ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Summary

This chapter isolates Bagan from its traditional moorings to Southeast Asian polities and highlights its westward links, particularly its relations with medieval Bengal, an expansive polity. The distinct geography and enigmatic history of Bagan — situated in an arid zone and driven by perennial cycles of conquest, expanding frontiers and growing exchange relations with small polities located between it and Bengal — illustrates how polities in the region responded to crisis and change. The region stretching from India's northeast into Burma experienced different trajectories of state formation, political legitimation and monetization; its nature can neither be studied within conventional paradigms of the state, nor by the “little kingdom” model (Schnepel and Berkemer 2003), the triad of time, change and linear evolution being irrelevant (Aung-Thwin 1991). Nor can its growth be analysed within a world-systems framework of cores and peripheries. Therefore, a different notion of political economy linked to time and change, distinct from the conventional notion of a sequential progression — from the prehistoric, through classical-ancient, to medieval, to the modern (Aung-Thwin 2002) — is necessary for our understanding of this region.

Enigma of Bagan

In its four-hundred–years-plus history (849 to ca. 1287 ce), Bagan displayed a state-driven religious policy, a state-directed labour system, a statesponsored building programme and state-administered trading practices. There was a direct and circular relationship between spending on religion, increased agricultural production, proportional demographic expansion and state development (Aung-Thwin 1985, p. 27). In this distinctive political and social formation, how important was trade and what was the role of money in Bagan's economy? What connections were forged by Bagan, with its silver supplies, with neighbouring polities? What follows is a visualization of Bagan's international connections, through tracing exchanges between Bagan and Bengal, to explain the curious absence of silver circulation in Bengal at a time when Bagan was reportedly accessing silver deposits. Was this silver traded at all? Why was it not exported as done previously? And what prevented the silver from reaching Bengal?

A Brief History of Money

A new polity in the mid-9th century, Bagan faced challenges on land while struggling to create a space for itself (Lieberman 2009, pp. 16–17). It seems isolated, cut off from silver supplies to its north and from the bay trade to its south.

Summary

On the surface, Southeast Asian archaeology presents an extreme example of the dichotomy between the theoretical extremes of the orthogenetic and heterogenetic types of city. The remains of major monumental complexes such as Angkor, Borobudur/Prambanan and Bagan contrast sharply with the remains of trading port-cities such as Palembang, Barus and Singapore. This apparently simple picture, however, begins to display more shades of grey the more one peers beneath the surface, as further exploration begins to provide more detailed information about the lives of these ancient cities. Research at the site of Trowulan, east Java, in the early 1990s necessitated a revision of the previous assumption that Majapahit's 14th-century capital was merely a complex of royal and religious buildings. Surface survey in the wake of large-scale looting of bricks for modern construction revealed dense scatters of pottery, both local and foreign. This pottery demonstrated the existence of numerous occupations and a dense population.

Archaeological observation at the sites of Bagan and Sriksetra (Pyay, Prome) is beginning to shed light on the distribution of population and range of economic activity at these sites. The occupations at the two sites overlap to a considerable extent, indicating that for a period of time they were linked in a complex economic relationship which written materials hint at but do not describe in detail.

Data obtained from the study of pottery distribution patterns is capable of measuring the degree of socio-economic complexity at a site. Preliminary analysis of recent discoveries indicates that Sriksetra and Bagan, like Trowulan, may have been hinterland capitals with some heterogenetic as well as orthogenetic characteristics. Preliminary pottery data indicates that Sriksetra and Bagan were similar but differed in several significant aspects, including internal settlement patterns and presence or absence of Chinese ceramics.

While our knowledge of pre-modern interaction between Southeast Asia and its neighbours to the east and west is increasing, we still know little of the interaction between Southeast Asian societies during this period. Stylistic studies of art suggest that Southeast Asian societies interacted and exchanged cultural and artistic traits to a relatively high degree, as well as economic commodities (Brown 1994).

