Korea has been a forerunner in incorporating macroprudential policies to mitigate the vulnerabilities from currency crises that can turn into a more generalised liquidity crisis. This paper examines longer-term design issues for a more resilient and stable financial system that could be expected to complement the existing macroprudential measures in achieving a more stable financial system. In particular, the paper examines the rationale and mechanics of a new public financial institution, provisionally called the Exchange Stabilisation and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC) whose main role is to buy dollar forward positions from Korean exporting companies who wish to hedge the currency exposure from long-term export orders. The ESGC is intended to mitigate the risks arising from the reliance on the role of the banking sector in providing currency hedging services to exporters. Rapid growth of short-term foreign currency denominated debt has been the result of banks receiving forward dollar sales by exporters, and then hedging the long dollar position by borrowing short in dollars. A public institution that can buy dollars forward, but which is designed so that there is no need to hedge by taking short dollar debt, can mitigate the rapid increase in short-term dollar debt in booms.

In this paper we empirically examine the sources of the volatility of the foreign exchange risk premia. Using a nonlinear structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) model based on no-arbitrage condition to identify various macroeconomic shocks and the foreign exchange risk premia, we find that more than 80% of the volatilities of the currency risk premia can be accounted for by the standard macroeconomic shocks that drive output and inflation. By explicitly modelling the currency risk premia in the VAR system, we also offer a potential reconciliation for the seemingly contradicting observations from the previous VAR analysis of the exchange rate “overshooting” behavior under exogenous monetary innovations.