is special, “chosen,” has a special relationship with God, or are the single “true believers”—as definitional (e.g., Jones, Reference Jones2011, Reference Jones2016).
(B) Behaviors
Behaviors related to knowing, thinking, and interpreting—such as their literal, selective, and intolerant manner of interpretation (Almond et al., Reference Almond, Sivan and Appleby2003; Ruthven, Reference Ruthven2007) and their defensive and adversarial thinking style (e.g., Priest, Reference Priest2004, 207)—are taken to be characteristics of Christian Protestant fundamentalists. They are described as demanding that individual behavior is guided by the holy scriptures in order to qualify as moral behavior (e.g., Stjernfelt, Reference Stjernfelt2009) and as rigidly following their moral code and norms (e.g., Munson, Reference Munson2003). Other characteristic behaviors are proselytizing and evangelism (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016), behaviors linked to historical developments such as selective modernization, their use of technology, and “traditioning” (i.e., selectively holding on to tradition and making it relevant today, see Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010). Many authors characterize Christian fundamentalists by reference to behaviors that create or enforce the in- and outgroup dichotomy (e.g., Watt, Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014), such as behaving in a separatist manner toward outgroups, and enforcing this separatism and isolationism by building parallel institutions (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth and Stein2012). Christian fundamentalists are often characterized as militant (Edwards, Reference Edwards2015), where militancy sometimes refers to the defense of certain beliefs (e.g., Bosman, Reference Bosman2008), a stance toward religious opponents (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016), or the strict requirement of total subjection to faith (e.g., Nipkow, Reference Nipkow2017). However, quietist aspects are described as well (although less), an aspect that fits well with separatist and isolationist tendencies (e.g., Priest, Reference Priest2004).
(C) Emotions
Overall, emotions receive little attention as definitional characteristic. When discussed, emotions relating to historical developments, like feeling uncertain and threatened by “modern” social, economic, and ideological developments (e.g., Beier, Reference Beier2006; Bendroth, Reference Bendroth and Stein2012), or experiencing a sense of urgency (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2016), are seen as characteristic. Christian fundamentalists are, according to some, also typified by feeling threatened by an outgroup (e.g., Nipkow, Reference Nipkow2017). With regards to metaphysical and religious matters, the experience of being “born again” is sometimes seen as characteristic for Protestant fundamentalism (e.g., Haynes, Reference Haynes and Haynes2009), as is religious zeal and the strong emotional attachment to their belief-system (e.g., Deifelt, Reference Deifelt2005). Furthermore, some authors portray Protestant fundamentalists as going hand in hand with a scandalized and outraged attitude (e.g., Bosman, Reference Bosman2008; Adloff, Reference Adloff2010), and a deep-seated fear of moral decline (e.g., Schneider, Reference Schneider2002).
(D) Goals and desires
Protestant fundamentalists are characterized in terms of their wish to preserve and purify their faith (e.g., Watt, Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014), to hold on to the fundamentals of their religion which lay in the past (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), and to achieve salvation (e.g., Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006; Crawford, Reference Crawford, Wood and Watt2014). Such goals and desires pertain to fundamentalists' metaphysical and religious commitments, and are connected to allegedly characteristic moral, historical, and political goals: their longing for moral and social purity by holding on and returning to their “core values” (e.g., Ammerman, Reference Ammerman, Ter Haar and Busuttil2003; Losurdo, Reference Losurdo2004). Relatedly, they are depicted as striving for the establishment of God's reign on earth, which often goes together with traditioning (Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010). Sometimes, their wish to (re-)gain political power to model society on the basis of the scripture is seen as characteristic (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2005; Crawford, Reference Crawford, Wood and Watt2014). Allegedly characteristic group-related goals are: preserving their (group-)identity (e.g., Donohue, Reference Donohue2004; Jones, Reference Jones2016), providing and experiencing a sense of security (e.g., Segura, Reference Segura2016), and exercising control (Watt, Reference Watt, Wood and Watt2014). Christian fundamentalists are also characterized by reference to their search for certainty regarding their beliefs (e.g., Nagata, Reference Nagata2001; Bartoszuk and Deal, Reference Bartoszuk and Deal2016), and to define the true tenets of the religion (e.g., Pierce, Reference Pierce, Newport and Gribben2006).
