This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.

Using newly released public data on beer prices in the state of California, we construct a large dataset (approximately 2 million observations) that includes beer prices and packaging configurations. We merge this dataset with brewery attributes and county demographics to explore pricing differentials across California, the U.S.’s largest brewing state. We provide evidence of potential pricing-to-market conducted by macro breweries across the three-tier distribution system where craft breweries do not. In addition, we describe package attributes that exhibit price differentials across brewery types. We make the cleaned data available to the public and provide avenues for future research that may be addressed with this new data.

This paper proposes an approach to determine efficient release prices on the Bordeaux en primeur (primary) market. The model exploits information from the secondary market to estimate efficient release prices. We apply the model to a representative sample of wines from the 2021 vintage. The results show that most chateaux released their wines at prices that were too high. The median overpricing is 5.2% but exceeds 30% for some wines. This situation may be partially attributed to excessively uniform pricing caused by the tendency of chateaux with similar status to release their wines at similar price levels.

The changing legislative landscape of the U.S. wine market provides a scenario to examine the effect of regulation on the size distribution of firms. Using the variation across states and time in the sum of in-state and out-of-state adult populations between 2002–2017, and a difference in difference-style empirical model, I examine how restrictions on Direct to Consumer (DTC) sales impact the number of establishments and the employment at wineries. I find that the expansion of the potential wine market by 10 M adults caused about a 3.5% increase in the number of wineries. While reduced DTC restrictions explain growth in the number of wineries, I find no effect of lessened restrictions on the number of winery employees, though there is evidence of a lagged effect. Additionally, I find that the growth of smaller wineries substantially outpaces that of larger wineries when regulations are lessened. These results suggest that regulatory barriers in particular industries may allow states to maintain an artificial size distribution.

We use data from Wine Spectator on 266,301 bottles from 12 countries sold in the United States to investigate the link between the score awarded by the guide and the price charged. The link between quality and price is positive, in line with the literature. In a deeper inspection, however, hedonic regressions show that the price premium attached to higher quality is significant only for “superstar” wines with more than 90 points (on a 50–100 scale), while prices of wines between 50 and 90 points are not statistically different from each other. Furthermore, an analysis performed through normal heteroskedastic and quantile regression models shows that the dispersion of quality-adjusted prices is described by an asymmetric U-shaped function of the score; that is, products with the lowest and highest quality have the highest residual standard deviation. Pursuing excellence is a risky strategy; the average price is significantly higher only for wines that achieve top scores, and the price premium becomes more volatile.

This analysis examines aggregate structural changes in the United States dairy industry, 1987–2017. We estimate the likelihood of operation changes in herd size, entry, or exits for each of the lower 48 states using a semiparametric Markov process model. Small- and medium-sized dairy longevity correlates with higher dairy margins and productivity improvements. An increase in consumer expenditures on dairy products is associated with smaller operation exits. Industry dynamics exhibit a persistent trend toward consolidation in most states. The exit probability for each state and all size classes has increased significantly for most states since 2002.

In the Dutch health care system, health insurers negotiate with hospitals about the pricing of hospital products in a managed competition framework. In this paper, we study these contract prices that became for the first time publicly available in 2016. The data show substantive price variation between hospitals for the same products, and within a hospital for the same product across insurers. About 27% of the contract prices for a hospital product are at least 20% higher or lower than the average contract price in the market. For about half of the products, the highest and the lowest contract prices across hospitals differ by a factor of three or more. Moreover, hospital product prices do not follow a consistent ranking across hospitals, suggesting substantial cross-subsidization between hospital products. Potential explanations for the large and seemingly random price variation are: (i) different cost pricing methods used by hospitals, (ii) uncertainty due to frequent changes in the hospital payment system, (iii) price adjustments related to negotiated lumpsum payments and (iv) differences in hospital and insurer market power. Several policy options are discussed to reduce variation and increase transparency of hospital prices.

UK labour productivity is significantly lower than that of many other similarly advanced economies and has been so for decades, with negative implications for UK living standards. To make matters worse, during the last ten years labour productivity growth has stalled in most industrialised countries, and particularly in the UK. This has led to a renewed policy focus on productivity growth, as evidenced by successive government productivity plans and efforts to re-invigorate industrial strategy. This paper reviews the evidence on UK productivity performance, identifying what we know about the causes of its weakness, what we do not know and what this means for policy. We review the evidence through the lens of developments in economic measurement, drawing in particular on the work of National Institute colleagues past and present, and with a view to the key measurement challenges ahead that, unlocked, will help us understand better what is holding back UK productivity.

This article utilizes the 2011 Nielsen scanner data for the Honolulu fresh tomato market to explore the existence of price premium for local food. Hedonic analysis is conducted to delineate the price impact of the local attribute. Contrary to the widely perceived local price premium in the consumer preference literature, mixed results of price premiums and discounts are discovered for local tomato products. Additional investigation suggests that the prices of local tomatoes are likely influenced by seasonal output fluctuation. The limited market distribution capacity facing local producers may have contributed further to the retail discounting.

This paper examines the industrialization process of U.S. agriculture by examining the trends in the number of farms, the concentration of production during the last decade, and the dynamics of farm survivability, entry, and exit underlying aggregate statistics. We next examine vertical coordination as part of the industrialization process and highlight contracting in the poultry industry. The analysis provides evidence that production is continuing to be concentrated on a smaller number of farms at a relatively rapid rate, in spite of the stability in the number of farms. Although contracting clearly dominates the broiler industry, it is less prevalent in egg and turkey production, where other forms of vertical coordination are likely established.

