After Cannae, Hannibal needed a maritime base to allow reinforcements and supplies to reach him. But he failed to win over or capture Naples, an old Roman naval ally, and had mixed results elsewhere in Campania: he was successful at proud Capua. He was under-supported from Carthage for all his time in Italy, whether because they could not or would not help him. In 215, he signed a treaty of alliance with Philip V of Macedon. This brought few benefits to either party and would long be remembered by the Romans. Syracuse in Sicily went over to Hannibal in 214 but was recaptured by Claudius Marcellus (late 212). Similarly most of coastal Tarentum in south Italy was in his hands, but only between 212 and 209. In 211, when Capua was under Roman pressure, Hannibal marched on Rome as a diversionary tactic but soon withdrew. Capua fell and was harshly treated.

Hannibal could not go to Ptolemaic Egypt or Antigonid Macedon. That left the Seleucids. But their preference for Greco-Macedonian employees meant Hannibal would never be fully accepted: Antiochus listened to Hannibal’s advice without taking it wholeheartedly. Hannibal’s Tyrian agent Ariston, sent to Carthage in Antiochus’ interest, failed. A Roman mission to Antiochus tried to turn him against Hannibal, who reassured Antiochus by recalling his childhood oath. Rome’s decision for war is explained: cooperation in Greece between Antiochus and the Aetolians, disaffected Roman allies. Hannibal’s role, and court intrigues against him, are traced. Antiochus lost on land at Thermopylae (Greece); his fleet under Hannibal was no match for Rome’s experienced allies the Rhodians. The Romans won at Magnesia, commanded by Lucius Scipio with Publius as adviser. Publius as Salian priest was delayed, then missed the battle through illness. He too gave Antiochus (cryptic) advice. Hannibal and Scipio are compared as advisers.

This chapter looks at the broader contemporary significance of declamation, focusing on (Macedonian) imperialism, and taking as its major case study Aristides' To the Thebans: concerning the alliance I–II (Orr. 9–10), in which Aristides recreates Demosthenes' speech urging alliance between Thebes and Athens before Chaeronea. The image of an attack by a despotic and barbaric king echoed some presentations of the Parthian menace, potentially ennobling a contemporary conflict. But the image of the greedy despot also echoed discourses about 'bad' emperors, thereby offering a negative exemplum to heed. Finally, Macedon in these texts further recalls the Roman empire more generally: accordingly, these texts make available an unusually negative attitude to the empire, but also, I argue, a celebration and a justification of Rome's power over Greece. I compare the discourses present in a fragment of Pollux's declamation On the Islanders, where the Persian court recalls Lucian's denunciation of the vulgarity of rich Romans in his De mercede conductis. In closing, I note the particularly high number of potentially meta-exemplary remarks in Aristides' declamations, encouraging audiences to ponder these texts' meaning deeply.

Macedonian kings used four methods of divination common among the Greeks – extispicy and other sacrifices, teratology, oneiromancy, and oracles – and resembled the Greeks in regard to when and how they consulted seers. The evidence mainly concerns Alexander III but allows conclusions to be drawn about traditional Macedonian royal practice. This practice differed from Greek divination on two counts: the employment of Egyptian and Babylonian seers by both Alexander and his Successors and the combination of royal divination with ruler cult; in other words, the combination of some sacrifices made by or for Macedonian kings with sacrifices made to them as quasi-divine beings. Demetrius Poliorcetes illustrates the perils of combining divination and ruler cult. This chapter also surveys Macedonian divinatory personnel, notably Aristander of Telmessus, Alexander’s chief seer, but also including unnamed Babylonian seers employing astrological methods foreign to the Greeks and Macedonians.

Like those studying other aspects of the ancient world, archaeologists working on housing frequently use textual evidence to provide a framework within which the archaeological material can be understood. This chapter suggests that the reverse can also be helpful, namely using archaeology to provide a context which facilitates a clearer understanding of some of the textual evidence. As an example, I choose three passages from Demosthenes which allude to the character of housing and other buildings in the city of Athens. I read these against the background of broader changes in the architecture of houses being constructed at Athens and other cities in the first half of the 4th century BCE, as well as the new evidence for the lavish palatial building at Vergina, which suggests it was originally constructed by Philip II. I argue that this material shows Demosthenes' allusions are actually veiled references to contemporary politics, and that they highlight an issue which was a matter of debate at Athens during the time he was writing, namely, the increasing use of the house as a symbol of personal wealth and power.

The chapter presents the results of the latest excavations at Methone and its capture by Philip II of Macedon. The siege is exceptionally well documented archaeologically, and the city does not recover.

The chapter collects the numismatic evidence for the destruction and survival of cities in Macedonia and Aegean Thrace in the Classical and Hellenistic periods.