Political and security developments in Southeast Asia in 2014 reflect efforts on the part of Southeast Asian countries as well as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to adjust and adapt to the conditions and circumstances of a “new normal” in the wider Asia-Pacific region: a rapidly changing regional strategic environment where emerging powers display greater assertiveness and assurance of their newfound status, whilst established powers experience relative decline and seek to rebalance against the growing power and influence of their rivals. China's rising power and influence appears to have grown from strength to strength, notwithstanding putative efforts by the United States, Japan and others to balance against it partly through rallying Southeast Asian partners in support of their cause. Adding to the growing prospect of regional instability and turbulence was Russia's annexation of Crimea in March, which raised fears among some Southeast Asians over the prospective emulation of Russia's action by more powerful claimant states over the South China Sea region.

At the same time within Southeast Asia, a number of states and societies underwent political transition. Indonesia conducted a successful presidential election in July which saw a popular non-establishment figure, the then Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (or “Jokowi”), win the presidency. It remains unclear at this point what Jokowi's foreign policy will look like. However, there are early hints that Indonesia might not be as fixated with ASEAN as in the past. Going beyond the “Indo- Pacific” idea advanced by the Yudhoyono administration, the Jokowi administration's vision for Indonesia is as a global maritime fulcrum connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Known as “PACINDO”, the area of engagement envisioned here is ostensibly geographically more extensive than the Indo-Pacific region the Yudhoyono administration had in mind. To that end, India and the Gulf states have been identified as countries with whom Jokowi would engage more deeply. As a foreign policy adviser to Jokowi has declared: “We used to say ASEAN is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Now we change it to a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

After considerable unrest in Thailand caused by the rift between the so-called “Red Shirts” and their “Yellow” rivals, senior officers of the Thai military launched a bloodless coup in May which brought temporary relief but left many questions unanswered.

On 21 May 1998 Soeharto announced that he was unable to continue leading the nation and had decided to step down. His deputy, B.J. Habibie, was immediately sworn in as the new President. This dramatic threeminute event ended the Soeharto era. It was the culmination of several dramatic months of rising political violence and protest, but failed to usher in a much hoped-for era of political stability.

Economic Crisis

The Indonesian economy deteriorated rapidly following the onset of the regional economic crisis that began in the middle of 1997 in Thailand. Indonesia, forced to accept a US$43 billion bail-out under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September, was the hardest hit by the crisis. The value of the rupiah dropped from Rp 2,350 per U.S. dollar in June 1997 to Rp 16,500 in January 1998. By early April, it was back to Rp 9,000 per U.S. dollar. However, the low value of the rupiah made it impossible for Indonesian companies to import goods and to pay debts. Prices of imported and domestic products rose drastically and many companies faced bankruptcy. Unemployment rates also jumped. These developments affected Indonesian politics. The presidential election in March was conducted under the shadow of economic turmoil and increasing discontent.

There were two interpretations of the economic crisis in Indonesia. The government view was that the causes were mainly economic. The problems could be solved by undertaking economic reforms. The situation would then improve, and political reforms would not be required.

The other view was that the crisis was both economic and political in nature. Economic problems included overexpansion of the Indonesian economy without sound infrastructure, overuse of foreign investments in non-productive sectors (for example, real estate), and rampant corruption and cronyism, which resulted in large debts being incurred by both private (US$74 billion) and state (US$63.4 billion) sectors. Indebted private companies were mostly owned by the New Order élite and Chinese conglomerates. Many argued that this was the root of the problem.

Rampant Corruption

Under authoritarian rule, the power of the Indonesian state was strong, and it was concentrated in the hands of Soeharto. The spoils distribution system was used to co-opt the élite. When there was enough money to distribute, and the economy was healthy, the situation appeared to be stable.

Southeast Asian states revised their strategic horizons during 1993 through an ASEAN-inspired initiative arising from the impact of the end of the Cold War. That development occurred, however, without a corresponding revision in economic horizons; nor was there any evident reconsideration of domestic political orders, which were in general strengthened.