Summary

To study Myanmar history, we need to examine chronicles, archaeological evidence, historical reports and studies, surveys and interviews with local people, among other sources. The Rakhine region is part of an ancient civilization which comprised several flourishing city states rich in cultural heritage. Chronicles mentioned that the Rakhine kingdoms, contemporaries of Burmese polities, were settled systematically by kings since the first century ce. An example was Dhanyawadi City. Rakhine kingdoms existed prior to the Mrauk-U period, which ended in 1785 ce. Each dynasty left an invaluable cultural heritage which showcased its glory and prosperity. This chapter examines the establishment of libraries in Mrauk-U connected with the propagation of Buddhism in the region between the 15th and 18th centuries.

A Brief History of Mrauk-U

Mrauk-U city is the most important archaeological heritage of the Rakhine people. Mrauk-U, which means “plentifully perceived foremost to be completely successful”, was Rakhine's last powerful kingdom. It represented the zenith of cultural values for the Rakhine people, and flourished from 1430 to 1785 CE (Rakhine State People Council 1988,p. 7).

The golden age of Mrauk-U was the 16th and 17th centuries, contemporary with the Tudor kings, Queen Elizabeth I and Shakespeare in England, the Moghuls in India, the Ayutthaya kings in Siam, and the kingdoms of Ava (lnwa), Taungngu and Hanthawaddy of Myanmar (Rakhine State People Council 1988, p. 8). U May Oung provides a chronology of Myanmar kingdoms based on various historical accounts of Myanmar and archaeological reports (May Oung 1912, p. 9).

Archaeological evidence from excavations of Dhanyawadi city provides much information on the period beginning with the 1st century ce. Excavations revealed irregular circular brick city walls, a moat, and the palace site. After Dhanyawadi, the Chandra Dynasty established the Vesali kingdom in the middle of the fourth century ce. U Pandi's Dhanyawadi Yazawinthit (New Dhanyawadi history) states that Vesali was founded in 790 ce, several decades before Bagan was built in 849 ce. Archaeological evidence from the Vesali site includes Buddha images, stupas, metal materials, inscriptions, et cetera. During the reign of the last Chandra king, Sula Chandra, Vesali became weak and was succeeded by a kingdom centred in the Lemro valley (Rakhine State People Council 1988, p. 8).

Summary

There are now sufficient radiocarbon dates for the walled cities of Halin, Beikthano and Sriksetra to suggest that they were all functioning by the early centuries ce. In the light of the new data, approaches to the periodization and interpretation of Myanmar's early urban system may need to be modified.

If you want to know the exact date of an ancient object or structure, find an inscription. In the 11th–13th century Bagan period, stone inscriptions give the founding year of dozens of pagodas. Some inscriptions, motivated by an urge to commence building at an auspicious moment, go so far as to nominate the day, hour or even minute when construction began (see, for example, Luce 1932). From Bagan onward, these absolute dates have provided a vital chronological framework for historical and archaeological analysis. When monks and scholars sat down in King Bagyidaw's “Glass Palace” in 1829 to try to bring together the often contradictory narratives of earlier chronicles, pagoda histories and religious commentaries, they recognized the value of inscriptions for their dates as well as for their dedicatory content (Pe Maung Tin and Luce 1923).

A “scientific” date, generally from carbon, can also provide an accurate time for a past event, but the time is within a range of centuries, not a specific year. However, radiocarbon dates can also go back many thousands of years before inscriptions. So far there have been relatively few samples from Myanmar tested to provide carbon dates, but the results of carbon dating so far show, among other things, that construction and other economic and cultural activity was taking place between the 1st and 3rd centuries ce at Sriksetra, Halin and Beikthano (figure 6.1). These date ranges help provide a framework within which we can view changes in art styles, palaeography, architecture and expressions of religious ideas in text or sculpture during the early urban period, before inscriptions appear.

Radiocarbon Dating

Radiocarbon dates tell us when the material being tested was alive. The material is usually wood which, before it rotted away in the ground, was converted to charcoal by burning and was thus preserved. During its lifetime the wood took in an isotope, Carbon-14 (written as 14C).

