The papers in this publication began as a discussion between Journal of Asian Studies editor Jeffrey Wasserstrom and author Prasenjit Duara, who wrote a think piece for the journal entitled “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times.” Early on, the two agreed that the paper should be published with commentaries, along the lines of the Rule of Law forum spanning India and China in volume 68: 1 (February 2009). The topics of the paper, which include the ways in which the area we call Asia has been interconnected in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and how it has been conceptualized as a coherent region by Asian intellectuals in the last century, fit in well with the unique aim of the Journal of Asian Studies in cultivating a common ground for discussions that encompass broad issues and regions in Asia. This paper in particular gives scholars the opportunity to problematise conceptions of what constitutes Asia.

As the discussion about how to proceed and who to include in a forum progressed, we at the editorial office found it appealing to expand the idea by hosting a roundtable discussion at the Association for Asian Studies meeting in Philadelphia in the spring of 2010, held as a meeting in conjunction rather than as a formal panel. As Moderator, I asked participants to consider two broad questions: what constitutes Asia, and what attributes or processes serve to allow Asia as a whole, or areas within Asia, to be considered under a single rubric. The working title for the event was “What Makes an Area an Asia,” though over the course of time, and in the conference programme it became “What Makes an Area in Asia.” Either question serves as a useful basis for discussion.

Our goals were to find commentators from a range of disciplines and backgrounds so as to explore and critique the ideas presented in Duara's essay.

Over the last year, as I have presented this paper at various venues, I have received a range of responses. One of them is that this paper is less a disinterested study and more like advocacy. I have hastened to confirm that mine is a position of ethical advocacy, but not without an empirical basis. Objectivity, impartiality, and autonomy from political positions are important ideals in the academic profession, and I count myself among the more enthusiastic supporters of such values. At the same time, I am not so naive as to believe that scholars do not inescapably reflect the intellectual and political positions to be found in the world out there. It is vital to acknowledge this connection because, in doing so, we subject our position and judgement to the scrutiny of their basis in objectivity and accuracy.

What is to be scrutinised are the materials and case I am presenting for a reemergent Asia. My understanding of the material leads me to believe that some form of region making will continue to emerge. Where my personal ethics and preferences play a role lies in my advocacy of one direction among others, that this development could take in the future.

Turning to the question of the ethical aims of such a project, Wang Hui's typically thoughtful considerations give us a good point of entry. Wang appears to be in fundamental agreement with my account, but he seeks to clarify the goals: how can this emergent Asia make a difference? His concluding summary puts it pithily, “the issue of Asia is not simply an Asian issue, but rather a matter of ‘world history.’” Reconsidering “Asian history” is at once to reconstruct nineteenth-century European “world history,” and an effort to break free of the twenty-first-century “new imperial” order and its associated logic. The critique of Eurocentrism, he argues, cannot be an affirmation of Asiacentrism, but rather an attempt to transform a logic dominated by “egocentrism, exclusivity, and expansionism.” I endorse this vision and find it fully compatible with the thrust of my paper.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been spoken in the recent years about efforts to conserve George Town's long standing heritage in ways that may seem unprecedented to the outside observer. The terms of debate between state and federal governments, and between them and civil society organizations have been couched within a set of parameters that could be characterised as “personal and advocatory” on the one hand, and narrowly as “political and instrumentalist”, on the other. For many heritage enthusiasts, to conserve sites and buildings that define George Town's landscape is to relive a part of their own collective memories of living within these nostalgic spaces. The social and personal dimensions of life thus become the raison d'être for change and this has been made the project of advocacy groups such as the Penang Heritage Trust and the Lestari Heritage Network. But the struggle for George Town's heritage has its political dimensions as well, especially upon the conferment by UNESCO of World Heritage Site status in 2008. Here, governments and political parties take centre stage, lobbying and garnering for support and muscling their way towards ends that are essentially instrumentalist, that is, to maintain their grip in the corridors of power and on the chests of the treasury. In the debates and battles to conserve and promote George Town's heritage, what tends to get lost are the voices of common folk and the landless class that are effaced by the more influential discourses of the state and power brokers - and not pottery and artefacts, heritage trails and museums. This makes it plain that the processes of heritage conservation are, in many instances, elite enterprises (Lowenthal, 2000: 419).

This effacement of the voices of the common folk and stakeholders is not limited to ‘talk’ and ‘politicking’ over heritage conservation by contending groups.

