• The future relationship between the UK and the EU remains unclear. Despite that uncertainty the economy has gained momentum over the last few months, fiscal outturns have been better and financial markets appear to be sanguine about the uncertainty. It is against this backdrop that the Chancellor will have announced the Budget on 29 October, after this Review went to press.

• Our main forecast is conditional on a ‘soft’ Brexit, but we also describe the consequences of an orderly no-deal Brexit. Under our soft Brexit scenario, the Chancellor will have the necessary space under the fiscal mandate to borrow on average an additional £16 billion per year between 2019–20 and 2022–23 compared with the OBR spring forecast. This, together with better revenues, provides room for the Chancellor to spend an average of around £30 billion more over the same period. Under the no-deal Brexit scenario, borrowing would be an average of £14 billion higher than in the soft Brexit case.

• Even though the government complies with the fiscal mandate under the soft Brexit scenario, it is unlikely to meet its medium-term objective to balance the budget unless it chooses to tax more.

• The global economy is set to continue to grow at a pace of slightly below 4 per cent a year in the near term.

• Oil prices have risen further and with some advanced economies appearing to be operating at close to full capacity, there is a risk that inflation will increase. Our expectation is that any rise will be limited.

• US tariff increases and confrontational trade rhetoric are adding uncertainty to the global economic outlook, with a bias towards slower growth as a consequence.

• Without a recovery in productivity growth, the pace of economic expansion in the medium term will be slower than at present. Our medium term outlook is for global growth of around 3.5 per cent a year.

The Institute is a world leader in macroeconomic modelling and forecasting. It has produced quarterly economic forecasts for around sixty years, supported by macroeconomic models. The aim of the original builders of macroeconomic models was to transform understanding of how economies worked and use that knowledge to improve economic policy. In the early years, when computers were rare, macroeconomic modelling was a new frontier and Institute economists were among the first to produce a working model of the UK economy. It is remarkable how quickly models were being used to produce forecasts, assess policy and influence the international macroeconomic research agenda. The models built at the Institute were mainstream in the sense that they followed the contents of standard macroeconomic textbooks, developed with the subject, and fitted the facts as they were known at the time. There were continual improvements in understanding as the subject developed in response to new ideas and developments in the global economy. This article celebrates the development of macroeconomic modelling at the Institute and the contribution it has made to public life.

This paper charts the evolution of mainly empirical research at the NIESR over the 1970s and 80s. As was all too evident there were very large discrete technical improvements in data handling and manipulation over this period. Less well appreciated were the effects on the economy of major supply-side shocks coming from the World economy leading to ‘Stagflation’ and, interconnected but somewhat later, in the UK, marked changes in macro policy regime. This latter was strongly influenced by the seminal papers of Lucas (1976) and Sims (1980); both highly critical of the then current practices in macroeconomics, though each having very different intellectual stances. The response in the NIESR was to engage at an early stage in these innovations; applying the mantra that an informed criticism was more efficient than an uninformed one. During this period it became a leader in the econometrics of applied macro modelling under different expectations assumptions, including the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). Throughout, it remained critical of the anti-empirical drift encouraged in the Lucas Critique, criticism borne out more recently by the financial instability of the 1990s and the crisis that followed.

UK labour productivity is significantly lower than that of many other similarly advanced economies and has been so for decades, with negative implications for UK living standards. To make matters worse, during the last ten years labour productivity growth has stalled in most industrialised countries, and particularly in the UK. This has led to a renewed policy focus on productivity growth, as evidenced by successive government productivity plans and efforts to re-invigorate industrial strategy. This paper reviews the evidence on UK productivity performance, identifying what we know about the causes of its weakness, what we do not know and what this means for policy. We review the evidence through the lens of developments in economic measurement, drawing in particular on the work of National Institute colleagues past and present, and with a view to the key measurement challenges ahead that, unlocked, will help us understand better what is holding back UK productivity.

This article takes a short personal ‘helicopter ride’ over the main policy issues in the UK labour market, putting them into the context of the developments which have taken place in applied econometrics. We overview NIESR's role in the study of labour economics in postwar Britain and review some recent advances of importance in the current Institute research agenda.

The Institute has long examined overseas developments in order to understand better domestic macroeconomic dynamics. The organising principle for much of the postwar period was simply the impact on net trade with an implicit view on whether the exchange rate was at an appropriate level and, as such, the external sector was viewed as a constraint on domestic activity. Increasingly integrated factor markets in the modern era of globalisation means that the overseas sector plays a fundamental role in the evolution of both aggregate demand and supply in the UK economy and it is increasingly hard to disentangle the overseas from the domestic sectors. It is not so much that we should reverse this integration but more how to design policy to limit any undesirable consequences on regional and income distribution, as well as aggregate fluctuations in activity.