Summary

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Throughout much of Southeast Asia and beyond, we are witnessing a resurgence of identity politics framed around notions of “nativeness” or “indigeneity” in opposition to “foreignness” or “otherness” (Dominguez and Metzner 2017). For example, in Myanmar and Thailand there is a rising trend among some members of the ethnic Burman and Thai Buddhist majorities towards the heightened politicization of Buddhism as an exclusive marker of the borders of national belonging (Hutt 2016; Jerryson 2011; Keyes 2016; Than 2015; Walton et al. 2017). In Indonesia, some groups are reviving an earlier public discourse of “pribumi-ism” (“indigenism”) alongside “political Islam” in order to address what are perceived as the ethnic roots of growing social inequalities in the country (Suryadinata 2017; Burhani 2017). Meanwhile, in Malaysia ethnic Malay nativism is on the rise as the ruling party attempts to shore up its support among the majority-Malay population (Lim 2016; Millar 2017). On the other side of the Straits of Johor in Singapore some nativists are making public assertions of “Singapore for Singaporeans” (Fenn 2014).

These resurgences of “nativism” are occurring at a particular juncture in history when states in the region are attempting to, first, exert more direct control over hitherto peripheral regions within their territorial borders, and, second, promote greater transregional economic integration within the utopian community of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These two processes of national and regional economic integration, while highly uneven and contested, are occurring hand in hand. In addition, while state-driven economic growth is generating great wealth throughout Southeast Asia, it is doing so in a highly uneven manner, leading to rising rates of inequality. On a more global scale, this resurgence is occurring amidst rising concerns over the ascendance of China and India to positions of global supremacy, and the waning of U.S. imperialism.

In the midst of these resurgences of “nativism” on the part of various national publics throughout Southeast Asia another related yet distinct movement being framed around altogether different notions of “Indigeneity” is occurring on the national and regional scale among diverse ethnic groups that have long experienced marginalization and oppression by more dominant ethnic groups during periods of European colonialism and post-colonial nationalism.

Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary

Daw Suu's National League for Democracy (NLD) government marked its first anniversary in office on 30 March 2017. There are differing “key performance indicators” set by analysts in assessing the administration's performance. National reconciliation and the peace process, constitutional reform, and better living standards are the top priorities highlighted in the inaugural address of President U Htin Kyaw. Of these three priorities, the NLD has emphasized the importance of the peace process towards national reconciliation. Many observers have pointed out other deserving issues including the overall performance of both the executive and legislative, and the relations between NLD and the Tatmadaw (military). While the NLD continues to have wide public support, concerns over a possible return to military rule and over ineffective executive and legislative performance have emerged.

Daw Suu has emphasized political considerations as the most important aspect of her agenda. She maintains that the country's development can only be smooth when Myanmar has genuine peace. But this prioritization of the domestic political agenda may come at the cost of economic performance. Additionally, much hinges on Daw Suu's health and ability to manage a punishing schedule as Myanmar's de facto leader; she was already 70 when the NLD won a landslide victory in the 2015 elections, making her as the most senior leader (in age) to take office.

Popular support — from both the Myanmar diaspora and the citizenry — is still high despite the fact that the 2017 by-elections saw lower voter turn-outs and more votes going to locals or ethnic-party candidates. There is a popular desire, despite any setbacks or dilemmas during the NLD's first year of administration, to avoid another military-led government in Myanmar.

Though not a declared campaign promise, the NLD has prioritized peace since taking office. Long-time watchers of Myanmar politics had observed that Daw Suu's intention for peace was not clear but she has openly stated that although the NLD did not participate in the NCA process formulated by the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) government, it would as an elected ruling party continue with this process, including the Union Peace Conferences that are meant to be held every six months. The NLD-led peace conferences have adopted the additional title of 21st Century Panglong, and the first under this dual title (the second since the first Union Peace Conference in October 2015) was convened on 31 August to 3 September 2016.

Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary

Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, has as its national motto 'Unity in Diversity.' In 2010, Indonesia stood as the world's fourth most populous country after China, India and the United States, with 237.6 million people. This archipelagic country contributed 3.5 per cent to the world's population in the same year. The country's demographic and political transitions have resulted in an emerging need to better understand the ethnic composition of Indonesia. This book aims to contribute to that need. It is a demographic study on ethnicity, mostly relying on the tabulation provided by the BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik; Statistics-Indonesia) based on the complete data set of the 2010 population census. The information on ethnicity was collected for 236,728,379 individuals, a huge data set. The book has four objectives: To produce a new comprehensive classification of ethnic groups to better capture the rich diversity of ethnicity in Indonesia; to report on the ethnic composition in Indonesia and in each of the thirty three provinces using the new classification; to evaluate the dynamics of the fifteen largest ethnic groups in Indonesia during 2000–2010; and to examine the religions and languages of each of the fifteen largest ethnic groups.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Access to and quality of education have been key agendas of the Malaysian government to foster national unity and enhance economic growth. The First Malaysia Plan (1966–70) and the subsequent plans give much importance to education: “unless the education system is geared to meet the development needs of the country, there will be a misallocation of an important economic resource, which will slow down the rate of economic and social advance” (Government of Malaysia 1965, p. 163). The government allocates substantial financial resources to education annually, constituting about 17 per cent of the total public expenditure.

