The Philippines is inherently vulnerable to adverse natural events of extreme intensity purely based on its geographic location.1 The warm western Pacific waters, normally around 28°C, contribute to the formation of typhoons, 18–20 of which reach the Philippines each year on average. Cagayan Valley (Region 2), Central Luzon (Region 3), and the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) are particularly vulnerable, averaging about seven to nine typhoons per year (Figure 8.1). Flooding occurs in a number of regions, the Western Visayas registering the highest incidence. The Philippines also rests on the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, where most of the earth's volcanic eruptions and earthquakes occur. Geophysical events, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, occur with regularity, albeit at long intervals. The Bicol Region, home of the active Mayon Volcano, experienced the greatest number of volcanic eruptions during 1991–2006. Earthquakes of moderate and high magnitude occur most frequently in the Central Visayas and Bicol regions (Figure 8.1).

Climate projections for the Philippines are similar to those in many other parts of the world (Chapters 2 and 4, this volume). Using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for the “A1B scenario” most relevant to the Philippines, Cinco et al. (2013) projected that mean yearly temperatures will rise between 1.9°C and 2.2°C by 2050, over baseline levels of between 25.5°C and 27.6°C (derived as averages of minimum and maximum temperatures for the 1971–2000 period). Increasing rainfall concentration and mean rainfall levels indicate that the wet seasons of June–August and September–November will become wetter in Luzon and Visayas towards 2050, yet higher rainfall concentrations combined with higher temperatures are likely to increase moisture stress in the dry season. In particular, it is expected that the frequency of damaging storms will increase. Although disputed by some (Cruz et al. 2007), evidence also suggests that the frequency of droughts will increase (Miyan 2015). One implication of these changes is that farmers’ experience of the frequency, duration, strength, and timing of rainfall and the frequency of droughts will be less reliable than previously; hence, the accuracy of their subjective decision-making processes will decline, causing their level of risk to rise. Past experience will become — and is already becoming — less useful as a predictor of future experience. The bottom line is that risk and uncertainty facing farmers are increasing.

Agriculture and food systems are among the top-ranked sectors deemed most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change (IPCC 2012, p. 235). This is especially so for developing economies, such as the Philippines, where small-scale and subsistence farming predominates, and eradicating poverty is a fundamental development priority. Confronted with all of its challenges within the context of climate change, the sustainability of the agricultural sector is pressed not only in terms of its capacity to meet current and future food security objectives, but also in terms of its ability to provide an appropriate standard of living, including equity, access to productive resources, social protection, and participation in democratic processes. Any analysis of the vulnerability of the agricultural sector would be incomplete without a consideration of the inherent gender dimension.

This chapter presents the results of research designed to examine gender dynamics within the Philippine agricultural sector in the context of climate change. Despite the limited existing body of literature on the subject, the findings offer insight into the gender-differentiated impacts of climate change, gendered responses to such impacts within the agricultural sector, and opportunities for gendered voices and perspectives within the Philippine's climate change policy framework. The intent is to promote and guide gender-sensitive decisions that are imperative to equitable and sustainable food and nutrition security, income generation, and improved rural livelihoods.

THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF GENDER EQUALITY

In addressing the adverse impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector, success in mainstreaming the gender dimension requires acknowledgement of the multidimensional nature of gender equality. Awareness of the reality that climate change does not affect people equally continues to grow (IPCC 2007, pp. 17, 359; IPCC 2012, p. 7; Mearns and Norton 2010, p. 5; Nellemann, Verma, and Hislop 2011, p. 8; Goh 2012, pp. 1–2). In a special report for policymakers, IPCC (2012, p. 7) noted that people — either as individuals or collectives — are differentially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change on the basis of disparities in economic and social well-being, including factors of health, gender, and class. A number of focused group discussions conducted similarly indicate that even in an agriculture-based community, finer sectoral categorizations can be identified as vulnerable to impacts of climate change (Table 6.1).

