The Thai-Cambodian Joint Communiqué, an agreement between Thailand and Cambodia to promote the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site, was signed on 18 June 2008 by the Thai foreign minister Noppadon Pattama and his Cambodian counterpart Sok Anh. Noppadon had earlier been a lawyer for Thaksin Shinawatra. The Thai government coalition at the time was headed by the pro-Thaksin People Power Party, though Thaksin himself was in self-imposed exile. The anti-Thaksin movement later claimed that Thaksin and his proxies had “sold the motherland” in exchange for Thaksin's business advance in Cambodia. Using nationalist rhetoric, the movement claimed Thailand would gain nothing from the inclusion of the temple on the World Heritage list other than a little tourist business in the temple vicinity; meanwhile Thailand risked losing sovereignty over 4.6 square kilometres of land around the temple to Cambodia.

This allegation dominated the Thai public's perception of the conflict over the temple. But, as I have elaborated in the previous chapter, the temple was only one issue in the fast developing and multidimensional relations between Thailand and Cambodia since the early 1990s. This is not to say that Thaksin had no business interest in Cambodia, but until now no proof has been produced so the allegation remains hearsay. Some of PAD's claims were simply fiction, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Moreover, Thaksin's background as a transnational businessman and the conflict of interest evident in some of his domestic policies should not overshadow the development of Thai-Cambodian relations in the last two decades. In other words, it is imperative to consider the temple issue within the context of Thai-Cambodian socio-economic relations since the end of the Cold War. The bilateral cooperation over the temple of Preah Vihear was not the decision of one man but involved several successive governments and several state agencies in charge of economic affairs, foreign affairs, and national security.

After the UNESCO's World Heritage Committee had granted world heritage status to the Preah Vihear temple on 7 July 2008, the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia started to head downhill. A number of reactions are worth noting here. Firstly, on 28 July, while officials from both sides were holding an urgent meeting in Siem Reap on defusing border tension, PAD organized a rally in Bangkok at which Sondhi Limthongkul addressed the temple issue. He proposed numerous measures of retaliation against Cambodia and its leaders who were condemned for being arrogant toward Thailand. These proposals were not intended for the Samak Sundaravej government, which PAD was trying to topple, but for a new government, which PAD hoped would soon replace the Samak one. Some of the interesting issues in Sondhi's proposal were:

1. • The Thai government should set up a special taskforce to lobby the members of the UN Security Council and ask them to choose between Thailand and Cambodia.

2. • The Thai government should tell Thai business people to withdraw from Cambodia because Thailand did not promote trade and investment in Cambodia and the Thai government would not be able to assist them if conflict broke out.

3. • The Thai government should inform Thai business people in the border areas that Thailand would have to close the border if conflict broke out.

4. • The Thai government should inform the Cambodian government that the disputed area around the Preah Vihear temple belonged solely to Thailand which would defend her sovereignty with all means, including war. Sondhi added that Cambodia would not dare to fight with Thailand because her economy still depended on Thailand, but if Cambodia remained stubborn, Thailand should shut down all the 40 border checkpoints along the Thai-Cambodian border and suspend all flights from Thailand to Cambodia which would impact Cambodia greatly since 70 per cent of the flights had to transit in Thailand.

This study examines the role of Thai state agencies and the mass movement led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple located close to the Thai-Cambodian border. It also evaluates the long-term repercussions of the PAD's uncivil action within the context of Thailand's post-Cold War policy towards its neighbours in general and Cambodia in particular.

The ending of the Cold War and of the war in Cambodia in the late 1980s opened up opportunities for a new era of economic development and cooperation in Southeast Asia. Thailand positioned herself as a centre of economic cooperation in the region. Policies promoted by various state agencies reshaped the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia from enmity to economic interdependence. Thailand's support for Cambodia's proposal to list the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site arose from Thailand's cross-border tourism strategy.

The relationship between Thailand and Cambodia deteriorated greatly in mid-2008 when the PAD raised a protest against the proposed listing, claiming that it was linked to business deals by the former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Cambodia, and that it would sacrifice Thai ownership of a disputed area around the temple.

However, the PAD's allegation overlooks the fact that the bilateral cooperation over the listing was pursued consistently by three Thai governments and various bureaucratic agencies in an attempt to turn the once disputed monument into a symbol of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. For the first time in Southeast Asia two formerly antagonistic states were employing economic and cultural methods to settle a territorial dispute.

The ultra-nationalist movement launched by PAD not only derailed this essay in cooperation but also worked directly against Thailand's post-Cold War strategy in the region. Instead of becoming a symbol of friendship, the temple became a symbol of hatred between Thailand and Cambodia. The success of the PAD's campaign is due in part to the support which PAD received from various civic groups and institutions.

