Chapter 6 develops an integrated framework of leader–subordinate dynamics in Chinese SOEs. How do leaders interact with subordinates to execute their agendas, and how do subordinates respond? Grounded in reward, coercion, and legitimate bases of power, the chapter identifies SOE leader tactics such as leveraging position authority, conducting personnel ploys, emphasizing material and status gains, invoking external threats, underscoring superiors’ directives and policies, and appealing to subordinates’ personal duty and morality. Subordinates may react by praising and supporting the leader or by expressing alternative views, delaying or subverting implementation, shirking, engaging in critical expression, or quitting. Leader–subordinate interactions are iterative and evolve over time.

This chapter discusses the crises Alexander faced leading up to his succession to his father, Philip II: his dispute with Attalus at Philip’s wedding to Cleopatra, its causes, significance and aftermath; and the Pixodarus affair. It then turns to the crisis of the succession itself: the circumstances of Philip’s assassination at the hands of Pausanias, Alexander’s movements at the time of it, and the steps by which he secured the throne himself and legitimated himself as Philip’s successor.

The chapter reviews the components of Mongol imperial ideology, notably the Heavenly Mandate and charisma, as well as their development, dissemination, uses, and legacies, in both steppe and sown.

This chapter provides an introduction to the evolution of IOM’s mandate and obligations from its founding in 1951 to 2022. In contrast to the tendency in some scholarly literature to portray IOM as a static actor devoid of normative obligations and available to unquestioningly advance state interests, however nefarious, this chapter paints a more complex picture. Focusing in particular on IOM as a “multi-mandated” organization, the chapter charts how IOM’s mandate and conceptions of its obligations have shifted over time, including in light of the development over the past two decades of a significant set of internal policies, frameworks and guidelines. Without minimizing the significant gaps and opacity that remain, the chapter explores changes in the organization’s perceived purpose and obligations, and explanations for these shifts, drawing on insights from international relations scholarship on international organizations’ legitimation efforts. Gradually, IOM has transformed from a logistics agency strapped to the interests of the United States, to a global organization with a still nascent but growing sense of its obligations not only to states but also to people on the move—changes that have ultimately advanced IOM’s efforts to secure its own position and power in the international system.

The Conclusion summarizes the main theoretical propositions of the book, reviews the empirical results, and offers a critical reflection on the methodological approach. It also identifies several avenues that future research might want to consider. Based on the experience of this book, macro-theorizing has proven to be a fruitful complement to micro-approaches. Equally important, the interplay of factors and the idea of “chemical causation” (Mill) deserve more scholarly attention. The polysemic and multidimensional nature of the concepts has been a critical issue throughout the book. This holds particularly true for the role of ordinary citizens and the key concept of legitimation. Lastly, the chapter argues that future research might want to tackle the enormous task of systematizing autocratic political thought. While we have consolidated and almost canonical knowledge about the different theories of democratic rule, the autocratic pole is less explored. The conclusion contends that future projects that bring order into the rich reservoir of autocratic political thought will be a promising endeavor.

This chapter brings into dialogue the insights of the three partial theory frames on legitimation, repression, and co-optation. Instead of looking at their individual functions and effects, this chapter proposes a conjunctural perspective. The conceptual cement that holds together these three frames is the concept of “complementarity.” Borrowing from the Varieties of Capitalism debate, it puts forward that complementarity can follow an understanding of contrast (A serves as the missing ingredient for B), of similarity (A and B are synergetic), or an economic approach of complementary goods (negative cross-price elasticity of A and B). The relationship between forms of legitimation, repression, and co-optation is assessed against these three understandings of complementarity. The chapter demonstrates why certain factors go together better than others, making the case for the two logics of over-politicization and de-politicization.

Why do ordinary citizens believe in an autocratic ideology? Why do people follow their autocratic leader? How can autocrats win the hearts and minds of their people, securing their support? This chapter seeks to absorb the manifold responses that have been given to these questions in the last decades. It theorizes the role of ordinary citizens in autocratic regimes, illuminating the legitimacy claims of autocratic rulers on the one hand and the popular beliefs in these legitimacy claims on the other hand. Drawing on a rich repository of previous research, it highlights the two strategies of autocracies to deal with their people. Autocracies might either overwhelm their citizens through mass-level political indoctrination or systematically underwhelm them, keeping them satisfied and apolitical. While the former relies on ideational legitimation, the latter refers to socioeconomic performance and a managerial, technocratic style of rule. Both strategies share the goal of thwarting the risk of public protest.

