The year 2022 was projected to be a year to turn the page for Singapore. The COVID-19 pandemic, which was described by Singapore's prime minister Lee Hsien Loong as a “crisis of a generation”, had become endemic and the country was transitioning to a new normal. By the beginning of the year, more than ninety per cent of the population had completed their full vaccination regimen, and about three-quarters had received booster shots. Also, a significant portion of the population had caught the virus, granting protection from immunity. In April 2022, the Singapore government announced the easing of most COVID-19 measures, including group size limits, safe-distancing requirements, and the lowering of the Disease Outbreak Response System Condition (Dorscon) level. International travel restrictions were also lifted, which permitted Singaporeans and visitors to travel more easily, giving a boost to businesses, particularly the tourism sector. The ebullience was perhaps manifest when the Formula 1 Singapore Grand Prix returned after a two-year hiatus because of the pandemic. The race weekend brought in the highest attendance the event had seen since its inception in 2008. Foreign visitors accounted for almost half of racegoers, and the takings of hoteliers exceeded past highs.

However, against this backdrop of cheer, a sliver of unease looms. The prime minister warned in the August National Day Rally (NDR) that Singaporeans must “get real” and be psychologically prepared for a “very troubled” external environment even as the country emerges from the pandemic. The war in Ukraine and the severely strained US-China relationship have also created “external dangers” that threaten the peace Singaporeans had taken for granted.

While the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) government quelled brewing political uncertainty when it finally announced that finance and deputy prime minister Lawrence Wong would succeed Lee Hsien Loong as the country's next prime minister, the 4G (or fourth generation) group of PAP leaders faces the task of navigating the city-state through significant economic and political unknowns in 2023 and beyond.

The Economy

Beating early estimates, Singapore achieved a robust GDP growth of 7.6 per cent for 2021.

Southeast Asia in 2022 furnished a glimpse of what regional life in its postpandemic incarnation might look like. Things were far from pretty, with restive Myanmar still under the oppressive rule of the military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the region's post-pandemic economic recovery unsettled by the ongoing war in Ukraine. That said, there were a handful of encouraging signs that reflect the strength and resilience of the region and its peoples amid very difficult times and challenging circumstances. This chapter examines a range of issues and developments at the national, regional and extra-regional dimensions.

National Developments

By and large, Southeast Asia has effectively transitioned into living with COVID-19 as endemic. Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia have the highest rates of COVID-19 vaccination in the region, with approximately 270 doses per 100 people on average, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Myanmar has the lowest rate of vaccination because of its internal turmoil and international isolation. China's Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines were ubiquitous throughout Southeast Asia in the early phases of the pandemic thanks to Beijing's vaccine diplomacy. However, they were subsequently spurned by countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand for their perceived inefficacy in protecting against Omicron. Even in Cambodia, where Sinovac and Sinopharm accounted for 88.5 per cent of its total COVID-19 vaccine portfolio in 2021, its roll-out of booster shots in 2022 also shifted towards Pfizer and AstraZeneca.

Economically, Southeast Asia has enjoyed a welcome rebound from the worst days of the pandemic. Tourism, a major source of revenue for the region—with pre-pandemic visitors numbering as high as 139 million in 2019—accounted for 10 per cent of the GDP for Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam and between 20 and 25 per cent of GDP for Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines. At the time of writing, all Southeast Asian countries have fully reopened to international travel without quarantine. Flights to the region have steadily returned to 2019 levels, with Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand reportedly being the most popular destinations in 2022. But the region is not completely out of the woods yet. There are a host of potential constraints in the form of rising costs and interest rates, inflation and a potential recession, all of which could hamper the region's recovery.

In the aftermath of the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar saw an unprecedented uprising across the country. The violent military crackdown on what was once a widespread, peaceful movement has generated spontaneous revolutionary violence. This rapidly escalated into a full-blown civil war as the pro-democracy movement and its newly formed People's Defence Forces (PDFs) joined together with preexisting ethnic armed organizations. For most of 2021, the balance of power remained in favour of the junta. By contrast, in 2022, this appeared to be less so. The continued escalation of conflict across the country, combined with the mobilization of resistance forces around the common goal of defeating the military dictatorship, is an indication that a return to the status quo is no longer an option. In this context, this chapter examines Myanmar's political, socio-economic and foreign affairs dimensions, and highlights the strengths and challenges of both the junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and the anti-coup movement. We explore how the revolutionary movement in Myanmar, or the “Spring Revolution”, gained ground in 2022 and, despite numerous weaknesses, began to represent a serious threat to the junta.1 We also examine the junta's military, political and economic actions and their consequences with a view to understanding the motivation behind these policies and decisions.