(E) Structural elements
Protestant fundamentalism's relation to broader historical developments,—specifically their reaction to social, economic, and intellectual changes (think of secularization and the perceived marginalization of religion, theological developments, the rise of evolutionary theory, etc., see e.g. Crawford, Reference Crawford, Wood and Watt2014; Rouse, Reference Rouse2021)—is seen as characteristic. These processes are often subsumed under the term “modernity.” It is highlighted that such processes are perceived as a threat or crisis (e.g., Madan, Reference Madan1997; Clouse, Reference Clouse and Walls2009). Several scholars argue that religious fundamentalism is a function of—rather than a reaction to—modernity (Bendroth, Reference Bendroth, Wood and Watt2014). While oftentimes scholars do not specify their understanding of modernity, those who do associate different meanings with it. It is associated with democratic principles (e.g., Deifelt, Reference Deifelt2005), sociological developments that bring uncertainty (e.g., Streib, Reference Streib2001), and an “assault of meaningfulness” (Bosworth, Reference Bosworth2006). Moreover, it is widely thought that the way fundamentalist groups are structured is characteristic. The trans-denominational nature of Protestant fundamentalism is highlighted (e.g., Bendroth, Reference Bendroth2005), as well as their hierarchical structures. These hierarchies determine the epistemic structure of the movement: leadership figures have the authority over interpreting the Bible (e.g., Schiller, Reference Schiller1997).
(Dis-)continuities with other religious fundamentalisms
(A) Beliefs
In line with Protestant fundamentalism, religious fundamentalisms are defined in terms of foundational beliefs—the belief in the absolute truth of the infallible scripture, which must be read literally (e.g., Pratt, Reference Pratt2007; Gierycz, Reference Gierycz2020)Footnote 9—and metaphysical beliefs—the belief in a strict distinction between good and evil (e.g., Almond et al., Reference Almond, Sivan and Appleby2003; Giedrojc, Reference Giedrojc2010; Gierycz, Reference Gierycz2020), and specific religious creeds, the content of which vary between the different fundamentalisms. While religious fundamentalisms are commonly characterized in terms of beliefs regarding historical developments (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), there are differences between religious fundamentalisms. Millennialism and redemption are highlighted for Abrahamic fundamentalisms. Jewish fundamentalism is frequently described as a messianic movement, emphasizing the occurrent redemption process (Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006). The belief in an idealized past is strongly emphasized for Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist fundamentalists, and connected to their political goals and actions (e.g., Abbott, Reference Abbott1996; Seneviratne, Reference Seneviratne, Ter Haar and Busuttil2003; Ferrero, Reference Ferrero2013). When it comes to group-related beliefs, all religious fundamentalisms—but especially Jewish and Hindu fundamentalism (e.g., Donohue, Reference Donohue2004; Ahmed and Bashirov, Reference Ahmed, Bashirov and Aravena2020)—are depicted as believing in their own superiority or chosen-ness, while holding other groups in low regard (e.g., Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006). To give an example, as Haynes (Reference Haynes and Ridgeon2003, 331) writes, that “Hindu fundamentalism is rooted in cultural chauvinism” and Stockwell (Reference Stockwell2006, 17) writes that fundamentalist Jews “believe that they are God's assistants, and that their task is the repair of the world.” For all religious fundamentalisms the religiopolitical nature of their beliefs is highlighted, especially the belief that secularism should be rejected (e.g., Gregg, Reference Gregg2018). This can be expressed in more concrete beliefs, such as various anti-democratic beliefs (e.g., Pfürtner, Reference Pfürtner1997). Islamic and to a slightly lesser extent Jewish fundamentalisms are depicted as believing that violence is justified to achieve religiopolitical goals (e.g., Gregg, Reference Gregg2018). Many authors characterize fundamentalisms by certain normative and ethical beliefs, such as their opposition to ideological modernism or gender equality (e.g., Frosh, Reference Frosh1997), or the belief in their moral superiority (e.g., Pratt, Reference Pratt2010). For Islamic fundamentalists, scholars highlight anti-Western attitude in its moral codes and values (e.g., Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006).Footnote 10
(B) Behaviors