High agricultural productivity is the key driver of successful structural transformation to promote long-term economic growth (see Chapter 1, this volume). Climate change, however, has the potential to impede the structural transformation process by introducing new and complex agricultural production risks at both national and global levels. Nationally — and especially in an already vulnerable archipelagic country like the Philippines — the adverse impacts of climate change could directly reduce agricultural productivity, while the indirect impact on global trade, and hence world food prices, could have negative impacts on the economy's international terms of trade. Both the direct and indirect effects of climate change could potentially damage the Philippine economy, as more resources are needed in the future to produce the same level of outputs.

Projections indicate that lower crop productivity induces the agricultural sector to retain less productive labour and capital, thereby absorbing resources that could be used more productively in the nonagricultural sectors and slowing the process of structural transformation. Higher world crop prices induced by climate change cause the country to pay more for imported food. On the other hand, the transmission of higher agricultural prices to domestic markets benefit farmers and rural households because they receive more income from agricultural activities. As incomes increase, farmers are motivated to invest in improving crop productivity and increasing production, which potentially helps mitigate the high word prices induced by global climate change. Estimating how these drivers interact in the economy is critical to determining their direct and indirect effects, and hence the net impact of climate change on the Philippine economy.

This chapter presents results of research designed to assess the impacts of climate change by considering both crop productivity and global agricultural trade effects that provide the main channels through which climate change directly affects the agricultural sector and indirectly affects the rest of the economy. An economywide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model was used to capture direct and indirect linkages, focusing on macroeconomic performance and the effects on long-term growth and structural change. The analysis also explores scenarios that include alternative policies intended to bring about the most advantageous outcomes in terms of higher economic growth and better income distribution.

The Philippines is highly vulnerable to climatic stresses, and droughts and floods have substantially affected agricultural production over time. In particular, El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)–related droughts have affected the country's water resources and temperatures, with flow-on effects to the agricultural sector, as well as to health and the environment. In addition to more frequent and severe flooding and drought, the Philippines has also experienced many catastrophic natural disasters, particularly typhoons. Yolanda (internationally known as Haiyan) devastated the country in 2013, causing 6,300 deaths; the displacement of over 5 million citizens; an estimated 89.60 billion Philippine peso (PhP) in property damage to houses, hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, and so on; and PhP42.76 billion in losses to the productive sectors, including agriculture. Consequently, the Philippines ranks high in the Global Climate Risk Index, taking first place in 2013. As recently as December 2017, Typhoons Urduja and Vinta (internationally known as Tembin and Kai-Tak, respectively) once again caused the loss of hundreds of lives, along with the destruction of property, infrastructure, and livelihoods.

The current state of climate science research does not attribute extreme events like floods, droughts, or typhoons to climate change, but there is growing consensus that climate change increases the frequency and severity of such events. In combination with key drivers of food production growth — such as income and population growth, investment in research and technology, and changes in dietary patterns — climate change will have a major impact on Philippine farmers’ ability to produce sufficient food and generate enough income to support healthy and productive lives. Poor and vulnerable communities are the most severely affected based on their reliance on subsistence farming and their limited capacity to undertake measures to adapt to climate change, which is of critical importance to sustaining agricultural production growth in the pursuit of food security and poverty reduction. Failure to adapt to climate change would make the Philippines even more susceptible both to extreme events and to the long-term impacts of climate change. The country must prepare for these impacts and enhance its capacity to deal with them economically, institutionally, scientifically, and technically.

Agriculture's direct share of the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen over time, from around from 20 per cent in the 1960s to 10 per cent as of 2014 (Chapter 1, this volume). Nevertheless, one-third of the labour force is still employed in agriculture, and 70 per cent of rural poor people depend on the sector and related activities for major shares of their income (Chapter 1, this volume). For these reasons, the medium-term development plans of successive Philippine administrations have consistently acknowledged the need to energize and modernize the agricultural sector in the pursuit of vigorous, broad-based economic growth and development that will generate employment and reduce poverty and inequality. Success in attaining this goal, however, has continued to be elusive. In fact, it has become more challenging due to climate change and the associated increase in the number and severity of natural disasters.

