Introduction: Change from New to Old

Change is not always about the new. Occasionally, it is about the reappearance of the old. This is easily missed in a country that takes deep pride in perpetual selftransformation, and nowhere was this more evident than in the 7 May 2011 Singapore General Election (GE2011). In the wake of the most thoroughly contested general elections in generations, the mainstream media and pundits alike sought to capture this sense of change with a variety of phrases such as the “new normal” and “watershed”, suggesting that the 61 per cent of the popular vote won by the People's Action Party (PAP) — its lowest since independence — has resulted in a different Singapore, one that has broken away from the norm. Such hyperbole is understandable and not entirely inaccurate, but greater contextualization will show that sometimes the old reappears as the new.

GE2011 was historically important for a couple of reasons. It saw the largest number of voters ever — 2.3 million, increasing from 2.1 million in 2006 and 2 million in 2001. It also gave us a quick glimpse into the future of Singapore politics because it saw the largest ever participation of first-time voters — 200,000 — as well as the largest number of younger voters with an estimated 600,000 out of 2.3 million between the ages of 21 and 35. The candidates from the various political parties reflect this youthful demographic too. However, the fact that the ruling PAP was not returned to government on Nomination Day is not new. While 2011 saw 82 out of 87 seats contested, it must be remembered that 2006 saw 56 per cent of the seats contested (47 out of 84). And if we cast our minds back further to 1980, we will remember that 38 out of 68 Parliamentary seats were contested; in 1976 53 out of 69 seats were contested; and in 1972 57 seats out of 65 were contested. The lesson: the PAP could only take its incumbency for granted from the 1980s onwards. GE2006 and GE2011 mark a return to the old.

GE2011 was also keenly contested because of the credible slate of Opposition candidates.

For Brunei Darussalam, 2015 was primarily about the dilemma of maintaining domestic stability in the face of significant regional and global instability in areas of particular vulnerability for Southeast Asia's smallest country. Plummeting global energy prices saw the country's once extremely large current account surplus reverse into a large deficit. At the same time, as the smallest and weakest claimant in the South China Sea, Brunei has the fewest means to counter the effects of growing Chinese assertiveness, U.S.–China rivalry, and ASEAN ineffectiveness in relation to these disputed waters that lap on to the shores of the Sultanate. Aided by significant long-standing financial, political and diplomatic reserves, Brunei Darussalam was able to maintain an impressive level of social, political and diplomatic stability in these challenging times. On the economic and diplomatic fronts, Bandar Seri Begawan responded by enhancing existing relations and assets and seeking greater diversification. On the social and political fronts, the response was one of greater conservatism and centralization. As Brunei Darussalam's economic problems are significant and structural, the responses will have to pass the test of time for the country to overcome them.

More than Headwinds

Even a cursory glance at Table 1 shows how dramatically the Brunei economy was affected by falling energy prices. And yet, the growth estimates for 2015 are based on inflated price assumptions for both oil and liquefied natural gas, so the reality will likely be even worse. Likewise, current market movements suggest that the IMF price assumptions going forward err on the side of optimism.

The Sultan, His Majesty Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, is well aware that the country's hydrocarbon resources will eventually expire, possibly as early as 2025, and has tried to extend their life in recent years by capping production. The volume of oil production reportedly is now a full 40 per cent less than in 2006.1 In 2015 the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance of some of the most important energy projects has further hit production. However, the short-term costs of the policy have been exacerbated by the global collapse in the value of hydrocarbons with the price of crude oil having fallen from above US$100 in mid-2014 to less than US$30 per barrel by January 2016 and the value of natural gas per million Btu (British Thermal Unit) having fallen from over US$6 to nearly US$2 during the same period.

