We investigate structural features and processes associated with the onset of systemic conflict using an approach which integrates complex systems theory with network modeling and analysis. We present a signed network model of cooperation and conflict dynamics in the context of international relations between states. The model evolves ties between nodes under the influence of a structural balance force and a dyad-specific force. Model simulations exhibit a sharp bifurcation from peace to systemic war as structural balance pressures increase, a bistable regime in which both peace and war stable equilibria exist, and a hysteretic reverse bifurcation from war to peace. We show how the analytical expression we derive for the peace-to-war bifurcation condition implies that polarized network structure increases susceptibility to systemic war. We develop a framework for identifying patterns of relationship perturbations that are most destabilizing and apply it to the network of European great powers before World War I. We also show that the model exhibits critical slowing down, in which perturbations to the peace equilibrium take longer to decay as the system draws closer to the bifurcation. We discuss how our results relate to international relations theories on the causes and catalysts of systemic war.

The article examines the aspects of contention and conflict escalation before and during the period from November 2013 till February 2014 in Ukraine that have not yet received due attention in research. It studies the contention between the government and the opposition and the concomitant Maidan protest mobilizations by groups advocating unity with Russia, and opposing the visions of political community of the radical groups making up part of the Maidan coalition. Conflict escalation is studied as a combination of structural conditions, choices and actions taken by conflict agents, and evolving discursive factors that enable political violence. The analysis indicates that while structural conditions played a role, conflict escalation is a nonlinear and agency-driven process, evolving through mutually influencing choices and actions of the competing parties, that either drive escalation or lead to deradicalization. The article suggests that the modes of contention and radicalization between the government and the opposition opened opportunities for groups supporting unity with Russia to escalate their demands, to radicalize their visions of political community, and to build leverage with Russia. In conclusion, several key narratives and discursive processes enabling the legitimization of the use of force and the implications for peacebuilding are discussed. The findings help to understand better the environment in which violent conflict further escalated in 2014.

Most civil wars are preceded by nonviolent forms of conflict. While it is often assumed that violent and nonviolent conflicts are qualitatively different and have different causes, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. We use a two-step approach to explore whether political exclusion and lost autonomy—two common causes of civil war according to extant literature—are associated with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims, with the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims to war, or both. Our analysis suggests that different types of grievances matter more at different stages of conflict escalation. We find that political exclusion is a significant correlate of the escalation of nonviolent claims for self-determination to violence, while its association with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims is weaker. By contrast, lost autonomy is correlated with both the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims and, if autonomy revocations are recent, their escalation to violence. We argue that these results are consistent with both grievance- and opportunity-based theories of conflict.

How should one balance the freedom of expression and the prevention of violence? This article delves into the grey zone between hate speech and incitement to violence by assessing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in cases of allegedly dangerous speech. Rather than labelling this case law as simplistic, as some critics even within the Court have done, it is shown that the jurisprudence reveals cleavages within the Court on whether to adopt a more or less consequentialist approach on the links between speech and violence. Freedom of expression cases should preferably be assessed on the merits under Article 10 ECHR since this allows for a balancing of the various interests involved. The application of the abuse of rights clause of Article 17 ECHR is for that very reason undesirable, in addition to its inconsistent use by the Court.

The goal of the present study was to determine what behaviors negotiators can use to help to quell an escalating conflict. In doing so, we formed a sample of professionals who took on the role of negotiator when we provoked an organizational conflict between a superior and subordinate that escalates due to the intervention of research confederates. Trained judges analyzed the negotiators' behaviors that most effectively mitigated the intensity of the conflict in which they were involved. The results demonstrate that the behaviors most effective at de-escalating an escalating conflict are problem-solving and accommodation, especially when said conflict has escalated considerably. Similarly, jointly employing problem-solving and direct fighting behaviors also seems to help de-escalate conflict. The results do not, however, consistently support using a forceful behavioral strategy to de-escalate a conflict in the early stages of escalation.