As for Christian fundamentalism, religious fundamentalisms are characterized in terms of behaviors regarding knowing, thinking, and interpreting (literalism in textual interpretation, selectively interpreting, dogmatic, dualistic, and adversarial thinking, and the suppression of doubt, e.g., Deifelt, Reference Deifelt2005; Abi-Hashem, Reference Abi-Hashem and Plante2013; Pratt, Reference Pratt2015; Nipkow, Reference Nipkow2017), metaphysical convictions and historical developments (such as selective modernization and traditioning, e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), in- and outgroup relations (most prominently: defensiveness, exclusivism, intolerance, hostility, and oppression, e.g., Donohue, Reference Donohue2004; Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), and ethical and political matters (e.g., Munson, Reference Munson2003; Kratochwil, Reference Kratochwil2005). Certain behaviors are more pronounced in the characterization of some fundamentalisms: oppressive behavior is strongly emphasized for Islamic fundamentalism (e.g., Noor, Reference Noor2007). Yateem (Reference Yateem2014, 103), among others, associates Islam with practices with the “aim of imposing a certain specific cultural identity and way of life.” Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist fundamentalism are more commonly characterized as militants, using violence or terrorism (e.g., Kuruvachira, Reference Kuruvachira2005; Clarke, Reference Clarke2017). One interesting difference between Christian and other religious fundamentalisms, especially Islamic fundamentalism, is how the characteristic of militance is understood. To illustrate: Cooper characterizes Islamic fundamentalism as “militant activism of divine violence” (Reference Cooper2008, 29) and Khashan (Reference Khashan1997, 12) describes the militancy of fundamentalists as the employment of “violence as a recipe for change towards the ‘right path’.” On the other hand, Bendroth (Reference Bendroth2005) associates Christian Protestant fundamentalist militancy with being oppositional reaction to perceiving of “themselves as a beleaguered minority in a hostile world” (5–6), while Brenneman (Reference Brenneman and Hunt2015, 81) understands militancy to be related to fundamentalists' “expressions of Christianity.” For Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalism, exclusivist and hostile behavior toward outgroups is comparatively strongly accentuated. As Kudriashova (Reference Kudriashova2003, 14) writes, Buddhist and Hindu fundamentalism “are manifested primarily in the form of cultural exclusivity and nationalism” (see also Nagata, Reference Nagata2001, e.g.). For Jewish fundamentalism, on the other hand, isolationism, closedness, and group-cohesiveness are highlighted more often than for other fundamentalisms (e.g., Magid, Reference Magid, Wood and Watt2014). Certain behaviors in reaction to historical developments are limited to specific fundamentalisms, such as settlement policy for Jewish fundamentalists (Heilman, Reference Heilman2005).
(C) Emotions
Again, emotions receive relatively little attention. When discussed, religious fundamentalism is characterized in terms of fear and uncertainty brought about by modern, social, economic, and ideological developments (e.g., Herriot, Reference Herriot2007). For Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu fundamentalisms, grievances—such as a sense of injustice due to discrimination, Western colonization, oppression and dominance, and the feeling of political powerlessness—are highlighted (e.g., Nagata, Reference Nagata2001; Weismann, Reference Weismann2009). Also, outgroup-related feelings are described as characteristic, like feeling threatened, victimized, and humiliated by members of the outgroup, and as feeling hostile toward outgroups (e.g., Pratt, Reference Pratt2007; Lawrie, Reference Lawrie2008). This is comparatively pronounced for Hindu fundamentalism (e.g., Marx, Reference Marx2001). Religious fundamentalists are depicted as being afraid of losing their group identity due to historical and structural developments (e.g., Krüger, Reference Krüger2006). Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists are depicted as rejecting and feeling hostile toward the (secular) government (e.g., Garrison, Reference Garrison2003; Aran et al., Reference Aran, Stadler and Ben-Ari2008), more so than other fundamentalists. Munson (Reference Munson2003, 698), for example, observes that Jewish fundamentalism rejects Zionism, which, among some fundamentalists at least, leads to the refusal to “have anything to do with the government of Israel,” and Fox (Reference Fox and Haynes2009, 284) notes that “Islamic fundamentalists reject modern states as inherently secular and corrupt.” Additionally, a scandalized and outraged attitude, and a deep-seated fear of moral decline (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010), is ascribed to fundamentalists. Moreover, the fear of declining faith is often highlighted (e.g., Appleby, Reference Appleby2002). Sometimes religious fundamentalists are characterized by their fear of cognitive uncertainty or the influence of prejudice on their thinking (e.g., Summers, Reference Summers2006; Lawrie, Reference Lawrie2008).
