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What is a populist judge, and when do judges embrace populism? Populist judges bypass legal and procedural constraints, seek an unmediated relationship with the public, and claim to represent the public better than political elites. Judicial populism can emerge in response to institutionalized dissonance in the political system. Dissonant institutionalization facilitates contestation between state institutions and can undermine the legitimacy of political institutions. This legitimacy crisis can imbue judges with a belief in their role as representatives of the public interest. In Pakistan, the dissonance caused by unresolved differences between the civil-military bureaucracy and the elected political leadership—differences that were embedded into the constitutional framework, facilitated the rise of judicial populism. I outline the key features of judicial populism and study the dynamics surrounding the rapid expansion of populist jurisprudence between 2005 and 2019 in Pakistan, with a focus on public interest litigation that became the cornerstone of the judiciary’s populist turn. Through case analysis, archival research, and semi-structured interviews, I discuss features of the populist approach to jurisprudence and trace how dissonance within Pakistan’s political system created new opportunities for the judiciary and changed judicial role conceptions within the legal and judicial community.
This chapter explores the Saudi judge and legal scholar Ibn Khunyan’s (b. 1376/1956) al-Kāshif fī Sharḥ Niẓām al-Murāfaʿāt al-Sharʿiyya al-Saʿūdī. This work focuses on the Saudi Code of Sharīʿa Procedure and follows the format of a European-style legal commentary, commenting on all 276 articles of the Code with reference to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). The section excerpted here discusses the first article of the Code of Sharīʿa Procedure (niẓām al-murāfaʿāt al-sharʿiyya), which stipulates the sources of the law applicable in Saudi courts. In addition to his explanation, Ibn Khunayn uses the commentary on the first article of the code as an opportunity to give an overview over the workings of the Saudi judiciary.
This chapter starts by explaining that, when a company becomes factually insolvent but it is not yet subject to a formal insolvency proceeding, the shareholders – or the directors acting on their behalf – may engage, even in good faith, in various forms of behavior that can divert or destroy value at the expense of the creditors. Moreover, the individual behavior of certain creditors can also destroy or divert value in a situation of financial distress. For this reason, most jurisdictions around the world respond with a variety of strategies, including the imposition of special directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. The chapter identifies six regulatory models for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. After exploring the advantages and weaknesses of each regulatory model, the chapter analyzes a variety of country-specific and firm-specific factors that may affect the desirability of a particular regulatory approach. It concludes by suggesting various policy recommendations for the design of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency taking into account the particular features of emerging economies.
This book explains how and why insolvency law in emerging economies needs to be reinvented. It starts by examining the importance of insolvency law for the promotion of economic growth as well as the similarities and divergences in the design of insolvency law around the world. The central thesis of the book is that insolvency law in emerging economies fails to serve as a catalyst for growth. It is argued that this failure is mainly due to the design of an insolvency legislation that is not tailored to the market and institutional environment generally existing in emerging economies. The book also provides a critical analysis of the design of insolvency law in many advanced economies where the insolvency system has proven to be unattractive for debtors, creditors or both. Therefore, in addition to suggesting a new insolvency framework for emerging economies, this book ultimately invites readers to rethink insolvency law.
There are two contrasting claims regarding the Hungarian judiciary. The Government asserts that it is in the best shape, while many other voices label it as captured or dependent. This article shows how both of these claims can be true, depending on the interplay between formality and informality and shows how a few small loopholes allow some actors to rig the judicial system. Therefore, the Hungarian judiciary is similar to Schrödinger’s cat, which is claimed to be dead and alive at the same time.
The synergy between formality and informality requires a network of a handful of trusted people in managerial positions to administer case allocation, promotion, and disciplinary systems, which seem to be very effective tools. Few small technical loopholes and some special remedies suffice to micromanage important cases precisely because key positions are captured which work as gatekeepers or emergency brakes. Most of these tools are legal in a very formal technical sense of the word because they rely on acts of Parliament. A formal legalism, a very thin understanding of the Rule of law, and a majoritarian mindset serve as a legitimizing ideology for the whole legal system.