The poultry industry is the most vertically integrated of U.S. agriculture and food production and is rapidly progressing toward being one of the most concentrated. In 2002, the top 15 broiler states accounted for 94.4% of U.S. production. From 1982–2002, the top four broiler firms had a fivefold increase in Ready-to-Cook (R-T-C) pounds, a tripling of plants and four- and eight-firm concentration ratio increases of 27.9% to 48.2% and 44.1% to 66.6%. In a broad sense, chicken became more affordable, appealing, and available; total R-T-C pounds increased from 234 to 663 million pounds between 1982 and 2002.

The exercise of market power by broiler processing firms (integrators) isplausible because local markets for growers are concentrated and becausegrowers face hold-up risks arising from substantial investments in specificassets set against limited integrator purchase commitments. This articleexplores the links between local integrator concentration and growercompensation under production contracts using data from the 2006 broilerversion of the USDA's Agricultural Resource Management Survey. Results ofthis study, which account for characteristics of the operation and specificfeatures of the production contract, suggest that greater integratorconcentration results in a small but economically meaningful reduction ingrower compensation.

The institutional environment of Portuguese banking during the golden age years of economic growth (1950–73) has been criticised in many instances, at the time and in recent literature. Direct observers of the period as well as historians have stressed two main aspects of that environment: excessive protection of existing banks, allowing them to obtain high rents, which represented a disincentive for them to compete and innovate; excessive concentration of their activity on short-term commercial paper, thus preventing them from contributing to finance growth. There seems to be a contradiction here, however, with the high growth rates of the years 1950 to 1973. The apparent contradiction is not limited to Portugal, in fact, as rapid growth in many economies in that period occurred within a framework of heavily regulated financial systems. This is the ‘financial paradox’ of the golden age. Portugal is an interesting case in the international perspective. As in the rest of the western world, legislation repressed banking quite tightly, but banks circumvented the law and competed with each other. The signs of competition were visible mostly in two dimensions: the growth of time deposits and geographical expansion.

This paper surveys the recent literature on the relationship between SMEs, financial deepening and economic development. While a large SME sector is not associated with faster economic growth or poverty alleviation, financial deepening can have a pro-growth and pro-poor impact by alleviating SMEs’ financing constraints, enabling firm entry and entrepreneurship, and better resource allocation. It is important to differentiate between different segments of the SME population, most critically between subsistence micro entrepreneurs and transformational entrepreneurs. This paper also discusses the importance of market structure, competition and regulations for SMEs and their access to finance over the business cycle and during crises.

Because the literature of European economic history has paid little attention to traditional electricity systems, the interest in studying Fensa lies in analysing the different types of companies, which helped to shape the development of the Spanish electricity sector prior to its present oligopolistic structure. This case provides insight into two issues. First, we learn about the behaviour of the second-generation companies (those that based their production on a controlled hydropower regime), which, despite their limited size, made their commercial specialisation (supplying the dynamic industrial market of Guipúzcoa) their main comparative advantage. Second, we analyse the behaviour of those companies which at this time, as distribution companies and/or subsidiaries of the large Spanish companies (Iberduero), were an instrument of the policy of integrating regional markets.

We study a spatial competition model which is a variant of the celebrated Hotelling (1929) framework. One of the firm is a brick-and-mortar one while the other is on-line. Both firms sell the same product except that (constant) marginal costs may differ. Consumers going to the shop around the corner face transportation costs according to their adress whereas on-line consumers bear a fix cost that may capture technological burden and risk premium. In the pricing Nash equilibria the “new economy” firm has smaller market shares eventhough it offers more attractive prices. For the on-line firm to become a leader, the cost difference must be large enough to offset the comparative disadvantage it face on the demand side. In the long run, increasing competition ultimately forces the local firm out of downtown. We argue that this effect may be related to some of the forecasts concerning the geographical impact of the development of remote access services.

This paper develops a new approach for investigating the determinant of the mark-up of prices over costs. We estimate basic price equations around an expression for marginal cost that is derived from a cost minimisation problem, using a vector error correction approach to avoid endogeneity bias. Observed basic prices include the mark-up over marginal costs, and this mark-up is of interest to policymakers as an indicator of competition and ultimately as a determinant of the level of equilibrium employment. We look at the factors driving this mark-up, and in particular look at the role of EMU, as well as globalisation, the European Single Market and openness to trade and the introduction of the euro. We use a panel data set that includes both EMU and non-EMU members. The results indicate an important role for trade liberalisation in determining the mark-up, but openness itself and the introduction of the euro do not appear to have a significant role.

Cet article s'intéresse à la façon dont un sociologue, fondateur de ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la « New Economie Sociology », Harrison White, a repris presque à l'identique le modèle d'un économiste, Michael Spence, sur les relations employeurs / employés en situation d'asymétrie d'information et ce, afin de bâtir son propre modèle des marchés.

Il s'agit plus précisément de montrer que cet emprunt (méthodologique) cache en réalité des différences plus profondes entre les deux auteurs, et de déterminer dans quelle mesure il peut donner un éclairage nouveau concernant les rapports entre économie et sociologie.

In this paper we consider a two-stage duopoly game where firms first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects: a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only.

Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria, and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investment in advertising and that strong product substitutabihty may induce a coordination problem.

Spanish banking has been considered as an industry ruled by oligopolistic conducts. It has been even dealt as a cartel, which has been able to keep along xx century with the support of the State. This paper checks this interpretation with the aid of a set of indexes of the degree of competitori in a market: an annual series of economic concentration and another one of intra-industrial turnover, as well as some proxi figures of the height of the barriers to entry. Doubts about the thesis of the banking cartelization are yielded by our results. To be precise, the competitive nature of the Spanish banking industry is defended, at least for the time before the civil war, and it is questioned that big banks emerged unharmed from the statu quo declared by Franco's goverments.