This DiF paper analyses the 2021 Consultations for Central & Eastern Europe and Central Asia, conducted as part of the process underlying the United Nations Working Group ‘Report on human rights-compatible international investment agreements’. These consultations led to three unique conclusions concerning International Investment Agreements (‘IIAs’), which were absent in other consultations: (i) the ‘regulatory chill’ caused by IIAs with respect to human rights regulations is moot in authoritarian and ‘hybrid’ regimes in this region, (ii) IIAs tend to be perceived in this region as tools to protect human rights, which can spill over to other areas of socio-economic life, and as a source of inspiration and a model for building similar protections in such other areas, and with the potential to (iii) have a positive impact on the development of domestic laws (and their relationship with the rule of law and good governance reforms in developing host states).

This article examines the rejection of the International Investor–State dispute (ISDS) system across the African continent and its replacement with a range of domestic and regional alternatives. It assesses the advantages of the two principal options for African countries: retaining the current ISDS system, or using local courts and regional tribunals. To this end, the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed in the Pan-African Investment Code, the 2016 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol, the SADC model BIT, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African States and East African Community investment agreements and domestic approaches are critically examined. The argument is then advanced that African countries should not abandon ISDS because replacing it with isolated domestic or regional mechanisms does not reduce any of the risks. In particular, for foreign investors, the risk associated with the adjudication of investment disputes in potentially biased, politically influenced domestic courts may prove too high. African host nations, in turn, risk sending out the wrong message concerning their commitment to the protection of foreign investments. Instead of veering off course, perhaps the time has come for African States to display the political will to remain within the ISDS system and contribute to its reform from within.

The legitimacy crisis confronting the international investment regime has called for reforms to eliminate the asymmetric and troubled nature of investment treaties. These instruments grant extensive investor protections without offering reciprocal safeguards for host States wishing to preserve regulatory space. This article argues that any reform designed to redress imbalances in the existing regime should first aim at narrowing the personal jurisdiction of investment tribunals. Problematically, access to most investment treaties depends on broad nationality requirements, which have enabled investors to use corporations or passports of convenience to obtain treaty protection. This practice exacerbates the unbalanced relationship between host States and investors. It increases host States’ exposure to investment treaty claims and allows investors to circumvent newer, more State-oriented investment treaties. Using as an example the novel anti-nationality planning approach embraced in the 2019 Dutch Model BIT, this article suggests effective treaty mechanisms that States can adopt to restrict the range of investors that are entitled to claim.

This article reviews recent cases from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States involving state immunity from execution and suggests the burden on creditors to disprove this immunity is excessively onerous. While the problem is much belaboured, few solutions have been explored or implemented. This article proposes that in the Canadian context, adjusting the evidentiary burden on parties to an execution immunity dispute would improve the ability of creditors to obtain fair payment from debtor states, without infringing state sovereignty.

Like all rules of customary international law, those existing in the field of international investment law are binding on all states. According to the theory of the persistent objector, however, a state is not bound by a rule if it objected to it in the early stages of its formation and continued to do so consistently thereafter. This paper analyses the different grounds of criticism that have been raised against the concept. We found that there is only very weak judicial recognition of the concept, that there is no actual state practice supporting it, and that it is logically incoherent. Specifically, this paper argues that the concept should not be successfully used in investor–state arbitration proceedings to prevent the application of a custom rule by an arbitral tribunal. This is essentially because of the great importance of the few custom rules existing in that field and the fact that they represent universally recognized values.

The recent investor–state arbitration claim of Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa considers the extent to which international human rights obligations might be compromised by investor protections. In this regard, the paper examines the investor protection known as fair and equitable treatment (FET). It addresses this treatment obligation in the context of the South Africa–Italy bilateral investment treaty, and its invocation by investors who feel wronged by South Africa's black economic empowerment policies. It analyses the main interpretative theories of the FET clause, and concludes that it is to be interpreted as a self-contained treaty standard. This sui generis approach to interpreting FET clauses more accurately reflects the intentions of the state parties. Such a view supports the conclusion that international human rights should be considered in the interpretation of the FET clause.