In the twelfth century AD, European elite warriors, knights, finding themselves in dire straits during battle, adopted the practice of surrendering themselves to adversaries who then guaranteed the safety of their prisoners. In turn, prisoners promised to pay a ransom to their captors, payment of which would free the prisoners and allow them to take up arms again. This practical transaction was considered honorable, even praiseworthy. Because ransoms could be substantial, it might be necessary for a prisoner to return to his lands to collect the funds. To do so, he would swear on his word of honor, parole d’honneur, to return with the required funds. The practices of honorable surrender, ransom, and parole were established in customary laws of war, and disputes between captors and their captives could be appealed to courts of honor. There were circumstances in which honorable surrender was not permitted. For example, military commanders could forbid their forces to accept surrenders until a battle was decided, lest their men disperse during battle to collect prisoners and ransoms. The recourse to honorable surrender was limited to the elites; common soldiers could be overwhelmed or killed outright in battle or siege.

The Court of Chivalry enjoyed a high political profile, owing to the military nature of the suits and the high social status of its litigants. Within the context of long periods of warfare during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Court maintained its reputation on account of nobles and knights wishing to challenge the legitimacy of perceived rights to lucrative ransoms of prisoners or to bear heraldic coats of arms. The procedures employed were predominantly those of the continental ius commune rather than the common law, probably on account of the international body of customs and practices found in the 'law and custom of arms' which underpinned the legal principles applied in the Court. In addition to its eclectic jurisdiction, the networks and connections of the legal personnel helped shape its distinct identity. The Court formed a nexus where highly qualified men from other courts and administrative traditions pooled their considerable intellectual understanding and practical experience. They were often educated in civil and/or canon law, but were probably both respected and well-placed from their involvement in parliament and other diplomatic and judicial business to act as commissioners and advocates in the often highly charged political circumstances of Court of Chivalry cases.