The Malaysian Ministry of Education has worked closely with state and district education offices, international organizations (e.g., United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Child Aid Borneo and Human Rights Commission, to expand access toprimary schooling to all children. However, access to education remains lower for children who are poor, live in remote and sparsely populated area and without citizenship documentation. It should be noted that children without citizenship documents are not captured in the calculations of Net Enrolment Ratio (NER), and thus represents an additional population of out-of-school children and youth.

The following sections will discuss patterns of primary school access and retention, quality and equity in Malaysia, and policies affecting access and retention in the sector.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED?

Patterns of Primary School Access and Retentionin Malaysia

Figure 6.1 shows the primary school NER for selected years (indicated by dots) between 1970 and 1972 as well as between 1994 and 2005. This rate measures the proportion of children aged 7 to 13 who were enrolledin primary school. One notes that this rate was already relatively high in 1970 (84.3 per cent) and had increased to 96.2 per cent in 1994. Between 1999 and 2005, although minor fluctuations occurred, the percentage of primary school-aged children enrolled remained at or above 95 per cent but did not reach 100 per cent (with the highest net enrolment of 97.8 per cent, recorded in 2000). It is important to note that the figures — both the numerators and denominators of these percentages — exclude undocumented children (e.g., those whose parents are refugees or migrant workers), who face special challenges in gaining access to public schools.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Singapore and Malaysia share a common history as colonial territories of the British. Each gained their independence from the British at around the same time, with the two countries even bound together as a single nation for a short period of time. Yet, if we examine the language policies of the two nations, we see a distinct difference in the paths that Singapore and Malaysia have taken in their approaches to managing linguistic diversity, and in their stances towards English. While Singapore has unambiguously embraced the utilitarian value of English and placed it as central to its language in education policies, Malaysia has, in many ways, been more Ambivalent and circumspect about the value and place of English especially in relation to Malay.

In this chapter, we examine how their language policies have also sprung from very different sets of ideologies about language, which has meant that despite their common roots, Singapore and Malaysia have taken significantly divergent paths, resulting in very different outcomes or “fruits”. The chapter is organized in three sections. In the first section, we trace the historical development of English in Singapore; in the second, we examine that of Malaysia, followed by a discussion which compares and contrasts the language in education policies of these two countries.

SINGAPORE

The Republic of Singapore is a relatively young nation, which celebrated only its fiftieth year of independence in 2015. Despite this, and the fact that it is a small island with no natural resources apart from its geographical position, Singapore has grown to become a thriving metropolitan country with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity) per capita that remarkably ranks it as the third richest nation in the world (International Monetary Fund 2014). This outstanding achievement is no mean feat for a country less than half the size of London and which less than fifty years ago had a GDP that placed it as a struggling Third World nation. Among the many factors credited for Singapore's phenomenal economic success are its language policies, seen by the Singapore government as instrumental to its economic competitiveness (Ng 2008).

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Since the political changes starting in 2011, the new quasi-civilian Myanmar government has announced a number of reforms to the education sector. For several decades before that, Myanmar had spent far less on education than any of its neighbours. When a government has failed to provide adequate education to enough citizens, many embrace decentralization as a strategy to improve their education system, often with the encouragement of international advisors and donors. The Myanmar government has stated that decentralization is a goal for their provision of basic education. It has also stated its intention to increase funding and the number of schools and teachers, increase the number of years of compulsory education, reform the curriculum, draft an education law, and reach out to non-state actors that have signed ceasefire agreements with the central government.