INTRODUCTION

International industry experts place the global halal industry in the region of USD3 trillion and the concept of halal goods and services is fast gaining ground in non-Islamic countries that have a substantial Muslim population. For instance, Europe's halal market is estimated to include over 50 million Muslim consumers with a substantial spending power of nearly USD66 billion a year. In the UK alone, the halal meat market is estimated to be worth up to £2 billion a year.

The food industry is the traditional mainstay of the wider halal industry and is centered around how food is prepared and whether animals have been slaughtered according to age-old Muslim practices (the word halal means ‘permissible’ in Arabic). Today's international halal industry comprises goods and services as diverse as pharmaceuticals, finance, logistics and biotechnology. The halal industry is more than just how livestock is prepared, it is the integration of many separate industries linked by a unique set of Islamic-based guidelines. This growing awareness of halal is creating new commercial possibilities much as what green development and the organic movement have done.

This chapter presents a brief overview of the global and Malaysian halal industry, and the development, opportunities and challenges faced by the halal industry in Penang.

HALAL IN MALAYSIA

Malaysia has been a key player in this global phenomenon, leading the way in certification, Islamic finance and food production. Two of the world's most established halal expos take place in Malaysia, including the World Halal Forum and the Malaysia International Halal Showcase (MIHAS) which promotes itself as the ‘world's largest platform for halal products and services.’ Concerted efforts and strategies to transform Malaysia into a global halal hub and to further develop the local halal industry have been outlined in various federal government plans including the Second Industrial Master Plan, 1996 - 2005, the National Agriculture Policy, 1998 - 2010, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP), 2006 - 2010, and the Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3), 2006 - 2020.

Often taken for granted, water is a necessity for life, and potable water, in particular, is a critical factor for the development and evolution of a community. The public provision of water began in Penang in 1805, when the island was administered by the East India Company. In response to complaints from residents as well as traders using the port, Governor Farquhar built an aqueduct system made of ceramic pipes running from waterfalls at the base of Penang Hill to George Town (Barber, 2009).

Since that time, the state's population and water needs have expanded significantly. From a sparsely settled trading outpost, Penang has become the industrial centre for Northern Malaysia. In particular, since the 1970s, the state has witnessed rapid development in the manufacturing, tourism, and international trade sectors.

As such, the organizational capabilities of Penang's water management bodies have had to evolve to meet these challenges. In 1968, water was provided to the state's residents by two different agencies, one run by the George Town City Council and the other by the State Water Department. Following recommendations made by the Asian Development Bank, this was streamlined and, in 1973, the Penang Water Authority was established as one of Malaysia's first statutory bodies charged with water supply.

The Authority built its reputation as one of the best water supply operators in Malaysia. A rapid introduction of a computerized billing system in 1975 enabled more effective revenue management. This, coupled with commitment to improving water supply and an efficient connection system, enabled the Authority to expand coverage and lower levels of non-revenue water.

However, there was a price for Penang's progress. As it prospered, the state became increasingly water-stressed due to its geographical limitations and a growing population. Water consumption increased by almost four-fold, from 59,663,636 m3 in 1975 to 285,583,785 m3 in 2010. With catchments totalling only 6% of its total land area of 1,031 sq. km., the state needed a forward-thinking and result-driven organisation that could effectively manage its water demand.

In his essay “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times,” Prasenjit Duara has aptly underscored the importance of comprehending the patterns of interactions and connectivities among Asian societies during the precolonial period. The following comments will reaffirm most of his contentions, but also will problematise the issue, especially in regard to some of the neglected topics and the conceptualization of the premodern interactions.

I will address three issues. First, Duara's paper emphasizes Asian interactions, mostly through the maritime channels, starting sometime in the thirteenth or fourteenth century. He also mentions, albeit briefly, that these contacts extend further back in history. The first section of my comments will elaborate on these pre-thirteenth-century linkages in order to demonstrate that they contributed significantly to the formation of later networks of exchange. I will highlight the role played by the intermediary states and peoples in linking various parts of Asia during the first millennium of the common era. The current emphasis on premodern India and China often obscures the important contributions made by these intermediary states and people.

Second, I will argue that conflicts and warfare were also important elements of cross-cultural interactions in precolonial Asia. These often involved military confrontations and political aspirations to control strategic passes, straits, and territories. Thus, looking back into the past does not necessarily provide us with a model for peace and harmony that can be replicated in contemporary political discourse, as politicians from some Asian countries have tried to do.