The Introduction outlines the main arguments of the book. While democracies can be aptly characterized as systems of “ruled open-endedness, or organized uncertainty” (Przeworski), autocratic rule attempts to do the opposite by trying to square the circle and organize certainty. Autocracies fear surprises and do everything they can to rule out chance. They want to control what the people think, and they want to repress dissent and co-opt potentially deviant elites. Yet, they face trade-offs and hard budget constraints. Against this backdrop, the two-logics theory is introduced. The theory argues that certain configurations of forms of legitimation, repression, and co-optation go together better than others, resulting in an ove-rpoliticizing or a de-politicization logic. While the former aims at mobilization, the latter aims at political apathy. The Introduction also familiarizes the reader with the empirical material that the book draws upon. It analyzes forty-five autocratic regime episodes in East Asia, ranging from 1945 to 2008.

Schools reveal dominant modes of governance and legitimation. The production of lived citizenship in Egyptian schools reveals a mode of governance that I call “permissive-repressive neoliberalism” –deinstitutionalization and heightened violence in the context of privatization and austerity. This chapter considers how far these trends can be considered a reflection of neoliberalism as a global phenomenon and unpacks their implications for the functioning of schools as disciplinary institutions. It shows how schools reflect everyday legitimation by charting what school textbooks, rituals and narratives reveal about the production of imagined citizenship before and after 2011.

Chapter 8 articulates a conception of culture, and examines competition as a system of beliefs and practices legitimating the social order. I emphasise the prominent roles of science, games, and sports in formalising and naturalising competition in daily life, thereby legitimating distributions of social power. I push this argument about legitimation further by exploring competition as a form of ritual. While we often think of the modern period as one in which the role of ritual has weakened in social life, domesticated competition in its myriad forms exhibits many of the core features of ritual, such as liturgical form, specialist practitioners, and dramatization of the social order. Understood this way, the systematisation of competition in modern liberal societies suggests a society still legitimated by ritual, albeit of a secular form.

This chapter investigates the instrumental use of non-state legal systems in postwar Chechnya by the Kremlin-imposed ruler Ramzan Kadyrov. It argues that Kadyrov has been promoting legal pluralism in order to win legitimacy among segments of the population, increase his autonomy from the federal center, and better accommodate former rebels, who became state bureaucrats in the postwar period. This chapter casts doubt on alternative explanations. The evidence that Ramzan Kadyrov’s policy towards non-state legal systems is radically different from the policy of his father, who was a cleric and traditionalist, yet strengthened Russian state law and abstained from promoting Sharia and custom, is troubling for the path-dependence argument. Meanwhile, the narrative of how Ramzan Kadyrov was able to effectively “cancel” the customs of bride kidnapping and blood revenge – the most notorious Chechen customs – indicates that the state capacity explanation is also limited. The second part of the chapter compares lawfare in Kadyrov’s Chechnya with legal politics in the neighboring regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan. These comparisons further support the idea that local leaders in the North Caucasus promote non-state legal systems not because of ideological commitments, but as a way to ensure their political survival.

This chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the book and outlines its broader implications for our understanding of politics. It reviews evidence in the book showing that elite communication affects the way citizens perceive of the legitimacy of IOs. When elites endorse or criticize international organizations in public, citizens take notice and adjust their opinions. In addition, it concludes that elites are more likely to shape citizen opinion toward international organizations under some conditions than others. Key moderating factors pertain to all three key components of the communicative context: elites, messages, and citizens. The chapter then discusses the broader implications of the book for current debates in four areas: legitimacy and legitimation, drivers of public opinion, elite influence and democracy, and the contemporary backlash against global governance.

This chapter explores the conditions under which global elites are influential in shaping citizens’ legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. It distinguishes between member governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations as three sets of global elites, evaluates whether these elites impact legitimacy beliefs through their communication, and identifies the conditions under which such communication is more successful. The chapter examines theoretical expectations comparatively across five prominent global or regional international organizations, including the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations. At the heart of the empirical investigation is a survey-embedded experiment in three countries (Germany, the UK, and the US). The analysis shows that communication by more credible elites (member governments and NGOs) has stronger effects on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions than communication by less credible elites (international organizations themselves).

This chapter focuses on domestic elites and examines the conditions under which political parties influence public perceptions of international organization legitimacy. While it is well-known that political parties are powerful communicators about domestic political matters, less is known about the effects of party cues on global political issues. The chapter explores this topic based on two survey experiments on party communication regarding two international organizations (North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations). The experiments are embedded in surveys conducted in two countries (Germany and the US), which vary in the degree of political polarization. The chapter finds that party cues tend to shape legitimacy beliefs toward NATO and the UN in the highly polarized US setting, while few effects are detected in the less polarized German context.