(D) Goals and desires
Religious fundamentalisms, like Protestant fundamentalism, are characterized by their desire to re-instantiate an idealized “lost golden age,” which is the foundation of traditions that must be upheld, and which shape the political, moral, and social ambitions (e.g., Denemark, Reference Denemark2008). This is especially emphasized for Hindu and Islamic fundamentalism (e.g., Robinson, Reference Robinson2001). Religious fundamentalism is also described in terms of social goals—the preservation of group-identity, providing a sense of security, exercising social control (e.g., Abi-Hashem, Reference Abi-Hashem and Plante2013; Reid Meloy, Reference Reid Meloy2018), and religious goals—the purification of faith by upholding or returning to the fundamentals of religion and the rooting out of evil (e.g., Frosh, Reference Frosh1997; Gregg, Reference Gregg2016). The goal of salvation is emphasized for Abrahamic fundamentalisms (e.g., Baurmann et al., Reference Baurmann, Betz and Cramm2014). Cognitive goals—especially the search for certainty, purity of understanding, and truth (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun2001; Krüger, Reference Krüger2006)—are similar across religious fundamentalisms. Ethical goals that are allegedly characteristic for all religious fundamentalisms, but particularly emphasized for Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism (e.g., Khan, Reference Khan and Abu-Rabi2007; Dupret and Gutron, Reference Dupret and Gutron2020), concern the prevention of moral decay and the purification of faith and morality by returning to their core values (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010). Another recurrent theme is the fundamentalists' search for authenticity (e.g., Antoun, Reference Antoun and Turner2010). For non-Christian religious fundamentalisms, more so than for Christian fundamentalists, political goals are described, such as the remodeling of society based on sacred scriptures, the fundamentalists' moral code, and divine laws, and the retaining of political power and religious influence (e.g., Lobo, Reference Lobo2009). Clarke (Reference Clarke, Wood and Watt2014, 164), for example, describes the conviction of Islamic fundamentalists that “cultural renovation and creation of an Islamic society are required to build an Islamic state capable of restoring the power of Islam.” Muslim fundamentalists are in addition described as having the establishment of justice as a political goal (e.g., Stockwell, Reference Stockwell2006). Moreover, for Islamic (and to a lesser extend for Hindu) fundamentalists, the global scope of their religiopolitical aims is viewed as characteristic (e.g., Robinson, Reference Robinson2001; Garrison, Reference Garrison2003). When it comes to Jewish fundamentalist contexts, the most prominent political goals concern territorial issues (e.g., Gitay, Reference Gitay2008).
(E) Structural elements
Like Christian fundamentalism, other religious fundamentalisms are characterized in relation to historical developments. They are described as a reaction to social, economic, and intellectual changes—think of secularization and the perceived marginalization of religion; theological developments; and developments such as globalization, Western influences, or certain forms of political organization that have been subsumed under the notion modernity (e.g., Eisenstadt, Reference Eisenstadt1999; Euben, Reference Euben1999; Marx, Reference Marx2001; Appleby, Reference Appleby2002; Ang, Reference Ang2005; Gregg, Reference Gregg2016). But different types of religious fundamentalisms vary in exactly what they react to. Islamic fundamentalism is described as a reaction to Western dominance, Westernization, and globalization (e.g., Munson, Reference Munson2008). Nationalist aspects are highlighted for Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalisms.Footnote 11 Ahmed and Bashirov (Reference Ahmed, Bashirov and Aravena2020, 253), for example, state that “Hindu fundamentalism is generally understood as a manifestation of a chauvinistic and majoritarian nationalism.” And Foxeus (Reference Foxeus2013, 68), discussing fundamentalist Buddhism, states that it is “characterized by a nationalism based on religious identity which must be protected against foreign influences.” While for most religious fundamentalisms the (global) structures and developments that gave rise to fundamentalism are highlighted, Jewish fundamentalism is described as a reaction to specific developments. For example, Jewish fundamentalism in the United States has been depicted as a reaction to the allegedly exaggerated assimilation that threatens Jewish identity (e.g., Magid, Reference Magid, Wood and Watt2014), whereas events such as the six-day war are seen as perpetuating Jewish fundamentalism in Israel (e.g., Munson, Reference Munson2008). The social structure of religious fundamentalisms, especially of Islamic fundamentalisms, is described as hierarchical (e.g., Baurmann et al., Reference Baurmann, Betz and Cramm2014). In addition, the importance of group-identity and -membership, and strong group cohesion has been emphasized especially for Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalism (e.g., Randeree, Reference Randeree2016). When it comes to their relationship with political structures, non-Christian fundamentalisms, and especially Jewish and Islamic fundamentalists are portrayed as rejecting (and often confronting) their governmental institution as it is not based on religious principles and divine laws (e.g., Nagata, Reference Nagata2001). Finally, structures determining with whom the authority of interpretation lies have been emphasized (e.g., Milligan, Reference Milligan2005).
