This chapter deals with two key documents concerning Palestine adopted during the First World War. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement was an agreement between Britain and France to divide the Middle East into respective areas of influence. The agreement was conditional on Britain and France defeating the Ottoman Empire. The Agreement ignored national interests of both Arabs and Jews. It was, however, a binding agreement between two sovereign States. The fact that it was a secret agreement and ignored rights of self-determination did not affect its legality at the time. An exchange of correspondence between British High Commissioner McMahon and Hussein Sherif of Mecca promised Arab independence. It is doubtful that the correspondence was regarded as a treaty at the time; nevertheless, it can be considered a binding international commitment by Britain. The fact that it was secret and conditional on Britain defeating the Ottomans does not detract from its legal validity. Britain apparently intended to exclude Palestine from the area promised to Hussein but, for political reasons, used ambiguous language that did not make an explicit reference to excluding Palestine.

Chapter 8 examines Israel’s regional foreign policy during the first Netanyahu government, in relation to three themes: the peace agreement with Jordan, relations with Syria, and relations with the Arab states in the Gulf. The chapter demonstrates that, during this period, Israel pursued a foreign policy of backtracking on engagement. The warm peace with Jordan became a cooler strategic peace. Relations with the Gulf countries were frozen and the Maghreb states all but severed their ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Syria and Israel were on the brink of war. The retraction from the foreign policy of engagement was entirely in line with the unmitigated hostility of the prime minister and his immediate circle towards the Arab world, and his clear preference for satisfying his core domestic political constituency over advancing the peace process. The chapter adds to the existing literature by exposing the divisions within Israel’s foreign policymakers, in government and the security network, amid the prime minister’s foreign policy of backtracking from engagement.