Intensifying Political and Armed Struggle

In 2022, the anti-junta movement, led by the National Unity Government (NUG), continued to strengthen its institutional structure, in particular with regard to local administration and revenue generation. Meanwhile, the State Administrative Council (SAC) took steps towards its 2023 election plans (which aim to legitimize the 2021 takeover) and intensified its violent crackdown and psychological warfare against the resistance. Looking at the competition of both actors over the allegiances of ethnic armed forces and the expansion of conflict areas, we argue that this indicates some shift in the balance of power in favour of anti-junta forces.

Political Developments in the Anti-coup Movement

While negotiations on a common political vision between the NUG and proresistance ethnic armed forces (now referred to as Ethnic Resistance Organizations, or EROs) are still under way, the anti-coup movement took steps to strengthen its institutional structures.

Until recently, Malaysia seemed on course to transition from a one-party dominant regime to a two-coalition system. However, following the 2020 Sheraton Move, the country's political panorama has produced perplexing permutations. Rather than competition between the government and the opposition, 2022 was characterized by tectonic tensions within the ruling coalition comprised of Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN).

At the heart of the matter lay a sclerotic and divided United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) unable to come to terms with its 2018 defeat. Consigned to the parliamentary backbench, party president Zahid and much of the organization's apex pushed tirelessly for early elections—pandemic and budgetary worries notwithstanding. Even though the polls were not due until mid-2023, this group felt that the political winds presaged an outright parliamentary majority for Malaysia's grand old party. Securing the control of government would allow the country to revert to the “norm” of UMNO and BN rule, and likely resolve the legal troubles besieging its top leadership—not least those facing Zahid Hamidi and former prime minister Najib Razak.

Subordinate to Zahid in the party hierarchy but leading the government, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob and a group of UMNO cabinet members sought to prolong their sojourn at the apex of power. Enjoying generally cordial ties with other coalition members such as Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) and the Islamic party PAS, the Ismail Sabri grouping sought to accommodate demands for snap polls without actually holding them.

The back-and-forth between these two factions, with occasional overtures to the opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan, was the theme of 2022, continuing up to the 15th General Election (GE15) in November and its dramatic denouement.

The Johor State Election

In early 2022, the wind was in Barisan Nasional's sails. On the back of their successful performance in the Melaka election in December 2021, BN called for elections in Johor in March. At first blush, the ploy worked as BN more than doubled their 19 seats to 40 in the Johor state assembly. The opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) was decimated, with their holdings plummeting from 36 to 13. An analysis of voting patterns found that turnout was lowest in urban constituencies that had traditionally leaned to the opposition.

The year 2022 proved to be a challenging one for the Lao PDR, with stability of the economy taking centre-stage once again. As the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic began to abate in the early part of the year, they were promptly replaced by a number of macro-economic concerns that brought some degree of anxiety to both the public and private sectors. By mid-2022, it had become clear that this was not going to be the year of the post-pandemic economic bounce that some had hoped for. In September, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) adjusted down its 2022 GDP growth forecast for Laos from 3.8 per cent to 2.5 per cent, up just 0.2 per cent on the previous year's figure, when the impact of the pandemic was very much apparent and borders remained closed. Meanwhile, the ADB's 2023 forecast for Laos is a modest growth of 3.5 per cent.

Financial Woes

The principal (but not only) culprit has been a marked decline in the value of the Lao kip, which then triggered a steep rise in inflation given Laos's dependence on imports for a range of essential inputs, including petroleum, fertilizers and animal feed, among others. In September, the ADB revised up its inflation forecast for Laos in 2022 from 5.8 per cent to 17.0 per cent. That same month, the yearon- year figure for inflation was estimated to be 34 per cent—the highest level recorded since late 1999, having steadily crept up over the spring and summer months. Month-on-month inflation was 3.6 per cent, and the critical food inflation was running at 35.5 per cent year-on-year in September. With the exception of Sri Lanka, the Lao currency was the worst performing Asian currency in the first half of 2022, behind both Pakistan and Myanmar.