(Dis-)continuities with nonreligious fundamentalisms
Forty nonreligious fundamentalisms were identified in 107 publications. These nonreligious fundamentalisms are diverse, ranging from political fundamentalisms, such as Stalinist (n = 2), Maoist (n = 2), or Chavist (n = 1) fundamentalisms, to economic fundamentalisms—mostly market (n = 32) but also capital (n = 2) and Keynesian fundamentalism (n = 1)—to psychoanalytical fundamentalism (n = 5), and feminist fundamentalism (n = 3).
The concept fundamentalism is loosely applied to such phenomena. Many authors characterize nonreligious fundamentalisms in terms of characteristic beliefs and behaviors regarding knowing, thinking, and interpreting. Take market fundamentalism as an example. Market fundamentalism is characterized in terms of beliefs resembling religious fundamentalisms. It is said that the laws advocated by market fundamentalism resemble divine laws or are grounded in the natural order (e.g., Baker, Reference Baker2010). Market fundamentalists are described as believing in an absolute and universal truth, such as in the truth of social Darwinism (e.g., Giroux, Reference Giroux2006). McDonough (Reference McDonough2013) even described it market fundamentalism as being scripturalist. Additionally, it has been described as mirroring religious fundamentalists' historical beliefs: by believing in a “lost golden age” (Hopewell, Reference Hopewell2017).
Behaviors regarding knowing, thinking, and interpreting are cited as defining characteristics of market fundamentalism, such as dualistic and dogmatic thinking, and as being uncompromising. They are seen as practicing a rigid moralism (e.g., Leonard, Reference Leonard2004). Other behaviors that are viewed as characteristic are specific for market fundamentalism, such as omissions of actions to decrease global inequality, the opposition of labor unions or the enabling of competition, and the reduction of state influence on the economy (e.g., Leonard, Reference Leonard2004). Lastly, market fundamentalists are also characterized by reference to specific goals: to bring about economic growth and profit (e.g., Giroux, Reference Giroux2006).
Other nonreligious fundamentalisms share few characteristics with religious fundamentalisms. Take academic fundamentalism, which is defined as “the attitude that a vital core of enlightenment exists and has been handed down to us, and that come hell or high water that core will be passed by us, undiluted, to our pupils, so that they can know the undying truth” (Chiszar, Reference Chiszar1998, 510), and hardly shares any characteristics with other types of fundamentalism. Another example of nonreligious fundamentalism which shares few characteristics with religious fundamentalism is feminist fundamentalism. Feminist fundamentalists have been described in terms of holding on to an absolute and universal truth—the “uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes” (Case, Reference Case, Baines, Barak-Erez and Kahana2012, 48), and as holding this belief with a high level of credence. Moreover, they are described as uncompromisingly committing to their belief (Case, Reference Case, Grossman and McClain2009, 107). Definitional components of feminist fundamentalism in terms of specific actions, affections, goals, and organization are absent: it is almost entirely spelled out in terms of the beliefs with which it comes.
Discussion
We presented the result of a scoping review of the scientific usage of fundamentalism between 1996 and 2020. Based on our analysis of 713 publications, we see that most scholar apply fundamentalism to religious phenomena, followed by scholars limiting the domain of application to Christian fundamentalism. Only very few publications explicitly limit it to Abrahamic fundamentalisms. A significant number of publications (n = 107) include nonreligious phenomena in the domain of application. Our findings confirm that there is disagreement on the domain of application of the concept fundamentalism in the academic usage since 1995, but that most scholars restrict it to religious phenomena.
We furthermore gave an overview of allegedly defining characteristics of different fundamentalisms, thereby contributing to the debate on the concept's intension. First, we show that the defining characteristics can be organized into five categories—the belief, behavior, emotion, goal, and structural category—which indicated that fundamentalism is multidimensional. Additionally, this review shows that all kinds of fundamentalism are conceptualized in terms of beliefs, and behaviors and structures are also frequently used as defining characteristic. Meanwhile, emotions and goals receive less attention.
