This chapter begins with a discussion of the standard definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, which is replicated verbatim in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and of the International Criminal Court. It turns to a discussion of its historical development as a response to the Holocaust, considers its relationship to crimes against humanity, and considers the underlying nature of the crime. The chapter then considers the protected groups (national, ethnic, racial and religious) and the challenges associated with identifying these groups. It considers the prohibited acts: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The chapter explains the contextual element, and the mental elements of ‘intent to destroy’, ‘in whole or in part’, and ‘as such’. It ends with a discussion of other modes of participation.

Starting with a discussion of genocide studies and the Genocide Convention, this chapter analyzes the definition and the theories of the causes of genocide. It presents the proposed and used strategies of how to intervene when there is a genocide and how to prevent genocide. It also examines several catastrophic examples, including those in Bosnia and Rwanda and the Darfur crisis.

Turning to Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the starting point for self-determination in international law has become part of the received wisdom of the field. In a 2017 article, Lauri Mälksoo examined the relationship between the liberal-Wilsonian and the socialist-Bolshevik conceptualisations of self-determination, rejecting the idea that the Bolsheviks contributed at all to the international right of self-determination. In his account, the right is an intrinsically liberal one, concerned with the ‘extension of human freedom from individuals to peoples’.

This chapter summarizes developments in international human rights law, mechanisms, and policies since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. We first describe the nine core human rights treaties, including the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which together converted the Declaration’s ideals into international law, and the seven conventions with the goals of eliminating racial discrimination, discrimination against women, torture, and enforced disappearances, and protecting the rights of children, migrant workers, and their families, as well as persons with disabilities. We follow with summaries of the Genocide Convention and of the UN declarations proclaiming the rights of indigenous peoples and LGBTI individuals. We next describe the UN mechanisms for advancing human rights, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council, and International Criminal Court. These are followed by summaries of UN policies for protecting persons from governmental abuses, ending the world’s worst poverty and suffering, and providing human rights guides for businesses. We then summarize developments in international humanitarian law (the laws of war) and conclude with a brief overview of the five regional human rights systems.

This chapter makes the case that it is appropriate, and justified, to revisit – based on existing international legal obligations – the problem of veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. The chapter presents three main legal arguments that indicate there are legal limits (or constraints) on the use of the veto in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. First, the chapter argues that the veto power, which is conferred by the UN Charter, is subordinate to the highest-level jus cogens norms; as a consequence, the veto should not be used (i) where it has the effect of facilitating ongoing jus cogens violations, (ii) where it undermines the duty of other Security Council members to cooperate to make an appropriate response to a serious breach of a jus cogens norm, or (iii) where its use is inconsistent with jus cogens protections. Second, the chapter argues that the veto power sits within the context of the UN Charter, which states that the Security Council must act pursuant to the UN’s “Purposes and Principles”; a veto in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes does not accord with the UN’s “Purposes and Principles.” Third, the chapter argues that there are also treaty obligations that bind individual permanent member states, such as those under the Genocide Convention and 1949 Geneva Conventions, and veto use should not be contrary to obligations created under these treaties.

In light of the issues raised, the chapter considers the scope of judicial review by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), concluding that the above legal questions are ones on which the ICJ could, and should, opine. Ultimately, the chapter suggests that the General Assembly consider requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on a question such as: does existing international law contain limitations on the use of the veto power by permanent members of the UN Security Council in situations where there is ongoing genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes?

On 26 July 1946, in court room 600 of the majestic ‘Palace of Justice’ (Justizpalast) in Nuremburg, Germany, Sir Hartley Shawcross (1902–2003), the British Chief prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal, presented his closing arguments on the 187th day in the case against the twenty-two high-ranking Nazi defendants, including Hermann Göring and Rudolf Hess. The British team had met with French professor René Cassin (1887–1976) in preparation for the landmark trial,1 and Shawcross’ speech had in large part been drafted by British law professor Hersch Lauterpacht, though he went off-script to include the charge of ‘genocide’, the term coined by Polish legal activist Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959).2 As the British case also covered the charges of ‘Crimes against Peace’, Shawcross’ arguments would have also touched upon the work of Soviet international law scholar Aron N. Trainin (1883–1957), author of ‘Hitlerite Responsibility under International Law’, a small pamphlet that apparently had been read by many in preparation for the trial in Nuremberg3 and which, uncharacteristically for Soviet discourse by the end of the war and after, was very explicit in its treatment of the Jewish identity of many of the victims of the Holocaust.4