During the Cold War, Southeast Asia and Indochina in particular had been coupled to international contention, which was inherent in the global balance of power. It was for this reason that Southeast Asia was described at one time as the Balkans of the Orient in an analogy with the condition of southeast Europe before the outbreak of World War I. With the end of the Cold War, global rivalry has ceased to exist in the same way as a point of reference for regional relations. This has been demonstrated with the end of the Cambodian conflict as a major international problem.

The states of Southeast Asia now inhabit a different strategic environment but not a fundamentally different international society, which is distinguished still by the absence of a common government able to enforce law and order. Furthermore, as a result of the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has begun to be called into question as a coherent category through which to address problems of regional security. A growing interdependence in security matters between Southeast and East Asia in particular has been perceived and registered by regional states. At issue, however, is the significance of a novel development in extended multilateral security dialogue joining Southeast and East Asia, inspired during the year by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Does that development indicate a genuine structural adjustment to a new strategic horizon or is it little more than a tinkering with the form of existing regional security arrangements?

Apart from involvement in vestigial security arrangements, which are both a legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, provision for either collective defence or collective security has not been undertaken on an exclusive basis by regional states. ASEAN, which repudiated military pacts from the outset, has established a limited regional security system based on a formula of conflict avoidance and management. The scope of that undertaking was extended within Southeast Asia in July 1992 but without augmenting its corporate membership.

Introduction

Indonesia is a fascinating amalgam of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions, united by history, by a common national language, by political will and sometimes by sheer force, and spread over thousands of separate, distinct, and often distant islands. That such a country would have a high degree of regional autonomy would seem to make sense but surprisingly the regions in Indonesia until recently did not have much autonomy and were administered mainly by the central government. This led to a lot of resentment towards the centre and particularly towards Java and the Javanese who dominate in politics and in the central government.

Addressing a call for more regional autonomy, the Habibie government passed new laws that promised the broadest autonomy to the regions and the Wahid government adopted regulations under the new laws. The laws and regulations came into force on 1 January 2001. This decentralization has been referred to by some as the “Big Bang” — Indonesia moved from a government structure that was highly centralized to one of the most decentralized in the world (at least on paper) and did so in about 27 months from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree opening up the regional governance reform in October 19981 until the coming into force of the laws on 1 January 2001. Many believe that no country has ever decentralized so much so suddenly.

This article will look at the provisions of the new regional autonomy laws. It will, in particular, examine the political context that led to their adoption, their contents including their shortcomings, the many difficult tasks faced during the implementation of the laws over the past two years, and the possibility of amending the laws. It will then look very briefly at the separate autonomy laws adopted for special regions.

I have elsewhere made a detailed legal analysis of the laws and regulations just before their coming into force and also written on the legal consequences of the regional autonomy laws on regional minorities in Indonesia. Jurists should refer to these other articles for a more detailed legal analysis. The purpose of this article will be to explain some of the legal difficulties generated by the law to non-lawyers and to give a more general overview of the law and its early implementation over the last two years — though still from a jurist's point of view.

Introduction

The unfolding of the affairs of nations rarely corresponds neatly with the beginning and end of the calendar year, and the experience of the Philippines in 1986 was no exception. The dramatic events of 1986, the high point of which was the toppling of the Marcos regime by a non-violent revolution in February, were inextricably rooted in the political and economic crises that had wracked the country since the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. in August 1983. Likewise, many of the daunting problems and challenges facing the Philippines in the post-Marcos era will not begin to be resolved until well into 1987, if at all.

Despite this seamless flow of events, the changes that occurred in the relatively short span of twelve months created a dramatically new political environment in the Philippines by the end of 1986. At the beginning of the year, for example, Ferdinand Marcos, weakening but still powerful, was marshalling the intimidating powers of his presidential office and political machine to assure his re-election in the face of the strongest political challenge ever to his twenty-year rule. At year end, Marcos was in exile in Hawaii and President Corazon (“Cory”) Aquino sought to fend off challenges from both the left and the right as she struggled to consolidate her still shaky political position and define and pursue the policy agenda of her coalition government.