The “Fukuda Doctrine”

Manila was the last stop on Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's tour of Southeast Asia. There, on 18 August, he delivered his noteworthy speech on Japan's policy towards that region. Japanese news media have billed the event as an epoch-making unveiling of what they call the “Fukuda Doctrine”, finding deep significance in the very fact that such a speech was made. While I would not go so far as to call the contents of the Manila address a “doctrine”, it is certainly the first time since the Second World War that a Japanese Prime Minister has made such a systematic presentation of views on relations with Southeast Asia.

The main points of the speech were as follows: first, Japan is committed to peace and to the role of an economic power; it will not become a military power. Secondly, as “an especially close friend” of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Japan will co-operate in efforts to strengthen the solidarity of that organization. Thirdly, Japan will emphasize “heart-to-heart” contacts, building stronger ties as an equal partner not only economically, but in the social, political, and cultural realms as well. Fourthly, Japan will forge particularly close economic and trade relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and continue to deal with them in the context of the world economy. Fifthly, Japan will also attempt to foster relations based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina. Prime Minister Fukuda phrased these points as the “pillars” of Japan's Southeast Asian policy.

No doubt the real intentions behind the Prime Minister's speech will be interpreted variously as time goes on, but my immediate impression is that his approach came out of a compromise between an aggressive Japanese stance advocating active, full-scale involvement in Southeast Asia, and a passive view similar to the Meiji period's “dissociation from Asia” thesis, which holds that Japan must avoid deep involvement in that region. Be that as it may, the very fact that Japan should publicly announce any sort of a “doctrine” at all on this subject is fraught with significance.

Role of Japan and the U.S. in Southeast Asia

A broad historical background underlies these events; the force of its logic has pushed Japan into the stage centre of Asian regional politics, irrespective of the will of the Japanese people.

The year 1976 for Vietnam was the first since 1858 — a total of 117 years — that the country was entirely free of Western colonial intervention. During this first year of independence, the country had to face a multifaceted challenge: that of bringing back national unity (disrupted since 1862), repairing the massive physical destruction, and overcoming the economic, cultural and social dislocations that had occurred during the Thirty-Year War (1945–75). Beyond these immediate problems, the first year of peace was also one when the foundations were laid for the country's future ideological, economic and institutional structure and for its selfassertion in international affairs. In more specific terms, 1976 was a year of hectic transitional activities which included the administrative restructuring of the country, nationwide elections for a National Assembly of the reintegrated country, a new formal name for the country (“The Socialist Republic of Vietnam”), and planned industrial and agricultural transformations designed to give the country a foundation for rapid economic and social development.

This article attempts to review the principal aspects of Vietnam's public life during 1976. This is done while recognizing the hazards of such an undertaking. Aside from the risks inherent in “instant history” — in effecting from afar a year-end review of the development process of any society — there are special problems awaiting those who study contemporary Vietnam. Most of these problems are associated with the fact that Vietnam, unlike other societies, is a divided country in the process of becoming one. While it is true that formally and juridically the country was reintegrated on the State plane during 1976, due to long years of partition and especially the difference in the socio-political regimes that governed the two regions, the reality of the existence of the two zones remains vivid. This could be observed in the postwar reconstruction efforts and in the transformations of the social, economic and institutional aspects of each zone. The North, as we shall see momentarily, greatly suffered from the war in material terms (far more than the South in many ways, due to the massive terroristic bombings); yet, it has the advantage of a stable political, social and economic structure and an experienced leadership.

Introduction

It was at the 1992 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit that the six states made a stronger commitment to a liberal trade regime through the instrument of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). They decided to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

Coming on the heels of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Europe 1992, AFTA did not evolve from a comprehensive and detailed programme of liberalization complete with rules and procedures. In fact the agreement incorporating AFTA was less than 10 pages. Compare this with the NAFTA document exceeding 2,000 pages. Yet AFTA stands out among all attempts in ASEAN at economic co-operation in several ways. First, this was the first time that ASEAN described free trade as its eventual goal, a break from its previous mind-set of cautious liberalization. Second, the Heads of Governments in ASEAN identified 15 product groups for accelerated liberalization, thus avoiding a lengthy process of negotiations among bureaucrats to identify product groups, Third, there was a definite timetable within which free trade would be achieved, that is in 15 years. Finally, the CEPT was a vast improvement over an earlier (1987) programme for enhanced Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), which allowed for more automatic liberalization of items, deeper margins of preferences, and more product coverage than under PTA. This latter programme did not really progress substantially, suffered from delays in submission of items for liberalization, and some members were behind schedule for as much as two years.