The final section of my comments will attempt to conceptualize the intricacies of premodern intra-Asian interactions. I will suggest that these interactions must be conceived within the larger context of Afro-Eurasian networks, as well as through a focus on subregional linkages. The use of the word “Asia,” in my opinion, does not reflect the breadth of premodern interactions or the intricate exchanges that took place within the subregions of the Asian continent.

Since its establishment in 1786, Penang has had to consistently reinvent itself. Originally conceived of as a port-of-call on India-China trading routes, Penang lost out to the better-located Singapore in the 1820s. Subsequently, it had to reinvent itself as a regional entrepôt, catering to southern Thailand, northern Sumatra, and Kedah in order to survive. Following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the age of steamships, Penang established itself as a conduit between the riches of Peninsular Malaya and the world (Chuleeporn, 2009: 105-06). European and Chinese businessmen linked the Settlement with tin mines and rubber plantations in Perak, southern Thailand, and beyond.

These periodic reinventions, along with Penang's historic openness to migration, led to an enviable cultural mix. At the apogee of the British period, the Settlement was a regional educational hub for Islamic, English, and Chinese education. Penang's polyglot society of diverse groups, cultures and ideologies proved potent enough to result in two secession movements in 1948 and 1953. Economics was no doubt a factor behind the challenges to Penang's incorporation in the emerging Federation of Malaya. The Penang Chamber of Commerce - the representative of European business interests - led the movement but secessionists also included the Penang Eurasian Association, the Chinese and Indian Chambers of Commerce and the Penang Clerical and Administrative Union (Mohd. Noordin Sopiee, 1973). However, the movement failed to gather momentum, or Penang's modern history may well have been different.

In the immediate post-independence era, Penang as a state within the Federation of Malaya (and Malaysia) saw its economic fortunes decline, especially after the Korean War, the withdrawal of its free port status, and increasing competition from other ports on the peninsula. However, in the 1970s, under the direction of Chief Minister Lim Chong Eu, the aging entrepôt transformed itself into an offshore manufacturing hub for the electronics industry and a well-known tourist site. This outwardlooking model of economic growth has underpinned Penang's economic development up until the present.

Asia is not “one,” and there is no singular idea of Asia. Asia is of multiple (although not always mutually exclusive) conceptions, some drawing on material forces, such as economic growth, interdependence, and physical power, and others having ideational foundations, such as civilizational linkages and normative aspirations. Some of these varied conceptions of Asia have shaped in meaningful ways the destinies of its states and peoples. Moreover, they have underpinned different forms of regionalism, which, in turn, has ensured that Asia, despite its fuzziness and incoherence, has remained a durable, if essentially contested, notion.

Before proceeding further, let me briefly comment on the concepts of region, regionalization, and regionalism, the three central pillars of any meaningful discussion of the contemporary idea of Asia. First, our understanding of what makes a region has undergone a major change. There is a growing agreement in the literature that (1) regions are not just material constructs but also ideational ones; (2) regions are not a given or fixed, but are socially constructed—they are made and remade through political, economic, social, and cultural interactions; and (3) just like nation states, regions may rise and wither.

Prasenjit Duara distinguishes between “region” and “regionalization”, taking the former to mean “the relatively unplanned or evolutionary emergence of an area of interaction and interdependence”, and the latter as “the more active, often ideologically driven political process of creating a region”. While this is a valid distinction, it obscures (although it is subsumed under “regionalization”) the concept and practice of regionalism. Indeed, regionalization and regionalism can be separated analytically. The former is normally understood in the political economy literature as market-driven, as opposed to state-led, advance of transnational economic linkages, including trade, investment, and production. Hence, a relevant term here is the “regionalization of production” in East Asia, which was spurred by the southward movement of Japanese companies and capital following the reevaluation of the yen after the Plaza Accord of 1985, which brought South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian countries under its ambit and created a de facto East Asian economic region.

INTRODUCTION

From world-class industrial giants to globally-renowned IT leaders, Penang hosts a wide range of companies. From less than 10 MNCs in the 1970s, it has more than 1,000 MNCs and local SMEs today and was the first state in Malaysia to establish export processing zones. By the early 90s, it had earned itself the title of the “Silicon Valley of the East.” The state's pursuit of competitiveness has paid off as companies present in Penang have chosen to locate higher value-added activities in the state, changing much of the manufacturing landscape. The Penang Skills Development Centre has played a key part in this transition through its role in liaising with industry to identify key skill gaps in the state's workforce and moving to address them through practical and focused training interventions.

