Book contents
- The Soul in Soulless Psychology
- The Soul in Soulless Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reintroducing the Soul
- 2 Psychology without a Soul
- 3 Dissenters I
- 4 Dissenters II
- 5 Substitution
- 6 Innovation
- 7 Restoration
- 8 Historical Psychologies of the Soul
- 9 Soul as a Psychological Category
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Dissenters II
Other Affirmations of the Soul in Early Modern Psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2023
- The Soul in Soulless Psychology
- The Soul in Soulless Psychology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Reintroducing the Soul
- 2 Psychology without a Soul
- 3 Dissenters I
- 4 Dissenters II
- 5 Substitution
- 6 Innovation
- 7 Restoration
- 8 Historical Psychologies of the Soul
- 9 Soul as a Psychological Category
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There were other dissenters to soulless psychology. Montague proposed that the soul was something like “potential energy.” Ladd held that the soul was a concept necessary for psychology because consciousness cannot be reduced to nerve action; consciousness has “real existence” in itself. Ladd’s hesitation to affirm the reality of the mind reflected his ambivalent position between an older Christian culture and the newer secular culture of his day. Hall attempted to ground the soul in recapitulation theory, with the soul evolving. Hall proposed a sublation or Aufhebung of the soul, with “immortality” transformed into the future evolution of the species and our gradual perfection. Münsterberg distinguished a soulless causal psychology and an ensouled purposive psychology. The two psychologies were both necessary but incompatible. McDougall did fuse the two by positing the real existence of a nonphysical mind.
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- The Soul in Soulless Psychology , pp. 82 - 114Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023