As shown in Figure 1, the CEPT has two tracks: fast and normal. In the fast track, according to the 1992 agreements, the achievement of free trade was to take place in 10 years, that is by 2003. For items with base tariff rates exceeding 20 per cent, reductions were to be spread over 10 years till 2003. For items with rates below 20 per cent, reductions were to be completed by the year 2000.

In the normal track, tariffs of more than 20 per cent were to be reduced in three stages: to 20 per cent by 2001, 15 per cent by 2003, 10 per cent by 2005 and free trade (0–5 per cent) in 2008. For items with tariff rates less than 20 per cent, reductions were to be completed by 2003.

The past decade has seen fundamental and dramatic changes in Indonesian national politics which have affected all aspects of public life. The forced resignation of President Suharto amid the Asian financial crisis in May 1998 ended the stranglehold of the authoritarian New Order regime which had ruled Indonesia for thirty-two years, and ushered in a new reformasi era characterized by rejection of many key features of the New Order. In a zeal to outlaw authoritarianism and build a more pluralistic democracy, Indonesia carried out four successive amendments to the 1945 constitution which, among others, abolished the social-political role of the armed forces, ensure a clear separation of power between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, enshrine the principles of human rights in the constitution, and allow the development of a truly multiparty system. To prevent the rise of another longterm leader like Suharto who was able to manipulate the Consultative Assembly to elect him for seven consecutive five-year terms, the presidential term has been limited to two non-renewable five-year terms while the president and vice-president are to be directly elected by the people. As a reaction to the overt centralization under the New Order which gave little room for regional initiatives, the post-Suharto governments have also introduced sweeping regional autonomy.

After difficult early years of transition, marked by various internal conflicts and political instability, relative normalcy and political stability seemed to have been restored by 2004 as Indonesia succeeded in holding its first direct presidential election, affirming its status as the world's thirdlargest democracy. The newly democratic Indonesia recognizes freedoms of expression and association as key principles, giving rise to a vibrant and increasingly critical civil society, free-wheeling media, and numerous political parties. These fundamental changes in Indonesia's political landscape have led to a re-structuring of relations between the state and society, between the central government and the regional governments, and between the various institutions of the state, which in turn has transformed the ways that decisions are made. One of the key areas affected by these political changes is in the making and implementation of Indonesian foreign policy, which during the previous era had been the prerogative solely of the predominant executive.

On 23 October 1991 Cambodia took a tentative step towards lasting peace when the four Khmer factions and 19 countries signed a UN-brokered peace accord in Paris which ended the 13-year-old war in Cambodia. It is at best a fragile peace as indicated by the series of violent events — the mob attack on Khmer Rouge leaders and demonstrations against corruption — that took place in Phnom Penh after the signing of the peace accord.

To understand how “peace” finally returned to Cambodia, it is necessary to examine the events that led to the first “breakthrough” in June which in turn led to the signing of the peace accord on 23 October. Before doing that, it may be useful to understand what the peace accord actually entails.

The UN Peace Accord: Main Features

Under the accord, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) will, on the advice of the 12-member Supreme National Council (SNC) headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, run the country until UN-supervised free elections are held, probably in April 1993. The day-to-day administration will continue to be in the hands of the State of Cambodia (SOC), the regime installed by Vietnamese forces in January 1979, while UNTAC will oversee the running of five key ministries — defence, finance, foreign affairs, interior and information.

