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Chapter 2 expands on economic drivers of welfare nationalism, the long-term structural trends that produced a “toxic mix of immigration and austerity,” which in turn drove exclusion of migrants in Europe and Russia after 2000. It identifies causes for the post-1990 explosion of international migration in both regions: the collapse of communist governments, rapid expansion of the European Union, and multiple crises in the Middle East and North Africa. The motivations and scale of the three major exclusionary migrations to Europe and Russia are covered. The chapter then turns to structural decline of labor markets and welfare states over recent decades. It tracks growing labor precarity s because of increases in non-standard and informal employment, growing exclusion of nationals from social insurance systems, and welfare state retrenchment. The 2008 global financial crisis, the 2011 Euro Crisis, and the recessions in Russia after 2012 are shown to further drive austerity. The chapter connects nationals’ welfare losses with grievances and appeals that are prominent in welfare nationalist discourse. . Declines in social security and welfare of nationals are shown to affect politics, alienating European electorates from mainstream parties and leaving postcommunist societies disillusioned with the West.
In this piece we argue for the revolutionary power of collective and collaborative work through the most maligned aspect of academic labour: service. The co-authors are the heads of academic units at Concordia University, who in fall 2023 organized a coalition of unit heads from across their university who worked collecitvely to push for greater budget transparency. Their experience challenges the false paradigm that would identify the “public humanities” exclusively with academic research and teaching, to show how service to one’s unit, faculty, and university is an important site of resistance, activism, and struggle. Done with intention and by modelling democratic and collective processes, service is not only a form of resistance to the erosion of any thinking and doing that is not under the thrall of capitalism, but it is also a way of enacting the public humanities themselves, through thinking, writing, talking and working out ideas together, a potential site for creating intellectual life by co-opting bureaucracy to creative and political ends.
‘Language policy’ is a highly diverse term, encompassing all attempts to purposefully influence language use. Government language policy is broadly considered to have originated as a distinct field of research and policymaking in the 1970s, but we begin the chapter with a historical review of its precursors dating back several centuries. We trace the roots of contemporary language policy to two broad historical developments: Bible translation and universal education. These laid the foundations for what would become language policy. In the contemporary language policy period, we divide our discussion across three fields: modern foreign languages (MFL), indigenous languages and community languages. These categorisations come from policy, not linguistics or sociology. These groups of languages are treated differently in policy, so we divide them accordingly and trace their origins and developments in three political eras from the 1970s onwards: neoliberalism (1970s–80s), New Public Management (1990s–2000s), and austerity (2008 onwards). We show how each field of language policy has been indelibly shaped and contoured by changing political conditions and priorities. Lastly, we consider forms of language that tend to fall outside the scope of government policy, and what extra this reveals about language policy.
Whether fiscal austerity by governments is unpopular or not is much discussed in the literature. One line of research argues that consolidation has negative electoral effects, ranging from declines in politicians’ approval ratings to abstention by voters at elections. Another strand highlights that re-election chances are not harmed by the implementation of austerity and that some voters in fact support consolidation measures. Both sides are limited in at least two regards. First, they do not allow for the possibility that public opinion is shaped by the political discussion about government debts and budget deficits. Second, and relatedly, the literature is limited in its extent to which it considers heterogeneity in preference adaptation across income groups. This article contributes to these debates by bringing to bear insights from the literature on mass preference formation. In particular, I argue that a cross-party consensus on austerity leads voters to align their preferences with the consensus, increasingly demanding cuts to government spending. This adaptation is conditioned by income so that the preferences of those income groups that are the furthest away from the consensus adapt their fiscal preferences most. By including the discursive context of fiscal policy, this article helps explain how austerity can be made popular. Empirically, I test these expectations by matching citizen preferences with party positions on fiscal policy for 60 country years. The empirical results indeed demonstrate that even though low- and middle-income voters are least supportive of austerity, they adapt the most to the party consensus on austerity.
This paper calls for the lawyering profession – which is often viewed as unabridged – to be reframed into two distinct occupations: legal aid practice and private practice, to better incorporate the divisions in labour. In order to better understand contemporary legal aid work and its workers, the hidden realities must be unveiled from behind their private counterparts, which opposingly signify wealth, professionalism, autonomy and privilege. Set within a context of crumbling professional identities, a shrinking industry and financial constraints, the paper draws on ethnographic and interview data. It finds that those working in legal aid undoubtedly face a more stagnated, under-resourced and precarious working environment, which means that their professional experience is vastly different from their private counterparts. Likewise, those in the field face toxic narratives from the government, the media, the public, and their private counterparts alike, resulting in persistent discourse of vilification. Ultimately, it calls for a refocus of legal aid work as a separate vocation due to its altruistic underpinnings, unique ‘professional’ identity, and values.