Second, our review shows that, while the conceptualizations of different kinds of fundamentalisms overlap, there are also significant differences. To begin with, we find overlap between defining characteristics of Christian and other religious fundamentalisms, such as the prominent role of foundational beliefs; behaviors, such as literal interpretations of sacred texts (although, as shown in the analysis section, what authors mean by literalism may differ); goals such as traditioning and the re-instantiation of an idealized past; and group structures, such as strict hierarchies. Differences in the characterization of religious fundamentalisms concern, for example, the content of religious, religiopolitical, and ethical beliefs; the specific political methods and group-related behavior; and certain context-sensitive goals and desires. While religious fundamentalists are characterized by reference to broad structural developments, there is a great variation with regards to the specific developments to which various fundamentalisms respond. Other differences between conceptualizations of different kinds of fundamentalism are, for example, that Islamic fundamentalisms are more frequently characterized in terms of violence, and Hindu and Buddhist fundamentalisms more frequently by reference to nationalistic and ethnic concerns and goals.
Third, when zooming in on how certain characteristic elements are understood, we also encounter differences. These can occur between different conceptualization of the same type of fundamentalism, for example, Christian Protestant fundamentalism as shown by different interpretations of literalism or militancy (see Williamson, Reference Williamson2020 for a similar point), but they also occur between conceptualizations of different kinds of fundamentalism which brings us to the last debate this review contributed to.
This debate concerns the question whether the concept fosters prejudice in the study of those phenomena we call “fundamentalist.” Did we find evidence that confirms the worry of bias in the study of fundamentalism? First, we found that by far most of the authors of the publications we reviewed are affiliated with universities in the Global North. While overrepresentation of knowledge production institutions located in the global north might not be unique for fundamentalism studies, we still think this finding is worth reporting as empirical (e.g., Duarte et al., Reference Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim and Tetlock2015) and theoretical studies (e.g., Anderson, Reference Anderson1995; Elgin, Reference Elgin2017) have shown that diversity along many dimensions benefits nuanced scholarship and has a bigger chance of counteracting bias. Therefore, while biasing effects of the accumulation of epistemic power in the global north most likely is not a problem unique for fundamentalism studies, these effects nevertheless merit attention. Future research should further scrutinize the (lack of) diversity in fundamentalism studies, and the potential and actual effect of power distribution on the field of fundamentalism studies.
Second, we found that, while Islamic fundamentalism is discussed almost as much as Christian fundamentalism, most of the qualitative and quantitative data for the empirical studies are collected in Christian majority countries, most prominently in the United States, or secular majority countries. It might be the case that scholars doing empirical research on Islamic fundamentalism prefer the concept of Islamism. In that case, it is necessary to scrutinize the precise conceptual relations between fundamentalism and Islamism, to evaluate the reasons for preferring the latter concept over the former, and the question whether both concepts pick out the same phenomenon, and if not, how they differ.
Third, we found variations in spelling out allegedly defining characteristics for different kinds of fundamentalism. Take the example of militancy. For Islamic fundamentalism it is often understood in terms of violence, whereas militancy for Christian Protestant fundamentalism is understood rather as a manner of holding and defining certain beliefs against opponents. This confirms the analysis by Williamson (Reference Williamson2020) and Crawford (Reference Crawford, Wood and Watt2014). In addition, we find that for non-Christian fundamentalisms their political beliefs and goals, as well as their willingness to use violence to achieve them, are emphasized more than for Christian fundamentalisms. This finding provides some warrant for the worry of, among others, Campo (Reference Campo1995) and Watt (Reference Watt2010, Reference Watt2017) that the widening of the concept's domain of application was motivated by political developments that were seen as threatening to Western scholars and politicians. It should be noted, however, that many scholars studying Islamic movements do not utilize the concept of fundamentalism but speak of Islamism instead, a concept that we—in line with our inclusion and exclusion criteria—excluded from this review.Footnote 12
