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7 results

  • 15 - Franciscan Knowledge

  • from Part III - New Directions
  • Edited by Jonathan Fuqua, Conception Seminary College, Missouri, John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC, Tyler McNabb, Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
    Published online:
    24 August 2023
    Print publication:
    17 August 2023, pp 224-240

  • Summary

    In “Francis and Dominic: Persons, Patterns, and the Trinity,” Eleonore Stump introduces the term “Franciscan knowledge” for a type of nonpropositional knowledge that includes certain sorts of self-knowledge; knowing music (without being able to identify it); knowledge of other persons through second-person experience and narratives; and, perhaps most importantly, knowledge of God (2000). In Wandering in Darkness (2010), Stump appeals to Franciscan knowledge in her response to the problem of evil, and a number of other philosophers (e.g., Benton, Duncan, and Efird, and Worsley) interact with Stump’s account in their accounts of nonpropositional knowledge, interpersonal knowledge, and knowledge of God. This chapter explains the notion of Franciscan knowledge and discusses some of the ways it has influenced recent work in the philosophy of religion. Since the claim that there is irreducibly nonpropositional knowledge is controversial, the chapter also defends the very existence of Franciscan knowledge.

  • Suppose We Know Things

  • Matt Duncan
  • Journal:
    Episteme / Volume 20 / Issue 2 / June 2023
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    31 August 2021, pp. 308-323
    • Article
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  • When contemporary philosophers discuss the nature of knowledge, or conduct debates that the nature of knowledge is relevant to, they typically treat all knowledge as propositional. However, recent introductory epistemology texts and encyclopedia entries often mention three kinds of knowledge: (i) propositional knowledge, (ii) abilities knowledge, and (iii) knowledge of things/by acquaintance. This incongruity is striking for a number of reasons, one of which is that what kinds of knowledge there are is relevant to various debates in philosophy. In this paper I focus on this point as it relates to the third kind of knowledge mentioned above – knowledge of things. I start by supposing that we have knowledge of things, and then I show how this supposition reshapes various debates in philosophy.

  • 2 - Disagreement and Deliberation

  • Mark Philp, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    Radical Conduct
    Published online:
    20 August 2020
    Print publication:
    03 September 2020, pp 57-92

  • Summary

    How did people understand those with whom they disagreed? How was that disagreement handled?And how was that process affected by the heightened political climate of the 1790s? More especially, how did literary radicals such as Godwin, who believed in the communicability of truth, understand his developing disagreements with a range of men who, by the end of the decade, were willing to denounce his ideas from the lectern and pulpit? This chapter charts the breakdown of several of Godwin’s friendships, including Samul Parr, James Mackintosh and Francis Burdett, and looks at the wider problems faced for his understanding of his deliberative aspirations as repression and financial hardship increasingly undermined the social world he had been able to take for granted earlier in the decade.It also looks at evidence of decreasing confidence among radicals, and others, in the light of this reaction and the intrusion of loyalism into people’s sense of their private concerns.

  • Schlick on the Source of the ‘Great Errors in Philosophy’

  • MARK TEXTOR
  • Journal:
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 4 / Issue 1 / Spring 2018
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 September 2018, pp. 105-125

  • Moritz Schlick's work shaped logical empiricism and thereby an important part of philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. A continuous thread that runs through his work is a philosophical diagnosis of the ‘great errors in philosophy’: philosophers assume that there is intuitive knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance. Yet, acquaintance is not knowledge, but an evaluative attitude. In this paper I will reconstruct Schlick's arguments for this conclusion in the light of his early practical philosophy and his reading of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea. Having the historical roots of Schlick's dichotomy between acquaintance (intuition) and knowledge in view will put us in a position to explore and question its presuppositions.

  • Chapter 11 - Scientific representation, denotation, and explanatory power

  • Edited by Athanassios Raftopoulos, University of Cyprus, Peter Machamer, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book:
    Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference
    Published online:
    05 May 2012
    Print publication:
    12 April 2012, pp 239-261

  • Summary

    The claim that perceptual illusions can motivate the existence of sense-data is both familiar and controversial. Admitting that various illusions do not give evidence for sense-data considerably limits the power of the argument from illusion and brings out its distinctness from the argument from perceptual relativity. To reach these conclusions, the chapter examines the role of ambiguity in perception, its connection to illusion, and the link reference to every element of this discourse. The inference from illusions to sense-data has been used to additionally argue for indirect realism, the claim that the immediate objects of perception are always (or at least typically) sense-data. The chapter is concerned with the extent to which a successful form of perceptual reference, what it calls acquaintance, is involved in perceptual awareness. Understanding why some illusions do and some do not support the existence of sense-data is a non-trivial task.

  • Chapter 8 - The very idea of token physicalism

  • Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book:
    New Perspectives on Type Identity
    Published online:
    05 April 2012
    Print publication:
    08 March 2012, pp 167-185

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses the groundwork for an account of acquaintance and the consequences of the account for the metaphysics of mind. Acquaintance is a unique epistemological relation that relates a person to her own phenomenally conscious states and processes directly, incorrigibly, and in a way that seems to reveal their essence. Such an epistemic relation has struck many philosophers as deeply mysterious. The chapter dispels some of this mystery by providing an account of direct phenomenal concepts. These are the concepts deployed when a person is acquainted with her own conscious states in introspection. Consciousness appears puzzling for many reasons, not just because of the conceivability of zombies. The chapter shows that phenomenal concepts are analogous to quotation expressions and explaining how certain conceptual roles can make an operation mental quotation.