This chapter describes: the creation of the ICC; its main features (such as its jurisdiction and its rules for selecting cases); opposition and criticisms; and a brief assessment of its work, including its controversial and sometimes disappointing early efforts, and the challenges that the Court confronts. The chapter discusses the Court’s jurisdiction – including personal and territorial jurisdiction, temporal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction. It discusses the ‘trigger mechanisms’: State Party referrals (including self-referrals), Security Council referrals, and initiation by the Prosecutor. It explains preliminary examination, investigation, and prosecution, as well as the selection criteria of admissibility (complementarity and gravity), and the interests of justice. It discusses opposition to the ICC, including the criticisms from the United States and the African Union, as well as key developments, such as US attacks on the ICC and threats of withdrawal from the African Union. The chapter reviews the Court’s record, including problems of collapsed cases, slow proceedings, the early focus on Africa, and accusations of selectivity and bias, as well as recent indications of progress.

In the landmark case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court of the United States articulated the admissibility standard for expert evidence. In jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standard, trial court judges must make difficult decisions regarding the admissibility of proffered expert evidence. Although all federal courts and nearly all state courts use the Daubert standard, we know little about how judges fulfill their gatekeeping role when making admissibility decisions. This chapter reviews the empirical and theoretical considerations regarding how judges in Daubert jurisdictions determine which proffered expert evidence should be admitted. After reviewing the standards governing the admissibility of expert testimony, which includes a discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert, and related cases, the chapter provides a discussion of each Daubert criterion, including the available evidence relating to judges’ understanding of those criteria. It then discusses the heuristics and biases that affect judicial decision-making. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implications for practice and research.

Complaints procedures offer a unique opportunity for individuals and groups to have claims of human rights violations considered and their rights vindicated in a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure. On the one hand, for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and human rights lawyers, complaints procedures are an important avenue to pursue strategic objectives, in addition to supporting victims in individual cases. States, on the other hand, may find themselves having to defend allegations of specific or systemic violations. Ideally, complaints procedures act as a mirror that provides an opportunity for states to bring their practices into conformity with the respective treaty. In practice, however, states often view unfavourable decisions as unwarranted criticism, which may create difficulties at the implementation stage. The treaty bodies themselves are in theory neutral arbiters that apply the treaty provisions and rules of procedures. However, inevitably, their position as bodies created by states, and relying on states’ cooperation on the one hand and seeking the effective protection of human rights on the other, raises a host of challenges in actual practice.

This chapter discusses how international courts operate, and how their jurisdiction is dependent on consent of states. It goes systematically through notions of jurisdiction, admissibility, interim measures, and compensation, ending with a discussion of advisory opinions and the possibilities for judicial review

The clinical diagnostic process invokes unvalidated general-causation theory (shaking) as an explanation for clinical findings in infants. These medical findings (subdural haemorrhage, retinal haemorrhage, and encephalopathy) are non-specific and develop in natural diseases and accidents. Yet child protection teams associate these findings with abuse. Such ‘diagnosis’ of abuse, triggers social service and law enforcement intervention. Outside the clinical system, which errs on the side of child safety, the SBS/AHT general-causation theories have been challenged. Biomechanical, neuropathological, and forensic pathology research disputes the validity of the shaking theory. Medical ethicists and epidemiologists question the clinical reliance upon data and studies limited by circular reasoning and case selection bias. While ‘child abuse’ may be a ‘valid diagnosis’ for triggering social service intervention, it is not a scientifically sound diagnosis. Lacking foundational validity and support in the relevant scientific fields, SBS/AHT lacks reliability and general acceptance. Expert opinion of SBS/AHT general causation theory is inadmissible under a Daubert or Frye analysis.

The orthodox view of shaken baby syndrome (SBS) has been predominant amongst the medical and forensic communities for decades, over which time scores of accusations of child abuse have been made based on standard diagnostic methods, which have been scientifically verified. Convictions for murder, manslaughter and child homicide have resulted in jail sentences of up to 35 years, whilst actions taken through family courts have resulted in removal of children. We discuss how belief in SBS has been systematically incorporated into Australian medical, forensic, judicial, policing, and social service institutions. We also highlight some important challenges that have been made to the orthodox views in Australia, despite the ongoing general adoption of the orthodoxy.

Arbitrators derive their jurisdiction from the agreement of the parties. The underlying contractual basis of their jurisdiction and the supervisory powers of the courts over arbitrator’s jurisdictions raises several issues which are examined in this chapter.

The first part of the paper briefly examines the principle of competence-competence and its ramifications on various matters, such as who has, or should have, priority to rule on jurisdiction (the courts or the tribunals) and what should be the appropriate level of scrutiny by the supervising courts.

The second part examines which issues are to be regarded as ‘jurisdictional’. A broader or narrower understanding of the term will reflect on the scope of the courts’ review.

The third part examines who and when is to rule on jurisdiction and the various scenarios that can be triggered depending on how the jurisdictional review is initiated. Prior to the constitution of the tribunal the matter can only be brought before the court. Once the tribunal is constituted, the issue of jurisdiction can be brought both before the court and before the tribunal, and the court may be called upon to review tribunal’s findings. Post-award jurisdictional review can be triggered both in the set-aside and recognition proceedings. Issues of particular importance in this regard are standard of review to be used by the courts and whether the courts should be entrusted to review negative jurisdictional rulings of the tribunals.

