This section consists of excerpts from Aristotles Rhetoric in which he discusses his division of rhetoric into deliberative, epideictic, and judicial or forensic rhetoric and a selection of speeches that illustrate each of these modes of rhetoric. There are two examples of deliberative rhetoric, eight of epideictic rhetoric, and seven of judicial rhetoric. The speeches range from the fifth century BC to the late twentieth century of our era.

Male medical experts faced challenges and uncertainty in examining presumably pregnant or postpartum women, particularly condemned women facing execution who declared pregnancy, as well as women accused of infanticide. Forensic doctors’ efforts and methods to establish the facts of infanticide cases commonly elicited criticism from other medical men or judicial authorities, and their conclusions were frequently at odds with the accused’s version of events. In many cases, forensic reports and testimony appeared to be the most decisive factor in shaping jury verdicts. However, all-male juries often weighed forensic evidence against evaluations of the character and life circumstances of the accused, and the sympathies of jurors shaped the interpretation of forensic evidence as well as judicial verdicts. Medical men’s role in the search for material proof of the crime was often both crucial and problematic, and changing, ambivalent social attitudes towards infanticide shaped the interpretations and consideration of forensic evidence.

The chapter covers the arrests and detention of the conspirators, the coercion used to force some to testify against their colleagues, preparations for the trials and the selection of the juries, public reactions to the news, identities of the men freed without prosecution.

The relative scarcity of matrimonial proceedings in England (and perhaps Normandy) resulted from administrative arrangements. It does not highlight differences separating the area from the rest of the North. English diocesan officials did not exercise exclusive rights of first instance jurisdiction over matrimony. Diocesan officials operated in a distinct environment because they had to compete with countless tribunals for rights of adjudication. Commissaries and exempt judges went on rounds of supervision, setting up vetting stations, especially for allegations that did not attain legal levels of proof. Unilateral marriage claims were normally decided on the spot and before they could reach central locations. If records from visited and permanent seats of English church justice are read in conjunction, on the other hand, they yield quantities of marriage cases resembling those from Paris or Cambrai. The treatment of cases was again exceptional in that multiple proceedings on account of identical charges were often staged in the same diocese. The rules of canonical jurisprudence envisioned three tiers of appellate hierarchy at a maximum. In Anglo-Norman practice, the revision of prior rulings could pass many more times between commissaries, deans, and higher dignitaries.

This chapter provides historical and contemporary perspectives on two long-standing systems of trial by jury in France and in Belgium. It begins with a brief history of the French criminal jury and describes its recent reforms, including a significant pilot program that extended lay participation. This chapter then turns to the history of the Belgian criminal jury, recent reforms which almost abolished it, and countervailing forces to resurrect and strengthen the jury. It explores how political and economic struggles in both countries have influenced the ebb and flow of lay citizen participation, combined with underlying tension between professional judges and lay citizen judges. The chapter concludes with observations about the future for lay participation in these two countries.

This chapter examines American jury films and what they teach the world about American juries. Some of the lessons they offer are instructive, but others do not comport with American juries in practice. One persistent and misleading message of jury films is that juries include a holdout juror, even though holdout jurors occur infrequently on actual juries. The most famous American jury film, 12 Angry Men, teaches this lesson; however, it also shows a jury that ultimately works hard to arrive at a responsible verdict, which is what most actual juries try to do. This film is enjoying an extraordinary renaissance; it is being remade into foreign versions across the globe. This chapter also explores how 12 Angry Men serves as a window into American juries; foreign remakes of it also provide a window into the aspirations of countries around the world.

This chapter examines the rise of the Argentine jury. Although promised in the 1853 National Constitution, the jury did not come to Argentina until the provinces took the lead in the twenty-first century. Responding to public distrust in the legal system, scholars and reformers saw the jury as a way to bring transparency, efficiency, and democratization to a judicial system rooted in the inquisitorial tradition. The chapter looks at the various choices each province has made in designing its jury trials and the distinctive features of equal gender representation and an indigenous jury introduced in Argentina. Although the reformers who advocated juries faced opposition, they overcame resistance, and appellate courts have rejected challenges to the new jury systems. Moreover, early research reveals positive reactions from the jurors, judges, and attorneys who have participated in jury trials in Neuquén and the province of Buenos Aires, and new provinces have been joining the move to implement jury systems. Other countries in Latin America have expressed interest in Argentina’s jury activities. Further developments will bear watching.

This chapter completes discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers that began in Chapter 4. The doctrine of the separation of powers requires that the judiciary remains separate and independent of both the executive and the legislative arms of government. This separation is enshrined in the Australian Constitution. In this chapter we look more closely at the courts. In particular, we look at how the courts are created through their constitutional and statutory basis. We look at the nine separate hierarchies of the courts in Australia, and how courts within these hierarchies interact, yet create only one common law for Australia. We look at how the courts have changed in Australia since colonial times, to examine the rise of specialised tribunals and the introduction use of technologies over time.