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1 results

  • Chapter 9 - Agnosticism, Permissivism, and Peer Disagreement

  • Avery Archer, George Washington University, Washington DC
  • Book:
    The Attitude of Agnosticism
    Published online:
    14 March 2024
    Print publication:
    21 March 2024, pp 171-202

  • Summary

    In this chapter, I defend two theses: (1) a narrow version of permissivism, according to which it may be rationally permissible to either believe or be agnostic about P, given some fixed body of evidence, e, or disbelieve or be agnostic about P given e, but it is never rationally permissible to believe and disbelieve P relative to e, and (2) the thesis that agnosticism is the rationally appropriate response to cases of revealed peer disagreement. I conclude the chapter by arguing, contra Michele Palmira, that in cases of agnostic disagreement, the agnostic party is rationally justified in retaining her attitude of agnosticism.