The final part of this chapter discusses anti-suit and anti-arbitration injunctions and their perceived pros and cons, form and legal basis.

The negative effect doctrine discussed in this chapter deals with when, if ever, a state court will stay proceedings before it and refer disputants to the arbitrators for them to decide, in the first instance, whether an arbitration agreement between the parties (i) exists, (ii) is valid, and (iii) has a scope that covers the dispute in question. An affirmative answer on each of these points would mean that the dispute’s merits must be decided in arbitration. Thus, the negative effect issue concerns whether a decision on these three jurisdiction sub-issues should be decided with finality by the court itself at the outset, or, in the first instance, by the arbitrators themselves, with possible court review on jurisdiction delayed until later.The chapter discusses the dramatically different approaches to the negative effect issue followed in several leading arbitral jurisdictions: France, Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, the U.K., and Canada (Quebec).It also discusses the underlying policy issues at stake in the different national approaches to the doctrine.In conclusion the chapter offer’s the author’s view of a preferred approach to the negative effect issue.

Evidence – its marshalling, disclosure and presentation – lies at the heart of many, if not most, international arbitration proceedings. Yet, perhaps more than any other aspect of arbitral practice, evidentiary issues lay bare the significant divergences between the common and civil law traditions. As result, evidentiary questions can sometimes be among the most contentious that arise in an international arbitration, particularly when a dispute involves parties and/or counsel from different sides of the common law/civil law divide.In this chapter, we outline the process by which evidence is used in international arbitration and highlight some particularly thorny issues that can arise, including in relation to the document disclosure process, the admissibility of evidence and the use of evidence at an evidentiary hearing.It is important that parties and counsel consider these evidentiary issues carefully – and early in the arbitral process. Although every tribunal is different, international arbitration is fundamentally party-driven.Parties should therefore be proactive in fostering an efficient, effective, and fair process as it relates to the gathering, production and use of evidence in an international arbitration proceeding.

A decision which does not respect jurisdictional limits may be annulled by a controlling authority. But if there is no issue as to jurisdiction, then any issue as to admissibility is an objection to the claim (for example its prematurity or – at the other extreme – its staleness) and not to the forum. It follows that determinations with respect to should ordinarily be final and non-renewable. Once it is established that the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a particular court or tribunal, there is a powerful policy reason – given the multiplicity of for a which might otherwise come into play internationally, with incompatible outcomes – to recognize its authority to dispose conclusively of other threshold issues.

The next battleground involves the admissibility of sovereign bond claims in investment treaty arbitration, which emerges as a complicated issue particularly when a large group of bondholders bring a case as a bundle against the debtor sovereign. To attain an appropriate balance between bondholder protection and respect for orderly debt restructuring, this study has conceptualised investment arbitration proceedings as a supplemental leverage available for bondholders as a group by which a stay of arbitral proceedings is imposed and lifted amid the fair progress of sovereign debt restructuring processes.

Chapter 5 analyzes the relationship between the international admissibility criterion on the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the right to an effective remedy in Article 13. Event though there is close affinity between the rules, the Court has never, in the abstract, explained whether the requirements of effectivenes, arising under both rules, are the same. However, as the chapter explains, several factors speak for a different threshold and evaluation of the required effectiveness.

Chapter 7 analyzes the applicability criterion of arguability, which requires that the applicant has an arguable claim that substantive rights in the Convention are violated for Article 13 to apply. The chapter first queries how this criterion relates to the scope of application of substantive rights. Is it sufficient to be arguably within the scope of substantive rights, for Article 13 to apply, or is it necessary to actually be within the scope? Although the Court's case law is not explicit, it reveals that it is necessary to be within the scope. This result is critcized. The chapter proceeds by analyzing the required threshold of arguability. Even though the Court has not provided an abstract definition, but, rather, determines on a case-by-case basis whether each individual claim is arguable, the Court has linked arguability to the international admissibility criterion of manifestly ill-founded. However, this adversely affects the arguability ctest and does not chime well with the principle of subsidiarity. The chapter argues that the Court needs to remove this linkage.

Chapter 5 investigates the availability of external review under the new economic governance of the Eurozone. It shows that the transformation of the EU’s powers in the economic and fiscal fields have not come together with a parallel intensification of judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice. It also finds that, considering the Court’s current case law and the conceptual frameworks that continue to structure its action (starting with the concepts of challengeable act and legal effects or the rules on standing) a shift in approach is quite unlikely. The result is a profound disconnect between the evolving nature of law and governance in the realm of EU economic policy and its judicial apprehension by the Court of Justice, an inappropriate level of review and a widening accountability gap. It notes that several bodies have sought to instil a certain dose of review, without compensating the lack of judicial review however. It enjoins the Court to lift the constitutional uncertainty produced by the new economic governance of the Eurozone, to come to terms with what standard economic governance has progressively become and to make sure that supranational judicial scrutiny keeps up with the evolving powers of the EU.