In the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, there is a pronounced paradigm shift associated with the transition from internalism to externalism. The externalist paradigm views cognitive processes as not isolated in the brain, but as interrelated with external artefacts and structures. The paper focuses on one of the leading externalist approaches – extended cognition. Despite the dominance of internalism in economics, in its main schools, there is an emerging trend towards extended cognition ideas. In my opinion, economists might develop the most advanced version of the extended cognition approach: socially extended cognition based on cognitive institutions. This paper analyses extended cognition ideas in institutional, Austrian, and behavioural economics and identifies numerous overlapping approaches and complementary research areas. I argue that the economics of cognitive institutions is a promising field for all economic schools and propose a preliminary research agenda.

Recent work has argued for a Hayekian behavioural economics, which combines Austrian economics with behavioural economics as developed by Kahneman, Thaler, Sunstein, and others. We suggest that this hybrid is misguided because it relies on individual cognitivism. This view of cognition is incompatible with the Hayekian view of cognition which treats rationality as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction in an institutional environment. This Hayekian view, which we call epistemic institutionalism, is compatible with an alternative prominent perspective in psychology, that of the extended mind, sometimes known as 4E cognition. We demonstrate how the Hayekian perspective on individualism, the price system, and the evolution of rules can be connected to the extended mind programme, through concepts such as the coupling of the individual and their environment, cognitive off-loading, and affordances. We suggest that this alternative combination of Austrian economics and psychology provides a more fruitful way forward, especially because it foregrounds the processes of learning, error-correction, and institutional orders, rather than choice, bias, and individual rationality. To explain why Austrian economists have been receptive to behavioural economics, we distinguish epistemic institutionalism from the (radical) subjectivist approach, which shares key assumptions of individual cognitivism.

Heterodox economic approaches such as Austrian economics and market process analysis rely upon a less formalistic approach to rationality than neoclassical frameworks. We argue such looser formalism provides a unique opportunity for interdisciplinary engagement to investigating and understanding social institutions, outcomes and complex phenomenon. This introduction briefly summarizes the contents of this invited issue as effective examples of such interdisciplinarity.

Critiques of the meritocracy have centered on its narrow definition and biased assessment of merit, its stigmatization of the unsuccessful, and excessive competition. This paper identifies a different mechanism that could have pernicious social and political consequences. Economic mobility sorts people based on certain ‘productive’ traits, separating them into classes, and thus alters social externalities. This sorting–separation–externalities mechanism can produce between-class polarization in social outcomes (e.g. alcoholism and drug abuse) and worsen aggregate outcomes over all classes, consistent with rising ‘deaths of despair’ in the United States (Case and Deaton, 2020, Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton University Press). When traits are endogenous, transition out of a caste-based society produces an initial burst of economic mobility which dissipates over time. Thus, a dynamic meritocratic society devolves into a static class-based society. I set out an alternative model called the ‘experimental society’, which is less susceptible to these problems.

This paper explores the potential for gains from trade between Austrian and behavioral economics, with a focus on how the two schools of thoughts can constructively critique each other. Among other things, the Austrian critique of behavioral economics would urge it to jettison its restrictive and axiomatic definition of rationality, and to treat humans as active agents rather than passive recipients of environmental and cognitive influences. Meanwhile, the behavioral critique of Austrian economics would push it to take more seriously the fundamental question of how individuals arrive at choices and to analyze how such choices can interact with ‘micro-institutional’ choice environments.

Frank A. Fetter is often classified as an American representative of the Austrian school, yet surprisingly, there is practically no published record of his views of the Austrians or theirs of him, and there is no indication that he ever seriously interacted with them after the First World War. However, Fetter enjoyed many personal and professional relationships with the Austrians, and they shared a reciprocal influence on each other's ideas that deeply influenced their respective research programs. This paper draws on unpublished archival records to explore Fetter's unique place in the history of economics, in particular, his positive and negative interactions with the leading individuals and institutions of the Austrian school. Their half-century of influence sheds light on Fetter and his role in American economics, but also brings to light a wide range of information about the lives, works, and personal relations of the Austrians that have not been included in their biographies or institutional histories.

The operation of monetary policy is likely to affect securities markets and asset values. This is of relevance to actuaries who work in or advise non-bank financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies. This paper examines different theories of monetary policy and the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices. It is found that central bank models have, at least until recently, tended to sideline consideration of the transmission of monetary policy through asset markets but that, with the implementation of quantitative easing, it is a subject that cannot be ignored. Many monetary schools, in fact, suggest that asset markets can be significantly affected by changes to monetary policy and those schools have lessons for important aspects of actuarial theory and practice.

This paper examines the political economy of regulation, reviewing market socialist, neo-classical and public interest approaches to regulation and analysing the development of financial services and insurance regulation in these frameworks. However, the paper suggests that these approaches do not capture properly many of the features of a market and the behaviour of regulators. Public choice theory is discussed, and it is concluded that there has not been significant capture of the regulatory process by interest groups. Austrian economics is proposed as a possible framework within which to analyse markets and regulators. It is concluded that there is prima facie evidence to suggest that the Austrian view of the market is realistic and that regulation in insurance markets can have unforeseen and undesirable effects. The author also concludes that, until 1970, insurance regulation did not deviate from principles which are appropriate if either a public choice or Austrian view is taken. However, the Financial Services Act 1998 and the Pensions Act 1995 do deviate from those principles.