This volume has identified key contributing factors to the complex challenge of developing and modernizing the Philippine agricultural sector, examined how changes in key input resources have affected agricultural growth, discussed the range of additional threats that climate change poses to the sector, quantified recent agricultural losses due to the impacts of climate change, and identified measures to help mitigate these losses under a variety of potential policy scenarios. The purpose of this final chapter is to summarize the key findings of the preceding chapters, and synthesize recommendations on the policy and institutional changes needed to strengthen the sector and enhance its resilience to climate change.

AGRICULTURE's POTENTIAL AS AN ENGINE OF GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION

Past studies analysing the Philippine agricultural sector have noted its weak growth performance despite numerous programmes to invigorate and modernize the sector. Productivity growth — measured in terms of land productivity, commodity yield per hectare (ha), or total factor productivity (TFP) — has slowed over time (Chapters 1 and 5, this volume). This has contributed to the sector's low levels of labour productivity and the high incidence of poverty in rural areas, where 69 per cent of the agricultural labour force remain either unpaid or self-employed (Chapter 1, this volume).

The future of Philippine agriculture ultimately depends on the extent of climate change's impact and the choices governments, agricultural producers, and consumers make in efforts to adapt to these impacts. This chapter focuses on modelling the economic impacts of climate change on Philippine agriculture, emphasizing the potential for adaptation technologies and government investment policies not only to assist the country in proactively preparing for and mitigating these impacts, but also to achieve its food security objectives. The main instrument underlying the modelling and analyses in this chapter is the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT), a partial equilibrium economic model developed and maintained by the International Food Policy Research Institute. The model facilitates the simulation of the impacts and costs of climate change; the effectiveness of existing and emerging production technologies and strategies; and the contribution of demographic, development, and investment policies to food security and climate change adaptation efforts (for details of the model, see Rosegrant and the IMPACT Development Team 2012).

The analyses presented in this chapter are based on model simulations undertaken using an interlinked combination of modelling tools: the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT), a biophysical crop-model described in Chapter 9 (this volume), the IMPACT model (briefly described above and in more detail in Rosegrant and the IMPACT Development Team (2012)), including the IMPACT-WATER model (described in Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline (2002) and updated and expanded since then), and a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model for the Philippines described in Chapter 11 (this volume). The technical linkages among these models were earlier described in Chapter 9.

Simulations were undertaken under four future climate scenarios derived from the following general circulation/climate models: the General Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GDFL), Hadley Centre Global Environmental Model (HadGEM), Institut Pierre-Simon Laplace (IPSL), and the Model for Interdisciplinary Research on Climate (MIROC). Two primary scenarios were modelled for the 2011–50 period, one being the baseline scenario without climate change, and one a scenario with climate change based on the average results from the GDFL, HadGEM, IPSL, and MIROC simulations. In detailed technology assessments the MIROC model was used because it was deemed to be the most accurate simulation of the future Philippine climate.

One of the pathways through which climate change will be felt is its impact on water resources (WEPA 2012). This includes increased risk in the form of excess water, water shortages, poor water quality, and disruptions to freshwater ecosystems due to higher water temperatures, increased intensity and duration of precipitation, longer periods of low flows, and higher operating costs (Kundzewicz et al. 2007). Dependence on and overexploitation of groundwater can result from the unreliability of surface water supplies, while at the same time changes in precipitation patterns increase the incidence of flooding. Increased water risks and growing uncertainty about future conditions are already exacerbating existing water security challenges in the Philippines and have implications for water-related planning, management, and investment decisions. Adapting to new circumstances will require knowledge-based investment strategies and adaptive water governance, taking into account climate variability and minimizing potentially costly mismatches between water systems and the future climate.