Since the Revolution of Dignity, civil society has become a major stakeholder in Ukraine's multiple reform processes. Judicial reform has been particularly salient as it aims to transform the country’s judiciary, long plagued by interrelated problems of political dependence, oligarchic capture, and internal corruption, into an autonomous guarantor of the rule of law. This Article examines how Ukrainian civil society has developed into an informal institution in Ukraine’s judicial reform. Building upon an overview of judicial reform efforts in Ukraine and a general theoretical framework of informality, this contribution studies how Ukrainian civil society influences the reform process, using the example of the country’s Constitutional Court. We argue that civil society has become an influential informal institution which plays an increasingly important role in judicial reform in Ukraine.
Most scholarly writings focus on the harmful effects of informal institutions. This article explores the positive influence of informal judicial institutions on the fundamental values of judicial systems. It develops a framework for assessing such institutions. The paper argues that the normative evaluation of informal judicial institutions is highly context-specific. Depending on their historical trajectories, different jurisdictions may emphasize different interests. Because of this, when evaluating informal judicial institutions, balancing the same values may yield different results in different jurisdictions. The recent trend towards formalization, supported by supranational institutions, goes hand-in-hand with the spreading narrative of good governance, emphasizing principles such as transparency or inclusion, principles that generally stand in tension with informality. This article cautions against emerging supranational templates insensitive to local practice.
The Israeli democracy regulates the operation of the judiciary through the constraints of formal rules that check the political actors, the individual judges, and the judiciary. Basic laws, laws and regulations prescribe the operation of every subject. Yet beyond these formal rules, informal institutions and practices are sometimes equally important in the operation of the judiciary, as they are in any constitutional system. In Israel, some of these informal institutions are crucial for the flourishing of democracy and the rule of law, through their protection of judicial independence from external political interference. The imminent possibility that political actors may set some of them aside is nothing less than a potential transformation in the constitutional order. Over the past few decades, judges and court administrators have introduced other internal informal institutions in the administration of the Israeli Judiciary, which qualify formal judicial accountability mechanisms in ways that may prove to be detrimental to democratic principles. This article discusses informal institutions that are important in the operation of the Israeli judiciary, separating the former external kind that are conducive to the rule of law—such as the illegitimacy of political and partisan considerations in judicial appointments—and whose disregard may signal democratic decay from the latter internal kind that may prove detrimental to the courts—such as opaquely changing who is responsible for court administration. Lastly, the political attempt to change informal institutions, detailed herein, can be seen as a harbinger of the current attempt to change formal institutions in the constitutional status of the judiciary in Israel.
Edited by
Selim Raihan, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh,François Bourguignon, École d'économie de Paris and École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,Umar Salam, Oxford Policy Management
This chapter provides a narrative analysis of the process through which involuntary land dispossession takes place in the particular socio-economic and historical context of Bangladesh, and the relative inability of the judiciary to resolve such cases. It also provides information about the way the judiciary works in general – another aspect of state capacity where Bangladesh appears relatively weak, for both logistical and institutional reasons. Logistical reasons relate to a lack of resources, whereas institutional reasons relate to the way the judiciary is influenced by both political and economic interests, as well as the fact that most actors in the judiciary extract rents from the system and act, almost collusively, to maintain its dysfunctionality. Consequently, this chapter scrutinises the interrelation between economic assets, human actions, and state institutions and its possible impact on the overall trajectory of long-term development. Finally, this chapter identifies potential reform measures and agendas in relation to land dispossession litigation in Bangladesh.
