This chapter discusses Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace as a matrix for understanding the changing institutional landscape of international trade. In 1919, Keynes highlighted the perils of German participation and US non-participation in international politics, twin problems that continued to frame trade debates in the League of Nations for the remainder of the 1920s. Generally, German leaders supported the construction of an open and regulated world economy. Many internationalists were eager to lock Germany into a system of multilateral norms but also feared that integrating Germany into global markets would reinforce its dominance in key strategic sectors. In contrast, the United States remained aloof from League trade negotiations in the 1920s. Europeans were divided over whether to respond with universal trade rules that the United States might eventually be persuaded to follow or with a regionalist approach that would enable Europeans to negotiate directly with their Atlantic neighbour on a more equal footing. As Keynes saw clearly, both sets of concerns were exacerbated by the financial imbalances stemming from war debts and reparations.

The epilogue to this book zooms in on a telling and difficult conversation between two highly influential friends at the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon epicentre of the extraordinary period in the history of the West, Europe, and European integration which this book is about (George Kennan and Isaiah Berlin). In doing so, the epilogue, in a more essayistic way, reconnects to the prologue and reflects upon the conclusion of this book and its deeper meaning for present-day Europe.

In 1927, when Coquet launched his movement for a European customs union, Riedl initiated an elaborate programme to use the League to bring about Anschluss gradually by embedding Austro-German bilateral economic integration in a multilateral system. He sought to bypass the formal treaty constraints that prevented the Austrian and German governments from pursuing this course by facilitating low-level administrative rapprochement through business organizations, using the Vienna Chamber of Commerce and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). By the time Riedl arrived in the ICC in 1927, it had already become an important organizational auxiliary to the League. Up to that point, the ICC’s engagement in League trade policy had focused on specific areas of business regulation, such as commercial arbitration and trade credit. Riedl pushed the ICC into a more political role by intervening in debates about the fundamental architecture of trade treaties. In the process, Riedl provoked new debate about the League’s authority to mediate relations between national governments and international business.

As Bernhard Harms pushed demanded a more global League trade policy, Lucien Coquet tried to establish firmer European substructures. Coquet embraced regional trade policy as a means to address unresolved Franco-German tensions over security. In effect, he was trying to reimpose the temporary constraints that had been placed on German commercial rights through the Treaty of Versailles by applying them to the rest of Europe as well. To advance this goal, he helped rally French politicians and business leaders in a new organization that was simply called the European Customs Union (Union Douanière Européenne, or UDE). Working in close partnership with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Coquet built out national branches of the UDE across Europe. Coquet and Riedl joined forces in 1929 to promote a proposal for European federation from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, and a parallel plan for a League-sponsored tariff truce. This marked a brief moment of unity when diverse League collaborators tried to work together to respond to the onset of the Great Depression through concerted European tariff reduction. This cooperation quickly lost momentum as the Great Depression advanced, however.

The chapter looks in detail at Churchill’s post-Second World War campaign for European unity. It begins by explaining the concepts of ‘the English-speaking peoples’ and ‘Christian civilisation’ that informed his thinking, before outlining the evolution of his thought through exposure to the ideas of Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand. Prior to the Second World War, Churchill stated explicitly that Britain should not be a member of a proposed United States of Europe, but his ideas continued to evolve. In 1940 his government made the offer of Franco-British Union, and by 1942 he was promoting the idea of a Council of Europe as a counterweight to Russian ‘barbarism’. Defeated at the 1945 election, his Zurich speech and ensuing United Europe campaign are seen within the context of his desire to demonstrate his continued relevance on the world stage and against the backdrop of the developing Cold War. Nonetheless, they were based on sincere beliefs that helped inspire a broader transnational movement. The chapter concludes with the ambiguities in Churchill’s views on the role of Britain in Europe and argues that they may be a ‘problematic guide’ to more recent European politics.