During the Cold War, when military security was a top priority, decision making on foreign policy in Thailand was a simple process with a state-centric character. It mainly involved a number of key state agencies, including the military high command, National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and government leaders. After the Cold War ended, former communist countries were welcomed into the once anti-communist regional grouping of ASEAN. The Thai state agencies appeared capable of handling the post-Cold War relationship with their former enemies fairly smoothly. Though there was a hiccup in 2003, when an angry Cambodian mob burned down the Thai embassy and business buildings in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress had allegedly said that Angkor Wat belonged to Thailand, the crisis ended quickly and a normal relationship was resumed soon after. Thai-Cambodian relations, however, spiralled downwards when a civil society movement in Thailand raised a campaign over the temple of Preah Vihear which is situated on the border between the two countries. The movement was led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), sometimes known as the Yellow Shirts. The crisis began in mid-2008, when the Cambodian government proposed to the World Heritage Committee (WHC) of the United Nation Economic Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to inscribe the ancient Brahmanic Temple of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage list, and the Thai government of Samak Sundaravej lent its support to the proposal. Several border clashes took place between Thai and Cambodian troops.

The sovereignty over the temple had first became a focal point of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia in 959 when the Cambodian government under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk demanded the Thai government withdraw its troops from the temple area. When Thailand failed to comply, Sihanouk decided to take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which awarded the temple and the territory where it is situated to Cambodia in 1962.

The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of PAD's uncivil action about the Preah Vihear temple. Apart from the immediate effects such as the deterioration of diplomatic relations and the deaths and damage incurred in border clashes, the nationalist campaign had longer-term repercussions which can only be properly understood within the context of Thailand's post-Cold War policy toward its neighbours in general and Cambodia in particular.

In Chapter II, I have shown that the ending of the Cold War and of the war in Cambodia in the late 1980s opened up great opportunities for a new era of economic development and cooperation in Southeast Asia. Former foes became allies and partners in both political and economic cooperation. Various cross-border schemes were launched to promote growth, spread prosperity, and build friendship among the region's states in order to compete with growing regionalism in other parts of the world. Since the government of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988–91), Thailand has positioned herself as a leader and centre of economic cooperation in the region. In the eyes of Thai policy-makers, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were no longer enemies, but potential partners in many schemes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Cambodia became an increasingly important country for Thai exports and investment. Both countries benefited from growing trans-border economic activities. Relations between the countries reflected this growing interdependence. In other words, policies promoted by various state agencies reshaped the fundamental fact of the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia from enmity to economic interdependence. Thailand could no longer employ economic measure, such as border closure, to punish its neighbour as it had done during the Cold War. Even when the diplomatic relationship between the governments of Abhisit and Hun Sen slid downhill and several bloody border clashes took place, both sides were careful not to let trans-border business be disrupted. Although Abhisit announced he would suspend financial aid to Cambodia and revoke the maritime MOU, he quietly failed to act on his promise since Thailand would suffer in the long term.

This chapter will discuss the campaign of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) over the Preah Vihear temple and will analyse factors contributing to its success. It is true that PAD has been able to manipulate the bitter history of Thailand's past territorial losses as a powerful tool in its campaign, as several scholars have pointed out. This study will, therefore, not repeat that issue. I would like to argue that while nationalist history is indeed a crucial factor in the temple conflict, we need to take into consideration the roles of several actors, both state and non-state, in legitimizing the PAD's campaign on the temple issue. These actors, which included academics, former diplomats, independent organizations such as the National Human Rights Commission, the Administrative Court, the Constitution Court, and the media, were considered authoritative, pro-democracy, impartial, and independent. Therefore, their support gave both moral and legal legitimacy to the PAD's temple campaign.

PAD and Its Allies

PAD was a coalition of heterogeneous groups with diverse and even conflicting backgrounds and interests. What united these diverse groups was their opposition to Thaksin. The alliance can be divided into two major strands. One was a network of grassroots and mass-based civil society organizations, such as the Alternative Agriculture Network, Northern Farmers Alliance, and Southern Federation of Small Scale Fishermen, along with state enterprise labour unions which opposed Thaksin's privatization policy and various NGOs involved in issues of consumer protection, anti-privatization, human rights, environmental protection, anti-free trade policy, communitarian development, and pro-democracy issues. This wing included many who had been strong supporters of Thaksin during the early years of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). Many civil society leaders participated in developing the TRT's policies, and helped connect the party with the masses in rural and urban areas, especially in the north and northeast. They saw Thaksin as a champion who could rescue Thailand from the forces of Western dominated globalization, which had taken advantage of the 1997 economic crisis to loot Thailand's resources and crush the country's pride, particularly through the IMF bailout package.

The literature of Islamic theology (“Sastra Kitab”, a kitab is a book or a scholarly tome) is potentially enormous. On the one hand, R. Roolvink (1971) suggests that Islamic theological literature includes studies of the Quran, tafsir (the interpretation of the Quran), tajwid (Quranic recitation), arkan ul-Islam (the pillars of Islam), usuluddin (theology), fikih (jurisprudence), ilmu sufi (Sufism), ilmu tasawuf (mysticism), tarikat (the different religious orders), zikir (chanting the names of God), rawatib (non-obligatory prayers), doa (supplications), jimat (talisman), risalah (tracts), wasiat (wills) and kitab tib (folk medicine and spells). In a narrow sense, however, Siti Baroroh Baried limits sastra kitab to the mystical literature (sastra tasawuf) that developed in Acheh during the 17th century (Sulastin Sutrisno et al. 1985: 291).

