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Chapter 4 explores the utility of different WTO rules in disciplining market-distortive behaviour of SOEs and subsidies, including GATT rules on import monopolies, state trading enterprises (STEs), transparency, and anti-dumping (AD) measures. In our view, these rules are all of limited utilities, albeit for different reasons: the rules on import monopolies and STEs are quite narrow in terms of the coverage of policy instruments and the prescribed obligations, the transparency obligation is rather tooth-less, while the ability to use AD measures to deal with market distortions due to state intervention has been curtailed by the Appellate Body (AB) in recent cases.
Chapter 3 deflates the myth that China’s state capitalism is a new problem with an extensive review of China’s WTO accession. Drawing from the negotiation records, we demonstrated that WTO Members have been well aware of the potential clashes between WTO rules and China’s state capitalism since the very beginning. Yet, contrary to those who argue that state capitalism is inherently incompatible with the WTO, the Members believed that practical solutions could be found. Thus, they meticulously identified specific aspects of the Chinese system that might undermine its WTO commitments and carefully crafted surgical solutions to address these problems in WTO-consistent ways. Such an approach is much better than the one asking for a complete overhaul of China’s economic system, as it not only minimises the resistance of China but also ensures that the problematic areas are fully addressed. Thus, the theory that the accession negotiation failed to address the problems presented by China’s state capitalism is unconvincing. Instead, the practical approach adopted in the negotiation demonstrates the faith among WTO Members in the ability of the WTO to act as a neutral forum.
Chapter 5 discusses the great potential of China-specific rules on pricing and commercial behaviour of SOEs, coupled with WTO rules on subsidies both in the original Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and further elaborated in China’s WTO Accession Protocol. In particular, in response to the argument that WTO subsidy rules have been rendered ineffective by the AB’s interpretation of the term ’public body’, we argue that the utility of the provision has been rehabilitated by the AB’s subsequent decision in US–Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5). Moreover, even the original ’authority-based’ test is no longer an insurmountable hurdle due to the back-tracking of China’s SOE reform in recent years, which resulted in more micro-management by the Party and state in the management of SOEs. Thus, the best way to tackle China’s state capitalism is through WTO litigation based on existing rules discussed in this chapter.
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