SKILLS DEVELOPMENT IN PENANG: THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE PSDC

The Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) is a player critical to the evolution of the state's manufacturing industry. The Centre is a unique organization that has helped in the transformation of Penang's E&E sector. Established in 1989 as the first skills development centre in Malaysia, the PSDC is an industry-led, non-government, non-profit oriented human resource development centre. First in the country, it is built upon a tripartite partnership between industry, academia and government. This synergistic relationship has allowed the PSDC to evolve along with the changing needs of the economy and produce industryrelevant students and trainees which are of international standard.

The establishment of the PSDC came at a time when Penang needed to ensure a ready supply of appropriately skilled labour to support the needs of existing and potential investors. The State Government of Penang, through its then investment and trade promotion arm, the Penang Development Corporation (PDC), initiated discussions with three of the state's leading multinational corporations – Hewlett Packard, Motorola and Intel – to set up a skilled manpower training centre in Penang.

In 2009, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) co-organized the inaugural Penang Outlook Forum with the Socio-Economic and Environmental Research Institute (SERI). The inaugural Forum, with a focus on “Restructuring and Reshaping Penang”, was held in George Town, Penang on 1-2 June 2009. I am pleased to note that this inaugural Penang Outlook Forum resulted in the joint publication of Pilot Studies for a New Penang by the two research institutions in 2010.

It was therefore with great pleasure that ISEAS decided to host the second Penang Outlook Forum with the focus on “Penang in Asia”. In the event, I was most encouraged by the enthusiastic response from the Singapore community to the forum and pleased that the forum has resulted in a second joint publication. I would like to congratulate the editors and the paper writers for their sterling effort.

As I understand it, the book aims at positioning Penang, and its primary city, George Town, in context of the rise of Asia as the new growth hub of the world economy. George Town is not a capital city or a megalopolis, yet it has still managed to carve out a niche for itself in a range of sectors. Second-tier cities, such as George Town, are clearly emerging as important sites for innovation, as their smaller size and pro-active policy-making has enabled them to attract or nurture a range of new industries. Specialized industries and services must also be served by efficient infrastructure, wellplanned townships, functioning public transport as well as the proper management of basic resources such as water.

We in Singapore are of course happy to share with Penang our experience in areas such as economic efficiency, in public transport, housing and infrastructural development. But I hasten to add that the two cities have developed quite differently over time although they shared a common history as Straits Settlements under the British.

With a population of 1.6 million and approximately 1,000 square kilometers of land, Penang is a state in northern Malaysia that has earned a reputation as the “Silicon Valley of the East”. Despite its small size and population base, it houses a sizeable cluster of electronics firms. In 2010, Penang attracted more foreign direct investment than any other state in Malaysia and over the past thirty years has consistently ranked among the top four states in the country.

However, the story behind Penang's deep and rapid economic transformation is less well-known. Traditionally a prosperous entrepôt economy dependent on trade, shipping, finance, and tin smelting, the state's economic model was called into question in the late 1960s. In 1968, the state's GDP per capita was 12 percent below the national average, and its unemployment rate of 15 percent was more than double the national average (Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce 1968:9, Nathan Associates 1970:85).

In 1970, the Penang state government launched an ambitious economic program aimed at revitalizing the economy through promoting manufacturing and tourism. In 1972, the first multinational corporations set up their operations in the state. These companies - which are still in the state today - include: Advanced Micro Devices; Agilent Technologies (came in as Hewlett Packard); Clarion; Fairchild Semiconductor (came in as National Semiconductor); Intel; OsramOpto Semiconductors (came in as Litronix); Renesas (came in as Hitachi) and Robert Bosch.

Over the next four decades, the growth of the state's manufacturing sector was consistent and rapid. In 1970, manufacturing accounted for a mere 12.7% of the state's gross regional product (GRP). Today, manufacturing accounts for 48.2 per cent of the state's GRP, followed by the services sector, which represents 47.9 per cent. Within the manufacturing sector, electronics is the main growth engine, accounting for 54.5 per cent of all employment in 2006 (InvestPenang, 2008: 13). Similarly, the workforce in the manufacturing sector increased from 15 per cent of the total in 1970 to 32.2 per cent in 2010 (SERI, 2010: 6).

In his provocative paper, Prasenjit Duara argues that prior to the nineteenth century, the web of maritime trade networks infused the ill-defined area we call “Asia” with a genuine coherence, providing a conduit for cultural flows that readily permitted interactive relationships and the mutual adoption of new beliefs and practices. By the late nineteenth century, however, the imperial powers sought to ensure their global dominance by creating regional blocs consisting of territories that were economically subservient to the metropole. The consequent focus on the establishment of territorial boundaries encouraged a “nationalist congruence between state and culture” that gathered pace over the next hundred years. Only now are we beginning to see an Asia where interdependence and increasing cultural contact, carrying echoes of past connectivities, have opened up new opportunities by which a “transnational consciousness” can and should be encouraged.

