A consensus has recently developed within the UK Parliamentary debate over the legalisation of assisted dying that the consent of a High Court judge should be required as part of a future regulatory regime. This chapter questions the basis of this consensus, arguing that it is neither evidence-based nor required by the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Nicklinson. The chapter begins by briefly sketching the approach of permissive regulatory regimes to the evaluation of assisted dying cases which demonstrates the dearth of direct experience of judicial approval of such cases. Recent calls for prospective judicial approval in two jurisdictions then contemplating legalisation are considered ‒ Canada (which did legalise) and England and Wales (which did not), demonstrating that these calls are tactical and lack substantive argument. The chapter then examines data from permissive regimes to describe persons likely to seek assistance in dying and evaluates the extent to which a prospective judicial approval requirement would meet likely legislative goals, before recommending an alternative approach and drawing broader lessons from this experience for legislative change on assisted dying.

This chapter completes discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers that began in Chapter 4. The doctrine of the separation of powers requires that the judiciary remains separate and independent of both the executive and the legislative arms of government. This separation is enshrined in the Australian Constitution. In this chapter we look more closely at the courts. In particular, we look at how the courts are created through their constitutional and statutory basis. We look at the nine separate hierarchies of the courts in Australia, and how courts within these hierarchies interact, yet create only one common law for Australia. We look at how the courts have changed in Australia since colonial times, to examine the rise of specialised tribunals and the introduction use of technologies over time.

This chapter outlines the system and structure of the courts in Hong Kong and discusses the concept of judicial precedent. It leads readers through the hierarchical structure of the courts and its historical development during the pre- and post-1997 periods. The different levels of the courts are examined including the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), the High Court, the District Court and Magistrates’ Courts. Different tribunals that exercise judicial power are also reviewed. The second section of this chapter deals with judicial precedents, an essential feature of the common law. The doctrine of precedent as it applies in Hong Kong is detailed, taking readers through vertical and horizontal stare decisis for each level of the courts. The status of English and overseas decisions, including Privy Council decisions in present-day Hong Kong, is discussed.