In May and June, petrol stations in Vientiane and other cities reported running out of both diesel and petroleum to sell, resulting in long queues of cars forming to purchase the modest amounts of fuel still available, albeit at high prices, and the introduction of some rationing. The lack of access to foreign exchange with which to import petrol seems to have been the root cause, forcing the Ministry of Finance to introduce temporary lines of credit to help import more fuel and thereby keep the Lao traffic moving.

Indonesia is no stranger to great power competition. During the Cold War, Jakarta pursued non-alignment as its foreign policy strategy towards the American and Soviet bloc's rivalries. Being non-aligned meant that Indonesia did not participate in any superpower's military alliance. Moreover, by standing outside the conflict zone, Indonesia had the flexibility to develop economic and trade cooperation with developed countries, especially the United States and Japan. This response to bipolar international politics allowed Suharto's New Order to consolidate the state, create a stable political system, pursue national growth, and settle communal violence.

This success story of the Cold War–era foreign policy conduct has inspired post-Suharto democratic governments to maintain the policy of non-alignment despite the geopolitical changes since then. For instance, the major driving force of great power contestations currently is no longer the ideological hostility between the capitalist West and the socialist East, but new factors related to the US-China strategic rivalry. The economic, military and political rivalries between the two are expressed through initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) led by Washington on the one side, and Beijing's expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) on the other, resulting in the complex, divided and unstable Indo- Pacific regional architecture of today.

The divisive consequences of intense US-China competition have adversely affected the Indonesian regional position and interests. With the South China Sea being the focal point of acute military tensions, there is increasing potential for great power conflict to reach Indonesia and Southeast Asia. As a result, Indonesia faces the challenge of revitalizing its leadership role to preserve peace and stability in its immediate region and the broader Indo-Pacific. Indonesia's primary diplomatic vehicle, ASEAN, has limited capacity and resources to help Jakarta achieve this.

Against this backdrop, it is time for policymakers in Jakarta to rethink Indonesia's foreign policy trajectory. Non-alignment may have been useful in the past, but pursuing it increasingly comes at a price. Being non-aligned is merely one instrument, among others, of carrying out the country's bebas aktif (independent and active) foreign policy.

Choosing the theme “ASEAN A.C.T.: Addressing Challenges Together”, Cambodia appeared to have the foresight in anticipating that its ASEAN chairmanship in 2022 would be beset with even greater challenges in an increasingly divided and uncertain world. At the handover ceremony of the chairmanship from Brunei to Cambodia on 28 October 2021, Prime Minister Hun Sen noted that “ASEAN must be resilient and strong against the pressure and influence stemming from rising geo-political competition” and other regional challenges.

In retrospect, Cambodia did assume the chairmanship when ASEAN had to confront more acute problems than the previous year or perhaps in all its fiftyfive years of history. As the chair country, Cambodia had to lead ASEAN through deadlocked issues such as the political crisis in Myanmar, stalling negotiations on a code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC), intensifying US-China rivalry, the manifold effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and heightened tensions in the Taiwan Straits. All of these problems stand to further polarize ASEAN and derail its unity.

The 2022 chairmanship could also be Phnom Penh's opportunity to redeem itself after the failure of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting to issue a joint communiqué when Cambodia was the ASEAN Chair in 2012. Observers were curious as to whether Cambodia could act in defence of ASEAN's interests in light of its traditionally pro-China foreign policy, while some wondered if it could achieve the targeted deliverables because of its generally passive role in ASEAN. China's immense influence over Cambodia economically and militarily has caused unease among ASEAN member states and external countries. Some analysts had expected Prime Minister Hun Sen to heed Beijing's preference regarding multiple issues in Southeast Asia.

Cambodia was able to rise above these doubts. On 13 November 2022, at the handover ceremony of the ASEAN chairmanship to Indonesia, Hun Sen highlighted ASEAN's achievements under Cambodia's leadership amid these extraordinarily challenging times. Phnom Penh managed to effectively leverage the chair's prerogative to shape the agenda and priorities of ASEAN, issue ASEAN chairman's statements when disagreement emerged over contentious issues, initiate foreign ministers’ statements in response to events and developments that affect regional peace and stability, and maintain a principled position on Russia's war in Ukraine that has been much applauded by the international community.

