This paper is the first to study the effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on marriage rates between foreign-born individuals and natural-born citizens. Using marriage license data, I find that gains to marriages involving a native bride and foreign groom decrease by 0.2 log points. The decrease in is driven by reductions in gains to marriages involving a Mexican groom or a non-Canadian, non-Mexican groom. I do not find evidence that the effects differed for states with lower educational attainment or higher shares of illegal immigrants.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan created a task force intended to gain the initiative on immigration reform. But immigration reform presented obstacles to his political stance in repudiation of his Democratic predecessors. After four years of wrangling, internally as well as with Congress, many on the Reagan team viewed the immigration task force as having shackled the president to an unwinnable issue. Frustrated politically, Reagan aides shifted focus to an emerging presidential tactic—the signing statement. This allowed the president to sign the Immigration Reform and Control Act while setting important precedents for his larger conservative agenda. The trajectory from presidential task force to presidential signing statement on immigration reform reveals the challenges Reagan faced on policy issues outside his core priorities, and also the development of a tactic to maneuver through the challenges. Immigration reform became less about immigration than about serving the administration’s larger core priorities.