The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), once regarded as the jewel in the crown of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been facing a variety of serious criticisms for its inherent limitations and problems while its appellate review function has been paralyzed. Discussions on the reform of the WTO DSM have been under way for several years now. Many key items are on the reform agenda, one of which is to introduce Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) proceedings to the WTO DSM. Among several options of ADR, ‘mediation’ can offer an important set of tools for the WTO and its Members to resolve disputes in a more efficient and prompt manner. If properly structured, mediation can complement the existing binding proceedings of panels and the Appellate Body. At the same time, introduction of mediation to the WTO DSM may also cause additional legal and practical problems. It may cause further delays, confidentiality traps, due process myriads, and enforcement loopholes. It is vital to introduce mediation provisions to address those critical problems. Systematized and structuralized mediation in the WTO DSM will be able to offer a viable alternative path to resolve certain complex and sensitive disputes.

The US complaint about Chinese tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on certain grain products helps illustrate several key issues in US–China trade relations and the effectiveness of WTO disputes. First, do international obligations based on transparency and fairness work in relation to an authoritarian country not known for the rule of law domestically? Second, can there be a disconnect between the legal aspects of a dispute and the underlying economic interests, with a DSB ruling sometimes not leading to improved trade flows? And third, given the bilateral trade war and ‘phase one’ trade deal between the United States and China, has the WTO been superseded in this trade relationship? This paper summarizes the facts and law of the China–TRQs dispute, and examines each of these questions in that context.

In March 2002 the US administration imposed protective duties to safeguard its steel manufacturing industry. The measure was subsequently found to be illegal and repealed. The widespread conception is that the measure was ill-conceived and that by declaring it illegal the WTO system of adjudication proved that it had come of age. However, closer examination of the case and the relevant law reveals that the measure was in fact not ill-advised but a clever legal and political ploy. Rather than proving that WTO adjudication was working, the opposite is shown to be the case. WTO adjudication is in need of some changes if it is to respond to political manoeuvres which abuse the dispute resolution system.