In January, the leadership of the Philippine Armed Forces appeared to be loyal to President Marcos, despite the growing prominence of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). By December, however, Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and his RAM followers had gone from being heroes of the February revolution to being outcasts as a result of their challenge to the Aquino government. Meanwhile, General Fidel Ramos, the other “Hero of EDSA (Epifania de los Santos Avenue)”, opted to support the Aquino government, and by doing so, strengthened his position as a key figure in the Aquino administration.

At the start of the year the communist insurgency continued to grow, and perversely, the insurgency issue was used effectively by Marcos to criticize the Aquino candidacy and justify his continued rule. By December the communists had recovered from their politically damaging boycott of the February election and were using a fragile sixty-day cease-fire to mount an effective public relations campaign.

The region now known as Southeast Asia has been called the Malay World, Malay Archipelago, Nusantara, East Indies, the Far East, and Southeast Asia or the ASEAN region. All these terms are still in use in various contexts for different purposes, quite often interchangeably, for instance, in books on the history of Southeast Asia available for undergraduate teaching across the globe.

The region physically includes mainland and maritime components. The “Malay World” is being used by a number of academic institutions and publications in Malaysia, Indonesia and the United Kingdom. Others prefer to use Nusantara, instead, the old Javanese terminology for “archipelago”. It refers to the maritime area of Southeast Asia. When British naturalists, explorers and biological scientists analysed the flora and fauna of the maritime region, they preferred to use the term “Malay Archipelago”. The French, German, Austrian and British orientalists of the nineteenth century refer to this maritime geophysical space as part of the Far East.

The term “Southeast Asia” that refers to the present mainland and maritime parts of the region was first used by American priest and educator Howard Malcom in 1837. During the Second World War, a century later, the Allied forces established a South-East Asia Command (SEAC) in 1943 that covered the areas previously known as the Dutch East Indies; British Burma, Malaya and Borneo; French Indochina; and Thailand. In 1944, the Washington D.C.–based National Geographic Society published the first map of Southeast Asia as we know it today, based on SEAC's military concept.

What is significant is that each of these names or labels for the region was constructed with different sets of knowledge content serving the specific purposes of whoever its originators were — imperialists, colonialists, researchers or academicians. The knowledge produced, based on empirical evidence derived from this region, often enriched the global discourse on a particular theory or concept.

For instance, the contribution of Alfred Russel Wallace (1858) was instrumental in establishing the “natural selection theory”, based on his eight-year research in the Malay Archipelago that was accepted and recognized by Charles Darwin himself. Similarly, the internationally well-known theory of “plural society” by J.S. Furnivall (1948), that was well received and applied widely in Africa and Latin America, was based on his research in Indonesia and Burma, which formed the empirical core of his theory.

Introduction

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a pair of initiatives that aims to restructure the economy and geopolitics of Eurasia. The Silk Road Economic Belt announced by Xi Jinping in September 2013 during a tour of Central Asian neighbours is a programme to build land transportation corridors that connect China to Europe and all other major Eurasian subregions, including Indochina, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. Then in October 2013, Xi visited Indonesia and announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is a port development initiative to broaden Chinese trade channels targetting the maritime regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. Xi Jinping's two Silk Road programmes are a package called the “One Belt — One Road” [yidai — yilu] initiative.

Both Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang spent great effort in the year 2014 launching concrete measures to advance the silk roads agenda of Eurasian connectivity and regional cooperation. They hope to build a comprehensive trans-Eurasian network of economic corridors that could sustain China's economic growth and strengthen China's political leverage for decades to come. The consequence would be to draw the countries of Eurasia into China's economic orbit to form what Xi Jinping calls a “community of shared destiny”. Members’ fortunes would rise as China's own rise continued. A culturally and politically diverse but economically integrated division of labour harmoniously organized by China's trade and financial interests is what China promises. If this vision is fully realized, China's silk roads vision will help realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the “China Dream” of a wealthy society grounded on Chinese values.