Cambodia in 2022 was at the crossroads of the past and the future. Cambodia's first parliamentary term (2018–23) under one-party rule of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) drew to a close. While the CPP has been in power since 1979, the 2018 election established their complete hegemony in the National Assembly. The end of this political experiment, or the first phase thereof, raised questions surrounding the future competitiveness of electoral politics. The resurrection of the Candlelight Party, from the ashes of the Sam Rainsy Party, which gained twentytwo per cent of the vote in the local elections in June, potentially promised the return to limited electoral competition ahead of the national elections in 2023. Yet, the profound reengineering of all aspects of political life over the electoral term ensured that the political landscape could not possibly return to its state before the turn to deepening authoritarianism set off in 2017–18.

The imminent power hand-over to a new generation of CPP leaders, almost without exception scions of the incumbent government, was thick in the air. In 2021, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP endorsed Hun Manet, Hun Sen's oldest son, as the next prime minister. Over 2022, Hun Manet and his wife, Pich Chanmony, took the stage as Cambodia's future first couple and made regular social media appearances with their son, implying a power transfer for several generations to come. The stage had also been set in December 2021 for a future cabinet of political heirs to come into power after the 2023 national elections. These heirs, often PhD holders trained abroad, took the limelight in preparation for the upcoming succession.

The closing of the era led by the “military fighter” (neak tosour) generation of CPP leaders born of revolution, and with it the end of the era of Prime Minister Hun Sen (samay Decho) in sight, necessitated reflection on their legacy. This concern took expression in the country's Win-Win Monument and memorials, developments in Koh Thmor at the Vietnamese border, as well as through films and writings.

In 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic that had plagued Southeast Asia and the world at large for the previous two years finally receded. But hopes for a strong rebound from the pandemic were soon overshadowed by new uncertainties and upheavals in domestic and international politics as well as structural economic shifts that have been accelerated by the pandemic. There were also significant economic and geopolitical disruptions brought on by Russia's war against Ukraine, while the rising tensions between the United States and China across multiple domains have contributed to a more fraught security environment—testing the region's resilience to avoid being drawn into a conflict between the major powers.

Elections in Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste brought back familiar names and faces into power. Anwar Ibrahim finally laid claim to the Malaysian premiership that had for so long eluded his grasp. In Manila, another Marcos once again occupies the Malacañang Palace—this time it is Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the scion of the eponymous dictator who was deposed by the People Power Revolution almost four decades ago. In Timor-Leste, the one-time president José Ramos-Horta was elected back into the same office with the support of the country's founding father and revolutionary hero José Xanana Gusmão.

Meanwhile, the prospects of impending elections in Thailand and Indonesia have prompted considerable political jostling and tussling. The electoral systems in both countries feature byzantine rules for qualification and complex balloting processes so politicians and parties have to manoeuvre early to ensure they remain ahead of their rivals. Cambodia will also hold legislative polls in 2023, but the political situation appears relatively secure for the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The CPP intends to use the election as an opportunity for leadership succession, with prime minister Hun Sen grooming his son to eventually take over. There was some flux in Laos and Vietnam, especially towards the end of 2022.

On the last day of the year, Lao prime minister Phankham Viphavanh tendered his surprise resignation—ostensibly for health reasons—though the general view was that his failure to effectively steward the pandemic-battered economy meant that he had to go.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary, Xi Jinping, announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI) on 21 April 2022 at the annual Boao Forum. The timing was noteworthy. It came only weeks after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and China joined Russia in blaming the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the cause for Russia's aggression.

In the arc of Boao Forums throughout the Xi era, development has been the dominant theme. Xi's 2015 Boao speech was entitled “Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia”. It was still a time of high hopes and few doubts within China about its rise, but then each subsequent year saw mounting problems that needed answers. In 2016, Donald Trump, who vowed to rectify trade and market access imbalances with China, won the US presidential election. In 2017, the Trump administration launched the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative. The year 2018 saw the start of the Sino-US trade war and the consolidation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between the United States, Australia, Japan and India. Xi was confident that he could win a trade war, and he invoked Mao's call for “self-reliance” to brush off worries about Beijing's continuing technological dependence on the United States. China's then foreign minister Wang Yi dismissed the Quad as something that would “dissipate like sea foam”. But by 2020, he would accuse the Quad of being a new “Asian NATO”.

