The paper builds a parsimonious US business cycle SVARMA model, establishing identification conditions for independent monetary shocks. The SVARMA model, utilizing Divisia M3 and Divisia M4, is compared to the simple sum M2. The monetary rule with Divisia M3 yields theoretically consistent results marked by the absence of the usual price and liquidity puzzles. As the Federal Reserve (Fed) took a more hawkish approach to curb inflation, significant increases in US interest rates and declines in monetary aggregates were largely influenced by the Fed’s reaction function, which incorporates the Divisia M3 monetary rule. Findings emphasize the monetary impact on the business cycle, highlighting the significance of Divisia monetary aggregates. Historical and variance decompositions reveal diverse, dynamic effects of monetary shocks on macroeconomic variables. The SVARMA model with Divisia M3 and M4 demonstrates superior performance over simple sum M2 in capturing the time path of monetary shocks.

This paper assesses the information content and predictive capabilities of Divisia monetary indicators concerning sector-specific economic activities. Although existing evidence strongly supports the informative nature and predictive potential of various Divisia indicators at an aggregate level, studies focusing on Divisia information content for specific industries are notably sparse. Sector-level data provide a more detailed insight into economic and labor market dynamics. By analyzing comprehensive sector-specific data on real GDP, value added, employment, and unemployment rates across thirteen diverse sectors in the United States, this paper investigates the predictive abilities of narrow and broad Divisia money across three categories (original, credit card-augmented, and credit card-augmented inside money). The results show that narrow Divisia money serve as robust predictors of sector-specific economic and labor market indicators, often surpassing the predictive capacity of the conventional Fed funds rate and slightly outperforming broad Divisia measures in relation to these indicators.

How was Romania able to borrow cheaply on the international capital markets before World War I? We explore this within the context of its three southeast European neighbours, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, using a novel dataset of monthly bond prices from the Berlin and London stock exchanges. A comparison of country characteristics and panel data analysis suggests that Romania was able to borrow under more favourable conditions due to its abundant natural resources and desirable exports.

This note provides a nontechnical summary of a research paper (Bullard and DiCecio [2021, Classical policy benchmarks for economies with substantial inequality, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, unpublished manuscript]) that I presented as the NIESR 2021 Dow Lecture on 9 February 2021. In the paper, we construct a simple benchmark macroeconomic model with substantial heterogeneity among households, enough to generate empirically plausible Gini coefficients for the distributions of consumption, income and financial wealth. The model includes aggregate shocks as well as both permanent and temporary idiosyncratic uncertainties. Four policymakers—implementing monetary, fiscal, labour market and education policies—act in concert to achieve a first-best allocation of resources. We argue that the roles of these policymaker types are ‘classic’ and match up well with observed policymaker roles in OECD countries. We regard this simple economy as a benchmark for the study of other aspects of the interaction between policy and inequality.

This article provides a historical overview of the factors leading up to debt crises and the default mechanisms used by governments to solve them, ranging from repudiation and restructuring to inflation tax and financial repression. The paper also analyses the Spanish governments’ graduation to responsible public debt management under democracy and the last debt crisis starting in 2010. After analysing the evolution of the outstanding public debt, budget deficits, the Spanish economy's ability to borrow, the central government's debt affordability and the profile of public debt, the article concludes that the Spanish case confirms the main hypotheses of concerning international debt crises: short-term borrowing enhanced the risk of a debt crisis; insolvency problems arose when governments were unwilling or unable to repay debt; debt crises took place after large capital inflows; most outright defaults ended up being partial defaults; public debt level became unsustainable when it rose above 60-90 per cent of GDP; default trough inflation became commonplace when fiat money displaced coinage; financial repression was used as a subtle type of debt restructuring; and defaults endangered the creditworthiness of the Spanish Finance Ministry and forced disciplined fiscal policies.

The recession of 1937–8 is often cited as illustrating the dangers of withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early in a weak recovery. Yet our understanding of this severe downturn is incomplete: existing studies find that changes in fiscal policy were small in comparison to the magnitude of the downturn and that higher reserve requirements were not binding on banks. This article focuses on a neglected change in monetary policy, the sterilization of gold inflows during 1937, and finds that it exerted a powerful contractionary force during this period. The transmission of this monetary shock to the real economy appears to have worked through lower asset (equity) prices and higher interest rates.

Cet article développe un modèle intégrant le role de la monnaie et des flux de capitaux internationaux afin d'examiner la fragilité du système bancaire d'une petite économie ouverte dans un contexte de crise financière internationale. Le modèle met l'accent sur les décalages de maturité et de devises au niveau du bilan des banques et illustre comment la contraction du crédit sur le marché financier international, via les banques commerciales, impacte la monnaie et l'activité d'une petite économie. Les effets stabilisants du capital bancaire et du ratio minimal de capital sur le système bancaire sont également examinés. Par ailleurs, le modèle souligne qu'un secteur informel de dimension importante est un facteur défavorable àla stabilisation de la valeur de la monnaie et du système financier.

In contrast to recent successful developments in macro monetary policies, the modelling, measurement and management of systemic financial stability has remained problematical. Indeed, the focus of most effort has been on improving individual, rather than systemic, bank risk management; the Basel II objective has been to bring regulatory bank capital into line with the (sophisticated) banks‘ assessment of their own economic capital. Even at the individual bank level there are concerns over (i) appropriate diversification allowances, (ii) differing objectives of banks and regulators, (iii) the need for a buffer over regulatory minima, and (iv) the distinction between expected and unexpected losses (EL and UL). At the systemic level the quite complex and prescriptive content of Basel II raises dangers of ‘endogenous risk’ and procyclicality. Simulations suggest that this latter could be a serious problem.

Cette étude revient sur la distinction établie entre deux règles de fixation irrévocable des cours de change: une règle temporelle suivant laquelle le gel de la parité est programmé à une date arbitraire; une règle d'état sous laquelle cette décision résulte de l'atteinte d'un seuil par les déterminants fondamentaux. En les replaçant dans un cadre d'analyse commun, ces stratégies apparaisent en fait rigoureusement équivalentes en l'absence d'incertitude sur le déroulement de la transition. Une correspondance en termes probabilistes est établie dans un contexte stochastique plus général. Ce cadre d'analyse unifié s'avère un préalable utile pour entreprendre une relecture de la stratégie maastrichtienne en matière cambiaire et mettre à jour certaines propriétés du scénario finalement adopté par les autorités européennes.

This paper compares the implications of different interest rate models for valuing the so-called OLOs (Belgian coupon bonds). The prices of these bonds implied by some well-known one-factor models are compared to the actual prices observed on the market. Our finding suggest that these interest rate models are unsatisfactory, especially in valuing longer term bonds.