Against this background of long-term underfunding and neglect, what is the nature of, and prospects for, decentralization in education inMyanmar? Can decentralization be effective in addressing the deep-seated problems in the Myanmar education sector? To explore answers to these questions, we have examined relationships within the formal education system in the Ministry of Education across various levels of government, from the national down to the state or region, and below that to the district and township. We describe the provision of education starting from the colonial era in the late nineteenth century through to the present. We have also reviewed some of the non-state actors involved in the provision of education, especially as their involvement throws into relief challenges that the formal education system faces. We then present our findings, which suggest that of this writing (2014), decentralization, to the extent that is has happened at all, is limited. The institutional culture of the Ministry of Education, together with societal attitudes towards education and perceptions of the proper roles of students, teachers, and Ministry staff, all limit decentralization.

METHODOLOGY

We have based our findings on a literature review and on interviews with key participants and decision-makers in two regions, Mon State and Yangon Region. The purpose of this review and interviews was to gauge how people involved with the provision of education understand “decentralization”, what decisions and responsibilities have been handed down from higher to lower levels of administration, and how they understand their own role in the process.

Summary

Since Southeast Asian countries attained political independence, they have created “national education systems … as part of the state forming process which established the modern nation state” (Green 1997, p. 170). Framed in the context of the nation-state, education was tasked with the overlapping objectives of state and nation-building and national economic development. All states in the region nationalized and monopolized education and founded largely public-funded centralized education systems to teach literacy through the medium of a national language — in the case of Singapore, an official language — and to create a shared national culture by using a common syllabus. In recent decades, however, globalization, which has profoundly transformed the economic, social, cultural and technological processes and structures throughout the world, has also impacted in varying ways and degrees the national education systems across the region. How Southeast Asian countries should reformulate and restructure their education systems and which strategy they ought to adopt to prepare to adapt and deal with globalization clearly depended on each country's societal make-up and economic situation and level of economic development.

How has globalization impacted and shaped the development of national education systems in Southeast Asia? In brief, globalization has brought about four interrelated changes to the education systems: (i) increasing demand for highly skilled and qualified labour; (ii) shifts in governance; (iii) privatization or commodification of education; and (iv) internationalization of education (Altbach and Knight 2007; Carnoy 2005; Robertson 2007). The emergent neo-liberal ideological paradigm accompanying globalization also dramatically altered the prevailing post-independent centralized governance and provision of education. In Southeast Asian states, in recent times the education sector has been subjected to varying degrees of decentralization and privatization or commodification. Moreover, the privatization of the region's education sector is occurring in the context of the growing internationalization of education, especially of higher education. Increasing global economic competitiveness and the emergence of the knowledge economy have raised the national, especially for more developed Southeast Asian economies, and international demand for tertiary-educated skilled and qualified personnel. While the scope, timing and pace of these transformations to the education systems differed in each Southeast Asian state, the main observable trend is the downscaling of state role in the governance and provision of education.

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Refine listing

Refine listing

Actions for selected content:

15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

8 - Silver Links! Bagan–Bengal and Shadowy Metal Corridors: 9th to 13th Centuries

Summary

10 - Orthogeneity, Settlement Patterns and Earthenware Pottery Distribution in Bagan

Summary

3 - Khraung-kaik Pitaka-taik: 16th-Century Repositories for Buddhist Scriptures in Mrauk-U

Summary

6 - A Thousand Years before Bagan: Radiocarbon Dates and Myanmar's Ancient Pyu Cities

Summary

Foreword

Summary

The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia

Summary

The Rising Politics of Indigeneity in Southeast Asia

Summary

Frontmatter

The Peace Process and Civil–Military Relations During the NLD Administration's First Year

Summary

The Peace Process and Civil–Military Relations During the NLD Administration's First Year

Summary

Frontmatter

Foreword

Summary

Demography of Indonesia's Ethnicity

6 - Increasing Access to and Retention in Primary Education in Malaysia

Summary

Contents

1 - English in Singapore and Malaysia: Common Roots, Different Fruits

Summary

Frontmatter

7 - Primary and Secondary Education in Myanmar: Challenges Facing Current Reforms

Summary

Introduction

Summary

Acknowledgements

ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Refine listing

Refine listing

Actions for selected content:

Save Search

15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary

Demography of Indonesia's Ethnicity

Summary

Summary

Summary

Summary