This chapter investigates how Napoleon funded his war effort during the fifteen years that he was in power. Coming to power in the wake of the French monarchy’s financial insolvency and the profound turmoil of the French Revolution, Napoleon chose to become personally involved in financial affairs of the nation, opting for radical but effective solutions. This aspect of his accomplishments is usual forgotten. This is all the more unfair as his successes were real and stark. By rationalizing old principles, the winner of Austerlitz gave himself the means to embody the “God of war” but failed to win the battle for credit due in large part to the disastrous legacy he received from regimes that had preceded him.

Between 1797 and 1815, Britain and France each developed modern central banks, albeit in very different forms. The Bank of England’s powers expanded enormously after the suspension of gold convertibility in 1797, and it also developed a vast system of investigation and prosecution of forgery and counterfeiting, whose records form the evidentiary core of the chapter. The Bank used its powers to protect itself, but also to aid in broader English governance, helping to produce a modern money-using financial public. As with the aftermath of 1720, the Bank’s powers produced widespread political condemnation, especially accusations of illegitimate elite conspiracy. In France, the brief chaos of free banking was replaced by the centralized Bank of France, mostly under government control and with limited policy discretion. In both cases, impunity was institutionalized as a function of governance, delegated to a private bank with political obligations. These new institutions, exercising new forms of monetary policy, would reconstitute the operation of international financial system after 1815.