This chapter outlines trends in water resource investments and agricultural water uses, focusing on irrigation projects, for the purpose of examining the preparedness of the agricultural sector to respond to the adverse impacts of climate change. While the literature on these impacts is mixed, lack of action could be more costly than a proactive, anticipatory approach. The increased recognition of the need to consider and mainstream the implications of climate change in government initiatives should be matched by increased preparation rather than a cursory or “business as usual” response. The next section outlines potential climate change adaptation strategies relating to water and irrigation. Thereafter, the climate change strategy of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is presented, followed by a discussion of trends in public investments in irrigation at national and subnational levels, which reflect planning, management, and decision making about agricultural water allocation and use. The chapter concludes with policy implications. (Details of the data and methodology utilized are provided in Box 3.1.)

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN THE IRRIGATION SECTOR

Irrigation and water are key sectors in need of climate change adaptation. In water-stressed areas, approaches should include applying irrigation, improving irrigation efficiency, adopting water-efficient technologies to harvest water and conserve soil moisture, developing and adopting improved varieties and species with resistance to heat and drought, and reviewing or developing other policies beyond the water sector.

The nexus between an increasing global population, the demand for food and the land on which it is cultivated, and emerging climate variability poses one of today's greatest societal challenges (Rudel et al. 2009). Understanding the dynamics and drivers of global land-use change is as important now as ever. As agricultural and pasture lands expand into remaining forests, previously fertile land is lost to desertification and intensified soil degradation. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC-AR5) suggests that land-use change may also be responsible for as much as 24 per cent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC 2014b). This poses challenges for decision-makers and farmers alike and requires a coordinated effort that balances the need to meet rising food demand with the protection of our fragile and depleted natural resource base. Underpinning this is the need for accurate information on global, regional, national, and subnational dynamics and drivers of land-use change. Increasingly, this needs to be viewed and considered through the lens of climate change.

A tension between two major land-use types — forests and agricultural land — also exists. Prevailing opinion is that expansion of agricultural land comes at the expense of forested areas; indeed, evidence exists suggesting this was, is, and most likely will continue to be one of the major drivers of forest loss and land-use change globally (Rudel et al. 2005; Chomitz 2006; Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011; Hosonuma et al. 2012). This is not necessarily the case in all countries, however, and local contexts are often more complex and ambiguous, as is discussed in this chapter focusing on the Philippines.

Agricultural lands and agroecosystems provide essential benefits to human society and, in addition to being crucial to subsistence and economic activity, are deeply embedded culturally. For developing nations, poorer, often smallholder farmers rely on agriculture to meet their daily needs, and as populations grow so too does demand for land. At the same time, forests also offer benefits to those dependent on their goods and services (who may also be smallholder farmers). Direct benefits such as food, fodder, and timber are obvious. Perhaps less tangible, but no less important, are trees and forests and the role they play in supporting agricultural activities such as micro-climatic regulation, soil nutrient cycling, and stabilization, as well as improving water retention.

The Philippines is noted for its climatic and ecological diversity, being a nation of many islands and spanning a large number of latitudes; hence, the impact of climate change would not be expected to be uniform. Yet, even if the changes were to have negative impacts on crop yields in every location, the question remains as to how bad such impacts may be. Will the impact be unequivocally negative, or might some parts of the country experience positive agricultural impacts? And could identifying places likely to experience negative outcomes ahead of time help people to plan and adapt? A 5 per cent yield loss, for example, is not so serious when compared with, say, a 40 per cent loss, and preparations would certainly differ depending on the extremes anticipated. There is also the question of climate change having differential impacts on crop yields. What if climate change negatively affects one crop in a given location, but positively affects another in the same location? Could this information help farmers and policymakers to prepare for what the future may bring?