Edited by
Selim Raihan, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh,François Bourguignon, École d'économie de Paris and École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris,Umar Salam, Oxford Policy Management
This chapter provides a narrative analysis of the process through which involuntary land dispossession takes place in the particular socio-economic and historical context of Bangladesh, and the relative inability of the judiciary to resolve such cases. It also provides information about the way the judiciary works in general – another aspect of state capacity where Bangladesh appears relatively weak, for both logistical and institutional reasons. Logistical reasons relate to a lack of resources, whereas institutional reasons relate to the way the judiciary is influenced by both political and economic interests, as well as the fact that most actors in the judiciary extract rents from the system and act, almost collusively, to maintain its dysfunctionality. Consequently, this chapter scrutinises the interrelation between economic assets, human actions, and state institutions and its possible impact on the overall trajectory of long-term development. Finally, this chapter identifies potential reform measures and agendas in relation to land dispossession litigation in Bangladesh.
This article focuses on the widespread practice of appointing deputy judges, called naibs, in the Ottoman Empire from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. Based on extensive archival research, it analyses how the judiciary turned into a system of allocating revenue sources. An increasing number of offices of kadı (judge) were assigned as a source of income to higher-ranking ulema, who, through intermediaries, in turn farmed out their judicial offices to naibs in return for a fixed sum of money. Importantly, the apportionment fees for taxes collected from local taxpayers constituted a significant part of naibs’ incomes. The practice of deputizing in the Ottoman judiciary thus shows a close parallel with tax farming. Because the naibs transferred their revenues to the higher-ranking ulema, farming out judicial offices became a major economic basis for maintaining the Ottoman ulema hierarchy.
By the second quarter of the fourteenth century, England had developed many attributes of a ‘constitutional monarchy’: one that would later expand and contract, in cycles, across the British Isles. This constitutional monarchy has been subject to many minor recalibrations; more major recalibrations have occurred between 1640 and 1690, and also between 1820 and 1870. To focus on the function and form of this hereditary institution of governance, it can be seen operating in accordance to rules and conventions within three separate if overlapping spheres: that is, the parliamentary, the personal and conciliar, and the judicial.
Judiciaries in England emerged from four interacting historical sources. At the foundation lay the authority of monarchs empowered to judge their subjects’ rights, duties and status by virtue of the regal office. The second form of judiciary arose by royal delegation of decisional power to dedicated judges sitting in permanent courts of common law, or to executive courts with a more political mandate. A third source of judicial power was local and widely distributed, whereby groups or associations or sub-units of government solved disputes and allocated rights and duties as a process of self-direction, taking place for example in manors, boroughs, guilds, and church assemblies.
Judiciary and litigation are the two most prominent types of activities within the legal profession. The judicial aspect of the profession entails the interpretation of laws and the administration of justice in a fair and impartial manner. As a concept, justice entails protecting society from offenders and evildoers who deviate from society’s norms and engage in illegal behaviour by punishing and sentencing them. Due to the predominance of the human factor in the legal profession, which has such a significant impact on the lives of all members of society, it is crucial to investigate whether there is a guiding force behind dispensing justice and, if so, how effective these guidelines or policy measures have been. As crime rates rise and societal standards fall in the contemporary era, the legal profession grapples with the complexities of modern criminal behaviour. Particularly in the realm of judicial sentencing, there is a need for guidelines that account for the diversity of crimes and their individualistic nature. In India, long pungencies in court cases and a decline in the State’s conviction rate further exacerbate these issues. This paper examines the pressing need for comprehensive, well-structured sentencing guidelines that promote transparency, fairness and efficiency in the judicial process. Through a detailed review of recent high-profile court cases and an analysis of current practices and policies, this paper highlights the urgency of reform in the sentencing process to enhance public trust in the legal system. This article provides additional information on the subject.
Based on a systematic and empirical comparative study of six European Union countries, Christel Querton explores judicial decision-making in the context of persons fleeing armed conflicts in the EU. Addressing and redressing misconceptions about the relevance of the Refugee Convention, this book demonstrates how appellate authorities across the EU approach situations of armed conflict predominantly through outdated understandings of warfare and territoriality. Thus, they apply a higher standard of proof than is warranted by international refugee law. Adopting a gender perspective, Querton also shows how appellate authorities fail to acknowledge the gender-differentiated impact of armed conflicts. Drawing from gender and security studies, this book proposes an original conceptual framework which, supported by existing international legal standards, reframes the definition of 'refugee' and better reflects the reality of violence in modern-day conflicts. In doing so, it re-asserts the Refugee Convention as the cornerstone of international protection.