While Duara's paper will certainly generate a range of reactions, most scholars would probably agree that a preoccupation with nationalism and the nation state has tended to divide Asia, and that pan-Asianism is one of the many “isms” now fading from our vocabulary. Nonetheless, in the early twentieth century, the notion of a unified Asia did have a powerful hold on elites in Japan, China, India, and Southeast Asia, undoubtedly encouraged by Japan's celebrated victory over Russia in 1904. Accordingly, “Asia Redux” draws our attention to the “cultural movement” of pan-Asianism, exemplified in the writings of Okakura Kakuzo (1862–1913) and in those of his contemporaries, the Chinese intellectual Zhang Taiyan (1869–1936) and his Bengali counterpart Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). These three men all thought in terms of a community linked by a shared civilization and spiritual values, where the “Asiatic races” formed, as Okakura put it, “a single mighty web.” From this perspective, Asian affinities encompassed even religious differences, as Islam could be imagined as “Confucianism on horseback.”

INTRODUCTION

Penang, like many other small, land- and resource-poor territories, has had to survive by being externally-oriented. For much of the past two centuries, its growth model has been outward-looking, fluctuating between catering for regional markets and acting as a conduit between Malaysia and global markets. And, since 1826, as a constituent unit of a larger entity – be it the Straits Settlements or Federation of Malaysia – it has always had to weigh up collective and individual needs.

A good reading of developments on these two planes has always been imperative for formulating strategies for Penang to best position itself. To this end, this chapter will provide an overview of the regional and national context. Of particular relevance are the large-scale and far-reaching structural changes taking place as the global economy shifts towards Asia – which conveys opportunities and threats. Of equal importance is the policy framework being put into place at the national level – which may map imperfectly onto Penang's localized attributes and strengths.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. The first asks what is happening in Asia economically and what implications this has for Penang. The second explores what is happening at the policy level in Malaysia in response to this. The third section assesses what this implies for a constituent state such as Penang in a relatively centralized federal system. The fourth and final section summarizes this chapter's main arguments.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC TRENDS: THE SHIFT TO ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PENANG

As economies, consumer tastes, and production networks the world over become more sophisticated, levels of competition are rising. This shift has been classified by some as a shift from the production or ‘P’ Economy to the knowledge or ‘K’ Economy, where successful competition is based on the acquisition and use of knowledge, as opposed to the undifferentiated physical production of goods and services (Machlup, 1962).

INTRODUCTION

Penang has recently become a popular destination for Japanese longstay retirees. Although more Japanese tourists are reported to visit Thailand (1,146,633 in 2008) than Malaysia (433,462), the latter country has constantly been voted by Japanese retirees as “the most desirable destination” overseas for long-stay since 2007. In Malaysia, Penang stands out as the primary destination city for the Japanese. Furthermore, thanks to Penang's strong reputation and well-developed facilities, it serves as a gateway to Southeast Asia for many Japanese retirees in their exploration of the region. Many Japanese come to Penang first, and then move on to various places in order to choose an ideal place for their retirement life.

Why do an increasing number of Japanese elderly choose to live overseas after retirement? What kind of retirees come to Southeast Asia, and, why Penang? This chapter aims to provide a broad overview about this emerging Japanese migration trend and its implications for the new development dynamics of Penang. We will first provide background information about the “super ageing” process in Japan and explain why Japanese retirees are heading to Southeast Asian countries. Secondly, we will trace the historical evolution of Japanese retirement migration, a process which is related to the development of tourism, government policies as well as business interests. Thirdly, we will describe how Malaysia and Penang emerged as important destinations for the long-stay retirees. Finally, we call attention to the phenomenon of outflows of Japanese from Penang, and attribute this to gaps between Japanese retirees' life strategies on the one hand, and the expectations of the Malaysia government and “retirement industry” developers on the other. By “retirement industry” we refer to a wide spectrum of businesses that target retirees as customers, including care homes, elderly-friendly real estate properties, travel agencies and the like.

PUSH FACTORS IN JAPAN

Japan has become a “super ageing” society where 23.1 per cent of the total population in 2010 was sixty-five years old and above (Ministry of Home Affairs, cited in Yomiuri Newspaper, 20 September 2010).