It should be noted that this yidai — yilu agenda is a work in progress rather than a fully drawn up master plan. That is, as previous Chinese leaders have done, Xi Jinping is providing a grand strategic vision or agenda for China. The Chinese Communist Party and government must work to realize this agenda to the best of their ability. So, for the rest of Xi Jinping's years in power — expected to last until 2022 — we will hear about the two Silk Roads at every meeting that Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang attends in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

Paradigm Lost — Changing Foreign Policy Models

During the mid- to late-1980s, a major transformation took place in how Vietnam's policy élite conceptualized foreign policy. The roots of this transformation are twofold. They lie in domestic circumstances arising from the socio-economic crisis which confronted Vietnam at that time. And secondly, they lie in external influences arising from the “new political thinking” fashionable in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Vietnam turned from a foreign policy model heavily structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy model which placed greater emphasis on national interest, balance of power and realpolitik. Vietnamese analysts now tend to emphasize global economic forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology over military aspects of power when weighing the global balance. The old and new foreign policy models are not mutually exclusive. Ideology and national interest are not dichotomous terms; they can and do overlap and co-exist.

The influence of ideology on Vietnam's foreign policy prior to the mid- to late- 1980s may be illustrated as follows. From the inception of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an established state in Southeast Asia in 1954, its élite accepted the “two camp” thesis that the world was divided between the forces of socialism and imperialism. In the late 1960s Vietnam adopted a framework known as the “three revolutionary currents”. According to this model, global order was determined by three trends (or revolutionary currents): the strength of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union; the strength of the workers’ movement in advanced industrial countries; and by the strength of the forces of national liberation in the Third World. In practical terms, Vietnam allied itself with the Soviet Union as the “cornerstone” of its foreign policy. Hanoi's leaders also viewed Indochina as a strategic entity and sought to develop an integrated alliance system with Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia and 25-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union were logical end products of this orientation. They resulted in a decadelong polarization of regional relations. Vietnam was left isolated and dependent on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for economic support.

Amid worldwide salutes and suspicion, China's international strategy took full shape in 2015. While many observers find increasing opportunities in China's multiple initiatives to enhance regional and global development as well as economic cooperation, others see an ever more assertive China, projecting might with its growing wealth. Especially for Southeast Asian nations, the most susceptible to China's moves due to their proximity to and close economic ties with China, the many new Chinese initiatives have brought both hope and challenges. Now that three years have passed since President Xi Jinping took office and the basic framework of China's international strategy has been established, it is time to examine the new features of China's international endeavours and draw salient implications for the future trends of its political, security and economic relations with the world, and in particular with its closest neighbour, ASEAN.

From the author's perspective, despite its widely perceived image as a revisionist, hegemony-seeking power, China has maintained its course of peaceful rise, and its new international strategy features more continuity than change. Nevertheless, with the evolving geopolitical environment of the world and bigger stakes in regional stability and global economic well-being, China has made many adjustments to its international strategy under the new leadership. If effectively implemented and well understood by other nations, this strategy will not only help achieve the grand “Chinese Dream”, but also boost global peace and development as well as regional stability and integration.

Old Ambition, New Approach: Five Changes to China's International Strategy

The peaceful and inward-focused nature of China's rise was reaffirmed when President Xi put forward China's strategic goal to achieve the “Chinese Dream”, a new name for the century-long ambition for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, on 29 November 2012, only two weeks after he was elected as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Despite occasional headstrong behaviour since then, China has in general demonstrated a peaceful and constructive stance in the international arena, and domestic reform and development have remained its first and foremost strategic targets.

On 5–6 July 1997, troops loyal to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (of the Cambodian People's Party, or CPP) and those of First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh (leader of the royalist party known as FUNCINPEC, or the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia) engaged in a fierce street battle in Phnom Penh. The fighting stunned the Cambodian people and the world. Within two days, the CPP force defeated its enemy, and then pushed the remnants against the northern Thai- Cambodian border into a tiny strategic area called O Smach. At year's end, Hun Sen still held high the trophy of victory.

