We study possible Scott sentence complexities of linear orderings using two approaches. First, we investigate the effect of the Friedman–Stanley embedding on Scott sentence complexity and show that it only preserves $\Pi ^{\mathrm {in}}_{\alpha }$ complexities. We then take a more direct approach and exhibit linear orderings of all Scott sentence complexities except $\Sigma ^{\mathrm {in}}_{3}$ and $\Sigma ^{\mathrm {in}}_{\lambda +1}$ for $\lambda $ a limit ordinal. We show that the former cannot be the Scott sentence complexity of a linear ordering. In the process we develop new techniques which appear to be helpful to calculate the Scott sentence complexities of structures.

We prove an effective version of the Lopez-Escobar theorem for continuous domains. Let $Mod(\tau )$ be the set of countable structures with universe $\omega $ in vocabulary $\tau $ topologized by the Scott topology. We show that an invariant set $X\subseteq Mod(\tau )$ is $\Pi ^0_\alpha $ in the Borel hierarchy of this topology if and only if it is definable by a $\Pi ^p_\alpha $-formula, a positive $\Pi ^0_\alpha $ formula in the infinitary logic $L_{\omega _1\omega }$. As a corollary of this result we obtain a new pullback theorem for positive computable embeddings: Let $\mathcal {K}$ be positively computably embeddable in $\mathcal {K}'$ by $\Phi $, then for every $\Pi ^p_\alpha $ formula $\xi $ in the vocabulary of $\mathcal {K}'$ there is a $\Pi ^p_\alpha $ formula $\xi ^{*}$ in the vocabulary of $\mathcal {K}$ such that for all $\mathcal {A}\in \mathcal {K}$, $\mathcal {A}\models \xi ^{*}$ if and only if $\Phi (\mathcal {A})\models \xi $. We use this to obtain new results on the possibility of positive computable embeddings into the class of linear orderings.

Every countable structure has a sentence of the infinitary logic $\mathcal {L}_{\omega _1 \omega }$ which characterizes that structure up to isomorphism among countable structures. Such a sentence is called a Scott sentence, and can be thought of as a description of the structure. The least complexity of a Scott sentence for a structure can be thought of as a measurement of the complexity of describing the structure. We begin with an introduction to the area, with short and simple proofs where possible, followed by a survey of recent advances.

We define the Scott complexity of a countable structure to be the least complexity of a Scott sentence for that structure. This is a finer notion of complexity than Scott rank: it distinguishes between whether the simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\alpha }$ , $\Pi _{\alpha }$ , or $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\alpha }$ . We give a complete classification of the possible Scott complexities, including an example of a structure whose simplest Scott sentence is $\Sigma _{\lambda + 1}$ for $\lambda $ a limit ordinal. This answers a question left open by A. Miller.

We also construct examples of computable structures of high Scott rank with Scott complexities $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ and $\mathrm {d-}\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ . There are three other possible Scott complexities for a computable structure of high Scott rank: $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}}$ , $\Pi _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ , $\Sigma _{\omega _1^{CK}+1}$ . Examples of these were already known. Our examples are computable structures of Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}+1$ which, after naming finitely many constants, have Scott rank $\omega _1^{CK}$ . The existence of such structures was an open question.

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named.

There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably infinite, then the property of being a tautology is $\Pi _1^1$-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is ${\Sigma _1}$-definable in set theory.

Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects.

The paper proves a conjecture of Solomon Feferman concerning the indefiniteness of the continuum hypothesis relative to a semi-intuitionistic set theory.