Two additional observations are worth noting. First, we find that scholars sometimes fail to clearly distinguish the concept of fundamentalism from those of extremism, terrorism, and radicalization (see Barkun, Reference Barkun, Pedahzur and Weinberg2004). For example: Inbar (Reference Inbar1996) uses the concepts of extremism and Islamic fundamentalism almost interchangeably; Pratt (Reference Pratt2007) links fundamentalism to extremist violence; Butko (Reference Butko2006) associates Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism; and Dupret and Gutro (Reference Dupret and Gutron2020) conceptually link fundamentalism to radicalization. This shows the necessity to clarify such conceptual relations, which would also contribute to the clarification of these concepts (for a discussion, see e.g., Striegher, Reference Striegher2015; Borum, Reference Borum, LaFree and Freilich2017; Bötticher, Reference Bötticher2017; Sardoč, Reference Sardoč2020). Second, we observe that different disciplines tend toward different conceptualizations of fundamentalism. Psychologists, for example, often refer to Altemeyer and Hunsberger's definition of fundamentalism, whereas scholars from the fields of international relation or religious studies frequently adhere to the conceptualization of the Fundamentalism Project. This prompts the question whether scholars utilizing Altemeyer and Hunsberger's psychological definition, and scholars endorsing the family resemblance conception of the Fundamentalism Project study the same empirical phenomena (see Hutchinson, Reference Hutchinson, Atherstone and Jones2024 for a similar point). To improve transdisciplinary exchange and foster a multidisciplinary understanding of the phenomena that fundamentalism studies study, future research should scrutinize disciplinary differences in conceptualizing and approaching the phenomenon.
Conclusion
This review has contributed to debates concerning the concept's domain of application, the concept's intension, and the legitimacy of its usage. By providing an overview and categorization of its definitional characterizes, it shows that fundamentalism is treated as a multidimensional phenomenon in the literature. It also shows that the domain of application of the concept fundamentalism extends from Christian to other religious movements, and secular phenomena. The review also shows that there are significant differences between the characterizations of different kinds of fundamentalisms. Lastly, it cites reasons to worry about bias in fundamentalism studies.
How can the descriptive results help to answer the normative questions about whether and how we should use the concept fundamentalism for research? And how can these insights help in addressing and assessing the criticisms of fundamentalism as global comparative concept as developed in the Fundamentalism Project? Overall, we see a tight connection between the debates on the concept's domain of application, intension, and danger of prejudice and bias. We point to three considerations that deserve attention in conceptualizing fundamentalism.
1. The mutual dependence between the domain of application and the specifications of defining characteristics: This review confirms the observation that scholars disagree about how they understand specific building blocks, and that specifications of building blocks can vary across different types of fundamentalisms. The domain of application of fundamentalism depends on how the building blocks are specified. If, for example, the belief in a sacred and revealed scripture is taken to be a defining characteristic of fundamentalism, then it makes sense to restrict the domain of application to Abrahamic fundamentalisms. Vice versa, the concepts intension depends on how the extension is specified. If we start by settling the concepts extension to a certain type of movements in Abrahamic religions, then it makes sense to qualify the belief in a sacred and revealed scripture as a core or defining characteristic. If we start out with a broader extension, for example, by including various secular political movements, then it makes less sense to conceptualize fundamentalism in terms of a sacred and revealed scripture.
2. The usefulness of scientific concepts: Considerations regarding the domain of application and the specification of conceptual building blocks depend on one's understanding of useful scientific concepts. What counts as useful is a matter of debate. If one values specificity, precision, and non-ambiguity in scientific concepts, then the domain of application will most likely be more restrictive. For example, if the building block “reaction to modernity” is specified as reaction to a liberal and progressive theological position and movement in the United States (called “modernism,” see Williamson, Reference Williamson2020), then it makes little sense to speak of Islamic or Jewish fundamentalism, as fundamentalism is defined in relation to inner-religious and -cultural dynamics specific for Christian Protestantism in the United States at a specific time. If one's understanding of usefulness of scientific concepts allows for certain degrees of vagueness and ambiguity, for example, because vagueness and ambiguity facilitates a broader, comparative application of fundamentalism as a lens for research, one is more likely to adhere to a broader understanding of “modernity” in terms of globalization, Western influences, and new forms of political organization. Such understanding allows for, for example, the inclusion of Islamic or Hindu fundamentalism.