During this period, a 10,000-member UN peace-keeping force will be deployed inside Cambodia to enforce the ceasefire — in place since 1 May 1991 — and to demobilize the four Khmer factions. Under a compromise agreement, 70 per cent of each of the four rival armies will be demobilized by UNTAC — which is expected in Cambodia in April or May 1992 — with the remaining 30 per cent to be held in UNTAC-controlled cantonments until just before the elections when they are expected to be totally demobilized or absorbed into a new Cambodian national army under the new government.

About four million out of the 8.5 million Cambodians are eligible to vote, and they will choose a 120-member national assembly, based on the electoral system of proportional representation. Political parties with a minimum of 5,000 members will be eligible to contest the elections. The presidential election is expected to be held immediately after the elections for the national assembly.

Southeast Asian Affairs, the annual publication of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, was launched in 1974 as an annual review of the politics, economies and international relations of Southeast Asia and its individual states. It is the only publication of its kind and is used by scholars, think tanks, universities and others interested in contemporary Southeast Asia.

As Professor Donald Weatherbee said in his short commemorative essay in Southeast Asian Affairs 2013 to mark the fortieth anniversary of the publication, “the collected volumes of Southeast Asian Affairs have become a compendium documenting the dynamic evolution of regional and national developments in Southeast Asia from the end of the ‘second’ Vietnam War to the alarms and struggles of today.” The chapters in the publication are written by experts and analysts both from within Southeast Asia and abroad in Australia, Northeast Asia, North America, Europe and India. As Weatherbee put it in the same essay, “A full list of contributors … reads like a kind of who's who in Southeast Asian studies.”

The present publication, Turning Points and Transitions, is produced to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of ISEAS in 1968. It comprises a selection of 57 chapters from the 45 issues of Southeast Asian Affairs from 1974, the first year of its publication, to 2018.

The Twists and Turns of International Relations

During these years, Southeast Asia went through major political and economic transformations.

Consider the international relations of the region. The communist victories in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975 crystallized the region's division into two blocs — one communist and the other non-communist. There were alarms then over the intentions of a victorious Hanoi regime with a seemingly invincible “million-man” army supplied by the Soviet Union and China. The nervousness was not unwarranted, given Hanoi's hostile propaganda against ASEAN and its selfcharacterization as the “beachhead” or “vanguard” of socialism in Southeast Asia, which was interpreted in the region as implying that it was only a matter of time before other countries would be “liberated”. With the withdrawal of U.S. military power from the mainland of Southeast Asia, the field seemed open for communism to advance into a strategic vacuum.

Implicit in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) of 16 April 1971 is an assessment, generally agreed upon by the participating states, of the contemporary situation in Southeast Asia. Explicit in ANZUK, established in November 1971, is the action which Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom agreed at the time was required in the circumstances by their national interests, and which was acceptable to Malaysia and Singapore, the other two partners. But in the changed circumstances of 1974 their assessments of the regional situation have diverged, and priorities in the pursuit of national interests have been changed by political choices and economic pressures. ANZUK (an integrated command of the three services set up by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom independently of the FPDA on the grounds of efficiency and economy), a modus operandi of the FPDA, was neither its purpose nor its prescription. With the end of the process of dismantling ANZUK on 1 January 1975, the FPDA remains intact as a convention of consultation on what is still agreed to be an area of common concern, though not necessarily of common diagnosis in description, or common direction of action. The strategic baby has not been thrown out with the tactical or political bath-water. Whether it will be more or less effective as a pentagonal pattern of power without ANZUK can only be assessed in the light of the new circumstances as reflected in the five facets of the national interests of the members.

