In 2015, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty Philip Alston stated that the World Bank treats “human rights more like an infectious disease than universal values and obligations” because of its understanding of what constitutes political interference. The World Bank’s interpretation, replicated by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the development finance regime complex, has shaped how activists hold the Banks to account. This chapter examines how the international accountability norm emerged through contestation with the World Bank and spread to be taken as given for the MDBs, as distinct from international human rights and environmental elemental regimes. It then documents how activists seek to protect human and environmental rights through the banks’ international accountability mechanisms as quasi-legal processes with implications for the banks’ culpability. Although there is an increasing recognition of some rights such as free, prior and informed consent and labour, the banks continue to view these as internal standards not legal obligations. The chapter then examines the extent to which the norm needs to be backed by hard law to be enforced, with efforts by the banks to maintain their international organisation immunity given legal claims as to their implication in human and environmental rights abuses.

This chapter re-inserts the (rethought) concept of territory into the legal-theoretical framework, offering a look at how this concept can be realised and might differently operationalise concepts such as sovereignty and jurisdiction. Taking the concept of sovereignty first, the chapter operationalises this concept as a bundle of legal rights, duties, etc. informed by legal realist methods and social constructivism. The chapter then turns to the concept of jurisdiction, problematising the ‘boundaries’ of and reterritorialising extraterritorial jurisdiction. The chapter offers an alternative to the ‘ownership’ and ‘exclusive’ model of legal rights, which otherwise has at its core a reified and flat territory. The final part explores actorhood, demonstrating how the spaces of international organisations can be understood as their territories. Taking as its starting point the possibility of territorial pluralism, multiplicity, and continuous (re)production, the chapter ends with an account of territories proliferating rather than diminishing. Taking the idea of reterritorialising seriously, it proposes a legal account of the relationship between actors and their spaces.

Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of discourses about deterritorialisation in international law. The first sections sketch out three main strands to these discourses. The first strand contains accounts of a fundamental transition in the organising logic of international law; a shift from ordering competences on the basis of territory to functions. The second strand groups together accounts addressing the relocation of power but containing imprecise and undertheorised understandings of these spaces. The third strand includes accounts concerning the porosity of states. The chapter then problematises these discourses. Each strand applies a similar legal-spatial imaginary, and in so doing omits the resulting spaces produced by deterritorialisation. Common to all is a tendency to continue to applying a particular and unproblematised concept of territory, limiting theoretical insight, consistently producing deterritorialisation without reterritorialisation, and often conflating at an analytical level actors, spaces, and functions. The reason for this again lies in the continuing prioritisation of the stato-centric approach to territory in international law’s implicit geography.

Chapter 2 analyses the negotiation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, 1998–2003). It illustrates that evidence was a key element of the negotiations and argues that the FCTC was developed as an evidence-based treaty to counteract the attacks on evidence by the tobacco industry. After a historical introduction, Section 2.2 outlines the theoretical background of the chapter, introducing the notion of ‘treaty entrepreneurs’. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 proceed to delineate and analyse how the strategy on evidence unfolded during the FCTC negotiations. Section 2.3 illustrates how legal expertise from international environmental law was borrowed to build a treaty that could embed and develop evidence. Section 2.4 describes how evidence was mobilised to build the treaty. First, the treaty entrepreneurs relied on existing knowledge within the WHO; second, they served as a catalyst for the production of additional evidence from other relevant actors, most notably the World Bank. Section 2.5 reviews how the treaty entrepreneurs framed the available evidence and how the label ‘evidence-based’ started being used. Section 2.6, finally, draws some conclusions on the implications of adopting a strategy on evidence to push forward the negotiations of a treaty.

The final chapter 8 considers the implications of an aesthetic analysis of images for international legal practice. International bodies making decisions under the three treaties examined in the book conflate and displace aesthetic value in favour of other environmental values, risking the integrity of their decisions and, ultimately, the protection of the environment for its aesthetic value under international environmental law. Photographs could be formally acknowledged for their relevance to the interpretation of the treaties and used in decision-making processes to conceive aesthetic appreciation of the environment in ways important for all nation states. They can encapsulate a sensorial experience of the natural environment shaped by imagination, emotion and knowledge from different cultures. But a critical analysis of such images is also important to distinguish aesthetic value from other environmental values such as natural beauty, cultural value and ethical value. An accommodation of aesthetic concepts and methods to develop meanings from images for the interpretation of international environmental treaties could also be taken up for other fields of international law.

