This chapter starts by explaining that, when a company becomes factually insolvent but it is not yet subject to a formal insolvency proceeding, the shareholders – or the directors acting on their behalf – may engage, even in good faith, in various forms of behavior that can divert or destroy value at the expense of the creditors. Moreover, the individual behavior of certain creditors can also destroy or divert value in a situation of financial distress. For this reason, most jurisdictions around the world respond with a variety of strategies, including the imposition of special directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. The chapter identifies six regulatory models for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. After exploring the advantages and weaknesses of each regulatory model, the chapter analyzes a variety of country-specific and firm-specific factors that may affect the desirability of a particular regulatory approach. It concludes by suggesting various policy recommendations for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency taking into account the particular features of emerging economies.

This chapter provides a narrative analysis of the process through which involuntary land dispossession takes place in the particular socio-economic and historical context of Bangladesh, and the relative inability of the judiciary to resolve such cases. It also provides information about the way the judiciary works in general – another aspect of state capacity where Bangladesh appears relatively weak, for both logistical and institutional reasons. Logistical reasons relate to a lack of resources, whereas institutional reasons relate to the way the judiciary is influenced by both political and economic interests, as well as the fact that most actors in the judiciary extract rents from the system and act, almost collusively, to maintain its dysfunctionality. Consequently, this chapter scrutinises the interrelation between economic assets, human actions, and state institutions and its possible impact on the overall trajectory of long-term development. Finally, this chapter identifies potential reform measures and agendas in relation to land dispossession litigation in Bangladesh.

This chapter provides a narrative analysis of the process through which involuntary land dispossession takes place in the particular socio-economic and historical context of Bangladesh, and the relative inability of the judiciary to resolve such cases. It also provides information about the way the judiciary works in general – another aspect of state capacity where Bangladesh appears relatively weak, for both logistical and institutional reasons. Logistical reasons relate to a lack of resources, whereas institutional reasons relate to the way the judiciary is influenced by both political and economic interests, as well as the fact that most actors in the judiciary extract rents from the system and act, almost collusively, to maintain its dysfunctionality. Consequently, this chapter scrutinises the interrelation between economic assets, human actions, and state institutions and its possible impact on the overall trajectory of long-term development. Finally, this chapter identifies potential reform measures and agendas in relation to land dispossession litigation in Bangladesh.

By the second quarter of the fourteenth century, England had developed many attributes of a ‘constitutional monarchy’: one that would later expand and contract, in cycles, across the British Isles. This constitutional monarchy has been subject to many minor recalibrations; more major recalibrations have occurred between 1640 and 1690, and also between 1820 and 1870. To focus on the function and form of this hereditary institution of governance, it can be seen operating in accordance to rules and conventions within three separate if overlapping spheres: that is, the parliamentary, the personal and conciliar, and the judicial.

Judiciaries in England emerged from four interacting historical sources. At the foundation lay the authority of monarchs empowered to judge their subjects’ rights, duties and status by virtue of the regal office. The second form of judiciary arose by royal delegation of decisional power to dedicated judges sitting in permanent courts of common law, or to executive courts with a more political mandate. A third source of judicial power was local and widely distributed, whereby groups or associations or sub-units of government solved disputes and allocated rights and duties as a process of self-direction, taking place for example in manors, boroughs, guilds, and church assemblies.