Changed Circumstances

What were the circumstances out of which grew both the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the ANZUK Force? The precipitating issue was the announcement by the British in 1968 of the accelerated and specific timetable of their withdrawal from their base in Singapore, and from their commitments under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. The robust image of Mountbatten of SEAC (Southeast Asia Command) in 1945 and of Mountbatten of India in 1947 had faded in the eyes of the world and in the esteem of the British people. Dilatory, if not dilettante, strategic thinking was caught up by the urgencies of political party change and economic stringency which set the background and the pace of the Labour Government's announcement in 1968 of complete British withdrawal before the end of 1971, thus setting the terminal date by which alternative arrangements were required to be made.

The decline in oil prices that started in the early 1980s adversely affected the Indonesian economy, partly contributing to the recession in 1982 and part of 1983. However, the decline in oil prices also forced the country to restructure its economy to one that is more diversified and balanced, and thereby more resilient to face the 1990s.

The new series of gross domestic product (GDP) figures announced in the presidential speech in Parliament on 16 August 1989 shows that the non-oil and gas sector grew at a rate faster than the oil and gas sector in the economy during 1983–88. The Indonesian economy grew at an annual average rate of 5.1 per cent during the Fourth Five-Year Plan period (1984–88). The GDP growth rates were 6.74 per cent in 1984, 2.47 per cent in 1985, 5.88 per cent in 1986, 4.98 per cent in 1987, and 5.65 per cent in 1988. The non-oil and gas sector grew by 4.91 per cent in 1984, 5.45 per cent in 1985, 6.24 per cent in 1986, 5.62 per cent in 1987, and 7.36 per cent in 1988.

The structure of production, pattern of export, and structure of government revenue all changed with the decline in oil prices. The importance of the non-oil and gas sector increased in the production structure while the reliance on oil and gas exports declined. Within the non-oil and gas sector the export of manufacturing products increased compared with that of primary products. Sources of government revenue shifted more from oil and gas taxes to income and value-added taxes.

Another major factor which contributed to the shift in the structure of production that resulted in an increase in the export of manufactured goods was the government's commitment to the liberalization of the economy. In this connection, financial market liberalization was one of the major programmes of the liberalization policy.

As a result of the above factors, the year 1989 also observed spectacular growth in its capital market. Within a short period of twelve months, market capitalization soared to 5 trillion rupiah from 1 trillion rupiah at the end of 1988. Several new banks comprising both national private banks and foreign joint-venture banks were opened in the country.

At the end of 1997, many Thai people hoped that 1998 would be the starting point for reforming the country. Even though the Thai economy was severely hit by the economic crisis, the new government of Chuan Leekpai promised economic recovery and better governance. As time went by, however, and the economy went into a sharp decline, expectations slowly diminished. The Chuan government rode out these difficulties, and had some success in projecting itself as the only option, but encountered increasing pressures from a critical civil society.

Thailand under the IMF

When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was asked by Thailand to help in the crisis after the devaluation of the baht in July 1997, many sectors of Thai society welcomed it as a force that could discipline what was perceived as an irresponsible gang of politicians and businessmen whose ineptitude had brought the country to its knees. Many technocrats even hoped that the structural adjustment programme might help dismantle crony capitalism in Thailand.

Initially, the IMF imposed a largely traditional formula on Thailand, involving cuts in government funding, increased taxation, high interest rates, greater disclosure, and financial sector reforms. It did, however, require much greater reforms of the financial sector than was normal for such programmes, together with other structural reforms to open the country up to foreign investment, and accelerate the spluttering pace of privatization. Thailand had experienced IMF tutelage before — in the mid-1980s when a period of global recession had a particularly debilitating effect on the financial sector. It was prepared to accept new IMF controls because officials felt that the key to recovery was to win back the confidence of foreign capital, and to do this it had to adhere to the IMF programme.

The Chuan government was more willing than its predecessor to take tough decisions, and to implement them. However, there was no initial easing of the economic problems. The baht declined to an all-time low against the U.S. dollar in January (US$1 = 55.5 baht) before it began to strengthen as part of a broader regional trend in February. Even as the currency stabilized, the economy plunged deeper into recession, contrary to the expectations of the IMF and others.