In 2019, Xi skipped the Boao Forum. He began the year warning Taiwan that unification “must be and will be achieved”. Then the Sino-US trade war deepened; a million Hong Kong citizens marched to protest a criminal extradition law that would violate Hong Kong's Basic Law and China's one country–two systems commitment in the Sino-British Joint Declaration; and the Second Belt and Road Forum saw Chinese officials pledge to reform the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was ridden with concerns over debt sustainability, corruption, environmental impacts and local benefits. As growth slowed, Xi called for a “new Long March” to overcome “major challenges at home and abroad”.

Rodrigo Duterte was the first president to have hailed from Mindanao. Along with federalism, making peace with Moro Muslim separatists in the conflict-ridden south was among his priorities. He pledged to uphold the 2014 peace deal and to grant greater autonomy to the Bangsamoro.

While the goal of federalism slowly faded and was eventually abandoned, he has delivered on his promise of bringing peace and prosperity to Mindanao despite some setbacks and persistent challenges. The Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), signed and passed in 2018, is regarded as Duterte's greatest legacy. This chapter examines the achievements of and challenges to Duterte's peace-building efforts in Mindanao and the prospects for sustainable peace after his presidency. The chapter is organized as follows: the first part provides a brief background of the Mindanao conflict and the events that led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM); the second and third sections examine the achievements of the BARMM during Duterte's tenure and the challenges to the established peace, respectively; and the final section discusses the developments under the new Marcos Jr. administration.

The Long Road to Peace

The Mindanao conflict was complex and multifaceted, involving ethno-religious, cultural, historical, political and ideological aspects. The often-cited cause of the conflict was the incompatible divide between the Muslims and the Christians, but the long-standing and unresolved socio-economic grievances of ethnic minority Moro Muslims, political repression and enduring patterns of inequality and injustice also contributed to its continuance. The origins of the Mindanao conflict date to as far back as the sixteenth century (when the native Muslims resisted Spanish colonialism), but most of the literature identifies the 1968 Jabidah Massacre as the spark that ignited the contemporary armed resistance. It triggered the reinvention of Moro identity and spurred the creation of the revolutionary Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1971, whose chief objective was to gain the independence of the Bangsamoro.

The conflict between the Philippine government and the Muslim insurgents intensified following the imposition of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972. The attempts by the government to disarm Muslim groups led to a full-fledged war between the Philippine military and the MNLF, resulting in an estimated 60,000 deaths and about 200,000 to 300,000 people displaced.

While there is no official poverty line in Singapore, the expansion of government support programmes for low-income individuals reflects an increasing poverty problem that has required government intervention. In 2007, Singapore introduced Workfare, with the Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) and the Work Support Programme (WSP) as anchor income-support programmes. WIS gives older lowwage workers an automatic earnings supplement, whereas WSP was a means-tested programme for low-income households. Both programmes have since greatly expanded. For WIS, the income ceiling and payout amounts have been periodically revised, and the age eligibility will be lowered from thirty-five to thirty in 2023. WSP has evolved into ComCare Short-to-Medium-Term Assistance, and in the last three years it had an average annual disbursement of S$25.8 million. This represented a twofold increase from when it was first introduced in 2007. These two workfare programmes are in addition to the existing welfare support through public assistance (now referred to as ComCare Long-term Assistance), and they operate alongside the Progressive Wage Model (PWM), which sets minimum wages by sectors corresponding with skill ladders. Evidently, from initially catering only to the most needy who cannot work, Singapore's welfare system now includes a range of support programmes for low-earning individuals and households.

The persistence of poverty is unsurprising given global economic trends of technological-biased development and globalization that have combined to compress the wages of lower-skilled workers. As a small, globalized economy with a lean welfare system, the issue of low wages is especially challenging. In earlier papers, I have estimated that Singapore's incidence of poverty and low wages are relatively high compared with OECD economies. Given the trends, made worse by COVID-19, support for low-income households will need to expand on account of income poverty alone.

However, the support will be inadequate to lift Singaporean households out of poverty if we do not also take into account three forms of non-income poverty, which this chapter will discuss. First, digital resources have become necessities in today's world of technology; thus, tackling digital poverty needs to become a priority. I will argue the case for universal digital access. Second, I will discuss attention poverty, which my colleagues and I have found is more adversely experienced by people in financial need and parents of young children.