The book concludes with situating the EAEU legal order within the indicia developed in Chapter 1 demonstrating whether and how these are fulfilled for the autonomous legal order to emerge. There are certainly some manifestations thereof, such as the Court’s move to recognize and incorporate the discourse of major doctrines relevant for legal order autonomy. Nevertheless, it has troubles demonstrating some of the indicia, and the power struggle between the Member States and EAEU institutions has resulted in limitations, particularly running the risk of misapplication of Union law and fragmentation of the legal system, as well as endangering the ability of the legal order for self-maintenance. While this leads to ‘fragile autonomy’, there are embedded premises, which can help in overcoming this, if such a desire prevails. The book spells out some concrete ways to do so.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the functioning of the EAEU Court and its ability to fulfil its aim of ensuring uniform application of EAEU law, and eventual aptitude to ensure the formation and continued existence of the autonomous legal order. The Court relies significantly on EU case-law as its main source of inspiration, making references to it and at times adopting similar doctrines. Some basic judicial remedies available in the EAEU are similar to those in the EU, however the focus is on the remedies that are absent while of paramount importance for legal order autonomy. Thus, the chapter reviews the special case of preliminary ruling as a mechanism ensuring uniform application and interpretation of law throughout the organization, and in the absence thereof, looks for a substitute. It reviews some other limitations that the Court has suffered and explores the reasons for that, including the analysis of some highly controversial decisions of the Court. It also addresses the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. It is argued that these challenges are the hardest to overcome. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that there are ways out and that certain treaty-imposed limitations are virtually impossible to uphold in practice.

Chapter 3 sets out the functioning of the EAEU in terms of its institutional structure and decision-making. It is particularly focused on the Eurasian Economic Commission as the main regulatory body due to its alleged supranational character. This chapter challenges the idea of supranationality by uncovering the predominantly intergovernmental mode of operation not only of the EAEU as such, but also of the Commission, which has implications for legal order autonomy. Another focus of the chapter is the Court and its structure as the major institution relevant for legal order autonomy. The chapter analyses the history of its establishment and the rules regarding its formation raising the issue of independence of the judges and the institution as relevant for the Court’s ability to play a role in the formation of the autonomous legal order.

This chapter examines courts in Asia as cultural symbols, social organizations, and political battlegrounds. As cultural symbols, courts are often embedded in religions, colonial legacies, and local norms. These cultural symbols are found in both informal tribunals and more institutionalized religious and secular courts. As social organizations, courts are intertwined with bureaucratic hierarchies, political influences, and the career trajectories of judges. This is particularly salient in civil law jurisdictions across Asia. As political battlegrounds, courts provide a space for the judicialization of politics as well as a soil for judicial corruption. The readings also examine the complexity of judicial decision-making in different national contexts. In addition, the readings highlight the nature and impact of judicial reforms, which take place amid broader political and social changes in both democratic and authoritarian contexts and can lead to tensions as well as encourage new alliances.

Only hours after discovering the victims’ bodies, Emparan, the judge in charge, initiates investigations in the neighborhood around Dongo’s house and other sections of the central city. He also sends out an alert to New Spain’s local leaders, calling on judicial officials across the viceroyalty to participate in the search for the perpetrators. Their initial goal is to find witnesses who had observed any suspicious activities in the area. Secondly, the judge sought to determine the provenance of the still-unknown murderers’ weapons. Emparan’s interrogations allow him to create a timeline of events leading up to the Dongo massacre. These initial efforts do not provide the clues necessary to solve the case. However, as gossip spread throughout the city and the court works hard to find the perpetrators, Emparan’s rapid actions encourage Mexico City residents to carefully observe anything unusual that they witness in the days after the crime. As a result, Emparan ascertains and arrests the perpetrators within a few days. The entire process proves the effectiveness of the Novohispanic judiciary.

Compared to other highly skilled labour markets, the legal profession has been slow to adopt technological changes, but lawyers have been downright speedy compared to courts. Courts already generate voluminous amounts of data, but restrict access to it. The private sector, recognizing how legal data can help its clients, willingly incurs the costs to gather this data and develop proprietary tools to analyze it. As this trend continues, access to justice will worsen, further benefitting wealthier clients over opposing litigants as well as the courts, for no other reason than that courts will lag in their ability to efficaciously decide judicial matters. The judiciary—across all levels—could reverse this trend. The first step is to develop a more robust institutional framework for making court data publicly available. The second step is a willingness among courts to analyze this data when issuing decisions, both procedural and sustantive. Doing so requires courts to develop core competencies in existing and emerging legal technology. Democratizing access to judicial data will diminish the advantage currently enjoyed by affluent litigants, but accrue to the benefit of everyone else—including courts themselves.