The title of my first contribution to Southeast Asian Affairs in 1980 was “Laos: The Vietnamese Connection”. A great deal has happened in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) over the past three decades, both internally, and in its relations with its neighbours. The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is still in power, but it is a party riven by ambition and greed. The country is wealthier than it was thirty years ago; but the urban-rural divide is more marked than ever. Wealth is concentrated in the cities, most of it in the hands of Party members and their families. The resources of the country, which the French had glimpsed a century before, most of which are located in rural areas, are now being rapidly exploited, but not for the benefit of the rural majority. Neighbouring states have hungrily eyed these resources, and seized their opportunities to obtain a share — none more so than China. So just as what was interesting about Laos in 1980 was the Vietnamese connection, so in 2009 what is interesting is the developing Chinese connection, and what this means for Lao politics and policies.

To focus on the Chinese connection is not to suggest that the Vietnamese connection no longer matters. It certainly does. Rather it is to focus on economic and political changes that are now taking place. What I want to do in this article is to examine the changes that were becoming apparent in 2008 in three areas: in politics; in economic development; and in international relations. But I shall deal with these in the reverse order, for Lao politics are all but opaque in the absence of any media reporting or discussion, and it is only by examining the shifting influence of neighbouring states, and popular responses to the impact of development policies, that some light can be cast on Lao politics.

International Pressures

The Rise of China

In early 2008, for the first time the growing Chinese presence became a matter of popular concern and debate in the LPDR. The trigger was an announcement in September 2007 that a consortium of three Chinese companies would build a new 20,000-seat stadium in Viang Chan (Vientiane) in time for Laos to host the Southeast Asian games in December 2009.

Although it is false to assume that a new decade ushers in a new era, in the study of international politics it is in many ways convenient to think in terms of decades, because it allows for a point in time to assess the past, to analyse the present and to point to the future. With this proviso made, it can nevertheless be asserted that the first three years of the 1970's have marked a watershed in the international affairs of Asia and particularly Southeast Asia. The events which have changed the pattern of international relations in Southeast Asia and will clearly distinguish the present decade from the past include:

First, the rapprochement between China and the West and the rest of Asia, heralded by President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972 and the seating of China in the United Nations in 1971.

Second, the reshaping of American policy in the region along the lines of the Nixon Doctrine of self-help and put into effect through the winding down of the Vietnam War, the signing of the Vietnam Ceasefire Agreement in January 1973, and the phased withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Third, the withdrawal of British military bases from Malaysia and Singapore initiated in 1968 and completed in 1971 and succeeded by the more fluid and ambiguous Five Power Defence Arrangements between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) and Malaysia and Singapore.

Fourth, the increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry, and the growing Soviet involvement in South and Southeast Asia marked by the Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971 and the expanding Russian naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Fifth, the growing Japanese domination of the economies and markets of Southeast Asia, and the shaping of a new political role for Japan in Asian affairs commensurate with her economic power.

Finally, the shifting of the foreign policies of Australia and New Zealand to a more Asian orientation and to a greater involvement in Asian affairs following the Labour Party victories in both countries.

Despite a reduction in tension, however, Southeast Asia still remains in a state of flux and transition.

If 1998 was the year of economic crisis, 1999 was the year of recovery. The pervasive gloom of 1998 receded somewhat, but Southeast Asia still, at best, presented a mixed picture. Economic recovery among the older members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) generated a palpable sense of optimism. Even Indonesia, with its battered economy, could inspire some hope after it held a relatively peaceful and fair parliamentary election, followed by a presidential election which resulted in the establishment of a democratic government with the moral and political legitimacy to govern. But there was also tragedy, followed by humanitarian intervention, in East Timor and, for Indonesia, enormous uncertainties remained. Elsewhere, the reforms needed to deal with the weaknesses in state and corporate governance which the crisis had highlighted were only partially addressed, raising doubts about the sustainability of the recoveries. Conditions in Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam were worse than in 1998. The durability of the new democracy in Indonesia was not assured, while in the rest of Southeast Asia, progress towards more tolerant, enlightened, and democratic societies was patchy, mixed with stasis, even regression.