This article seeks to explore the events of July 1997. At issue is whether or not what took place constitutes a coup; and, if it is a coup, what kind? I argue that the overthrow of Ranariddh was a coup, not a social revolution or putsch. Unlike coups in many other countries, however, it was not caused by factors such as ethnic or ideological antagonisms, sociopolitical turmoil, or military dominance. I take a structural approach, arguing that Hun Sen's actions must be explained in terms of his struggle for hegemonic preservation, as his party and adversaries braced themselves for the next election scheduled for 1998. (In this study, the term “hegemon” means “leader”, and struggle for hegemony simply means struggle for political leadership.) Although the Second Prime Minister has now achieved political dominance, preventing bipolarity from emerging, he has also recreated Cambodia's old power structure, prone to coups, violence, and war.

Prelude to a Pre-Emptive Coup

In the debate over whether Hun Sen's actions were or were not a coup, those who supported or sympathized with the Second Prime Minister viewed them as preventing Prince Ranariddh from staging a coup against the government. Those who put the blame on Hun Sen considered his actions a coup. It may be worth describing politico-military developments leading to the July events and then examining the two opposing perspectives more closely.

In May 1993, elections were organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which intervened in the country following the Paris Agreement in October 1991.

The wheel of fortune turns for most people but for the Vietnamese, it seems to have long remained immobile. Nearly two years ago, when the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, war-weary Vietnamese took heart that somehow the wheel would finally turn to their advantage. Although few were naïve enough to expect miracles, or that the next couple of years would be an easy time, many began to talk of post-war reconstruction. Most people had hoped that the framework established in the Paris Agreement, agreed to by signatory parties, would somehow transform the bloody struggle of the battlefields to a less violent competition in the political arena. Unfortunately their hopes did not materialize. Indeed, all that the Paris Agreement has achieved thus far has been to put an end to the direct U.S. involvement in the Indochina conflict and allow President Nixon to fulfil his promise of bringing the “boys” home. As far as Vietnam is concerned, the fighting has continued unabated; casualties are still high; and the prospects for a rapid political settlement is just as illusory today as when the Agreement was signed. With the South Vietnamese economy rapidly deteriorating, ordinary Vietnamese discover that living in “post-war” Vietnam is not much of an improvement from the days of the war itself.

This paper attempts to review and assess the significant political, economic, and social events that took place in South Vietnam in 1974. In so doing, the major trends of the country will be brought into sharper focus.

Major Political Trends

The year 1974 was one in which the government of the Republic of South Vietnam (GVN) has had to face some of the most serious challenges since it came into power. Jostled along by political currents, both external and internal, the political base of the government has been seriously eroded.

Adversary Challenges

On the military front, GVN's competition with the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) has not diminished as a result of the cease-fire agreement. In fact, there has been little doubt as to the PRG's and DRV's capability of launching a full-scale military offensive.

The coup on 22 May 2014 in Thailand has, for the present, caused a break in the political divide and impasse, a problem that the previous elected government was unable to solve. Many were worried that the deeply entrenched political polarization which had existed for almost a decade would lead to bloodshed if it was allowed to continue. So many questions were asked on what went wrong with the presumed Thai democracy. Why did the coup happen? What would be the future of democracy in Thailand? How can it be consolidated? These questions reflect that Thailand is facing a serious problem of democratic consolidation.

Many scholars on democratization agree that the road to a stable democracy is not always smooth. They agree that democratic consolidation in many countries is not an easy task, and Thailand is no exception.

Democratic consolidation depends on a variety of factors which vary from one country to another. Nonetheless, one of the major causes for the instability of a democratic regime is related to political legitimacy. Any political regime which does not secure legitimacy will find it hard to survive since its legitimacy depends on its acceptance by its citizens as expressed through major political forces. There is no need at this stage to debate in detail here how to develop and fortify a democratic regime's legitimacy. However, it is accepted that the essential requirement for strengthening such legitimacy is the regime's effectiveness in meeting the needs of its people and the implementation of democratic values, practices and procedures.

