The judiciary’s counter-majoritarian role in the realm of national security is of paramount importance. By and large the Israel Supreme Court has taken cognizance of this truism and has imposed significant procedural and substantive restrictions on the Israeli military authorities, relying more and more on public international law. Yet when faced with house demolition measures, it has adopted a different stance, preferring to conduct a judicial review which is devoid of any meaningful scrutiny of the measures according to international law. The article attempts to ascertain the reasons for the Court's different judicial position, by advancing, inter alia, legal, historical, socio-political, and personal reasons, reasons relating to the nature of the petitioners, as well as those pertaining to the intertwined concepts of status quo bias, omission bias, and loss aversion. The findings of the case study may be relevant to other courts, in other countries. When faced with deterrent measures that are employed at times of severe security threats and that are strongly supported by the political establishment and by the public, courts may find it difficult to perform a counter-majoritarian role and to abide by their own judicial doctrines and principles.