Institutional logics are interrelated sets of cultural elements (norms, values, beliefs, and symbols) that help people and organizations make sense of their everyday activities and order those activities in time and space. In this paper, we describe the rise of a robust literature on institutional logics, which mostly focuses on Western societies. We then describe changes in Chinese society and economy over the past four decades, as it shifted from state-controlled planning and redistribution to market-mediated exchange. We detail how the institutional logics that guide Chinese firms have been transformed in the wake of the economic transition. The state logic, which developed in the Maoist era, valorizes equality, national community, and political stability. Although it is still in evidence, it has been partly supplanted by a market logic that encourages efficiency, competition, and property rights. But this market logic differs from the one that prevails in Western capitalist economies. The Chinese version of the market logic valorizes the central role that the state and the Communist Party continue to play in economic life. Therefore, in the Chinese version of the market logic, efficiency, competition, and property rights are tempered by a continued concern for political stability. We review and summarize the existing literature on institutional logics and Chinese firms, and then identify fruitful lines that future research could take.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployed – initially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization gives time-worn procedures a second life. The inclination for institutional bricolage is a deeply rooted hallmark of innovation in Chinese statecraft.

Since 2015 rights-based NGOs, lawyers, feminists and journalists have endured the most stringent crackdown since 1989. Simultaneously the Xi Li administration has pushed forward a series of laws, policies and regulatory changes to enable service-oriented NGOs to apply for government contracts to provide welfare services. This seemingly Janus-like policy of welfarist incorporation can be traced back to the Hu–Wen period, often described as a lacklustre period, despite significant efforts to tackle issues of poverty and inequality. This article argues for a more balanced appraisal of this period by exploring in depth the complex politics underpinning efforts to pluralize welfare provision by involving service-oriented NGOs. It explores three sets of politics influencing this policy process: inter-institutional politics; state/non-state actor politics; and domestic/external politics. Furthermore, it considers processes of gradual institutional change adopted by key political actors to achieve these ends.

The proliferation of new property rights regimes in transitional economies provided an opportunity to examine the interaction between institutions and organizations. Some private enterprises in China developed the Red Hat strategy whereby they disguised their private ownership by registering as a public-owned organization. Drawing on a national survey, this study investigated how institutional variations, transaction costs and social embeddedness affected the firms’ Red Hat strategy. The findings suggest that private firms preferred a fuzzy property rights arrangement in the early years of market transition. The temporal and regional variation of the institutional environment contributed to the adoption of the Red Hat strategy. High transaction costs — networking cost and resource constraints — were positively related to the adoption of the Red Hat strategy. Social embeddedness also played an important role. The reliance on transaction partners in the public sector increased the pressure to adopt the Red Hat, while connections with high-ranking cadres facilitated the process. However, private firms opted for clearly delineated property rights as the institutional environment improved. In turn, the decisions of individual firms affected the institutional environment at the aggregate level. The Red Hat strategy exemplifies the co-evolution of institutional change and organizational dynamics.

This study examines the factors that affect the choice of location for foreign direct investment (FDI) in China. We identify three groups of factors that may affect the location choice by foreign firms: agglomeration economies, infrastructure, and institutional changes resulting from the economic reform. The study utilizes the most recent data from China's industrial census for the empirical testing. The findings show that agglomeration economies, in particular the clustering of foreign firms and domestic firms, exert the strongest effect on FDI location. Higher FDI concentration tends to attract more foreign firms. The clustering of domestic firms exerts a negative effect on FDI locations. Better infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, and road) and greater institutional change (open policies, privatization, and legal development) also show positive effects on FDI location. The size of the local economy does not seem to affect the choice of location of FDI.