This chapter presents the results of research designed to fill gaps in the knowledge base about the intensity of the impacts of climate change on agriculture in the Philippines, taking a spatially disaggregated approach intended to differentiate the impacts across regions. The research employed crop-modelling software together with the latest climate models to evaluate the impact of climate change on key crops. With this knowledge in hand, policymakers, researchers, and farmers should be better equipped to both prepare for and adapt to the impacts of climate change. To date, most of what has been published about the impact of climate change on agriculture has been based on climate models from the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), or even earlier. The research in this chapter is based on climate models from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), which was published beginning in 2013 and provides the most accurate, up-to-date predictions available.

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the regional divisions presented in Figure 9.1 The main land cover in each (approximately) 500-metre grid-cell is presented in Figure 9.2.

Climate change and variability have profound and wide-ranging effects on the agricultural sector, the environment, and society. Global, regional, and local evidences of climate change and variability have grown in recent years, and historical records from the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), combined with past and recent studies, provide evidence that climate change is no longer an anticipated scenario but a reality. Climate change is defined as shifts in mean climate variables or variance in the distribution of climate variables based on historical records over a significant period of time (IPCC 2007, 2014, p. 6). Changes may be evident in temperature and precipitation levels, as well as in other indicators, such as the number of wet and dry days, the number of warm days and cold nights, extremes of climate, and so on.

This chapter presents historical evidences of changes in climate variables at local and national levels. The implications of climate variability and climate change on the agricultural sector are also discussed, along with some beneficial agricultural practices, climate adaptation strategies, and location-specific measures for coping with changing climate at different levels.

LOCAL EVIDENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND VARIABILITY

Observed Trends in Temperature and Precipitation

One of the earliest studies analyzing observed trends climate variables in the Asia and Pacific region, as well as in specific countries, is the work of Manton et al. (2001, pp. 269–84), which made use also of historical data from selected weather gauging stations in the Philippines. Their analyses confirmed that the observed trends are statistically significant. Recently, these results were further updated by Cinco, de Guzman, Hilario, and Wilson (2014, pp. 12–26) using the historical climate data for thirty-four synoptic stations in the archipelago.

Analysis of time-series data on historical yearly mean temperatures (based on available PAGASA data) shows an increasing trend relative to normal values (that is, a thirty-year average for the period 1971–2000). The plot shows that the mean temperature increased by 0.65°C between 1951 and 2010 (Figure 4.1). Averaged across the country, yearly mean temperatures increased at a rate of 0.0164°C per year during 1981–2010, and by 0.0108°C per year during 1951–2010.

Leadership

In 1981, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) was led by the same small, cohesive band of revolutionaries who had directed the Pathet Lao since 1949, the year that the latter had split from the Lao Issarak (Lao Freedom Movement). A contingent of leaders, including Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Phoune Sipraseut, had emerged in 1973 from their mountain redoubt in Sam Neua Province to accept ministries in the coalition government established by the Vientiane Agreement (an outgrowth of the Paris Agreement concluding the war in Indochina). In 1975, a second contingent of leaders — which included the number one and two men in the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phomsivan — descended to Vientiane. It was at this point that, following the collapse of the non-communist regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh, the LPRP moved to consolidate its power, without violence.

A Politburo of seven members (Khamthay Siphandone and Sisomphon Lovansay, in addition to the five leaders mentioned above) and a 33-member Central Committee constitute the core of the party leadership. One striking characteristic of this leadership is that it is overwhelmingly Lao Loum (Lowland Lao). Only one alternate member of the Central Committee, Nhiavu Lobaliayo, is a Hmong (or Lao Soung) and perhaps one or two are Lao Theung. The paucity of minority representation in the LPRP leadership is significant in a country whose estimated 3.2 million population is divided between about 50% lowland Lao and 50% highland tribes. For two decades of their revolutionary struggle, the LPRP had its base in the mountain regions ofLaos, and after 1964 it controlled most of the mountain area, which constitutes almost two-thirds of the country's land. Many analysts assumed from this that the Lao Communist movement had tribal representatives among its top leadership, an assumption clearly put in question when the Party revealed its leadership lists.

