Kemp refuses to distinguish philosophical dualism from the sociological analytical dualism of the M/M approach where two entities can be interdependent but are not inseperable. This makes him a Central Conflationist

This chapter critically reviews dualism, as developed by Heinrich Triepel, and monism, mainly formulated by Hans Kelsen. It argues that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international and EU or EU and national law and that, due to their emergence almost a century ago, these theories must be understood in their historical context. Historically, dualism was progress as the separation of international and national law helped international law become independent. Thus, dualism liberated international law from being understood as “external State law,” and was even referred to as a “cleansing thunderstorm” by the monist Alfred Verdross. The main characteristic of monism is the assumption of a single unified legal system. Kelsenian monism must face the criticism of having a highly fictitious understanding of the world: nothing less than the “unity of the legal world order” is proclaimed. To depict the most important assumptions of Kelsenian monism, this chapter looks into the Kelsenian adherence to neo-Kantian epistemology, and shows that this understanding refers to a very specific philosophical position, which has been rightly criticized by many philosophers.

This chapter holds that the CJEU follows two diametrically diverging doctrines regarding the relationship between international and EU, as well as EU and Member State law. From a theoretical perspective this is inconceivable. One and the same organization cannot follow two different approaches. However, from a pragmatic perspective, this chapter acknowledges that this Janus face of the CJEU is quite understandable. Autonomy understood as monism, on the one hand, is an expression of legal unity, which is absolutely necessary for the EU to safeguard its integration process. On the other hand, autonomy expressed as dualism helps to secure the stability of this integration process by separating the EU legal order from far-reaching international influences. However, at the same time, autonomy cannot provide for an adequate replacement of monism and dualism.

The author seeks to unpack five of the main discursive moves witnessed in the literature and case law pertaining to the question of consent to international law. He argues that these five specific discursive moves are performed by almost anyone engaging with the question of consent to international law, be such engagement on the more orthodox side or on the more critical side of the argumentative spectrum. The author claims that these five discursive moves correspond to the reproduction of a very modernist understanding of authority, the constitution of the very subject that is consenting, the anonymization of the author of consent, the reversal of the temporality of the legal discourse on consent and the adoption of very binary patterns of thought. This chapter shows that discursive moves made by international lawyers around the idea of consent bears heavily upon the type of political legitimacy, the type of geography, the type of responsibility, the type of temporality, and the type of hermeneutics that international law is serving.

There are a number of theoretical problems in the growing field of ‘meaningful work’: a lack of precision in the basic concept of work, leading to dearth of comparative research. A disregard of worker agency, leading to an impression that meaningful wage labour is a gift from employers to employees. A dichotomisation into meaningful work being either a subjective or an objective phenomenon, leading to unnecessary simplification. And, finally, another dichotomisation into waged work or types of jobs being either meaningful or meaningless, leading to a lack of variation. In this concluding chapter, we suggest solutions to these problems that we have dealt with at several places in the book, before we take up the new framework for analysing meaningful and meaningless wage labour.

This chapter discusses the complicated relationship between international alw and domestic law, focusing on international law is received by domestic legal orders

The Australian legal system is not an island, and Australian law has felt the influence of law and legal ideas from other jurisdictions, particularly other common law countries. Australian law has also been shaped by public international law both directly and indirectly and this interaction has become increasingly important as the scope and content of international law have grown. The relationship between Australian law and international law is mediated by Australia’s constitutional framework in which the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the courts holds central place. Unlike the constitutions in many other legal systems, the Australian Constitution does not address the relationship between international and domestic law, and most of the relevant legal principles are to be found in the common law. This chapter examines how each arm of government in Australia has engaged with international law, identifying areas where the relationship is well settled (as it is in relation to treaties) and areas where there remains some uncertainty (as in relation to customary international law).

This chapter examines how parties to treaties give effect to them in their domestic (internal) law. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda). A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. A state should therefore adopt any domestic legislation necessary to give effect to the treaty before it consents to be bound. There are two broad approaches to implementation of treaties, depending on a state’s constitutional provisions: monism and dualism. The essence of monism is that a treaty may, without legislation, become part of domestic law once it has been concluded and has entered into force for that state. The practice of France, Germany, The Netherlands, Russia, Poland and Switzerland is examined. Under the dualist approach, the rights and obligations created by treaties have no effect in domestic law unless legislation is in force to give effect to them. UK constitutional practice is examined, together with the interpretation and application of treaties by UK courts. US practice is similarly analysed.

Today, the soul appears in psychology as a noun, as an adjective, and as a verb. First is soul as a noun, where debates over dualism loom large. Dualism still has a place in psychology. Second is soul as an adjective: psychical reality. Casey and Meissner distinguish psychical reality from the “subjective” by finding that this reality can be shared. Psychical reality relates to what is given to an experiencing person. To discern this reality, one must participate in the unfolding of what is experienced. For Christou (1963), psychological experience has two aspects: “subject-object unity” and “dramatic quality” (p. 75). Third is soul-as-verb, that is, soul as activity, creative activity, imaginative work, or in general, “soul making.” This section concentrates on the archetypal psychology as well as its critics. The book ends by delineating characterizations of the soul developed in the book, a psychology with soul in a soulless psychology.

There were other dissenters to soulless psychology. Montague proposed that the soul was something like “potential energy.” Ladd held that the soul was a concept necessary for psychology because consciousness cannot be reduced to nerve action; consciousness has “real existence” in itself. Ladd’s hesitation to affirm the reality of the mind reflected his ambivalent position between an older Christian culture and the newer secular culture of his day. Hall attempted to ground the soul in recapitulation theory, with the soul evolving. Hall proposed a sublation or Aufhebung of the soul, with “immortality” transformed into the future evolution of the species and our gradual perfection. Münsterberg distinguished a soulless causal psychology and an ensouled purposive psychology. The two psychologies were both necessary but incompatible. McDougall did fuse the two by positing the real existence of a nonphysical mind.

What is international law, and how is it different from domestic (national) law?  This chapter provides an answer to those questions and introduces other foundational concepts in international law such as opinio juris, sovereignty, and the state. We trace the development of international law from Western/European perspectives and discuss how international law was often experienced as oppression and violence in the non-Western world. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the classic sources of international law: customs, treaties, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and scholarly writings, each of which is presented in some detail.