3. The connection between conceptual ambiguity and the risk of bias in the study of fundamentalism: Vagueness and ambiguity increase the risk of prejudice and bias to be introduced in the study of fundamentalism. Almond et al. (Reference Almond, Sivan, Appleby, Almond and Appleby1995) argue that extending the domain of application of fundamentalism to religious movements on a global scale generates interesting research questions—and is thereby useful. To make this extension possible, they allow for more vagueness and ambiguity in the specification of the building blocks. Critics of the concept fundamentalism have argued that the concept only appears to be useful—to scholars and an audience with a Western and liberal background (see Watt, Reference Watt2017). In fact, however, the concept, due to its ambiguity, is not useful but misrepresents and misunderstands certain phenomena by applying the lens of fundamentalism (see Wood, Reference Wood, Wood and Watt2014; Watt, Reference Watt2017; Williamson, Reference Williamson2020 for similar points). This increases the risk for bias. Ambiguity and vagueness are all the riskier given the overwhelming representation of scholars affiliated to universities from the Global North, and given the fact that data were mostly collected in the Global North, in Christian majority countries. Also given the strong focus on Islamic fundamentalism, and its association with violence provides reasons to be on the lookout for biases in the study of fundamentalism.
Overall, we conclude that any conceptualization of fundamentalism requires a careful deliberation between the concept's domain of application, its intension, and its usefulness. Based on the above, we draw two lessons for future research on fundamentalism. First, to avoid ambiguities and the related danger of unwarranted assumptions and misrepresentations (especially when it comes to global fundamentalism as theorized in the Fundamentalism Project, see Watt, Reference Watt2017; Williamson, Reference Williamson2020), scholars should specify how they use the building blocks of fundamentalism, and as well as how broad the domain of application of fundamentalism is, on their view. Second, for transparency reasons, to avoid bias, and to facilitate debate on how to use the concept of fundamentalism for research, scholars who endorse the concept should make explicit why they find it useful. At the same time, it should be noted that more theoretical work is required to determine what makes concepts useful in the social sciences and the humanities. We hope that making these deliberations explicit can help to mitigate the danger of bias, prejudice, and misrepresentation in fundamentalism studies.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048324000385.
Data
This research was preregistered with the Open Science Foundation (https://osf.io/prereg/). Following the PRISMA-P checklist, we preregistered the data-searching and -selection process, including search platforms, search-terms, and inclusion and exclusion criteria. We also preregistered our method for analysis. In accordance with the nature of a scoping review, and the qualitative data-analysis, changes in the method of analysis occurred as the researchers got more familiar with the literature under review. All changes in the method of analysis including an explanation of these changes, an overview of all codes that were used, and a description of our interpretation of the inclusion and exclusion criteria will be made available with the preregistration form on the website of the Open Science Foundation.
Acknowledgments
Work on this article was made possible by the project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 851613) and from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we thank the Strong Religion and Extreme Beliefs research group at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam as well as two anonymous reviewers.
Financial support
Work on this article was made possible by the project EXTREME (Extreme Beliefs: The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism), which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 851613) and from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Nora Kindermann is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Humanities and the Faculty of Religion and Theology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. As part of the ERC project Extreme Beliefs—The Epistemology and Ethics of Fundamentalism, she conducts research on fundamentalism, focusing on the question whether the concept “fundamentalism” is useful for research.
Professor Dr Rik Peels holds a University Research Chair in Analytic and interdisciplinary Philosophy of Religion at the Faculty of Religion and Theology at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He specializes in the ethics and epistemology of belief, in particular extreme belief, see www.extremebeliefs.com, and replication in the humanities. Among his most recent books are Ignorance (OUP 2023) and Monotheism and Fundamentalism (CUP 2024). He is the main editor of the OUP Extreme Belief and Behavior Series (2024–2026).
Anke I. Liefbroer is endowed professor for Interconnection Psychiatry and Theology and associate professor of Psychology of Religion and Spiritual Care at Tilburg University. Her work focuses on how people make and find meaning in life and how life questions are coped with in situations of crisis. Her work includes the empirical study of interfaith spiritual care, multiple religious belonging, spiritual care in palliative care, and meaning in life among nonreligious young adults.
Linda Schoonmade as an information specialist from the University Library at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. She is specialized in performing comprehensive literature searches for systematic and scoping reviews and has co-authored over 70 published reviews in the field of Medicine, Epidemiology, Dental Sciences, Behavior Sciences, Psychology, Health Sciences, and Social Sciences. Beyond her expertise in conducting search strategies for complex research questions, she advices and teaches on database utilization, essential tools, and guidance related to literature research.
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