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The sharp bound for the third Hankel determinant for the coefficients of the inverse function of convex functions is obtained, thus answering a recent conjecture concerning invariance of coefficient functionals for convex functions.
where $h$ is a convex univalent function with $0\in h(\mathbb {D}).$ The proof of the main result is based on the original lemma for convex univalent functions and offers a new approach in the theory. In particular, the above differential subordination leads to generalizations of the well-known Briot-Bouquet differential subordination. Appropriate applications among others related to the differential subordination of harmonic mean are demonstrated. Related problems concerning differential equations are indicated.
We extend our study of variability regions, Ali et al. [‘An application of Schur algorithm to variability regions of certain analytic functions–I’, Comput. Methods Funct. Theory, to appear] from convex domains to starlike domains. Let
$\mathcal {CV}(\Omega )$
be the class of analytic functions f in
${\mathbb D}$
with
$f(0)=f'(0)-1=0$
satisfying
$1+zf''(z)/f'(z) \in {\Omega }$
. As an application of the main result, we determine the variability region of
$\log f'(z_0)$
when f ranges over
$\mathcal {CV}(\Omega )$
. By choosing a particular
$\Omega $
, we obtain the precise variability regions of
$\log f'(z_0)$
for some well-known subclasses of analytic and univalent functions.
We begin the study of Hankel matrices whose entries are logarithmic coefficients of univalent functions and give sharp bounds for the second Hankel determinant of logarithmic coefficients of convex and starlike functions.
For $f$ analytic in the unit disk $\mathbb{D}$, we consider the close-to-convex analogue of a class of starlike functions introduced by R. Singh [‘On a class of star-like functions’, Compos. Math.19(1) (1968), 78–82]. This class of functions is defined by $|zf^{\prime }(z)/g(z)-1|<1$ for $z\in \mathbb{D}$, where $g$ is starlike in $\mathbb{D}$. Coefficient and other results are obtained for this class of functions.
We present some inequalities for the mappings defined by Dragomir [‘Two mappings in connection to Hadamard’s inequalities’, J. Math. Anal. Appl.167 (1992), 49–56]. We analyse known inequalities connected with these mappings using a recently developed method connected with stochastic orderings and Stieltjes integrals. We show that some of these results are optimal and others may be substantially improved.
In this paper, we introduce a class of nonsmooth nonconvex optimization problems, and we propose to use a local iterative minimization-majorization (MM) algorithm to find an optimal solution for the optimization problem. The cost functions in our optimization problems are an extension of convex functions with MC separable penalty, which were previously introduced by Ivan Selesnick. These functions are not convex; therefore, convex optimization methods cannot be applied here to prove the existence of optimal minimum point for these functions. For our purpose, we use convex analysis tools to first construct a class of convex majorizers, which approximate the value of non-convex cost function locally, then use the MM algorithm to prove the existence of local minimum. The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed when the iterative points $x^{(k)}$ are obtained in a ball centred at $x^{(k-1)}$ with small radius. We prove that the algorithm converges to a stationary point (local minimum) of cost function when the surregators are strongly convex.
All non-negative, continuous, $\text{SL}(n)$, and translation invariant valuations on the space of super-coercive, convex functions on $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ are classified. Furthermore, using the invariance of the function space under the Legendre transform, a classification of non-negative, continuous, $\text{SL}(n)$, and dually translation invariant valuations is obtained. In both cases, different functional analogs of the Euler characteristic, volume, and polar volume are characterized.
Let ${\mathcal{S}}$ denote the class of analytic and univalent functions in $\mathbb{D}:=\{z\in \mathbb{C}:|z|<1\}$ which are of the form $f(z)=z+\sum _{n=2}^{\infty }a_{n}z^{n}$. We determine sharp estimates for the Toeplitz determinants whose elements are the Taylor coefficients of functions in ${\mathcal{S}}$ and certain of its subclasses. We also discuss similar problems for typically real functions.
This work concerns Markov decision chains on a finite state space. The decision-maker has a constant and nonnull risk sensitivity coefficient, and the performance of a control policy is measured by two different indices, namely, the discounted and average criteria. Motivated by well-known results for the risk-neutral case, the problem of approximating the optimal risk-sensitive average cost in terms of the optimal risk-sensitive discounted value functions is addressed. Under suitable communication assumptions, it is shown that, as the discount factor increases to 1, appropriate normalizations of the optimal discounted value functions converge to the optimal average cost, and to the functional part of the solution of the risk-sensitive average cost optimality equation.
We present refined and reversed inequalities for the weighted arithmetic mean–harmonic mean functional inequality. Our approach immediately yields the related operator versions in a simple and fast way. We also give some operator and functional inequalities for three or more arguments. As an application, we obtain a refined upper bound for the relative entropy involving functional arguments.
The most important open problem in monotone operator theory concerns the maximal monotonicity of the sum of two maximally monotone operators provided that the classical Rockafellar’s constraint qualification holds. In this paper, we establish the maximal monotonicity of $\def \xmlpi #1{}\def \mathsfbi #1{\boldsymbol {\mathsf {#1}}}\let \le =\leqslant \let \leq =\leqslant \let \ge =\geqslant \let \geq =\geqslant \def \Pr {\mathit {Pr}}\def \Fr {\mathit {Fr}}\def \Rey {\mathit {Re}}A+B$ provided that $A$ and $B$ are maximally monotone operators such that ${\rm star}({\rm dom}\ A)\cap {\rm int}\, {\rm dom}\, B\neq \varnothing $, and $A$ is of type (FPV). We show that when also ${\rm dom}\ A$ is convex, the sum operator $A+B$ is also of type (FPV). Our result generalizes and unifies several recent sum theorems.