This chapter explores the legality of the IMF’s shift in mandate, and considers the overarching question of whether the institution was legally entitled to expand its mandate over time through de facto legal doctrines rather than express or implied consent of the members. The analysis begins with a consideration of the legal basis of the Fund’s initiative by examining the international legal theory on the legal personality of international organisations. That is, whether the mandate of an international organization is strictly dependant on the wording of its constitutive instrument(s), or whether the mandate can evolve so as to accommodate new de facto attributions and competences. The Fund’s mandate shift is then tested by taking into account the power of soft law. A key aspect in the legal literature is whether the constituent doctrine of ‘separate will’ or ‘volonté distincte’, which allows an organisation to act independently – that is without the express or implied consent of members – would apply to the mandate expansion as the move ensured the Fund maintained relevancy in an ever-changing world. Finally, the chapter concludes that the Fund’s mandate expansion was in line with the standards of international law applicable to international organisations.

States often need to cooperate with each another to address legal and other issues of common concern across many fields in an interdependent world. International organisations (‘IOs’) emerged in the 19th century as a means of intensifying and permanently institutionalising international cooperation, through bodies with an international legal personality, and functions and powers, separate from their member states. While the earliest IOs had a narrow technical focus, the League of Nations (1919–46) and United Nations (since 1945) reflect a more ambitious global agenda of broad-spectrum cooperation. The proliferation of IOs has generated some key legal issues which this chapter explores: how to define IOs; the nature, extent and consequences of their international legal personality; their powers, immunities and privileges; and the scope of their legal responsibility for their conduct. There is a special focus on the United Nations, as a universal IO with competence in many areas of international life and human activity, and from whose establishment and practice much of the international law of IOs has emerged.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 contains the body of rules governing the law of treaties. Its scope covers treaties between states. The rules largely reflect customary international law. So even where states are not parties to the Convention, its rules will often apply to their treaty relations by virtue of customary international law. Treaties between a state and an international organisation, or between international organisations, are not covered by the 1969 Convention. But international organisations may be party to the separate Vienna Convention of 1986, which adapts the rules of the 1969 Convention to international organisations. If they are not parties to the 1986 Convention, customary international law will apply to their treaty relations. The 1969 Convention does not cover oral agreements, which are in any case extremely rare. The 1969 Convention does not have retrospective effect. The implications of this are discussed.

This chapter assesses the contribution of the ICJ to the law of international organisations. It emphasises the limited role of the Court in this field, setting out the multiple reasons for this: parts of the law were developed before the Court commenced its work; and the Court has only had intermittent opportunities to consider it through its cases. The author argues that the Court’s approach reflects a more general ambivalence of classic international law when it comes to international institutions: that it emphasises the centrality of States in the international legal system, notwithstanding the steps that have been taken by States to institutionalise significant areas of international law.

This chapter deals with Germany’s perspective on and activities in the United Nations and other international organisations. The first part deals with Germany’s involvement in a UN Security Council reform, Germany failing to integrate climate security into the work of the Security Council and Germany’s position that the UN headquarters must be accessible to all member States. Germany’s take on Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020) will be criticised. It will be assessed why Germany opposes the US interpretation of Security Council Resolution 2331 (2015). Germany’s position on civil society briefers to the Security Council, Germany accusing Russia and China of obstructing the implementation of resolutions, Germany’s difficulties as chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee, Germany’s membership of the Economic and Social Council and criticism against Germany for its handling of the Afghanistan file in the UN General Assembly is also addressed. Russia’s and China’s criticism of the German Security Council membership and reviews of the German membership will also be examined. The second part encompasses Germany’s position on youth participation in international organisations.

In exploring supremacy, this chapter aims to explain how the EEC became a new form of international organisation, or a supranational organisation, the only one of its kind. It will discuss the development of a supranational polity with strong independent powers and the establishment of founding principles which are key to the autonomy of the EU as we know it today. It will also highlight the attitudes of the member states. The chapter begins with a summary of the seminal case, van Gend en Loos. This case is often discussed as a revolution in EU law but recent research suggests that this decision was in fact the culmination of a gradual change in the opinion of legal scholars on how EU law should operate. The case will serve as a launch pad into discussion of the controversies that continue to give rise to lively debate on EU law and European integration. While exploring the facets of the concept, the chapter will intertwine debates about the legislative and judicial dimensions. It will also consider the theoretical and practical legal and political challenges to which it has given rise. The chapter will end with consideration of why supremacy was accepted.

This chapter will explore and provide a background to European integration, from the creation of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC or the ‘Community’) to its evolution into the present-day European Union (EU) and EEA. Klaus Patel describes the EEC as ‘a fragile latecomer in an already densely populated field of international organisations’. It covers, first, patterns of post-war regional cooperation, of which the EEC/EU is just one example; second, the enlargement of the EEC, which saw it grow from six members in 1957 to an EU of twenty-eight member states in 2013; third, the process of Treaty reform and development from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Rome Declaration in 2017 and the Future of Europe conference in 2021; and fourth, Brexit or the British exit from the European Union, taking it to twenty-seven member states.