Political Polarization and the Crisis of Political Legitimacy

In the case of Thailand during the past decade, we have witnessed a deeply entrenched political polarization which had never reached such extreme levels in the past. This divisiveness, initially caused by a conflict between the pro- and anti- Thaksin groups, later developed into a crisis of political legitimacy. The anti-Thaksin group was formed around 2001 by a mass media tycoon, Sonthi Limthongkul, and later joined by some prominent political elites, notably Chamlong Srimuang, former Governor of Bangkok. In the beginning, the group was composed of thousands from the urban middle class and some upper-middle class who believed that Thaksin was leading the country towards one party rule.

For anybody working on Southeast Asia, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (hereafter ISEAS) has been a “light on the hill”, a beacon of warm hospitality and serious scholarship for fifty years. ISEAS has quickly established itself as unquestionably the leading institution in the field, a great testimony to the vision of its founders and to the wonderful work of its staff, past and present.

In what is arguably its flagship publication, Southeast Asian Affairs (hereafter SEAA) has been published annually since 1974. Each year, the Southeast Asian community, both within and beyond the region, and from the academic, policy, media and NGO worlds, eagerly awaits the arrival of this volume.

The series has generally followed a winning formula that has clearly stood the test of time. There are general overviews of politics, international relations, economics and social affairs. Then follows detailed country surveys highlighting, interpreting and assessing recent developments. The guiding principle has been to invite scholars with a deep knowledge of the subject matter to write analytical yet accessible and concise papers looking backwards and forward.

Perusing the pages of the present volume — Turning Points and Transitions: Selections from Southeast Asian Affairs 1974–2018 — the reader is introduced to a veritable “who's who” of Southeast Asian Studies since the 1970s: Wang Gungwu, Chan Heng Chee, Michael Leifer, Rodolfo Severino, Sharon Siddique, Sjahrir, Suchit Bunbongkarn, and many, many others.

Appropriately, the editors have selected papers that call attention to key turning points and trends in the region. These are well reflected in some of the chapter titles: “the handling of contradictions”, “the ASEAN economic miracle unravels”, “from Bali to Iraq”, “Kampuchea 1979– 81”, “the fall of Soeharto and the rise of Habibie”, “what went wrong with the Thai democracy?”, among many other arresting titles.

The timing of this volume is propitious. It is an opportunity to celebrate ISEAS's fiftieth birthday, to showcase its unrivalled network of scholars and to reflect on the “journey” that the region has taken since 1974. Few if any regions of the world can match Southeast Asia for its dynamism, its diversity, its rising economic and political coherence, and its effective international engagement. All these dimensions are evident in this wide-ranging volume.

While election years in Cambodia are always eventful, 2017 proved to be even more so than expected. While the months leading to the June commune elections brought the customary machinations and jitters, it was the post-election developments that dashed whatever hope for political change may have been engendered by the results of the last two elections. As the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) moved to consolidate its power in anticipation of the forthcoming elections in 2018, the country spiralled away from whatever measure of political openness may have been achieved in recent years. While election-related violence is not unprecedented, as forecast in the frequent references to “colour revolution” and imminent eruption of “social chaos”, the crackdown against regime opponents in the months following the June elections was wholesale and decisive. The consequences affect not only the upcoming 2018 elections but potentially the next electoral cycle as well. The hoped-for democratic transition into which the international community had poured massive financial and political investment over the last quarter of a century appears more elusive than ever.

Still smarting from its precarious win in the 2013 elections, the CPP was confronted with yet another disconcerting outcome in the 2017 commune elections. Despite the ruling party's efforts to turn the political tide, the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) successfully secured 5,007 council seats (to the CPP's 6,503) and 489 out of the 1,646 commune chief seats, a tenfold increase from their win in the 2012 elections. Though short of the 60 per cent that the party had projected, the CNRP did secure 44 per cent of the vote, compared to the CPP's 51 per cent. This narrowing margin is significant because it reveals not only a wide base of support for the opposition in urban centres but, even more significantly, an erosion of the CPP's political control in rural areas that have been the party's traditional base, where the majority of Cambodians live and where the ruling party has long-established political infrastructure. At 85 per cent of registered voters, voter turnout was impressively high, an indicator of popular optimism about the prospect of change, bolstered in no small part by the earlier performance of the opposition party, despite the preponderant power and repressive grip of the CPP.