The contradiction between LPRP claims of ethnic egalitarianism and the limited representation of tribal minorities in the policy-making levels of the Party has several possible explanations. The communist leaders, like their Royal Lao Government (RLG) predecessors, have been nurtured in an environment in which the lowland Lao feel a sense of superiority toward the highlanders and they are little inclined to take them into the highest circles of command.

Amidst tears and apprehension about a future without a man who became synonymous with Malaysia for over a generation, Malaysia's fourth and longestserving prime minister stepped down after a sixteen-month transition on 31 October 2003, making way for the tenure of his appointed deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Malaysia's new prime minister faces an extraordinary set of challenges, many of which were the direct result of his predecessor's twenty-two-year premiership that ended on a high note of international stature and strong domestic support, especially among non-Malays. Mahathir's last year in office was indeed a tribute to his service to Malaysia, yet it was riddled with controversy at home and abroad as his style of rule and views provoked strong criticism. Abdullah's first few months in office sent a signal that his leadership differed both in style and substance. However, he needs to obtain a strong political mandate in the general election and party elections in 2004, before he can effectively implement reforms and initiate policies that address some of the problems Tun Mahathir left behind.

Grand and Controversial International Exit

Over the course of his twenty-two years in office, Mahathir propelled Malaysia on to the international stage, citing its success in managing ethnic tensions, promoting economic development and projecting an anti-Western stance as a calling card for the developing world and Muslim nations. While the merits of Mahathir's record in these areas remain contentious, 2003 was used to solidify his role as an international spokesman on issues of co-operation and social justice in the international community. The year saw the culmination of a gradual progression of a foreign policy over the last third of his years in office involving extensive overseas travel and the systematic expansion of his exposure in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. At its core Mahathir projected himself as one of the leading critics of the United States, whose policy in Iraq isolated itself from the international community.

The grand exit unfolded in three acts, involving three different gatherings that drew international attention. In February, Malaysia hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Kuala Lumpur. The event served to galvanize opposition to perceived unilateralism on the part of the Bush administration.

Vietnam suffered two major domestic financial crises on either side of the global economic crisis of 2008. This extended period of turbulence destabilized the economic model that had been in place for most of the doi moi or “renovation” period since the late 1980s. The model had consisted of export-oriented and labour intensive “vent for surplus” sectors welded to a state-dominated economy producing goods and services for the domestic market. The former generated employment and export earnings, while the latter distributed economic rents throughout Vietnam's highly commercialized and fragmented state apparatus.

By the early 2000s, rapid credit growth was fuelling speculative investments in equities, property and other risky ventures by domestic businesses and households, both in the state and non-state sectors. This process gradually undermined bank, corporate and household balance sheets. By 2011 the decay could no longer be concealed, and major scandals broke in the state economic groups, notably in the shipbuilder Vinashin and the state shipping company Vinalines. The export sector continued to grow, led by surging exports of mobile phones and other electronic goods as global producers sought to diversify production bases away from China, where wages and other costs were rising quickly. However, domestic investment and consumption stagnated as businesses and households struggled under the weight of a heavy debt burden, frozen asset markets and tight credit conditions. Moderate rates of growth have been sustained but they remain heavily dependent on foreign direct investment and external demand. The challenge facing the government is to devise a new growth model that builds on the country's export success and stimulates investment in domestic supplier and downstream industries, while at the same time opening domestic markets to greater competition.

This chapter sets out to do three things. First, it briefly describes the growth model that evolved during the doi moi period and remained intact until the crises of 2008–11 played themselves out. One of the most interesting features of the model is the concentration of domestic commercial activity within the state, and the resulting absence of large-scale private firms in the dynamic export sectors or the importsubstituting sectors. Second, we revisit the crises of 2008 and 2010 to emphasize the central importance of these events to the breakdown of the old model.