Kripke models, interpreted realistically, have difficulty making sense of the thesis that there might have existed things that do not in fact exist, since a Kripke model in which this thesis is true requires a model structure in which there are possible worlds with domains that contain things that do not exist. This paper argues that we can use Kripke models as representational devices that allow us to give a realistic interpretation of a modal language. The method of doing this is sketched, with the help of an analogy with a Galilean relativist theory of spatial properties and relations.

Varieties of the Fan Theorem have recently been developed in reverse constructive mathematics, corresponding to different continuity principles. They form a natural implicational hierarchy. Earlier work showed all of these implications to be strict. Here we reprove one of the strictness results, using very different arguments. The technique used is a mixture of realizability, forcing in the guise of Heyting-valued models, and Kripke models.

We separate many of the basic fragments of classical logic which are used in reverse constructive mathematics. A group of related Kripke and topological models is used to show that various fragments of the Weak Law of the Excluded Middle, the Limited Principle of Omniscience, and Markov’s Principle, including Weak Markov’s Principle, do not imply each other.

Varieties of the Fan Theorem have recently been developed in reverse constructive mathematics, corresponding to different continuity principles. They form a natural implicational hierarchy. Some of the implications have been shown to be strict, others strict in a weak context, and yet others not at all, using disparate techniques. Here we present a family of related Kripke models which separates all of the as yet identified fan theorems.