The UK welfare landscape is increasingly challenging due to ongoing austerity involving public sector cuts, service retrenchment, and withdrawal of statutory responsibilities. This article shows that as the welfare state contracts, precarity increases and responsibility for service provision is progressively devolved to front-line individuals and service users. To illustrate, the article examines the use of assistive and everyday technologies to improve social housing residents’ quality of life based on a longitudinal mixed methods study conducted between 2020 and 2022. The findings highlight how housing providers can support person-led technology interventions for older residents, where minor improvements positively impact day-to-day living. However, interventions are often limited by practicalities, capacity, and cost. This article connects technological engagement in housing to the ongoing ‘responsibilisation’ of many areas of housing provision to social landlords and tenants. This suggests an extension of responsibility where social housing providers are papering over the cracks in the welfare state.
The UK government has called for employers to make work adaptations in response to changes in health individuals may experience as they age. However, government assumptions place too much emphasis on the voluntary actions of employers and managers, without placing the management of health in a wider context. Drawing on insights from Thompson’s disconnected capitalism thesis, we explore whether financial/competitive pressures facing many private and public sector organisations today, alongside other factors, contribute to organisations not considering or implementing work adaptations. In this context, it is suggested that older workers may also hide health issues because of anxiety, or ‘ontological precarity’, regarding working longer. Qualitative case studies compare the delivery of work adaptations in three organisations: ‘Local Government’, ‘Hospitality’, and ‘Trains’. Work adaptations were only widely available in Trains; this was for a range of reasons, including the fact that Trains was relatively insulated from financial pressures and able to deliver job and financial security for older workers. As many older workers will continue to be employed by organisations similar to Local Government and Hospitality, we argue that policy makers cannot rely solely on employers to make adaptations.
In this interview, which took place in Birmingham on 16 February 2023, Hakan Gültekin talks to playwright David Edgar about his theatre universe and the current state of British theatre. Edgar has long championed the social and economic rights of playwrights, and here suggests that the lack of long-term and sustained support from British theatres has created what he calls ‘Primark playwrights’. His plays are characterized by a careful examination of historical events and the impact of these events on society, as evident in his epic two-part play Destiny (1976), which examines the roots of the British Labour movement. Other notable plays include Excuses Excuses (1972), Saigon Rose (1976), Wreckers (1977), and Entertaining Strangers (1986), commissioned by the Colway Theatre. He has also written plays for the Royal Shakespeare Company, including The Jail Diary of Albie Sachs (1978), Maydays (1983, revived in 2018), and Pentecost (1994). More recently, he adapted A Christmas Carol for the RSC (2017) and staged the one-man show Trying It On (2018). He founded the first playwriting degree in Britain at the University of Birmingham in 1989, and served as President of the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain from 2007 to 2013.
Any fair evaluation of the Conservative effect (2010-14) must be cognisant of the context. Tom Egerton’s chapter will place the Conservative premierships in the six external shocks Britain faced, beginning with the Great Financial Crash and the Eurozone Crisis, before the impact of Brexit (and a debate over its external and structural causes), Covid, the Russo-Ukrainian War and the inflation crisis. How did each government succeed or fail in the face of compounding shocks? What opportunities and constraints emerged as a result? Only through an analysis of a decade of poly-crisis, and in the perspective of wider political change, can we make a conclusion on the question of ‘fourteen wasted years’.
Paul Johnson began his relationship with the series with his analysis of Conservative economic policy in The Coalition Effect and will return, with his team, to his conclusions then, analysing not just the first period of austerity but also how Conservative economic policy has evolved through the post-referendum premierships of Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak.
Britain is not a good place to be poor. That has become even more true over the last fourteen years. Our justification for that statement is that, in Britain, the health of the poorest people, always lower than that of the average person, declined since 2010. Regional inequalities in health also increased with the ‘Red Wall’ north falling further behind. There has also been stagnation in the UK’s average life expectancy – and we have dropped down the international rankings. Please let the implications sink in: the health of the poorest people and places got worse; life expectancy went down; living with illness went up; and thousands of families lost loved ones before their time. It is an unprecedented calamity.
Chapter 7 shows that EU leaders had already started in the 1980s to steer the trajectory of national public services in a commodifying direction. The commodifying pressures from direct EU interventions reached a peak in 2004 with the Commission’s draft Services Directive, which failed to become law because of unprecedented transnational protest movements. After the financial crisis however, the EU’s shift to its new economic governance (NEG) regime empowered EU executives to pursue public service commodification by new means. Our analysis reveals that the NEG prescriptions on public services for Germany, Italy, Ireland, and Romania consistently pointed in a commodifying direction, by demanding both a curtailment of public resources for public services and the marketisation of public services. Although our analysis uncovers some decommodifying prescriptions, namely, quantitative ones calling for more investment at the end of the 2010s, they were usually justified with policy rationales subordinated to NEG’s commodification script.
City institutions engage with language provisions in order to ensure equal access to services. Global provisions are intertwined with local knowledge resources introduced by individual agents. As UK austerity measures post-2012 led to a reduction of resources and specialised provisions, institutions began to rely more and more on the deployment of local individualised knowledge in response to communication challenges. Multilingual spaces became in some areas improvised and driven by the agency of both institutional agents and clients. The city’s day-to-day operations can be seen as a space of resistance to monolingual ideologies, born out of the necessity to provide front-line services to all and tightly embedded into the shared experience of a multilingual reality. But city-based institutions have limited powers to legislate or to fund operations.