The book concludes with situating the EAEU legal order within the indicia developed in Chapter 1 demonstrating whether and how these are fulfilled for the autonomous legal order to emerge. There are certainly some manifestations thereof, such as the Court’s move to recognize and incorporate the discourse of major doctrines relevant for legal order autonomy. Nevertheless, it has troubles demonstrating some of the indicia, and the power struggle between the Member States and EAEU institutions has resulted in limitations, particularly running the risk of misapplication of Union law and fragmentation of the legal system, as well as endangering the ability of the legal order for self-maintenance. While this leads to ‘fragile autonomy’, there are embedded premises, which can help in overcoming this, if such a desire prevails. The book spells out some concrete ways to do so.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the functioning of the EAEU Court and its ability to fulfil its aim of ensuring uniform application of EAEU law, and eventual aptitude to ensure the formation and continued existence of the autonomous legal order. The Court relies significantly on EU case-law as its main source of inspiration, making references to it and at times adopting similar doctrines. Some basic judicial remedies available in the EAEU are similar to those in the EU, however the focus is on the remedies that are absent while of paramount importance for legal order autonomy. Thus, the chapter reviews the special case of preliminary ruling as a mechanism ensuring uniform application and interpretation of law throughout the organization, and in the absence thereof, looks for a substitute. It reviews some other limitations that the Court has suffered and explores the reasons for that, including the analysis of some highly controversial decisions of the Court. It also addresses the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. It is argued that these challenges are the hardest to overcome. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that there are ways out and that certain treaty-imposed limitations are virtually impossible to uphold in practice.
Chapter 3 sets out the functioning of the EAEU in terms of its institutional structure and decision-making. It is particularly focused on the Eurasian Economic Commission as the main regulatory body due to its alleged supranational character. This chapter challenges the idea of supranationality by uncovering the predominantly intergovernmental mode of operation not only of the EAEU as such, but also of the Commission, which has implications for legal order autonomy. Another focus of the chapter is the Court and its structure as the major institution relevant for legal order autonomy. The chapter analyses the history of its establishment and the rules regarding its formation raising the issue of independence of the judges and the institution as relevant for the Court’s ability to play a role in the formation of the autonomous legal order.
In this original study of the Eurasian Economic Union, Maksim Karliuk assesses the law and dynamics of functioning of this international organization. Examining the Eurasian Economic Union as an attempt to encourage post-Soviet integration, this book addresses the problematic legal issues of the integration process. Using the legal order autonomy framework, Karliuk carefully selects and organizes the topics included to offer readers a clear, systematic account of the most significant concerns. As well as considering theoretical issues, Karliuk engages with practical solutions to the problems identified. Besides merely outlining the present, this book develops a framework to address gaps and failures in current integration efforts and encourages further research into the complexities of Eurasian integration in the future.
This chapter examines courts in Asia as cultural symbols, social organizations, and political battlegrounds. As cultural symbols, courts are often embedded in religions, colonial legacies, and local norms. These cultural symbols are found in both informal tribunals and more institutionalized religious and secular courts. As social organizations, courts are intertwined with bureaucratic hierarchies, political influences, and the career trajectories of judges. This is particularly salient in civil law jurisdictions across Asia. As political battlegrounds, courts provide a space for the judicialization of politics as well as a soil for judicial corruption. The readings also examine the complexity of judicial decision-making in different national contexts. In addition, the readings highlight the nature and impact of judicial reforms, which take place amid broader political and social changes in both democratic and authoritarian contexts and can lead to tensions as well as encourage new alliances.