Mystical literature is certainly a very important part of Islamic theological literature in Malay. According to A. H. Johns, mystical literature played an important role in the spread of Islam in the Archipelago. Firstly, the Sufi mystics were adept at imparting the doctrines of Islam in terms that the local populace could understand. Secondly, mysticism itself had its own attraction, as joining a religious order (tarikat) meant that one became part of a large and supportive family. Furthermore, many tarikat members were well-travelled merchants, who had studied in Islamic centres all over the world. During the first half of the 17th century, four main Sufi brotherhoods—the Qadiriyah, Naksyabandiyah, Syatariah and Suhrawardi—all flourished in Acheh (Hall, 1962: 37-47).

We can glean a little bit about the activities of the Sufis from the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals), which tells us that many maulana (religious scholars), syaikh (leaders) and makhdum (Sufi masters) arrived in Malaka to teach and spread Islam. The scholar Abu Ishak sent his book, Daru'l- Mazlum (House of the Oppressed), to Sultan Mansur Syah. Maulana Yusuf taught metaphysics to Sultan Mahmud. These servants of Allah were regarded as holy men who possessed extraordinary supernatural powers.

Classical Malay law codes provide an important resource for the study of traditional Malay governance and administration, as well as the structure of society. That is not all. Legal codes reflect traditional ways of thought. The proverb, “pound rice in a mortar, boil it in an earthenware pot”, suggests that Malays had a fine regard for order. The proverb, “Where the sky touches the earth, the earth upholds the sky; in the land where you live, you must follow local custom”, suggests a willingness and an ability to adapt to current conditions and the vicissitudes of change. For this reason, elements of animism, Hinduism and Islam can exist comfortably side-by-side in Malay culture.

Sir Stamford Raffles was the first person to realize the value of studying classical Malay legal codes. While he was in Penang (1805-1810), he employed four Malay secretaries to collect legal documents. He rejected the contemporary scholarly idea that Malays had no understanding of law, firmly insisting that each kingdom had its own code. The secretaries were to transcribe these codes for his earnest attention. The result of his studies was an article he published in Asiatic Researches (volume 12, 1818).

Even so, there have been scholars who have doubted the relevance of traditional law codes for the actual administration of justice. In one of his articles, R. J. Wilkinson advised students of the law not to bother too much about these codes. He pointed out that Malay law codes had never had the backing of any legal body and were more like “legal digests”; as such, they might suggest what the current practices might be but the laws were not always applied and individuals were not always punished for their faults (Wilkinson 1908). R. O. Winstedt was also of the opinion that these digests were nothing more than reference works; they were often ignored and a strong sultan, or a judge who sought to be on good terms with such a sultan, could easily set their provisions aside (Winstedt 1958: 136).

It is very difficult to determine which literary works belong to the period of transition from Hinduism to Islam in the Malay Archipelago. Firstly, traditional Malay literature is generally not dated and does not bear the name of its author. Secondly, it is written in the Arabic alphabet. This means that it was the advent of Islam in the Malay Archipelago and the ensuing use of the Jawi script that heralded the birth of traditional Malay literature in general. Thirdly, one can find evidence of Islamic influence even in the very oldest known Malay literary work, the Hikayat Sri Rama. For example, there is mention in one version of the Hikayat Sri Rama of the prophet Adam bestowing supernatural powers upon the meditating Rawana. In the folktale Hikayat Pelanduk Jenaka, the animal protagonist, the mousedeer, is often referred to as a servant of the prophet Sulaiman (Solomon) and of Syaikh Alim (a holy man) who lived in the forest. Fourthly, all literary works produced during the transition period were called hikayats, and the word hikayat is an Arabic word that means “story”. According to L. Brakel, the word hikayat was initially used to mean a “short story”, and was only used to denote a story of greater length after the publication of the Hikayat Muhamad Hanafiah (L. Brakel, 1979: 6). So which literary works belong to the transitional era?

Malay literature of the transitional age is a coming together of Hindu-inspired literature and Islamic influence. In other words, works which are patently Hindu but also contain Islamic elements, such as the Hikayat Sri Rama, are not considered literature of the transitional period. The characteristics of transitional age literature are as follows. The supreme deity in such works is initially referred to as “Dewata Mulia Raya” or “Batara Kala”, and then later replaced by “Raja Syah Alam” or “Allah Subhanahu wa Taala” (Allah, Glorious and Exalted).

There are various famous framed narratives (cerita berbingkai) in Malay literature, including the Hikayat Bayan Budiman, the Hikayat Kalilah dan Dimnah and the Hikayat Bakhtiar. The framed narrative is said to have originated from India and traveled to the Archipelago along a number of different paths. Such works often contain several stories within the main story itself. Usually one or more characters in the story narrates the tale and then a character in that inner tale will take over the further narration, as a way of substantiating or corroborating the previous story. The inner or smaller story will, in turn, contain further sub-stories that will add to the further length and breadth of the story as a whole. For example:

Another characteristic of the framed narrative is that its animal characters are often given human qualities. These animals are not only expert story-tellers, they are also adept at giving advice to their masters on various human problems.