Existing research on the rise of precarious forms of employment has paid little attention to gender and diversity challenges. Yet precarious work has damaging effects for vulnerable demographics, with women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities more considerably affected. This volume unpacks this research and offers insights into the role of organisations in fostering inclusive change.
This chapter focuses on transnational solidarity conflicts, that is, a new type of distributional conflict which encompasses both quarrels about the adaptation of domestic welfare systems to EMU requirements and the distribution of costs and benefits between Member States. It seeks to understand how constitutional accountability may contribute to constructive management of such conflicts. In addressing this question, the chapter focuses specifically on the accountability goods of openness and publicness. It analyses the case law of the German and the Portuguese constitutional court as well as of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) following the Eurozone crisis. Domestic courts applied mostly a deductive approach to accountability in the EMU and thereby also tended to ‘nationalise’ transnational solidarity conflicts rather than acknowledge their European dimension. By contrast, the CJEU made the European constitutional dimension visible, thereby contributing more to openness. However, by focusing mostly on economic constitutional values, while only hesitantly applying other constitutional values such as social rights as a benchmark for substantive accountability it ensured publicness only to a limited extent. In conclusion, both domestic and European constitutional accountability mechanisms did not ensure meaningful accountability in the sense of concretizing and re-negotiating constitutional common goods.
Aggregate demand problems can jeopardize the existence of a steady growth path in mature capitalist economies: fiscal policy may be needed to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. This functional finance approach to economic policy endogenizes the movements in public debt. The debt ratio will converge towards a long-run value that depends (i) inversely on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government consumption, and (iii) directly on the degree of inequality. The analysis implies that policies and policy debates on the dangers of public debt have been misguided and that the incipient theoretical redirection following the rediscovery of secular stagnation by Summers and others does not go far enough. Unlike in mature economies, functional finance cannot target full employment in developing economies with high rates of underemployment. Instead, high investment rates are desirable, and functional finance should aim to stabilize the level and composition of demand at values that are consistent with a target growth rate of the modern sector; excessive aggregate demand stimulus can squeeze the modern sector and lead to premature deindustrialization.
What explains the variation in countries’ propensity to engage in austerity policy? Economic and political country-level factors are the paramount explanations in the literature. Nevertheless, variation in fiscal preferences at the executive level remains underexplored, except for ideology. Moreover, budget decisions are endogenous to the state of the economy, thus casting doubt on standard measures based on the debt and/or deficit ratio. This article contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I turn to the individual level of analysis and suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely to pursue a balanced budget and tend to implement fiscal consolidation policies based on spending cuts. Second, I ease concerns about individuals’ self-selection into office by relying on fiscal adjustments that are weakly orthogonal to the economic cycle. The statistical analysis of a panel of 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2014 confirms the theoretical expectations. The results are robust to a variety of specification and statistical methodologies and hold for a subset of as-if random leadership transitions following close elections. A case study of Brian Mulroney's governments in Canada (1984–93) further illustrates the argument.
This article studies the impact of the 2012 British austerity policies on youth political attitudes using a difference-in-differences. The study achieves this by combining longitudinal survey data from “Understanding Society” with a district-level estimate of the austerity shock that each individual faced between the years 2013 and 2015. The findings indicate that the welfare cuts had a negative impact on the political efficacy of young people, as they were more inclined to believe that public officials did not care about them and that they had no say in the actions of the government. Additionally, their satisfaction with politics, as determined by their perceived level of political influence, also decreased. Overall, the results suggest that the implementation of austerity measures increased the likelihood of political disenfranchisement among young people in Britain.
This is the first academic paper to consider the role that parliamentarians play in access to justice. Under austerity, England and Wales has seen cuts to legal aid and local authority budgets that have impacted the ability of people to get help for legal problems in social welfare law from the advice sector. Members of the UK Parliament and Members of the Senedd Cymru are increasingly being called upon by their constituents to fill the resultant gap in advice. This paper draws on interviews with parliamentarians that draw out the nature of the role they are now playing in access to justice across three key areas of civil justice: welfare benefits; housing; and immigration. The growth of parliamentarians as figures in access to justice has thus far been largely neglected but is crucial to grasp, as the implications for the future of access to justice are massive. The paper calls for more research to better understand the phenomenon but urges caution that elected representatives should not be considered as an adequate substitute for a properly functioning, adequately funded advice sector.
Over recent years, a preventative approach has been promoted within adult social care policy and practice in England. However, progress has been somewhat inconsistent, in part due to issues around conceptualising what exactly prevention means within this context. Particularly since the financial crisis, there have emerged tensions between seeing prevention as a positive strategy to build assets and capability; as part of a neo-liberal project to roll back expectations for state support; or simply as a technocratic strategy to increase efficiency by deploying resources ‘upstream’ where they might have greater impact. This paper provides a critical perspective on how policy has unfolded over the last 15 years, which provides the context for an analysis of findings from a national survey of English local authorities and interviews with key stakeholders. These findings demonstrate a substantial commitment to preventative activity, but also some serious confusions and contradictions in how this agenda may be taken forward in the current policy environment.