The first part of the chapter analyses the disparity of the forces involved and Wolseley’s calculations once the intervention in Egypt had begun. It traces the manoeuvres of the belligerents, concluding with the Battle of Tel el-Kebir. The relative importance of British and Egyptian technology, cohesion, and command coherence is assessed. The Sudan campaign followed two distinct phases. The first was an attempt to restore Egyptian authority over its colony, and the ongoing resistance from the proclamation of Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah as ‘Mahdi’ in 1881. The disaster of General Hick’s mission offers the opportunity to analyze the belligerents and their strategic designs, tactics, arms, and early manoeuvres. The second phase of the campaign was the attempted evacuation of Khartoum, and its fall in 1885 despite the relief efforts of Wolseley and his Anglo-Egyptian force. Despite the Victorian apotheosis of Gordon, the garrison commander, the focus here is the operational one, especially the evolution of Wolseley’s more scientific approach to campaigning. There are fascinating episodes, such as the Battle of Abu Klea, that challenge the technological-determinist arguments that are used to explain British military success.