ASEAN sought to overcome a crisis of credibility. The broader Asia-Pacific strategic environment remained relatively benign. There were, however, more signs of Sino-American competition. China's claims and posture in the South China Sea remained a troubling long-term strategic lever against Southeast Asia.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

A Question of Credibility

The death of Azahari bin Husin in a shootout with Indonesian police near the East Java town of Malang on 9 November 2005 was widely acclaimed as the most important victory against the regional terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) since the capture of Hambali. But it became increasingly clear during the year that Malaysian-born Dr Azahari — known as the “Demolition Man” for his skills in assembling the first Bali bombs that killed 202 three years earlier — did not answer to the JI hierarchy and was operating as his own man. Indeed, in 2005 it became obvious that old ways of thinking about JI and regional terrorism were no longer adequate — if they ever were in the first place.

The dominant model, perpetuated in the media by prominent commentators Rohan Gunaratna and Zachary Abuza, views JI as an al-Qaeda franchise, with a clearly demarcated command structure and organizational boundaries, dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate embracing much of Southeast Asia. To the extent this image was ever valid, as Sidney Jones points out, it represents a five-yearold “snapshot” of JI with little relevance today. A fluid pattern of alignment and realignment between autonomous jihadi factions characterized the terrorist threat in 2005, and this trend is likely to strengthen in the future.

What knits these factions loosely together is not “a very horizontal and exceptionally compartmentalized organization” with a “very rigid cell structure”, as Abuza insisted after Bali's second series of suicide bombings on 1 October 2005, but a shared world-view based on personal allegiances forged in exile, training camps on the Afghan border, or the conflict zones of Sulawesi, Maluku, and — looking forward — Mindanao. Gunaratna has even declared Mindanao the “new strategic base of Jemaah Islamiyah”, but like Abuza, misperceives the nature of this threat.

This overview examines Mindanao's growing role as the regional terrorist crossroads in 2005, but from the perspective of local realities, not externally imposed organigrams. It demonstrates a kaleidoscopic interplay of foreign and domestic jihadi groups only possible in Mindanao's lawless enclaves, where for all practical purposes the Philippine state has failed.

In the past year, the mass media have highlighted three developments in Southeast Asia, which thus became the subjects of public attention. One was the start of the implementation of the new Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly the establishment of the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Another was the scheduled elimination on 1 January 2010 of tariffs on most goods traded among China and the six older, and more advanced and heavily trading, ASEAN members — Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (the other ASEAN members are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). The third was the response of Southeast Asian countries to the regional impact of the global economic crisis.

The media spotlight on these developments has led the public to expect some dramatic, overnight changes in the region because of them. As an academic, I have sought to dampen such expectations, called for caution, and urged the media and the public to refrain from rash predictions and speculation. As the Americans say, “the jury is still out” on these three questions.

The ASEAN Charter

The drafting of the ASEAN Charter by a task force of senior ASEAN officials, its signing by the ASEAN leaders in November 2007, and its entry into force in December 2008 were significant for six reasons. For the first time, after forty years of existence, ASEAN has adopted a charter for itself, comprehensively placing it more firmly on a rules-based path.

If one looks closely at the Charter's contents, this is more than a matter of form. For the first time, the ASEAN countries have committed themselves in a formal document to norms having to do with the internal behaviour of states. As first enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, norms for inter-state conduct had guided ASEAN and other countries related to it — the peaceful settlement of disputes, the rejection of the threat or use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations. This is important in itself, but the Charter goes beyond that. In it, the ASEAN countries have declared their aspiration for such goals as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, constitutional government, and social justice.