We give precise conditions under which the composition of a norm with a convex function yields a uniformly convex function on a Banach space. Various applications are given to functions of power type. The results are dualized to study uniform smoothness and several examples are provided.
Let (Xt)0 ≤ t ≤ T
be a one-dimensional stochastic process with independent and stationary increments, either in discrete or continuous time. In this paper we consider the problem of stopping the process (Xt) ‘as close as possible’ to its eventual supremum MT := sup0 ≤ t ≤ TXt, when the reward for stopping at time τ ≤ T is a nonincreasing convex function of MT - Xτ. Under fairly general conditions on the process (Xt), it is shown that the optimal stopping time τ takes a trivial form: it is either optimal to stop at time 0 or at time T. For the case of a random walk, the rule τ ≡ T is optimal if the steps of the walk stochastically dominate their opposites, and the rule τ ≡ 0 is optimal if the reverse relationship holds. An analogous result is proved for Lévy processes with finite Lévy measure. The result is then extended to some processes with nonfinite Lévy measure, including stable processes, CGMY processes, and processes whose jump component is of finite variation.
Some inequalities of Jensen type for Q-class functions are proved. More precisely, a refinement of the inequality f((1/P)∑ ni=1pixi)≤P∑ ni=1(f(xi)/pi) is given in which p1,…,pn are positive numbers, P=∑ ni=1pi and f is a Q-class function. The notion of the jointly Q-class function is introduced and some Jensen type inequalities for these functions are proved. Some Ostrowski and Hermite–Hadamard type inequalities related to Q-class functions are presented as well.
Let (Bt)0≤t≤T be either a Bernoulli random walk or a Brownian motion with drift, and let Mt := max{Bs: 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. In this paper we solve the general optimal prediction problem sup0≤τ≤TE[f(MT − Bτ], where the supremum is over all stopping times τ adapted to the natural filtration of (Bt) and f is a nonincreasing convex function. The optimal stopping time τ* is shown to be of ‘bang-bang’ type: τ* ≡ 0 if the drift of the underlying process (Bt) is negative and τ* ≡ T if the drift is positive. This result generalizes recent findings of Toit and Peskir (2009) and Yam, Yung and Zhou (2009), and provides additional mathematical justification for the dictum in finance that one should sell bad stocks immediately, but keep good stocks as long as possible.
Some major companies have the policy of annually giving numerical scores to their employees according to their performance, firing those whose performance scores are below a given percentile of the scores of all employees, and then recruiting new employees to replace those who were fired. We introduce a probabilistic model to describe how this practice affects the quality of employee performance as measured over time by the annual scores. Let n be the number of years that the policy has been in effect, and let Fn(x) be the distribution function of the evaluation scores in year n. We show, under certain technical assumptions, that the sequence (Fn(x)) satisfies a particular nonlinear difference equation, and furnish estimates of the solution of the equation and expressions for the quantiles of Fn. The mathematical tools that are used include convex functions, difference equations, and extreme value theory for independent and identically distributed random variables.
In a two-person red-and-black game, each player holds an integral amount of chips. At each stage of the game, each player can bet any integral amount in his possession, winning the chips of his opponent with a probability which is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players' bets and is called a win probability function. Both players seek to maximize the probability of winning the entire fortune of his opponent. In this paper we propose two new models. In the first model, at each stage, there is a positive probability that two players exchange their bets. In the second model, the win probability functions are stage dependent. In both models, we obtain suitable conditions on the win probability functions such that it is a Nash equilibrium for the subfair player to play boldly and for the superfair player to play timidly.
In this paper a two-person red-and-black game is investigated. We suppose that, at every stage of the game, player I's win probability, f, is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players' bets. Two results are given: (i) if f is convex then a bold strategy is optimal for player I when player II plays timidly; and (ii) if f satisfies f(s)f(t) ≤ f(st) then a timid strategy is optimal for player II when player I plays boldly. These two results extend two formulations of red-and-black games proposed by Pontiggia (2005), and also provide a sufficient condition to ensure that the profile (bold, timid) is the unique Nash equilibrium for players I and II. Finally, we give a counterexample to Pontiggia's conjecture about a proportional N-person red-and-black game.
Let X1, X2, …, XN be Banach spaces and ψ a continuous convex function with some appropriate conditions on a certain convex set in RN−1. Let (X1⊕X2⊕…⊕XN)Ψ be the direct sum of X1, X2, …, XN equipped with the norm associated with Ψ. We characterize the strict, uniform, and locally uniform convexity of (X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ … ⊕ XN)Ψ; by means of the convex function Ψ. As an application these convexities are characterized for the ℓp, q-sum (X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ … ⊕ XN)p, q (1 < q ≤ p ≤ ∈, q < ∞), which includes the well-known facts for the ℓp-sum (X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ … ⊕ XN)p in the case p = q.